






















































Europe - Space for Transcultural Existence? is the first volume of the new se-ries, Studies in Euroculture, published by Göttingen University Press. The se-
ries derives its name from the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Euroculture: 
Europe in the Wider World, a two year programme offered by a consortium of 
eight European universities in collaboration with four partner universities outside 
Europe. This master highlights regional, national and supranational dimensions of 
the European democratic development; mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and 
transculturality. The impact of culture is understood as an element of political and 
social development within Europe.
The articles published here explore the field of Euroculture in its different ele-
ments: it includes topics such as cosmopolitanism, cultural memory and trau-
matic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Europeanization as well as 
the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary contexts such as law 
and the social sciences. In which way have Europeanization and Globalization in-
fluenced life in Europe more specifically? To what extent have people in Europe 
turned ‘transcultural’?  The ‘trans’ is understood as indicator of an overlapping 
mix of cultures that does not allow for the construction of sharp differentiations. 
It is explored in topics such as (im)migration and integration, as well as cultural 
products and lifestyle.
The present economic crisis and debt crisis have led, as side-result, to a public at-
tack on the open, cosmopolitan outlook of Europe. The values of the multicultural 
and civil society and the idea of a people’s Europe have become debatable. This 
volume offers food for thought and critical reflection.
ISBN: 978-3-86395-062-0 
ISSN: 2196-3851
Europe - Space for  
Transcultural Existence? 
Edited by Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong  
Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal  




Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal (Eds.) 
Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 
  
This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons License 3.0 “by-nd”,  
allowing you to download, distribute and print the 
document in a few copies for private or educational 
use, given that the document stays unchanged  




























Published in 2013 by the Universitätsverlag Göttingen  
as Volume 1 in the Series “Studies in Euroculture” 
 
 




Martin Tamcke,  
Janny de Jong, Lars Klein, 
Margriet van der Waal  
 
 
With contributions from 
Asier Altuna-García de Salazar, Bill Bell,  
Paul Blokker, Marcin Galent, Elizabeth M. 
Goering, Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz, Janny de 
Jong, Lars Klein, Alexandre Kostka, Anna Pia de 
Luca, John McCormick, Péter Nádas, María Pilar 
Rodríguez, Bianca Polo Del Vecchio, Grzegorz 
Pożarlik, Katharina Raabe, Sascha Schießl, Richard 
Swartz, Martin Tamcke, Bassam Tibi, Herman 
Voogsgeerd, and Margriet van der Waal 
 













Bibliographische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek 
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen 





“Studies in Euroculture” Series Editors 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;  
Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;  
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; 
Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen  
 
Editors of Volume 1 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;  
Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;  
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; 








This work is protected by German Intellectual Property Right Law.  
It is also available as an Open Access version through the publisher’s homepage and 
the Online Catalogue of the State and University Library of Goettingen 
(http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de). Users of the free online version are invited to 
read, download and distribute it. Users may also print a small number for educational 




Redaktion: Jörg Zägel 
Umschlaggestaltung: Margo Bargheer 
Titelabbildung: © iStockphoto, File #17095396 
 





Table of  Contents 
 
Martin Tamcke / Janny de Jong / Lars Klein / Margriet van der Waal 
Introduction           9 
 
1. European Identities 
 
Péter Nádas / Richard Swartz / Katharina Raabe 
Europa im Zwiegespräch         21 
 
Bassam Tibi  
European Identity Contested?        47 
 
Lars Klein 
How (Not) to Fix European Identity?       57 
 
John McCormick 
Cosmopolitanism and European Identity      67 
 
Grzegorz Pożarlik 
Individual, Collective, Social  
Identity as (Most) Contested Social Science Concept in the Symbolic  
Interactionism Perspective        77 
 
2. Postcolonial Europe 
 
Bill Bell 
Zeichen als Wunder? 
Eine der Geschichte entnommene Anekdote      89 
 
 
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 6 
Janny de Jong 
Empire at Home         117 
 
Margriet van der Waal 
Contesting Cultural Memory.  
Rethinking Postcolonial Identities in Europe     125 
 
Elizabeth M. Goering 
Entering the Third Dimension.  
A CMM (Coordinated Management of Meaning)  
Analysis of Transculturalism in Inter/Action     133 
 
3. Towards a Transcultural Europe? 
 
Martin Tamcke 
On the Path to Transculturality       143 
 
Janny de Jong 
“Here We Go Again”.  
The Supposed Failure of Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective 151 
 
John McCormick 
European Multiculturalism.  
Is It Really Dead?         163 
 
María Pilar Rodríguez 
Multiculturalism vs Transculturality.  
European Film         175 
 
Asier Altuna-García de Salazar 
Envisaging Transcultural Realities through Literature in Europe.  
The Case of Ireland        185 
 
Anna Pia de Luca 
Transcultural Encounters in Re-Inscribing Identity.  
European Memories and Ethnic Writing in Canada    195 
 
Marcin Galent 
Social Capital of Migrants in Transcultural Europe    207 
 
 
Table of Contents 7 
Alexandre Kostka 
The Neustadt in Strasbourg.  
A space for Transcultural Identity Building?     217 
 
4. The Role of the State 
 
Paul Blokker 
Multiple Democracies.  
A Cultural-Sociological Approach to  
Democratization and Europeanization      235 
 
Herman Voogsgeerd 
The European Court of Justice between Cosmopolitanism and  
National Identity         243 
 
Bianca Polo Del Vecchio 
The United Kingdom and the European Union.  
The Shaping of Public Opinion       251 
 
Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz 
From a Traumatic Past to a Constructive Future.  
The Spanish Transition Period as a Case Study    261 
 
Sascha Schießl 
Identity, Memory, and Belonging. The Friedland Transit Camp  
and the Process of Admission to Post-War Germany    271 
 
Aknowledgements         285 
 





Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein and Margriet van der Waal 
This book is the joint publication of two international scientific conferences that 
took place from 18-19 June 2010 at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 
and from 24-25 June 2011 at the University of Göttingen, Germany. Both confer-
ences were closely related to the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Eurocul-
ture: Europe in the Wider World, a two year (120 ECTS) programme offered by a 
consortium of eight European universities in collaboration with four partner uni-
versities outside Europe.  
The Master programme uses the term Euroculture as a concept to reflect in an 
interdisciplinary way on the many different expressions and manifestations of self-
understandings of societies, social groups and individuals of, about and within 
Europe. The programme includes knowledge of historical perspectives, political 
issues, social relations, legal issues and cultural and religious traditions. Discussions 
on cultural identity take a prominent position in the programme as do issues such 
as transnational cultural contacts, popular culture and the role and function of the 
media in shaping social processes.  
Therefore, the first scientific conference associated with the programme had 
the explicit intention to explore the impact of culture as an element of political and 
social development within Europe. As was stated in the call for papers:  
 
The term Euroculture offers great advantages as a label for a study pro-
gramme and poses exciting challenges as a conceptual research tool. Cross-
over and interdisciplinary research include attempts to link political concepts 
such as Europeanisation with cultural ones such as identity. The concept of 
citizenship has (in this) become a central focal point.  
 
The participants to this first conference discussed topics such as cosmopolitanism, 
cultural memory and traumatic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Eu-
ropeanization as well as the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary 
contexts such as law and the social sciences. 
The second conference continued where the one in Groningen left off by ask-
ing more specifically in which way Europeanization and globalization have influ-
enced life in Europe. It has become a truism that in today’s world all countries and 
cultures have become interconnected and been influencing each other constantly. 
But what does that mean exactly? To follow up on this question further, the sec-
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ond conference inquired whether people have turned ‘transcultural’. The ‘trans’ 
was understood as indicator of an overlapping mix of cultures that does not allow 
for the construction of sharp differentiations anymore. Wolfgang Welsch’s distinc-
tion of intercultural, multicultural and transcultural has thus been a recurring 
theme during the conference.1 While in Welsch’s view ‘transculturalism’ entails an 
appreciation of diverse influences, it is in no way a given that indeed these influ-
ences constitute positive enrichments rather than a dissolution and watering down 
of traditional and cherished understandings of culture.  
By investigating a “Space for Transcultural Existence”, the conference put a 
special emphasis on topics such as (im)migration and integration, as well as cultural 
products and lifestyle. Most contributions turned out to examine the receiving end, 
rather than that of the senders, in the spread of Europeanization and globalization. 
Others asked how these processes are organized and which role the state and other 
institutions or companies play or could play.  
The usage of ‘space’, finally, underlines the openness of the procedures and 
structures. It is thus more than a geographical category, it is also a social concept. 
According to Homi Bhabha, in creating and discussing culture, communication 
and exchange processes provide for a constant change in all original perspectives.2 
So that in effect, there is neither the one nor the other anymore. Any bipolar un-
derstanding is overcome and a ‘third space’, an ‘in-between’ created. Whether or 
not that is the case, was what many contributors aimed to find out. The call for 
papers posed the following questions:  
 
Is there “space” for more than one culture in oneself, or can it be that peo-
ple are afraid of challenging the very core of their identity? Does transcultur-
ality stand in competition to multicultural or intercultural approaches, or is it 
of supplementary nature? This leads to more general understandings of cul-
ture and to questions of inner homogeneity and outer delimitation. Here, 
one could reflect, for example, on increasing extremist nationalism, separa-
tism and ghettoization.  
 
Sections 
For this publication, we have decided not to maintain the ordering of the contribu-
tions according to the original conferences, but rather to follow thematic threads 
that run through the various contributions. These threads form the basis of the 
section description below. 
                                                     
1 Wolfgang Welsch, “Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today,” in Spaces of Culture: 
City, Nation, Work, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213. 
2 Homi K. Bhabha, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern. The Question of Agency,” in The Location 
of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 171-197. 
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Section 1: European Identities 
Section one on European identities opens with a conversation between the Hun-
garian writer Péter Nádas and the Swedish journalist and writer Richard Swartz. 
Nádas and Swartz had met in 1989 for a long discussion on their life and work in a 
changing Europe, which was subsequently published as a book. For the conference 
in Göttingen, they had been asked to resume their discussion. Moderated by 
Katharina Raabe and co-hosted by the Literarische Zentrum, the two paint a rather 
dark picture of Europe today. Nádas senses a failure to come to an understanding 
of “Easterners” and “Westerners”. Swartz argues that although the division has 
historical roots, a better mutual understanding can only be achieved on the basis of 
historical knowledge. “This kind of freedom feels cold,” as Nádas puts it. 
In his contribution, the international relations scholar Bassam Tibi argues for 
an understanding of identity that is based on cultural diversity. As in his definition 
of ‘Leitkultur’ that Tibi had coined in earlier writings for the German context, he 
formulates an idea of cultural diversity that is conditioned by consent to the core 
values civil society, freedom of belief and gender equality. For Tibi, identity has 
many dimensions. He names individual identity, professional identity, citizenship 
identity, as well as civilisational identity. Tibi perceives himself as part of two civili-
zations, Islam and Europe, so that with regard to both identifications identities, he 
finds himself in a constant struggle for harmonization. 
The political scientist John McCormick examines European identity in its cos-
mopolitan dimensions. In his contribution, he holds that the cosmopolitan quali-
ties of the EU have only been discussed theoretically, but they can be grasped in 
the “realities of the European experience.” Here, McCormick points to European 
understandings of patriotism and multilateralism, on which he further elaborates in 
his text. A cosmopolitan approach in the latter case shows, according to the au-
thor, a turn away from a ‘European exceptionalism’ or “Europe’s self-doubt about 
its power.” With regard to the concept of patriotism, McCormick refers to Ha-
bermas’ concept of ‘constitutional patriotism,’ which he considers applicable to the 
European level. Whether or not it would be better to leave the meaning of Euro-
pean identity open for debate, is a question he concludes his article with. 
This question is elaborated on by the cultural historian Lars Klein in his con-
tribution. He traces some attempts that have been undertaken to come to a com-
mon understanding of a European identity. For the author, neither an attempt to 
define the EU against an ‘other’ (such as the United States of America) nor an 
attempt to define a set of common values haven proven to be a solid and inclusive 
basis for the EU. He holds that the ongoing ‘souvereign debt crisis’ was further 
delimited this basis and suggests an open and always changing, always to-be-
negotiated understanding of Europeanness. 
The section closes with political sociologist Grzegorz Pożarlik’s discussion of 
the challenge to maintain the use of identity as a useful concept in the social sci-
ences. In the first part of his contribution, the author explains that a conceptual 
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“road map” is required to ensure the use of this concept and he therefore intro-
duces the notion of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism is, as such a 
concept, capable of bringing together individual and collective aspects of identity 
formation, by emphasising the social dimensions of this process, influenced by the 
flux and dynamic character of current society. In the second part of his paper, 
Pożarlik turns his focus to a number of recent studies, which indicate(s) the use-
fulness of applying the notion of symbolic interactionism to understanding pro-
cesses of identity formation in relation to social processes such as migration and 
professional mobility within a European context. 
Section 2: Postcolonial Europe 
Section 2, on postcolonial Europe, opens with literature and history of the book 
scholar Bill Bell launching a lucid and gripping ‘myth busting’ engagement with 
Homi Bhabha’s influential article, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Am-
bivalence and Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817”. By carefully re-
considering the historical evidence available about the anecdotal event describing 
the assembling of a large group of Indians and the circulation of a number of cop-
ies of the Bible, Bell formulates caution with regard to a facile and uncritical use of 
concepts such as hybridity, sly civility and mimicry. Bell’s paper shows that Bha-
bha’s account clearly does not take the complexity of the historical facts and con-
text sufficiently or correctly in consideration and has too easily been inscribed in a 
particular postcolonial critique of the relationship between Indians and the English 
than the historical facts warrant. Bell’s account shows that the historical facts re-
veal not only a much more complex and multidimensional process, but also, and 
even more importantly, the existence of specific human beings who become the 
subjects of history. His conclusion, thus, echoes a warning to any project engaging 
with social relationships across time: “we should be careful not to write history out 
of the subject, or the subject out of history.”  
Continuing with the lines of enquiry set out by Bill Bell, historian Janny de 
Jong opens her paper on the relevance of studying colonial ties with the empire in 
order to understand Europe and its relation with non-European countries by 
stressing the longevity of imperial relations in the form of unequal power relations. 
De Jong asks what benefit the discipline of history might experience from the 
kinds of questions posed within the field of European Studies, by identifying two 
key questions: To which extent does a common and unique European culture exist 
in relation to non-European and regional cultures? Secondly, what are the percep-
tions within and from outside of Europe concerning cultural transformations in 
Europe? Clearly, Eurocentrism plays a problematic role in endeavours to study 
relations between Europe and its former colonies, as well as other areas of the 
world. One way of dealing with this problematic Eurocentric attitude, is to direct 
the gaze of inquiry about the effects of empire to European domestic history itself, 
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in order to understand contemporary Europe with its multiplicity of cultural, social 
and political dimensions. 
It is exactly this idea of turning the gaze to the inside that is taken up in the 
contribution by Margriet van der Waal, within the context of cultural studies. Her 
paper considers collective memory and debates in a context where different expe-
riences of traumatic events are seemingly played out against each other in a strug-
gle for meaning and priority. The novel, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen (Only Decent 
People), by Robert Vuijsje (published in 2008, and released as film in the Nether-
lands in October 2012), is such an occasion where the topics of Dutch colonialism 
and slavery are brought into focus together with considerations of Jewish identity 
and commemoration of the Holocaust. Van der Waal argues that the way in which 
these issues are represented implies the existence of various, exclusive memory 
cultures delineated along ethnic lines. Therefore, she explains, traumatic events 
need to be investigated as semiotic sign systems constructing senses of cultural 
identity, which in turn will allow a greater understanding of how constructions of 
European identity are intertwined with such problematic issues as racism, trauma 
and memory. 
In the final contribution to this section, communication scholar Elizabeth 
Goering contributes to the topic of the postcolonial in Europe with a critical re-
flection on the negative attitude towards the European multicultural society and 
the possibility of transculturality by means of a case study. She analyses the social 
and intercultural interaction between a school teacher and his/her pupils in the 
French film, Entre les Murs (2008), with recourse to the ‘coordinated management 
of meaning method’. In her conclusion she emphatically states that transcultural 
spaces – the location of multicultural interaction – are possible, but admittedly 
require arduous and continuous effort from the side of all (actors) involved. Such 
effort entails being willing to share and listen in a context of respect and openness 
to personal stories that we and others tell about ourselves and themselves. Within 
such a context it does become episodically possible, as her analysis of the film 
optimistically shows, to find evidence of the existence of transculturality within a 
European context. 
Section 3: Towards a Transcultural Europe? 
All articles in this section were first presented at the 2011 Euroculture conference 
in Göttingen and use the remark of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel that 
“multiculturalism has absolutely failed’ as a starting point. To what extent was her 
statement correct, and if so, did or does it apply to Europe as a whole? What are 
the underlying norms and values in today’s Europe? At the time of the conference, 
the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sar-
kozy had joined Merkel’s scepticism about the multicultural state and society which 
made the problematising of this issue even more timely and up to date.   
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This section opens with a contribution, by ecumenics and oriental church historian 
Martin Tamcke, on “the path to transculturality”. After giving the telling example 
of two Muslim scholars in Bulgaria who converted to Christianity in the early 
1900s and mingled Christian, Western ideas with Islamic reformatory speech and 
in the process alienated themselves from both the Christian and the Muslim world, 
he explores the various readings and explanations of transculturalism. Tamcke 
defines transculturalism as a “passage through all particularism and interaction 
towards a common ground or aim”. This does not mean by the way, that all cul-
tural differences are abandoned throughout this process.  
The same holds true for multiculturalism, as Janny de Jong argues. Janny de 
Jong and John McCormick both explicitly address the issue of multiculturalism, 
and point to the difficulty of properly defining this concept. Contrary to how mul-
ticulturalism is depicted in the public debate, this idea/concept entails that integra-
tion of immigrants is possible without urging them to assimilate/copy norms, val-
ues and behaviour of the majority population. Taking a historical perspective into 
consideration can be very helpful, De Jong argues, because it illuminates the roots 
of the different integration policies throughout Europe. Furthermore it may serve 
to create a more balanced view on migration through time, showing what multicul-
turalism was and really is about. Multiculturalism has become framed in public 
debates as a (too) soft approach of problems related to immigration which stresses 
the necessity of a more distanced perspective. 
Proclaiming multiculturalism dead is absurd, John McCormick states, because 
obviously all of Europe is distinctly multicultural and multinational in character. 
Almost all European states consist of multiple cultures; within the European 
member states there are no fewer than 160 national minorities. Although multicul-
turalism in the European context usually relates to immigrant communities, it is 
more appropriately understood with regard to indigenous minorities. McCormick 
argues that it has been very successful in that respect: Europe has recognized and 
protected its cultural differences through, for instance, sustenance of minority 
languages. However, it failed in accommodating racial and religious minorities, in 
particular the postwar immigrants. The problems ascribed to the failure of multi-
culturalism therefore are in fact a function of race and religion.  
In the next contribution the concepts of trans- and multiculturalism are ana-
lysed through the lenses of film and literature by cultural studies scholar Maria 
Pilar Rodríguez, who shows how contemporary film directors address(ed) the shift 
from national contexts to transnational surroundings, places and cultures. Two 
films are discussed in more detail: Inch’Allah Dimanche (Inch’Allah Sunday by Yas-
mina Benguigui, 2001) and Gegen die Wand (Against the Wall by Fatih Akin, 2004). 
These films show that cultural interaction results in new domestic and urban spac-
es, hybrid cultures and in multilingual practices. Contemporary life such as depict-
ed in these films is very different from official political discourses on multicultural-
ism.  
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With Asier Altuna-García de Salazar, scholar of Irish literature, we turn to the 
work of Roddy Doyle, Margaret McCarthy and Hugo Hamilton. Their works por-
tray a transcultural Irish reality in an Ireland whose society and economy has ob-
tained a global character. Doyle’s short story “57% Irish” in particular shows the 
lack of validity of former pillars of Irish identity; identity is not fixed but fluid. 
Transculturalism, as Altuna writes, should be seen as a “useful tool for the recogni-
tion of identity reformulation processes”. What holds true for Ireland, also applies 
to Europe at large. 
Anna Pia de Luca, scholar of Canadian literature, shows how European mem-
ories, especially of second-generation writers, and Canadian experiences blend. 
This is literally symbolized in the ‘mixed grill’ dish that author Fred Wah makes in 
his father’s restaurant as a symbol for a variegated cultural identity. Language and 
‘doubleness’ form a recurrent pattern in literature, especially in the work of Gianna 
Patriarca and Mary di Michele. But perhaps Janice Kulyk Keefer, who blends 
Ukrainian family history with experiences in Canada, gives the clearest portrayal of 
what Pia de Luca describes as the “different selves that co-exist within a person’s 
variegated and constantly changing identity”.  
The sociologist Marcin Galent presents a study undertaken among Polish mi-
grants in the Belgian city of Leuven. His research into the scale and quality of the 
social capital of these migrants allows Galent to further cluster this group. He dif-
ferentiates between ‘residents’, ‘guests’, ‘commuters’ and ‘diasporians’, whose iden-
tity is influenced by their experiences and connections made in Leuven. In elabo-
rating on these ideal types, Galent also aims to contribute to a better understanding 
of the conditions of the world in its transculturality and overlapping identities. 
Alexandre Kostka, cultural historian, concludes this section with an analysis of 
whether the Neustadt, an area within the inner city of Strasbourg, can be seen as a 
space for transcultural identity building. The Neustadt was built between 1878 and 
1918, a time when Alsace-Lorraine was part of the German Empire. Yet the build-
ings do not reflect a German patriotic or national character, making for instance 
also use of “French” architectural styles. Kostka suggests that the architecture and 
urban town planning of this part of Strasbourg can best be understood as a form 
of histoire croisée and the result of a continuous debate between many stakeholders 
such as politicians, entrepreneurs and architects.  
 
Section 4: The Role of the State 
The fourth section, on the role of the State, is opened with the article “Multiple 
Democracies” by the sociologist Paul Blokker. Blokker discusses the phenomena 
of democratization and Europeanization with regard to its cultural-sociological 
implications. Especially the cultural dimension is important to him, since, as he 
holds, it is often overlooked in research on democratization. As he shows with 
case studies from post-1989 East-Central Europe, political culture is of relevance 
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in particular with regard to “the ethics of rights, of identity, of solidarity, and of 
participation”. 
The second article, in turn, argues that the relevance of the judiciary for cultur-
al matters is easily underestimated. Herman Voogsgeerd, whose fields of expertise 
are law as well as international relations, discusses the role of the  European Court 
of Justice as caught between cosmopolitanism and national identities. Building on 
the premise that there is an interrelation between law and identity, Voogsgeerd 
asks whether the ECJ has been promoting cosmopolitan values. This question is of 
special importance beyond the more narrow fields of law, since, as the author ven-
tures, law “may easily enter the domain of culture”. Voogsgeerd underlines the 
ECJ’s role in cases concerning the rights of migrants and free-movers and stresses 
the necessity to “remain sensitive for cultural pluralism”. 
The political sociologist Bianca Polo Del Vecchio analyses the relationship be-
tween the United Kingdom and the European Union. Del Vecchio’s premise is 
that the “‘goodness of fit’ of domestic institutions, policies and processes with 
those of the EU” may explain the Eurosceptic stance taken by many in the UK, 
though not fully. In her contribution, she thus starts off by rationalising negative 
public attitudes towards the EU. In her analysis, a strong national identity in Brit-
ain as well as the misfit of institutions and the absence of a public debate on Brit-
ain’s EU membership contribute to a situation in which even members of the EU 
parliament do not dare to take a more pro-European stance. 
The historian and political scientist Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz discusses the 
Spanish transition period from the early 1970s onwards as a transition “from a 
traumatic past to a constructive Future”. He challenges those views according to 
which memories of the Spanish Civil War have not been dealt with and adequately 
reassessed after Franco’s death. Instead, he holds that in dealing with the past, 
traumatic events have been worked on in a manner that contributed to and was 
supported by “the incorporation of the country into the European Union”. The 
opening of new perspectives and working across national borders has thus, accord-
ing to Ibarrola-Armendariz, been fostered in this transition period. 
The historian Sascha Schießl, in his article, “Identity, Memory and Belonging,” 
analyses the function of the Friedland Transit Camp in Post-War Germany. He 
highlights the importance of the camp as the “most outstanding place” in which 
people were prepared for entering German society as German citizens. It is these 
“conditions and procedures of admission” that Schießl analyses in more depths, 
since they help to understand what was expected of refugees and expellees going 
through Friedland and which idea of a German citizen was prevalent at the time. 
Thus, Schießl aims at a better understanding of identity, memory and public com-
memoration. 
 
The contributions all analyse very important aspects of current developments in 
Europe. The importance of this can hardly be underestimated and understated. 
The present economic crisis and debt crisis have led, as side-result, to a public 
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attack on the open, cosmopolitan outlook of Europe. The values of the multicul-
tural and civil society and the idea of a people’s Europe have become debatable. 
The editors are convinced that in this respect the contributions in this volume will 








Europa im Zwiegespräch 
Péter Nádas und Richard Swartz im Gespräch mit Katharina Raabe1 
Raabe:  
Péter Nádas und Richard Swartz haben sich überreden lassen, hierher nach Göt-
tingen zu kommen und einen Abend lang ihr Gespräch wieder aufzunehmen, das 
sie an vier Tagen im Jahr 1989 geführt haben. Sie werden versuchen, ihre damali-
gen Gedanken und Beobachtungen im Lichte der Dinge, die seit damals passiert 
sind, zu reflektieren. 
Bei den unzähligen Veranstaltungen zum 20. Jahrestag der Ereignisse von 1989 
gab es häufig Gelegenheit, auf diversen Podien Rückschau zu halten und Einschät-
zungen abzugeben. Was aber nicht stattfand, das war die Besichtigung eines ver-
gangenen Zeitalters aus der Perspektive zweier Schriftsteller und Intellektueller, die 
sich schon einmal, vor der epochalen Wende, wenige Monate vor dem Herbst 
1989, über sich selbst unterhalten haben, wie Freunde das tun, in einer gewissen 
brüderlichen Vertrautheit sich von ihrer Kindheit, ihrer Herkunft erzählt und dabei 
auch ein bisschen ineinander gespiegelt haben. Dass dies so ein ingeniöser Versuch 
war, hängt maßgeblich mit dem Autor des Buches zusammen, das dann auf 
Deutsch unter dem Titel „Zwiesprache“ erschien, nämlich mit Péter Nádas, der 
dem Leser, jedenfalls zu Anfang, als Initiator vorkommen wird.2 Er ist es, der sei-
nen Freund Richard Swartz, den ‚Westmenschen‘ aus Schweden, einem peripheren 
europäischen Land, in die Mangel nimmt und befragt.  
Péter Nádas wurde 1942 geboren. Er ist ausgebildeter Fotograf, arbeitete kurze 
Zeit als Journalist, genauer als Fotoreporter, und debütierte 1967 mit einem Band 
erzählender Prosa. 1977 erschien Ende eines Familienromans, gleichsam der große 
Anlauf zu seinem Werk „Buch der Erinnerung“3, das 1986 in Ungarn und 1991 in 
Deutschland erschien und das viele Leser damals in ein geradezu schreckstarres 
Erstaunen versetzt hat: Das Neue und Überwältigende an diesem Buch war der 
radikale, fast ins Vivisektorische gehende Versuch, die intimsten Regungen eines 
empfindenden Subjekts, die verborgenen Zentren seines Ich als Austragungsort 
                                                     
1 Am 23.06.2011 in der Paulinerkirche Göttingen auf Einladung des Euroculture-Programms, des 
European Studies Intensive Programmes und des Literarischen Zentrums Göttingen. 
2 Péter Nádas / Richard Swartz, Zwiesprache. Vier Tage im Jahr 1989 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 
1994). 
3 Péter Nádas, Buch der Erinnerung (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992). 
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von gesellschaftlicher Repression zu beschreiben. Hier wird von den Verstörungen 
einer Kindheit gesprochen, aber auch von der Sinnlichkeit, von der Sehnsucht 
nach dem Anderen und der Verschmelzung mit ihm, von einem Begehren, dem 
die frühe Erfahrung von Tod und Verlust eingebrannt ist. Das komplexe Werk 
verknüpft drei Erzählstränge: einen Entwicklungsroman aus dem Ungarn der 50er 
Jahre, eine Erzählung über einen Schriftsteller, der, quasi wie ein Bruder von 
Thomas Mann, um 1900 im Ostseebad Heiligendamm seine Homosexualität ent-
deckt, und eine homoerotische Liebesgeschichte im Ost-Berlin der 70er Jahre. Die 
markanten Ereignisse jener Zeit, das Jahr 1953, Stalins Tod, Arbeiteraufstand in 
Ost-Berlin, der Aufstand in Budapest 1956, die Niederschlagung des Prager Früh-
lings – all das bleibt im Hintergrund und ist doch im Textgewebe anwesend. Nádas 
wollte, wie er sagte, „die unpersönliche Geschichte auf die persönlichste Weise 
aufarbeiten“ und rückte deshalb den Körper ins Zentrum der existentiellen Selbst-
erforschung. Péter Nádas ist ein Autor mit der seltenen Fähigkeit, aus den Details 
des Ephemeren, der flüchtigen Wahrnehmungen, der kaum an die Schwelle des 
Bewußtseins gehobenen Empfindung, Bilder einer Epoche aufzubauen. Er ist ein 
Minimalist und Sensualist, er erforscht die labyrinthischen Verzweigungen und die 
Brüche und Schocks der Geschichte genauso mikroskopisch wie das gewaltige und 
zarte Gebilde: die menschliche Seele.  
Als Motto über dem „Buch der Erinnerung“ stand der Satz: „Es war meine 
Absicht, Geschichten zu erzählen, ein wenig wie Plutarch, parallele Erinnerungen 
verschiedener Personen zu verschiedenen Zeiten, und die verschiedenen Personen 
wären naturgemäß alle ich, ohne dass ich es wirklich wäre.“4 2005 erschienen, nach 
achtzehnjähriger Arbeit, die also unmittelbar nach dem Ende des „Buchs der Erin-
nerung“ begonnen haben muss, die „Parallelgeschichten“5, ein nochmals umfang-
reicheres Werk, ebenfalls Geschichten aus dem 20. Jahrhundert, in dem die paralle-
len Geschichten zwischen einer ungarischen und einer deutschen Familie, entlang 
noch weit dramatischerer Bruchlinien erzählt wird. 
Péter Nádas hat sich seit der Wende immer wieder mit scharfsinnigen Reden 
und Essays zum politischen Geschehen zu Wort gemeldet hat. Ich erinnere nur an 
den großen „Kursbuch“-Aufsatz „Armer Sascha Anderson“6 über den Verrat eines 
Schriftstellers an seine Kollegen. 
Richard Swartz wurde 1945 in Stockholm geboren, studierte an der dortigen 
Handelsakademie und ging 1970 bis 1972 an die Karls-Universität nach Prag. Er 
promovierte und arbeitete dreißig Jahre lang als Korrespondent des Svenska Dag-
bladet, seit 1976 von Wien aus. Während die meisten Korrespondenten irgend-
wann ihre Felder wechselten, nach Paris, damals noch nach Bonn, nach Washing-
ton, nach Moskau gingen, blieb Richard Swartz Ostmitteluropa treu und verfügt 
                                                     
4 Nádas, „Buch der Erinnerung“, 6. 
5 Péter Nádas, Parallelgeschichten (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2012). 
6 Péter Nádas, „Armer Sascha Anderson“, Kursbuch 108 (Juli 1992): 163-88. 
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deshalb über eine sehr seltene, lange Epochenerfahrung. Ähnlich wie Péter Nádas 
mit seinem „Buch der Erinnerung“ war auch Richard Swartz mit einem einzigen 
Buch plötzlich da: „Room Service“7, dieser zu Recht international stark wahrge-
nommene Band von Reportagen, Berichten und Erzählungen hat einem ahnungs-
losen Publikum das unbekannte, kaum beleuchtete, in Dunkel und Verfall dahinle-
benden osteuropäischen Gelände nahegebracht. Richard Swartz hat entlegene, 
unbequeme Orte, besucht. Er hat den Bericht eines alten Synagogenkantors aufge-
zeichnet, dessen Worte es ohne ihn, Richard, in der Welt jetzt nicht mehr gäbe. Er 
hat nach der Revolution, nach der Erschießung des Ehepaars Ceaușescu, mit den 
Revolutionären Rumäniens gesprochen. Und er gehört, vielleicht wie Karl Schlögel 
und Martin Pollack, wie Claudio Magris und Timothy Garton Ash, zu denjenigen, 
ohne die wir sehr viel weniger über die sogenannte andere Hälfte Europas wüssten. 
In der „Zwiesprache“ heißt es: „Meine ganze Existenz ist darauf begründet, dass 
ich mich mit einer Welt beschäftige, die nicht die meine ist, auch wenn sie mir sehr 
nahe steht.“8 
Die Welt, über die diese beiden im Frühjahr 1989 in Ungarn reden, war damals 
tatsächlich noch eine geteilte Welt. Wie sieht diese Welt heute aus? Was hätten Sie 
sich zu sagen, wenn Sie Ihr damaliges Gespräch heute wiederholen würden? Wann 
haben Sie überhaupt zum letzten Mal miteinander gesprochen? Wann haben Sie 
sich das letzte Mal gesehen? 
Swartz: 
Péter lebt in Gombosszeg und ich lebe in Wien, das heißt, wir begegnen uns nicht 
sehr häufig. Das letzte Mal, dass wir uns getroffen haben, war unter merkwürdigen 
Umständen: Péter erschien mir in einem Traum mit schönem Gesicht und buschi-
gen Augenbrauen. Er erzählte mir, Kardinal Richelieu habe an Seelenwanderung 
geglaubt. Ich war skeptisch, denn das klingt nicht sehr katholisch, eher blasphe-
misch. Aber Péter insistierte, dass Richelieu auf seinem Sterbebett sogar angefan-
gen habe, Heu zu essen, weil er überzeugt gewesen sei, in seinem nächsten Leben 
ein Pferd zu sein. Das habe ich dir nicht geglaubt, Péter, aber ich glaube oft nicht, 
was du mir erzählst. 
Nádas: 
Ja, das ist unser großes Problem, obwohl ich natürlich immer die Wahrheit sage, er 
glaubt mir nie.  
                                                     
7 Richard Swartz, Room Service. Geschichten aus Europas Nahem Osten (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 
1996). 
8 Nádas / Swartz, „Zwiesprache”, 192. 
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Swartz: 
Das mag stimmen, traf in diesem Fall aber sicher nicht zu. Unser letztes wirkliches 
Treffen war vor anderthalb Jahren. Ich bin zu Péter nach Gombosszeg gereist, um 
etwas über Ungarn zu erfahren. 
Raabe: 
Péter Nádas hatte Sie von Anfang an im Verdacht, nicht einfach nur Journalist zu 
sein. In Ihnen stecke eigentlich ein Schriftsteller. 
Swartz: 
Das klingt etwas abfällig gegenüber Journalisten. 
Nádas: 
Ich meinte damit lediglich, dass Richards Schilderungen die Grenzen des Journa-
lismus überschreiten. Das beginnt schon mit den Fragen, die er stellt, denn sie 
zielen nicht einfach auf Antworten ab, sondern ermuntern die Gesprächspartner 
zum richtigen Erzählen. Dieser Wunsch, Hintergründe auszuleuchten, ist kein 
typischer Charakterzug von Journalisten, das geht über die bloße journalistische 
Neugier weit hinaus. Das hat mich davon überzeugt, dass Richard selbst eine Nei-
gung zum Erzählen hat. Ich habe mich darin auch nicht getäuscht. Er hat in der 
Tat im Laufe der Zeit angefangen, seine eigenen Erzählungen zu veröffentlichen. 
Diese Erzählungen sind unglaublich fein und sehr tiefgehend, zeugen also von 
einer großen Erfahrung. 
Swartz: 
Sie sehen, wie sanft wir miteinander umgehen? 
Nádas: 
Sei ruhig, es wird härter. 
Raabe: 
Richard Swartz, Sie haben immer gesagt, dass das Sich-Fremd-Fühlen in diesem 
Osteuropa wichtig für ihre journalistische Arbeit war. Sie hatten die Freiheit, zu 
kommen und wieder zu gehen. Sie konnten sich den Dingen, die Sie interessierten, 
zuwenden und dann wieder verschwinden. Ein Schriftsteller aber bleibt doch an 
den Dingen hängen, er wird sie nicht so einfach wieder los. Die Tatsache, dass Sie 
bis zum heutigen Tag immer wieder hinfahren, spricht dafür, dass Sie sie nicht 
wieder losgeworden sind.  
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Wie hat sich denn dieses gesamte west-östliche Gelände verändert seit Ihrer letzten 
Zwiesprache im Jahr 1989? Reizt es Sie noch, dorthin zu fahren, oder quält es Sie?  
Swartz: 
Beides, würde ich sagen. Es kann auch gar nicht anders sein. Schauen Sie, allein 
einen anderen Menschen wirklich kennenzulernen, Dinge über sein Leben zu er-
fahren und ihn zu verstehen, ist eine fast unmögliche Aufgabe, wahrscheinlich weil 
man von sich selbst bereits so wenig weiß. Um wie viel schwieriger ist es da, sich 
eine ganze Welt anzueignen! Und den Begriff Welt würde ich für dieses Osteuropa 
verwenden wollen. Diese Aufgabe ist eine Zumutung, sie ist nicht zu lösen. Man 
kann die Grenzen überschreiten und versuchen zu verstehen, aber man schafft es 
nicht wirklich.  
Péter hatte die gleiche Neugier, nur in der umgekehrten Richtung. Er selbst 
kann das besser schildern als ich, aber ich glaube, auch er hat bis zum heutigen Tag 
nicht alles verstanden, was unser Leben im Westen ausmacht. 
Was ist geblieben vom alten Osteuropa von vor 1989? Ich fürchte, sehr viel. 
Ich bin der Letzte, der die vielen Veränderungen, die stattgefunden haben, unter-
schätzen möchte. Es ist unglaublich, was da passiert ist, dass der Kommunismus 
verschwunden ist. Ich hatte nie erwartet, das erleben zu dürfen. Und dennoch, es 
ist vieles auch geblieben. 
Nádas: 
Ich kann von mir selbst sagen, dass ich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren ge-
scheitert bin in dem Versuch, den Westen besser zu verstehen. In der ersten Hälfte 
meines Lebens habe ich mich sehr darum bemüht, in Belangen der Kunst und 
Kultur mit der westlichen Welt mitzuhalten und mich auch über das Politische 
ausreichend zu informieren. Aber die Quellen, die einem zur Verfügung standen, 
waren nicht immer die verlässlichsten. Ich beispielsweise wählte den Wiener Rund-
funk, um mehr über Demokratie zu erfahren. Das war nicht gerade die beste Quel-
le für diesen Zweck, aber die einzige, die mir zur Verfügung stand. Ich wusste 
damals jedoch nicht, wie unzulänglich ich da informiert wurde. 
Swartz: 
Es war sogar eine sehr schlechte Quelle.  
Nádas: 
So ist das halt, wenn man in einem Haus ohne Elektrizität auf einer Donauinsel 
wohnt. Mit meinem kleinen russischen Sokol-Radio konnte ich nur Österreich 1 
empfangen. Das hat mir damals sehr viel bedeutet. Ich hörte jeden Tag Nachrich-
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 26 
ten und andere politische Sendungen, auch Konzerte. Dennoch, auf der Basis 
solch unzulänglicher Quellen hat man sich auf unserer Seite der Grenze falsche 
Vorstellungen gemacht. Das gilt nicht nur für mich persönlich, sondern für die 
gesamte Region. 
Wie das Leben im Westen wirklich war, konnten wir häufig nicht erahnen, an-
gesichts der ganz anderen Lebensverhältnisse, die wir hatten. Nur ein kleines Bei-
spiel hierfür: Es gab im realexistierenden Sozialismus keine Reklame im westlichen 
Stil. Was es gab, das waren große Hinweisschilder, wenn ein Produkt, das sonst 
Mangelware war, einmal zur Verfügung stand. Dann konnte man beispielsweise 
überall lesen: „Geht ins Schuhgeschäft und kauft Schuhe!“ Das war die uns geläu-
fige Form der Reklame. Also bin ich, wenn diese Schilder auftauchten, auch tat-
sächlich ins Schuhgeschäft gegangen, denn Schuhe sind ein menschliches Grund-
bedürfnis. Nur häufig wurden eben keine neuen Schuhe angeboten. 
Swartz: 
Oder es wurde nur ein linker beziehungsweise nur ein rechter Schuh angeboten, 
nicht beides zusammen. 
Nádas: 
Nein, das stimmt nicht. Es gab schon passende Schuhpaare, nur eben nicht jeder-
zeit. Wenn es sie gab, sprach man davon, dass Schuhe ‚geworfen‘ werden. 
Swartz: 
Daran erinnere ich mich auch noch. Als ich Student in Prag war, hat man sich 
sofort in eine Schlange eingereiht, die sich irgendwo gebildet hatte, ohne überhaupt 
zu wissen, was da gerade feilgeboten wird. Nach einiger Zeit fragte man die Leute 
dann: „Was wird denn hier ‚geworfen‘?“ Und häufig kam die Antwort: „Das wis-
sen wir nicht, irgendetwas halt. Aber wir stehen schon mal an dafür.“ 
Nádas: 
Genau. Aufgrund dieser eigenen Erfahrungen machte man sich falsche Vorstellun-
gen vom Westen, insbesondere wenn das wenige, das man kannte, die westliche 
Form von Reklame war, was sehr häufig der Fall war. Denken Sie an den 
Marlboro-Mann, diese Werbefigur mit einem kräftigen Körper und scharfen Ge-
sichtszügen, die rauchend durch die Gegend reitet. Man stellte sich in Osteuropa 
tatsächlich vor, dass so die Wirklichkeit in Stockholm aussieht. Wir waren schlicht 
desinformiert und hatten dadurch deformierte Bilder im Kopf. Das gilt für die 
ganze Region. Die DDR war da keine Ausnahme, sondern im Gegenteil sehr ty-
pisch. Reklame wurde einfach mit der Realität verwechselt. 
Europa im Zwiegespräch 27 
Swartz: 
Das kann ich aus eigener Erfahrung bestätigen. Ich war in Albanien, als der Kom-
munismus zusammenbrach, und besuchte Freunde dort. Die Töchter der Familie, 
11 und 14 Jahre alt, saßen den ganzen Tag vorm Fernsehgerät und haben italieni-
sche Sender geschaut, hauptsächlich wegen der Werbung. Die eigentlichen Pro-
gramme haben sie gar nicht so interessiert. Wenn die liefen, haben sie halt irgen-
detwas anderes gemacht. Aber die Werbung, die wollten sie auf keinen Fall verpas-
sen. Naja, wenigstens haben sie dabei sehr gut Italienisch gelernt. 
Nádas: 
Ich persönlich bin zumindest dieser Gefahr, mir falsche Vorstellungen aufgrund 
von Werbung zu machen, entgangen. Reklame hat auf mich nie einen großen Ein-
druck gemacht. Das gilt auch für die Konsumgüter, für die sie warben. An solchen 
Dingen hatte ich nie großes Interesse. 
Dennoch bin auch ich gescheitert bei dem Versuch, mir ein korrektes Bild 
vom Westen zu machen. Vor allen Dingen erlag ich der Illusion anzunehmen, dass 
die westliche Welt auf Vernunft aufgebaut sei, dass Demokratie und Kapitalismus 
gleichbedeutend mit Vernunft seien. Es war eine sehr große Enttäuschung zu be-
greifen, dass das nicht so ist. Ich habe in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren gelernt, 
dass Vernunft auch im Westen nur lokal vorkommt und sehr begrenzt ist. Wo man 
auf sie trifft, das kann man sich ab und ausrechnen, aber auch nicht immer. 
Menschliche Interessen und Vernunft sind häufig gegenläufig, sie fallen nicht im-
mer zusammen. 
Swartz: 
Das alles hättest du eigentlich schon vorher wissen können, denn ich hatte es dir 
jahrelang gesagt. 
Nádas: 
Ja, aber ich hatte dir das einfach nicht geglaubt. 
Meine Vorstellung von der Gesellschaftsordnung der Demokratie war beein-
flusst von ihren Ursprüngen in der Französischen Revolution, die selbst wiederum 
aus der Aufklärung erwuchs. Ohne die Aufklärung hätte es die Französische Revo-
lution nicht gegeben. Mein Irrtum lag darin, anzunehmen, dass die Revolution 
selbst und das, was daraus erwuchs, vernunftgeleitet sein musste. 
Swartz: 
So steht es in den Büchern, aber das ist nicht die Wirklichkeit. 
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Nádas: 
Das weiß ich schon – jetzt. 
Swartz: 
Diese Vorstellung von der Hoheit der Vernunft, wenn diese die Freiheit hat, sich 
zu entfalten, hast du mit Leuten im Westen geteilt, beispielweise mit den Neolibe-
ralen. Ich habe in der damaligen Zeit viele Gespräche mit Menschen geführt, die 
immer wieder sagten: „Der Kommunismus ist weg, wir werden diese Gesellschaf-
ten jetzt sehr schnell umbauen.“ Und wenn ich nachfragte, wie das genau gesche-
hen soll, antworteten sie einfach: „Parlamentarische Demokratie und freie Markt-
wirtschaft ergeben automatisch ein normales Leben.“ Sie haben fest daran ge-
glaubt, auch wenn ich Vorbehalte anmeldete und bekräftigte, dass es so schnell 
und zwangsläufig nicht vonstattengehen werde. Im Grunde genommen erlagen sie 
also dem gleichen Trugschluss wie du.  
Nádas: 
Beide Seiten hatten ganz einfach einen sehr großen Mangel an Information. Das 
betraf im Westen nicht nur die Liberalen, sondern Konservative und Linke fast 
genauso. Als Helmut Kohl, alles andere als ein Liberaler, 1990 sagte, dass auf dem 
Gebiet der DDR innerhalb weniger Jahre blühende Landschaften entstehen wür-
den, wusste jeder, der die DDR gut kannte, dass das ganz einfach Blödsinn war. 
Eine zerfallene Gesellschaft, eine zerfallene Industrie, eine zerfallene Landwirt-
schaft – das alles konnte keine blühenden Landschaften hervorbringen. Diese Art 
Trugschlüsse entwuchsen aus einem Mangel an Information, aus einem Unvermö-
gen zu begreifen, was auf der anderen Seite eigentlich vorgegangen ist. Das war 
auch ein gelenkter Mangel an Information, denn man wollte viele Dinge ganz ein-
fach auch nicht wissen. 
Swartz: 
Es ist sehr wichtig, das hervorzuheben: Man wollte es nicht wissen. Der Unter-
schied zwischen Ost und West liegt hierbei darin, dass diese Dimension der Ideo-
logie, die ja auf dem Unterdrücken von Information beruht, zwar im Osten zu-
sammengebrochen ist, im Westen aber weitergelebt hat. 
Wir haben in diesem Zusammenhang zuvor bereits das Wort Glauben ver-
wendet. Solch ein Glaube kann sehr gefährlich sein, wenn er in ideologischer Form 
daherkommt. Viele unserer Vorstellungen im Westen waren – und sind es immer 
noch – von Ideologie geprägt. Um die Empirie hat man sich nicht gekümmert. Ich 
weiß das sehr gut, denn ich fühlte mich mit meinem Interesse an Osteuropa jahr-
zehntelang oft recht einsam im Westen. Kaum einer im Westen hat sich für die 
Wirklichkeit im Osten richtig interessiert. Die Menschen wollten einfach nicht 
Europa im Zwiegespräch 29 
wissen, was in diesem anderen Teil Europas vor sich ging. Es gab gewisse Kon-
junkturen des Interesses und Engagements, aber das war dann immer schnell wie-
der weg. Das war so beim ungarischen Aufstand 1956, beim Prager Frühling 1968, 
während der Hochphase der Solidarność in Polen 1980... 
Nádas: 
Bei Solidarność war das Interesse schon deutlich geringer als 1956 und 1968. 
Swartz: 
Nein, das würde ich nicht sagen. Das Interesse war auch damals da, nur ist es eben 
schnell wieder abgeflaut.  
Das Gleiche kann man auch heute beobachten. Es gibt eigentlich keine Hin-
dernisse mehr, die Informationen im Weg stehen, aber ich habe nicht den Ein-
druck, dass man sich im Westen besonders für Osteuropa interessiert. Ich kann 
beispielsweise nicht erkennen, dass man in Deutschland besonderen Anteil daran 
nimmt, was in Ungarn vor sich geht, dass es da ein bemerkenswertes Interesse 
gäbe. Analog gilt dies auch für andere Staatenkombinationen, etwa für das Desin-
teresse der Österreicher an Rumänien. In meinem Heimatland Schweden ist es 
nicht anderes. Nicht einmal die naheliegenden baltischen Staaten interessieren 
meine Landsleute wirklich. 
Raabe: 
Würden Sie sagen, dass es noch immer eine Zweiteilung Europas in Ost und West 
gibt, oder haben sich diese Grenzen verschoben? 
Swartz: 
Das muss man differenziert betrachten. Natürlich sind sehr viele von diesen Gren-
zen verschwunden. Das Wort Freiheit ist hier bisher noch nicht gefallen, aber na-
türlich ist diese Freiheit, die sich auch als Verneinung von Grenzen ausdrückt, eine 
ungeheure Errungenschaft. Das ist etwas ganz Fantastisches, was da passiert ist. 
Aber wenn man das genauer analysiert, erkennt man doch, dass es sehr viele Phä-
nomene gibt, Regungen der Seele, Traditionen, Sitten, die uns noch immer tren-
nen. 
Nádas: 
Ich möchte das Desinteresse an Osteuropa, von dem wir gesprochen haben, doch 
verteidigen. Das ist ganz einfach auch menschlich. Genauso wie reiche Menschen 
sich nicht für arme Menschen interessieren, nur umgekehrt, ist es auch mit Regio-
nen: Arme Regionen interessieren sich immer für die reichen Regionen, aber in der 
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entgegengesetzten Richtung ist das Interesse nur da, wenn man etwas Konkretes 
haben will, wenn man etwas wegnehmen oder ein Tauschgeschäft eingehen möch-
te. Handel und Finanzgeschäfte basieren auf dieser menschlichen Ungleichheit. 
Aber wir können von den Reichen, Altreichen wie Neureichen, nicht erwarten, 
dass sie ein generelles Interesse für ärmere Menschen oder Regionen aufbringen. 
Es gibt da noch eine andere Komponente, die vielleicht noch wichtiger ist: Das 
Strukturierte will immer noch strukturierter werden – und nicht unstrukturierter. 
Es gibt Umstrukturierungen, sicher, aber das Ergebnis ist dann nur noch mehr 
Struktur, nicht weniger. Die westlichen Gesellschaften haben mehrere Wellen von 
Modernisierungen durchgemacht, welche die östlichen Gesellschaften nicht ken-
nen oder nur zum Teil kennen. Das ist ein Strukturproblem. 
Ein sehr bedeutender ungarischer Historiker, Jenö Szűcs, Schüler des ebenfalls 
sehr bedeutenden Historikers István Bíbó, hat diesbezüglich eine These aufgestellt, 
die mir sehr schlüssig erscheint. Er identifizierte drei historische Regionen Euro-
pas, die im Kern bis auf das Reich Karls des Großen zurückgehen: das katholische 
Europa I, das protestantische Europa II und das orthodoxe Europa III. Diese 
historischen Grenzen, die auch mit der zivilisatorischen Entwicklungsstufe der 
städtischen Kultur zusammenhängen, zu beseitigen, dafür benötigen wir nicht 
zwanzig Jahre, sondern vielmehr hunderte von Friedensjahren. Das heißt nicht, die 
Errungenschaften der jüngsten Geschichte kleinzureden, die Tatsache, dass es in 
Europa keine Kriege mehr gibt, oder dass beidseitig der beschriebenen Grenzen, 
abgesehen von Weißrussland, zumindest eine Art von Freiheit existiert. Aber den-
noch sind diese großen historischen Grenzen geblieben. Mit Tomasi di Lampedusa 
könnte man hier sagen, man braucht sehr große Veränderungen, um beim Alten zu 
bleiben. So sehe ich es zumindest. 
Swartz: 
Ich teile diese Vorstellung. Außerdem bin ich überzeugt, dass unsere westliche 
Zivilisation das Ergebnis einer historischen Wellenbewegung vom Westen nach 
Osten ist. Was sich am weitesten westlich abgespielt hat, die Amerikanische Revo-
lution, ist in diesem Zusammenhang wahrscheinlich sogar noch bedeutender als 
die Französische Revolution, obwohl wir das in Europa natürlich etwas anders 
sehen. Das Entscheidende ist aber, dass der zivilisatorische Schwerpunkt im angel-
sächsisch-französischen Bereich liegt. Das ist das Problem für Länder wie Ungarn 
oder Schweden. Wir sind im Grunde genommen Randvölker, die historisch sehr 
wenig zu dieser westlichen Zivilisation beigetragen haben. Es ist sehr schmerzlich, 
das zuzugeben, aber man muss mit sich selbst da ins Reine kommen. Auch die 
Deutschen haben, im Vergleich zu Franzosen und Engländern, nicht viel beigetra-
gen, erst sehr spät zumindest. 
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Nádas: 
Nun ja, wenn man an die Hansestädte denkt und an die Entwicklung einer städti-
schen Kultur, die sich mit ihr verknüpft, dann können wir weder Deutsche noch 
Schweden ganz außen vor lassen.  
Swartz: 
Das stimmt, die Deutschen haben uns Schweden kultiviert, so wie wahrscheinlich 
die Ungarn auch von den Österreichern kultiviert wurden. Diese Erkenntnis ent-
kräftet aber nicht das Hauptproblem, das darin besteht, dass zivilisatorische Er-
rungenschaften sich von Westen nach Osten ausbreiten, nicht umgekehrt. Diese 
Zivilisation ist praktisch etwas, das auf uns zugekommen ist, das wir übernommen 
haben – und diese Übernahmeprozesse haben oft hunderte von Jahren gedauert.  
So etwas hören Ungarn oder Rumänen oder Schweden oder schon gar Russen 
überhaupt nicht gern, obwohl es stimmt. Mit dieser Feststellung wird man in Un-
garn keine Wahlen gewinnen. Vielmehr gibt es dann eine Gegenbewegung, in der 
es heißt: „Nein, wir waren schon etwas, bevor die westliche Zivilisation uns er-
reichte – und darauf bauen wir auf und daraus machen wir Politik!“ Die Konfron-
tation mit der westlichen Zivilisation und den Dynamiken, die sie mit sich bringt, 
provoziert häufig diese Reaktion, eine Art von Fundamentalismus, bei dem man 
sich auf das besinnt, was man immer schon hatte. Aber was man hatte, war in 
Wirklichkeit sehr wenig. Darf man das so offen sagen? 
Nádas: 
Nein, du hattest vielleicht sehr wenig. Ich hatte sehr viel. 
Raabe: 
Zeichnen Sie beide hier nicht das Bild eines sehr starren Europa, eines Europas, 
das  sich  in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren doch ganz anders dargestellt hat? 
Man könnte dem historischen Zivilisationsmodell von Szűcs beispielsweise das des 
Arabisten sowie Platon- und Aristoteles-Kenners Rémi Brague gegenüberstellen, 
der an der Sorbonne gelehrt hat. Brague hat von einem exzentrischen Europa ge-
sprochen, dessen Stärke darin liege, sich das jeweils Andere und Fremde anzueig-
nen, so wie beispielsweise bereits das antike Rom sich die Errungenschaften Grie-
chenlands angeeignet hat. Was Ihr Zwiegespräch vor 20 Jahren auszeichnete, war 
doch genau das, nämlich dass sie damals versucht haben, voneinander zu lernen. 
Und diese Art von Stoffwechsel ist in den letzten zwanzig Jahren bei sehr vielen 
Menschen in Gang gekommen, er hat diesen Kontinent verändert. Dass jetzt neue 
Probleme und Konflikte auftauchen, denken wir an Ungarn, ist unbestritten, deren 
Herkunft müsste man  aber doch genauer beschreiben, anstatt nur auf historische 
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Kontinuitäten zwischen Arm und Reich oder Strukturiertem und Unstrukturiertem 
zu verweisen. 
Swartz: 
Darf ich diesen Einwurf so interpretieren, dass die Betonung des Desinteresses, 
von dem wir gesprochen haben, realitätsfremd sei? Das kann ich nicht nachvoll-
ziehen, gerade nicht zu einer Zeit, da Griechenland fast im Begriff ist, Europa zu 
zerstören. Das eigentliche Problem bei dieser Griechenland-Krise liegt doch nicht 
darin, dass über lange Zeit mit Geld um sich geschmissen wurde. Vielmehr haben 
wir uns über Jahrzehnte hinweg einfach nicht darum gekümmert, was in diesem 
Land und dieser Gesellschaft vor sich geht. Wir hatten doch keine Ahnung, wie 
man dort lebt, was die Menschen tun und unterlassen, wie ihr Verhältnis zur Arbeit 
ist und welche Erwartungen sie an das Leben richten. Das ist echtes Desinteresse, 
aus dem die jetzige Krise erwachsen ist. Daher verstehe ich diese rosigen Vorstel-
lungen von Austausch und vom voneinander Lernen nicht. Natürlich könnten die 
Menschen voneinander lernen, wenn sie es wirklich wollten, aber sie tun es ganz 
einfach nicht. 
Raabe: 
Was mich stört, sind die allzu pauschalen Urteile. Die Faszination des Zwiege-
sprächs lag doch gerade darin, dass Sie damals nicht wie Politiker gesprochen ha-
ben, sondern als sensible Objekte, als Literaten, die sich Gedanken darüber ma-
chen, wie sie als Personen von der historischen Situation in ihren Hemisphären 
individuell geprägt worden sind. 
Péter Nádas, Sie haben geschrieben: „Ich bin in Ruinen aufgewachsen unter 
Versehrten. Ich bin selbst ein versehrter Mensch.“ Die gesamte, gewaltige Schreib-
arbeit Ihres Lebens ist ja nichts anderes gewesen, als der Versuch, mit dieser Ver-
sehrtheit zurechtzukommen. Diese Versehrtheit hat auch Ihre gegenseitige Wahr-
nehmung bestimmt, die Reaktionsweisen, die ins Unbewußte reichen, die Reflexe. 
Sie haben damals von Ihrem „eingefleischten Gefühl, schuldig zu sein“ gespro-
chen. Im Unterschied zu Richard, der als Westmensch weiß,  dass die Institutionen 
des Rechtsstaates ihn schützen, ist Ihnen dieser Gedanke fremd Zum Beweis er-
zählten Sie damals,  wie sie einmal in West-Berlin von einem Polizeihund ange-
sprungen wurden. Ihre spontane Reaktion: „Ja, richtig, das musste ja kommen!“ 
Richard Swartz hat Ihnen ihre Reaktion, ihren Mangel an Empörung, damals im 
Zwiegespräch zum Vorwurf gemacht. Er hielt Ihr Verhalten für inakzeptabel.  
Das sind die Dinge, dich mich interessieren. Ich wüsste gerne, ob diese Reflexe 
in Ihnen beiden noch lebendig sind, oder ob sich in den zwanzig Jahren seit 1989 
in dieser Hinsicht etwas geändert hat.  
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Nádas: 
Wahrscheinlich haben die wenigsten im Publikum das Buch gelesen oder die 
Anekdote in Erinnerung, also werde ich sie kurz rekapitulieren: Ich gehe auf einer 
Straße in West-Berlin und plötzlich werde ich aus einer Ecke von einem Polizei-
hund angegriffen. In der letzten Sekunde, bevor der Hund mir die Nase abbeißen 
kann, wirft sich der Polizist, der zuvor wahrscheinlich geschlafen hatte, dazwischen 
und ringt den Hund zu Boden. Ich habe Richard diese Situation geschildert und 
kam zu dem Schluss, dass nichts Weltbewegendes passiert war. Der Hund hat 
meine Nase eben nicht abgebissen, sie ist genauso lang wie früher. Richard konnte 
meine Sichtweise des Geschehens einfach nicht nachvollziehen. Er verstand nicht, 
warum ich dem so gleichgültig gegenüberstand und mich nicht mehr empört habe. 
Aber meine Reaktion ist eben von meinen eigenen Versehrungen geprägt, die aus 
einer historischen Situation erwachsen sind. Ich bin noch während des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs in einem der betroffenen Staaten geboren worden, Richard erst nach 
Ende des Krieges in einem Land, das neutral geblieben war. Als ich ein Kind war, 
fuhr ich mit einem Schlitten, mit dem meine Eltern einst Tote eingesammelt und 
transportiert hatten. Dann habe ich die Verhafteten, die Gequälten und die Hinge-
richteten während des ungarischen Aufstandes 1956 gesehen. Meine Eltern waren 
als überzeugte Kommunisten für das, was damals geschah, auch zum Teil verant-
wortlich. Das ist der Grund, warum ich die Geschichte mit dem Polizeihund ganz 
anders erlebt habe, als das bei Richard der Fall gewesen wäre. Unsere Reflexe sind 
völlig unterschiedlich aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Umstände, in denen wir auf-
wuchsen. Ich habe damals ganz einfach nicht verstanden, warum Richard sich so 
darüber aufgeregt hat, dass ich nicht protestiert hatte. Heute, zwanzig Jahre später, 
verstehe ich das besser. 
Dennoch, im Grunde genommen haben sich meine Ängste nicht sehr verän-
dert. Ich halte Freiheit für eines der wichtigsten zivilisatorischen Güter, die es 
überhaupt gibt. Ein Teil davon ist politische Freiheit, die wir schaffen oder eben 
nicht schaffen. Was ich damals nicht vollkommen begriff, was Richard mir jedoch 
nahezubringen versuchte, war, dass Freiheit auch sehr kalt ist. In Freiheit zu leben, 
heißt, Kälte zu erfahren. Das habe ich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren am ei-
genen Leib erlebt. Diese Kälte habe ich nun selbst erfahren und erfahre sie jeden 
Tag. 
Swartz: 
Das wechselseitige Interesse und die Neugier, von der wir gesprochen haben, das 
Bemühen, von anderen zu lernen – das alles funktioniert nur als individueller Pro-
zess. Als historische oder gesellschaftliche Größe kann man sich darauf nicht ver-
lassen. Es wird immer nur ein einzelner Mensch sein, der diesen Weg einschlägt 
oder dazu fähig ist. Die historischen und gesellschaftlichen Prozesse werden davon 
wenig beeindruckt. Veränderungen gehen auf andere Weise vonstatten und sie 
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dauern sehr lange. Die Schwierigkeit liegt darin, genau das zu begreifen. Wenn sich 
irgendetwas in die Welt hineingefunden und sich eingenistet hat, sei es Gewalt oder 
Kommunismus oder Diktatur, dauert es eine sehr lange Zeit, das wieder komplett 
zu vertreiben. Wie Péter sagen würde, es bleibt in den… 
Nádas: 
In den Knochen.  
Swartz: 
…in den Knochen stecken. Daher gibt es für uns, für Menschen in unserem Alter, 
nicht so sehr viel Hoffnung, um es einmal brutal auszudrücken. Péter wird immer 
mit seinen Ängsten leben, ich werde immer mit meinen Ängsten leben. 
Aber es kommen ja neue Generationen. Meine Frau ist Kroatin und wir be-
suchten unlängst Freunde in Zagreb. Wir sprachen über die Vergangenheit, genau-
er gesagt über Bücher und ihre damalige Bedeutung. Einige der Söhne und Töchter 
dieser Freunde waren auch anwesend und haben zugehört, worüber sich die alten 
Leute da unterhielten. Ich erwähnte einen Autor und sagte: „Das war ein sehr 
schönes Buch, das er damals geschrieben hat, aber er konnte es ja nicht publizie-
ren.“ Darauf reagierte ein junger Mann in der Runde, 17 oder 18 Jahre alt, mit 
völligem Unverständnis: „Wieso konnte er es nicht publizieren, wenn es so ein 
schönes Buch war? Das verstehe ich nicht.“ Daraufhin haben wir Älteren in der 
Runde zunächst ihn angestarrt und dann uns angestarrt. Erst dann haben wir ver-
standen: So wird man alt. Dieser junge Kroate konnte einfach nicht nachvollzie-
hen, was Zensur einst bedeutet hatte. Er hat das schlichtweg nicht begriffen, er 
hatte keine Ahnung. Das war einerseits ein erschreckendes Erlebnis, aber anderer-
seits auch wunderschön.  
Nádas: 
Etwas Schönes kann ich daran nicht finden.  
Swartz: 
Ich sage das nur polemisch.  
Nádas:  
Solche jungen Menschen müssen geprügelt werden.  
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Swartz: 
Aber sie haben wirklich das Glück der Ignoranten. Es ist doch herrlich, dass sie in 
einer Welt leben können, wo man sich um so etwas nicht mehr zu kümmern 
braucht. 
Nádas: 
Das stimmt allerdings. 
Swartz: 
Er hätte es natürlich wissen müssen, aus anderen Gründen, aber das war für ihn 
kein Problem. Insofern hat sich also doch schon sehr viel getan. 
Nádas: 
Das ist doch sehr gefährlich. Er lebt in Kroatien, in Zagreb, tagtäglich mit den 
Folgen der Diktatur konfrontiert und weiß dabei nicht einmal, woher er stammt. 
Das beraubt ihn doch der Möglichkeit, die Dinge richtig zu reflektieren und zu 
beurteilen. 
Swartz: 
Da hast du Recht. 
Nádas: 
Das ist schon fast tragisch, aber natürlich ist es auch eine menschliche Reaktion. 
Die Nachkriegsgeneration wollte über die Kriegsereignisse auch nichts wissen. Der 
Holocaust und Auschwitz wurden nicht nur von den Deutschen oder von den 
Ungarn unterschlagen, sondern auch von den Überlebenden. Sie wollten darüber 
ebenfalls nicht sprechen. Sie empfanden es als fast schon pervers, ihre Kinder mit 
so etwas zu belasten. Ich kenne Menschen, die das erst viel später aus den Ge-
schichtsbüchern erfahren haben, nicht von den Familienmitgliedern, die es selbst 
erlebt hatten.  
Ein Freund von mir wurde in seiner Jugend von seiner Mutter gezwungen, 
nicht weniger als drei Fremdsprachen zu lernen. Warum? Die Mutter hatte einst ihr 
Leben dadurch retten können, dass sie fließend Französisch sprach und sie daher 
Franzosen in einem der Lager, Auschwitz oder Ravensbrück, ich weiß nicht wel-
ches, dazu bewegen konnte, ihr zu helfen. Das ist bis heute eine unglaubliche Last 
für diese Menschen. Fremdsprachen zu lernen, was wir ja eigentlich als positiv und 
optimistisch definieren würden, war hier motiviert aus dem Negativsten, aus dem 
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Glauben, nur so überleben zu können. Mein Freund verstand das ganz einfach 
nicht. 
Die Geschichte besteht aus einer ständigen Bewegung, aus Phasen der Pro-
gression und aus Phasen der Regression. Das gehört zusammen, das wechselt sich 
ab. Was wir jetzt in Europa beobachten, in Griechenland und anderswo, ist eine 
solche Phase der Regression, eine Regression, die vor den historischen Grenzen 
nicht haltmacht, sondern West und Ost gleichermaßen betrifft. 
Swartz: 
Ich komme noch einmal darauf zurück, wie schwierig es ist, einen anderen Men-
schen zu verstehen oder sich ihm zu öffnen, denn es gibt Dinge, über die wir Men-
schen nicht sprechen können. Das berührt, was Péter über das Schweigen der 
Überlebenden gesagt hat. Dasselbe trifft ja auch auf Soldaten zu, auf Männer oder 
auch auf Frauen, die im Krieg waren. Viele reden nicht darüber oder nur sehr un-
gern. Man fragt sich warum. Sicherlich ist da Schmerz, den man nicht wieder auf-
wühlen möchte. Es gibt Verdrängung, man möchte ganz einfach nicht daran erin-
nert werden. Aber ich glaube, sehr wichtig ist es auch, die dialektische Situation des 
Austausches zu verstehen. Wenn man mit jemandem ein Gespräch führt, gibt es 
auch eine Voraussetzung, nämlich dass der Andere dazu fähig ist zu verstehen, 
worüber man redet. Ich kann mir vorstellen, dass es viele menschliche Erfahrun-
gen gibt, die… 
Nádas: 
…die nicht zu verstehen sind. 
Swartz: 
… nicht zu verstehen sind. Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, dass jemand, der im Kon-
zentrationslager war, fast aggressiv sagen würde: „Warum sollte ich mit dem dar-
über reden? Ihm fehlt die Voraussetzung, etwas zu verstehen.“ Oder wenn ich in 
Stalingrad war und das mit Glück überlebt habe, warum sollte ich darüber spre-
chen, wenn ich wieder daheim bin? „Was verstehen die überhaupt davon? Ich habe 
überhaupt keine Möglichkeit, das an jemanden weiterzugeben, auch nur im kleins-
ten Maßstab verständlich zu machen.“  
Nádas: 
Hinzu kommt, dass Überleben immer auch bedeutet, dass andere nicht überlebt 
haben. Das heißt, der Betroffene weiß etwas, das die Nachwelt auch nicht wissen 
soll, nicht wissen darf. Ich kann niemanden darin einweihen, wie ich einem Ster-
benden den letzten Rest seines Brotes oder einem halbtoten Soldaten in Stalingrad 
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die wärmenden Stiefel weggenommen habe. Das wird nicht eingestanden, das kann 
man nicht eingestehen. 
Swartz: 
Vielleicht ist das auch eine Frage der Zeit. Könntest du dir nicht vorstellen, dass 




Es könnte vielleicht eine Zeit kommen, da man über den real existierenden Sozia-
lismus nicht mehr sprechen will und auch nicht mehr sprechen kann. Denn wie 
spricht man etwa mit diesem jungen Kroaten in Zagreb, den ich erwähnt habe? 
Wenn er gar keine Ahnung von Zensur und von der Unterdrückung der Intellek-
tuellen hat, dies nicht mit dem Kommunismus verbindet, hat man dann noch das 
Bedürfnis oder lohnt es sich überhaupt noch, mit einem solchen Menschen dar-
über zu sprechen? Ich würde es hoffen, aber ich bin mir diesbezüglich nicht sicher. 
Nádas: 
Diese Möglichkeit schließe ich leider aus, denn dann hätte Hegel recht behalten, 
die Geschichte wäre an einem Endziel angekommen und wir lebten in der besten 
aller Welten. Diese Vorstellung ist wahrscheinlich nicht richtig. 
Swartz: 
Ich sehe ein anderes Problem, nämlich dass die Menschen nicht dazu fähig sind, 
diese Dinge immer wieder durchzukauen, sich ständig mit ihnen zu konfrontieren. 
Dabei ist die Erinnerung wahrscheinlich die einzige kleine Möglichkeit, die wir 
haben, zu verhindern, dass wir das Ganze nochmals durchleben müssen. Aber ich 
habe den Eindruck, die Menschen wollen das nicht, immer wieder an das Vergan-
gene zu rühren. Wir stürzen uns in die nächste Katastrophe, anstatt ein Gespräch 
darüber zu führen, was war und wie es war. Wir tun es ganz einfach nicht. 
Die Deutschen haben es nach 1945 brav und tüchtig getan, aber nur, weil sie 
dazu gezwungen wurden. Wir anderen hingegen lügen noch immer über die Ver-
gangenheit, ergehen uns in Mythen. Die Polen sagen, sie hätten mehr gelitten als 
alle anderen. Dann kommen die Juden und sagen: „Entschuldigung, wir sind auch 
noch da!“ Das empört dann wiederum die Polen. Die Schweden und die Schweizer 
behaupten, dass sie während des Zweiten Weltkrieges neutral gewesen sind und 
mit dem ganzen ungeheuerlichen Geschehen nichts zu tun hatten, dabei haben ihre 
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Staaten sehr viel Geld verdient in dieser Zeit. Die Russen sind davon überzeugt, 
dass sie ganz alleine Europa befreit haben, dabei war die Sowjetunion zwei Jahre 
lang Deutschlands wichtigster Alliierter und sie wäre das wahrscheinlich auch ge-
blieben, hätte Hitler nicht den Angriff befohlen. In Frankreich redet man ständig 
von der Résistance, dabei waren Franzosen die eifrigsten Kollaborateure. Und so 
weiter und so fort.  
Wir lügen alle, alle lügen wir über die Vergangenheit. Nur die Deutschen nicht. 
Sie sind die Einzigen, die über die Vergangenheit nicht lügen. Aber nicht etwa weil 
die bessere Menschen sind, sondern weil die dazu gezwungen wurden, nicht mehr 
zu lügen. Dieser Zwang ist jedoch die große Ausnahme. Wo er nicht ausgeübt 
wird, wird eifrig weitergelogen. Also ich sehe das ziemlich schwarz. 
Nádas: 
Ich auch. Wenn man versucht, diese Dinge zu klären, ist das eine sehr schwierige 
Angelegenheit, bei der man eigentlich neue Begriffe verwenden müsste. Nur gibt 
man alte, eingefahrene Begriffe nicht gerne auf. Man könnte beispielsweise auch 
fragen, ob wir gerecht mit dem Begriff des Kommunismus umgehen. Wo gab es 
überhaupt Kommunismus? Kommunismus ist eigentlich ein scharf umrissener 
Begriff. Wo herrschten denn in Wirklichkeit Kommunisten? Meine Eltern waren 
Kommunisten und sie waren nicht die einzigen Kommunisten, die ich kannte. 
Aber nach einigen Jahren wurden sie aus dem Verkehr gezogen von Kommunis-
ten, die im Grunde Nichtkommunisten waren. Wir sollten viel passender von einer 
Diktatur sprechen, von einem sowjetischen Imperium. Aber wie gesagt, man gibt 
die alten Begriffe nur ungern auf, auch den des Kommunismus. 
Raabe:  
Péter Nádas, unmittelbar nach der Wende haben Sie in mehreren Essays über die 
nationale und die individuelle Selbstbestimmung geschrieben. Das klang damals, in 
der Wendezeit, hoffnungsvoll. Was ist daraus heute geworden? Warum gibt es 
gerade in Ungarn, aber auch in Serbien, in Rumänien, anders als in Deutschland, so 
viele virulente Geschichtslügen? Hängt das miteinander zusammen, dass man nati-
onal sich selbst bestimmen will und dass man einen erlogenen Mythos dazu 
braucht? 
Nádas: 
Das hängt eher mit dieser historischen Wellenbewegung zusammen. Nach einer 
progressiven Phase, die recht lange dauerte, etwa sechs oder sieben Jahre, trat die 
ungarische Gesellschaft in eine regressive Phase ein. Diese Regression, die gesund 
und nötig gewesen ist, hält nun aber schon sehr viel länger an und ist auch unnötig 
tief. 
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Alles das ist in gewissem Sinne selbstverständlich. Jeder nutzt seine Freiheitsrechte 
in der Demokratie, auch die Nationalisten und Rechtsextremen. Darauf war ich 
nicht vorbereitet, dass die Demokratie gegenüber Kräften, die sie unterwandern 
wollen, ausgeliefert ist, eigentlich schutzlos. Denn wenn Demokratie sich schützen 
würde, dann wird sie zur Diktatur oder nimmt zumindest die Züge einer Diktatur 
an. Es handelt sich also um eine Gratwanderung. 
In Deutschland verbindet man die Veränderungen von 1989 hauptsächlich mit 
dem Mauerfall. Bei uns in Ungarn ist keine Mauer gefallen, daher spricht man vom 
Systemwechsel. Bei diesem Systemwechsel wurde auch unsere alte Verfassung 
reformiert. Die Personen, die dafür verantwortlich gezeichnet haben, einige davon 
Freunde von mir, hatten häufig an amerikanischen Universitäten studiert und zum 
Teil auch gelehrt. Sie waren stark beeinflusst vom amerikanischen Freiheitsver-
ständnis und das spiegelt sich in der neuen Verfassung, in der viele Elemente des 
amerikanischen Politik- und Rechtssystems übernommen worden sind. Nur vergaß 
man dabei, welche Traditionen, auch rechtliche Tradition, die ungarische Gesell-
schaft selbst hat. Die Progression ist also zu weit gegangen, hatte negative Seiten. 
Das hatte die jetzige Regression zur Folge. Das meine ich mit dieser historischen 
Wellenbewegung. 
Swartz: 
Ich sehe es ein bisschen anders. Wie zuvor bereits betont, Demokratie und Wohl-
stand, das alles braucht Zeit. Es kommt nicht von einem Tag auf den anderen. 
Dessen war man sich in Osteuropa nicht bewusst und das hat am Ende zu einer 
Enttäuschung geführt. Man hatte es sich anders vorgestellt. Es sollte alles viel 
schneller kommen. Aber es kommt eben nicht so schnell. 
Nádas: 
Schnell und vor allem automatisch. 
Swartz: 
Ja, das ist ein wichtiges Wort in diesem Zusammenhang, automatisch. Wenn wir 
von der Mangelwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft übergehen, dann lösen sich alle 
Probleme von alleine, dann sind Wohlstand und Demokratie die logische Folge. 
Das war die Vorstellung. 
Nádas: 
Eine sehr amerikanische Vorstellung. 
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Swartz: 
Wahrscheinlich. Wenn man dann am eigenen Leib spürt, dass es nicht so schnell 
und automatisch geht, dann entwickeln sich Enttäuschung und Frustration. Daraus 
entsteht die besagte Regression, der Rückfall auf das, was einem vertraut ist. Nur 
ist das jetzt nicht mehr Kommunismus, sondern Nationalismus. Der Nationalis-
mus ist eine Ideologie für frustrierte Völker und Menschen. Er hat mit der Wirk-
lichkeit der modernen Welt nichts zu tun. Es ist ein Weg, den man eigentlich nicht 
begehen kann. Aber viele, die enttäuscht sind, verfallen doch darauf, denn der 
Nationalismus hat seine Vorteile. Beispielsweise ist immer jemand anderes an einer 
Misere schuld. Man selbst trägt keine Verantwortung, weder als Gesellschaft noch 
als Individuum. Die Vorstellung ist, dass, wenn man denjenigen, der verantwortlich 
oder schuldig ist, ausmerzen kann, dann wird alles rosig und schön. Der Nationa-
list braucht und sucht also immer einen Feind. Ohne diesen Feind kann er nicht 
existieren. 
Das erklärt viele der Dinge, die etwa heute in Ungarn vor sich gehen. Im Wes-
ten sind viele gerade von dieser Entwicklung in Ungarn überrascht worden, zum 
Teil weil die Sprachbarriere bei diesem Land so hoch ist. Das ist wirklich eine die-
ser Grenzen, die geblieben sind. Das Schlimmste, was in Ungarn passiert, ist diese 
Identifizierung von Feinden, von der ich gesprochen habe. Gerade in dieser Hin-
sicht müsste die Europäische Union stärker eingreifen. 
Nádas: 
Die Europäische Union hat bisher alles geschluckt, was in Ungarn vor sich gegan-
gen ist. Barroso und Merkel sind einverstanden. Gelegentlich regen sich einige 
westliche Zeitungen auf, aber diese Aufregung verpufft angesichts der politischen 
Akzeptanz, die die Veränderungen gefunden haben. 
Diese moralische Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Verhältnissen in Ungarn ha-
be ich auch zuvor schon beobachtet, in Zeiten der Diktatur, als János Kádár eine 
Art Vermittlerrolle zwischen Ost und West einnahm. Willy Brandt hat sich ganz 
gut mit Kádár verstanden. Die kleine demokratische Opposition in Ungarn, die 
störte nur bei dem Versuch der westeuropäischen Linken, eine Verbindung zu den 
Kommunisten in der Sowjetunion aufzubauen. Als Brandt und Kádár nach ihren 
erfolgreichen Verhandlungen miteinander tanzten, durchaus im wörtlichen Sinne, 
war man sich bezüglich der Beurteilung der ungarischen Demokraten sehr einig: 
„Was wollen diese Menschen überhaupt? Warum regen sich die so auf? Das sind 
doch Verrückte!“ 
Die Geschichte hatte ihre eigene Logik. Ich habe nichts gegen die Verhandlun-
gen, die Willy Brandt mit János Kádár oder die Helmut Schmidt mit Erich Ho-
necker führten. Diese Verhandlungen haben einen Dritten Weltkrieg verhindert 
und das war strategisch wichtiger. Aber sie fanden eben immer statt hinter dem 
Rücken einer kleinen demokratischen Opposition, im Falle Polens sogar hinter 
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dem Rücken einer großen demokratischen Opposition. Dieser Wahrheit muss man 
sich heute stellen, also hinter die Kulissen der Lügen und Spiele und des Theaters, 
die es früher gab, blicken. Das wird nicht immer akzeptiert. Als ich einmal einen 
Vortrag bei der Deutschen Bank in Frankfurt hielt und diese Dinge ansprach, hat 
mich die anwesende Witwe von Brandt schwer dafür angegriffen. Erst beim an-
schließenden Abendessen haben wir uns dann versöhnt. 
Raabe: 
Wir möchten die Zwiesprache jetzt zum Publikum hin öffnen. Es sind ja sehr viele 
wichtige Themen angeklungen, und vielleicht gibt es dazu Fragen oder Kommen-
tare? 
Frage: 
Herr Nádas und Herr Swartz, sie haben sich in der Zwiesprache sehr ausführlich 
darüber unterhalten, dass Freundschaften in Osteuropa und in Westeuropa unter-
schiedlich funktionierten. Diese Vorstellung artikuliert sich ja sehr oft, nämlich 
dass es einen engeren Zusammenhalt zwischen Freunden und Bekannten in Ost-
europa gab. Herr Swartz betonte damals sogar, dass er das beneide. Woraufhin 
Herr Nádas sagte: „Wir sind immer nur eine Notgemeinschaft. Stell dir darunter 
nicht so etwas Schönes vor!“ Hat sich das verändert, ist es gleichgeblieben? Wie 
führt man heute Freundschaften in Osteuropa? 
Nádas: 
Das ist eine schwierige Frage, weil Freundschaften oder Liebschaften zu den Din-
gen gehören, die durch das politische Geschehen nicht richtig veränderbar sind. 
Ich würde nicht behaupten, dass es gar keinen Einfluss gibt, aber im Kern sind 
solche Verbindungen unveränderbar oder doch zumindest nur langfristig verän-
derbar. Dieser Hang zu Notgemeinschaften oder zum Familiären, das ist geblie-
ben. Aber die Kontakte sind kühler geworden, zurückhaltender. Man wird vorsich-
tiger. Früher spielte es für mich keine Rolle, welchem meiner Freunde ich welche 
Frage stellte oder wie ich eine an mich gerichtete Frage beantwortete. Heute über-
legt man doch häufiger, ob man eine bestimme Frage überhaupt stellen oder wie 
man eine Frage beantworten sollte. Das ist auch eine Gefahr, die mit der Freiheit 
kommt. Freiheit ist gefährlich, aber Diktatur ist noch gefährlicher. 
Swartz: 
Ich weiß gar nicht mehr, was da genau im Buch steht, aber für mich sind Freund-
schaften nicht abhängig von politischen Systemen. Das heißt, vielleicht mit einer 
Einschränkung, die mit der Dimension der Zeit zu tun hat. Wie vieles, das wichtig 
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ist im Leben, brauchen auch Freundschaft und Liebe Zeit, um sich zu entwickeln. 
Das war der große Unterschied zwischen West- und Osteuropa damals: In Osteu-
ropa hatte man sehr viel Zeit. Das traf im Westen überhaupt nicht zu, teilweise mit 
verheerenden Folgen. Natürlich gab es andere Einflüsse im Osten, die zerstöre-
risch auf Freundschaften wirken konnten, aber Zeit hatte man. Ich erinnere mich 
immer noch mit Freuden daran, wie oft und freundschaftlich ich in Osteuropa 
aufgenommen wurde und wie viel Zeit die Menschen sich für mich nahmen. 
Manchmal gab es sogar die Möglichkeit, sich zu revanchieren, wenn Freunde 
in den Westen reisen durften und mich in Wien besuchten. Aber dann stellte sich 
immer auch schnell ein riesiges Problem ein, weil diese Freunde Vorstellungen von 
dieser gemeinsamen Zeit hatten, die ich nicht oder nur unter äußersten Anstren-
gungen erfüllen konnte. Denn sie waren davon ausgegangen, dass ich ewig für sie 
da sein und mit ihnen etwas unternehmen würde – was ich aber nicht konnte. Ge-
legentlich hat das sogar zu regelrecht peinlichen Situationen geführt. 
Nádas: 
Ab und zu auch zu komischen Situationen. 
Swartz: 
Komisch, ja. Aber für dich habe ich ja immer eine Ausnahme gemacht. 
Nádas: 
Wirklich? Ich erinnere dich da an die Zeit, als ich deine Gastfreundschaft drei Wo-
chen strapazieren musste, weil ich in Wien auf ein Visum wartete. Du hast mir 
damals einfach nicht erlaubt, ohne das Visum abzureisen. Aber diese Art von Be-
suchen ist schon nach wenigen Tagen eine Belastung, um wie viel mehr nach drei 
Wochen! 
Swartz: 
Ja, das war zugegeben echt zu lang. Ich habe dir mehrmals auf meine diskrete Art 
und Weise angedeutet, dass du wieder abhauen solltest, aber du hast es nicht be-
griffen. 
Nádas: 
Nicht begriffen, ja. Gut, dass du es jetzt zumindest sagst. 
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Frage: 
Sie haben Zweifel angemeldet, ob die Freiheit, die man jetzt nutzen kann, die Mög-
lichkeit, sich ohne Probleme zu besuchen und kennenzulernen, wirklich zu einem 
besseren wechselseitigen Verständnis führt. Nach meiner Erfahrung ist das aber 
so. Ich habe als Student in meiner Zeit in Amsterdam Menschen aus Slowenien 
und Polen und Tschechien gut kennengelernt, was unter den früheren politischen 
Verhältnissen nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Dieses Kennenlernen hat mir ein bes-
seres Verständnis dieser Länder und ihrer Gesellschaften eröffnet. Auch die Kon-
ferenz, zu der wir uns hier versammelt haben, findet ja in diesem Geiste statt, näm-
lich dass Dialog zu Verständigung führt. 
Nádas: 
Natürlich ist das eine sehr große Hoffnung. Es ist auch die einzige Möglichkeit. 
Das ist ja gerade, was Freiheit ausmacht, diese Option, zu reisen und sich auszu-
tauschen. Im Laufe der Zeit führt das sicher auch zu Veränderungen. Das bedeutet 
aber nicht, dass die historischen Unterschiede, von denen wir gesprochen haben, 
einfach so verschwinden werden, denn das sind stärkere Einflüsse. Dennoch, wenn 
die Unterschiede zumindest überbrückt werden und man sich verständigen kann, 
dann ist das schon eine sehr große Leistung. Und für einen jungen Menschen wie 
Sie ist es das Natürlichste überhaupt. 
Frage: 
Das Desinteresse, das Sie angesprochen haben, ist das wirklich etwas, das typisch 
für die west-östliche Dimension ist, oder handelt es sich dabei nicht doch um ein 
allgemeineres Problem, das sich auch innerhalb des Westens manifestiert? Meiner 
Beobachtung nach interessieren sich die Menschen hier genauso wenig für das, was 
Herr Berlusconi in Italien treibt, wie dafür, was Herr Orbán in Ungarn macht. Das 
ist doch eine ähnliche Konstellation, aus meiner Sicht zumindest. 
Nádas: 
Ich habe sehr früh die Erfahrung gemacht, bereits 1968, dass die historischen 
Entwicklungen in ganz Europa recht ähnlich ablaufen, unabhängig davon, in wel-
cher Materie sie sich abspielen. Es ist überhaupt kein Zufall, dass in ganz verschie-
denen Gesellschaften zur gleichen Zeit kleine ‚Diktatoren‘ mit sehr ähnlichen Cha-
rakterzügen auftauchen. Man könnte in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Namen 
Sarkozy und Putin anführen. Wir haben es mit sehr ähnlichen Charakteren zu tun, 
die aber in Gesellschaften mit ganz unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen in Erschei-
nung treten. Diese Parallelen sind sehr interessant. 
Auch das Verhalten der einfachen Bürger ist in diesem Zusammenhang her-
vorzuheben. Italien und Griechenland – das sind Urlaubsländer. Die Menschen 
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fahren dorthin, um sich zu erholen, um sich zu amüsieren. Sie wollen sich von 
dem, was in diesen Ländern vonstattengeht, nicht dabei stören lassen. Und das ist 
das gute Recht dieser Menschen, denn sie haben ihren Urlaub bezahlt, dürfen also 
mit einem Gegenwert rechnen. Wer in diesen Ländern gerade Ministerpräsident ist, 
das ist diesen Menschen gleichgültig. In diesem Sinne hat jeder auch persönliche 
Verantwortung – und diese Verantwortung kann nicht auf Regierungen oder Par-
teien abgeschoben werden. 
Frage: 
Herr Nádas, könnten Sie die Vorstellung, dass Freiheit auch Kälte bedeutet, noch 
ein bisschen konkreter erläutern? 
Nádas: 
Das diesbezügliche Zitat aus der Zwiesprache stammt eigentlich von Richard. Al-
lerdings hatte ich damals schon eine gewisse Vorstellung, was damit gemeint ist. 
Der Begriff der Freiheit hat zwei Seiten. Einerseits bezieht er sich auf die innere 
Freiheit, andererseits auf die politische Freiheit. In beiden Fällen aber geht Freiheit 
mit individueller Verantwortung einher, die nicht aufgegeben werden kann. Bei 
politischen Entscheidungen übertragen wir diese Verantwortung auf Parteien, 
Regierungen, Gemeinderäte und so weiter. Aber diese Übertragung verantworten 
wir selbst, dem können wir nicht entkommen. Das impliziert auch, dass wir uns 
den Folgen zu stellen haben, unabhängig davon, wie diese aussehen. Diese Kon-
frontation mit der eigenen Verantwortung kann sehr hart sein. Das ist ähnlich wie 
im Protestantismus, wo Gott diese Verantwortung auch nicht einfach von uns 
nimmt. Luther und Calvin hatten diesbezüglich verschiedene Vorstellungen in den 
Details, aber in den Grundfragen waren sie sich einig. Hier in Deutschland sind 
sogar die Katholiken von dieser Vorstellung beeinflusst worden. 
Frage: 
Herrn Swartz, Sie haben den Faktor Zeit mehrfach angesprochen. Wie viel Zeit, 
denken Sie, hat die junge Generation, um das friedliche Projekt Europa weiter 
voranzutreiben? 
Swartz: 
Ich kann, will und darf hier nicht als Lehrer der Jugend auftreten. Ich war gestern 
jung, heute bin ich es nicht mehr. Alles geht so furchtbar schnell. Das ist das Ein-
zige, was ich dazu sagen kann. Oder vielmehr, ich könnte das mit einer Anekdote 
beleuchten: 
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Als die Franzosen 1989 den 200. Jahrestag ihrer Revolution feierten, gab es eine 
große Konferenz von Experten in Paris. Zu den Teilnehmern zählte auch ein chi-
nesischer Historiker, ein älterer Herr, der in Fachkreisen sehr berühmt war. Jedoch 
hat er sich tagelang überhaupt nicht geäußert, während seine Kollegen auf dem 
Podium dies und jenes über die Revolution gesagt haben. Am letzten Tag der 
Konferenz ist dann der Vorsitzende an ihn herangetreten mit der Bitte, doch auch 
etwas zum Thema beizusteuern. So hat er dann, sehr höflich, das Wort ergriffen 
und gesagt, dass er mit großem Interesse die Beiträge seiner Kollegen zur Franzö-
sischen Revolution verfolgt und dabei auch sehr viel gelernt habe. Dann fügte er 
hinzu: „Ich selbst möchte mich aber nicht zu diesen Dingen äußern, denn in mei-
nem Land sind 200 Jahre eine viel zu kurze Zeit, um über ein solch wichtiges Er-
eignis irgendetwas zu sagen.“ 
Frage: 
Wenn wir versuchen, das Transkulturelle auf der persönlichen Ebene zu verorten 
und auf das eigene Erleben schauen, wie sich Identität da immer wieder verändert 
und neu bestimmt, wie sehen Sie selbst heute diese Vorstellung von ‚Ostmenschen‘ 
und ‚Westmenschen‘, wie sie in Ihrem damaligen Gespräch anklang? Wirkt dieser 
Gegensatz noch in Ihnen fort? Oder hat sich in der langen Zeit seit 1989, zuhause 
oder auf Reisen, nicht doch eine Vermischung der Identitäten eingestellt? 
Swartz: 
Dieses Begriffspaar ‚Ostmensch‘-‚Westmensch‘ hatte damals vor allem die Funkti-
on einer Provokation, um bestimmte Dinge besser zu verstehen. Allerdings denke 
ich, dass diese Gegenüberstellung auch recht tauglich ist. Diese Unterschiede exis-
tierten damals und sie leben auch weiter fort. Es gibt kleine Regungen, filigrane 
Reflexe des Herzens oder des Bewusstseins, die in der Tat auf die grundverschie-
denen historischen Erfahrungen der Menschen zurückgehen. Nach meiner Ein-
schätzung werden diese Unterschiede da sein, solange ich lebe. Wie es sich diesbe-
züglich bei der jüngeren Generation verhält? Die Hoffnung ist natürlich, dass diese 
Unterschiede bei Auffassungen und Reaktionen im Laufe der Zeit verschwinden 
werden. Aber, um diesen Aspekt noch einmal anzusprechen, solche Umstellungen 
dauern sehr, sehr lange. Ich wage nicht vorauszusagen, wie lange junge Menschen 
in Europa noch mit solchen Phänomenen leben müssen. Das weiß ich ganz ein-
fach nicht. Jedoch sind die Voraussetzungen geschaffen, um sie zu überwinden.  
Nádas: 
Wir hatten diese Begriffe ‚Ostmensch‘ und ‚Westmensch‘ in Anführungszeichen 
gesetzt und ironisch verwendet. Sie sind nicht bierernst zu verstehen wie etwa 
politische Fachtermini. Die Zwiesprache fand zwischen zwei Menschen statt, die 
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sich nahestanden, die gelegentlich also auch grobe Begriffe verwendeten, um etwas 
provokativ zu veranschaulichen. Ich würde diese Begriffe heute eigentlich nicht 
mehr in den Mund nehmen wollen, auch aus pädagogischen Gründen. Sie wirken 
wie eine faule Ausrede, mit der man eigene Unfähigkeit verschleiern will.  
Swartz: 
Man kann es so machen wie meine kroatische Frau und ich, wenn wir miteinander 
zanken, auf Englisch oder auf Kroatisch oder auch auf Schwedisch. Dann sagt 
einer von uns beiden zwangsläufig irgendwann: „Ja, du bist auch einer von denen!“ 
Das ist geographisch und damit historisch nicht so spezifisch wie ‚Ostmensch‘ und 
‚Westmensch‘ und daher vielleicht ein wenig neutraler. 
Nádas: 
Im Gegensatz dazu ist das Begriffspaar ‚Ossi‘-‚Wessi‘, wie es in Deutschland ver-
wendet wird, überhaupt nicht harmlos oder ironisch oder leichtfüßig. Es ist viel-
mehr sehr ernst zu nehmen – und wird natürlich auch falsch verwendet. Obwohl 
die Unterschiede noch heute vorhanden sind. Berlin besteht bis heute aus zwei 
Städten. 
Raabe: 
Ich möchte mich herzlich bei Péter Nádas und Richard Swartz für diese Fortset-
zung Ihrer Zwiesprache aus dem Jahr 1989 bedanken. Es war ein mäanderndes, 
schönes, lebendiges, spontanes Gespräch, auf seine Weise transkulturell und euro-
päisch. Was einen wirklich in die Verzweiflung treiben kann, das klang mehrmals 
an, ist nicht nur die Schutzlosigkeit, sondern vor allem die Dummheit. Gegen die 




European identity contested? 
Bassam Tibi 
1. 
Let me start my reflections with an anecdote: In 1995, I was Visiting Professor at 
India International Centre in Delhi. As a farewell the institution arranged a party 
for me the night before I was leaving. The Director of the Centre asked me: 
“Where are you going tomorrow?” As I was heading to Cairo to continue my work 
at Al-Ahram Strategic Center, I replied: “I’m heading to the Middle East.” He 
started laughing, laughing in a way that his glass fell down and broke. People 
looked around and asked: “What is going on?” He said: “Professor Tibi is lousy in 
geography.” And I said: “Why? I’m going to the Middle East.” He said: “But you 
are in India right now and so you are going west, you are not going east. If you’d 
go east, you’d go to Japan. But going to Cairo means you are going west.”  
By then I realized in that awkward situation that my perspective on the world 
was shaped by a Eurocentric geography. My country of origin, Syria, is West Asia, 
whereas Egypt is Africa. I am West Asian, I am Muslim and Arab and I claim to be 
a European citizen. I’m a German citizen and I believe the European identity is as 
model inclusive. I’m critical of exclusion and I argue instead for an inclusive identi-
ty. In principle European identity is inclusive and not ethnic. In this sense, ethnici-
ty and citizenship are contradictions. A model which is based on the ethnicity of 
individuals contradicts the realities in our age of globalisation and global migration. 
In reality, however, Europe is ethnic and does not match with the ideals of its uni-
versal inclusive citizen identity.1  
When you walk through a city like Frankfurt, you see Asians, Africans, Middle 
Easterners – and very few Germans. When I had first come to Frankfurt in 1962, 
there were maybe only one thousand foreigners in the city at the time – and most 
of them were Greeks and Italians, meaning Europeans. Today, 35% of the people 
who live in Frankfurt are not ethnic Germans. Imagine this, 35%! And they come 
from 165 nations. So Germany, but also Europe as a whole, is changing as a result 
of globalisation and global migration. Is Europe in a position to deal with these 
                                                     
1 See the contributions to Ethnic Europe. Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a Globalized World, ed. Roland 
Hsu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) in particular my chapter “The return of Ethnicity to 
Europe via Islamic Migration? The Ethnicization of the Islamic Diaspora,” 127-156. 
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new realities? Is it able to adjust to the changed conditions? This is not meant as a 
rhetorical question. If an inclusive European identity cannot plausibly be defined in 
terms of ethnicity, what is the alternative? My proposition is a model based on the 
concept of civilisation and bridging. I shall explore this idea in the course of the 
present article and try to answer the question whether this concept is compatible 
with the changes we observe in the age of globalisation.  
2. 
At this conjunction let me start with addressing the ideology of multiculturalism, 
which is often brought up in these debates. Professor Will Kymlicka is one of the 
prophets of multiculturalism in the world. His perspective is a Canadian one, not a 
European. I am very critical of multiculturalism, because the term is not clearly 
defined. If you say: “Ich bin gegen Multikulti. I am against multiculturalism” in Ger-
many, then you run the risk to be viewed as a person who is against foreigners and 
against migration. In response, I say in Arabic: “Astaghfiru li Allah. I ask God for 
forgiveness.” How could I be against migration, how could I be against foreigners? 
I am a migrant, I am a foreigner myself, of course with a German citizenship. The 
point is that I draw a clear distinction between multiculturalism and cultural plural-
ism. This point is not well understood in the common debate. People of different 
cultures can live together peacefully. Of course they can, why not? However, there 
is one requirement. The requirement is that they need to accept a house order for 
living together. If you live in a house and you have no order for the house, the 
tensions would follow and conflict emerges. And the house order, in academic 
terms, has to be based on a consent to core values. This is my understanding of 
value conflicts and cross-civilisational bridging as a conflict resolution.2 
Multiculturalism is cultural relativism that argues: “Anything goes.” Like Prof. 
Kymlicka does. When we were in Jerusalem five or six years ago, he started arguing 
for multiculturalism of anything goes including Sharia. Then I questioned his 
knowledge about the Sharia and I asked him: “Can you be more specific?” His 
response was amazing. I gave him a lesson in the Sharia, because I’m an expert in 
this field. Then he realised it wouldn’t work. If you want to live in Europe and you 
want to practice the Sharia, you would get into a value conflict with all European 
constitutions on all levels. That is why there must be some boundaries. The differ-
ence between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism is this: cultural pluralism ap-
proves diversity. However, you need to add that diversity has to be combined with 
the consent to universal crosscultural core values. These core values are actually 
very limited: civil society, freedom of belief, gender equality and so on. In the Is-
lamic Sharia, there is no gender equality. So if somebody says: “It is part of my 
                                                     
2 For more details see Bassam Tibi, Islam in Global Politics. Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging (Lon-
don/New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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faith not to consider a woman as equal.” I can only reply: Okay, you can do that in 
private at home. But when you enter the public square, woman and man are equal. 
You cannot deny gender equality, if you want to live as a citizen in Europe. The 
ideal of European identity is based on universal human rights. This is an accom-
plishment nobody is allowed to deny. 
When we talk about European identity, then what are we talking about? And 
where do we go from here? My mother tongue is Arabic. I was educated in Da-
mascus in school in French and then in English. When I came to Germany in 
1962, I spoke not a word of German. But I learned German and it became one of 
my beloved languages. After all, I have written thirty books in German ever since. 
When I published my book Europa ohne Identität3, I added many terms to the Ger-
man language. I’m very proud of doing that. The term Parallelgesellschaft, parallel 
society, did not exist before, I added it. I also added the notion Leitkultur. There 
was a huge debate in this country about Leitkultur from October to December 
2000. For three months, all media, all politicians were talking about Leitkultur every 
day. Since I am the one who coined the term in the cited book, I was at the centre 
of this debate. That is why Angela Merkel by then leader of the CDU opposition 
party, in a press conference in Berlin in October 2010, quoted me as source of the 
term. But people got me wrong. They allege that “Leitkultur, das sind deutsche Sitten 
und Bräuche, encompasses German customs and traditions.” My response was: „My 
god, no!” By Leitkultur I mean a consensually accepted value system of a civil soci-
ety. There are many German Sitten und Bräuche, which I disapprove and they could 
never inspire my model. In short: Leitkultur is a European value system. These are 
not national values. Deutsche Werte are national values, they might be good for some 
Germans, but definitely not for all of them, who prefer to be Europeans and clear-
ly prefer European values. European values are civilisational – and European iden-
tity is based on civilisational values. Universal arguments against the relativism of 
multiculturalism approve a cross-civilizational bridging in an effort to establish 
shared values of people of different cultures.  
3. 
At this point there is a need to introduce the notion of civilisation and differentiate 
it from the tainted one used by Samuel Huntington the late distinguished Harvard 
professor. He was actually the one who brought me to Harvard in 1982. We were 
friends, but we were also in disagreement and critical of one another. One should 
speak with respect about people who passed away, but it is simply true that he did 
not know much about civilisations. Still, his most successful book was The Clash of 
                                                     
3 Bassam Tibi, Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (München: Bertelsmann, 
1998). 
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Civilizations4 preceded by an article of ten pages in Foreign Affairs in 1993, called “A 
Clash of Civilizations”5, sparked an international debate. Within six weeks, it had 
been translated into 36 languages. A publisher offered him to develop the ten pag-
es into a book. So the term “clash of civilisation” became very famous. But this 
was not Huntington’s true field of expertise. Civilisation is a classic term in the 
humanities, one that has been debated on the highest intellectual level for a long 
time. I mention only a few of the most important protagonists of this debate. Their 
most significant contributions, such as Will Durant do not appear in Huntington’s 
book. 
The man who coined the term civilisation is an Islamic philosopher. His name 
is Ibn Khaldun. He wrote a Prolegomena, in Arabic Al Muqaddimah, in the fourteenth 
century. He claimed to be the founder of ilm al-'umran.” which means “science of 
civilisation.” French scholars discovered his contribution as late as the 18th century. 
Another main protagonist in the academic debate on civilisation is Will Durant. He 
was an American Jew, who, together with his wife, published twelve volumes: The 
Story of Civilizations.6 The Frenchman Fernand Braudel wrote a History of Civiliza-
tions. And, finally, one of the greatest European historians, Arnold Toynbee, estab-
lished the study of civilisation as an own discipline.  
When you talk about civilisational identity and relate this to Europe, the thing 
you have to realise is that there are different levels of building identity. Everyone 
has an individual identity. I have an individual identity: My name is Bassam. This 
personal identity is unfolded in in a socialization process in family and education. 
But I also have a professional identity as an academic. I have a citizenship identity 
as a German citizen. There is also a pattern of a civilisational identity. For Muslims 
civilisational identity is Islam. Can one though be also a European, which means 
averting a conflict between Islam on the one hand, and the West and Europe on 
the other? This is why most of my academic life has been devoted to harmonising 
Islam, as a civilisation, not as a faith, with Europe as a civilisation in order to pro-
mote a Euro-Islam. Civilisation indeed is a major notion. When I talk about Euro-
pean identity, I speak of it in terms of a European civilisation. Such a thing does 
exist. European civilisation is an idea, an idea that is documented in the history of 
ideas, yes, but it is also a reality in history of a European civilisational identity.  
In my teaching years in Germany (1970-2009), I made the experience that 
maybe 90% of my German students and 95% of my American students claim: 
“The West has always been there.” This is not true. European civilisation actually 
                                                     
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996). 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations? The Next Pattern of Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 
72.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. 
6 The Story of Civilization, eds. Will Durant and Ariel Durant, 12 volumes (New York: Simon & Schus-
ter, 1935-1975). 
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has a date of origin: It was born in the age of Charlemagne. There is a German 
book called Einladung in das Mittelalter7, where it says: “Karl der Große ist der Be-
gründer Europas” – the founder of Europe and the founder of European civilisation. 
There are two big epochs of European civilisation. The first epoch lasted from 
Charlemagne until the beginning of the Renaissance, meaning the sixteenth centu-
ry. This first big epoch of European civilisation is defined by the term Christliches 
Abendland, Christendom in English. However, we should be more precise about 
this. The term should actually be Western Christendom, because Eastern Europe, 
which is also Europe, had a different civilisation. There is a civilisational boundary 
between Western and Eastern Europe, and the history of both entities is different. 
Western Christendom later split up into Catholicism and Protestantism, but it is 
still represented in one civilisation, distinct from the Eastern European civilisation. 
The second epoch of Western European civilisation, lasting to date, is das säkulare 
Zeitalter, the secular age. Europeans remain Christians, but the values of their civili-
sation have been secular since the Renaissance. These values are based on Human-
ism, on Enlightenment, on the ideas of the French Revolution and on modern 
democracy – not on Christianity. It is very important to underline this point, be-
cause we have entered a period where the paradigm of secularity is being ques-
tioned. Charles Taylor recently published a book called The Secular Age, where he 
challenges some of our basic notions about the retreat of religion and the domi-
nance of a secular worldview.8 What lies ahead, I do not know. But to date, Eu-
rope is definitely a secular civilisation. Its values are secular as well. The notion of a 
“post-secular society” is a mere construction.    
4. 
What are the ingredients of European identity? West Europeans have a common 
history, they share some core values. Of course, diversity exists. Italy is not Swe-
den, though both belong to Europe. The same actually applies to Islam. I have 
lived in Senegal in West Africa and also in Indonesia in South-East Asia. I know 
both countries very well. The Senegalese people are Muslims and they are black 
and the Indonesians are Asians. But both share not only the belief of Islam but 
also being members of the Islamic civilisation as Islamdom. People ask: “You really 
want to put Italians and Swedes in the same boat? “ Well, civilisationally, yes. The 
fact is that, within each civilisation, there is a great diversity, so we encounter both 
unity and diversity. I again refer to the example of Islam: 1.7 billion people are 
Muslims and they exist throughout the world and they share the core values of 
Islamic civilisation. But these values of Islamic civilisations developed historically 
                                                     
7 Horst Fuhrmann, Einladung ins Mittelalter (München: Beck, 1987). 
8 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007); German edition: Ein säkulares Zeit-
alter, translated by Joachim Schulte (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012). 
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 52 
and are not identical with Islamic faith, though of course both are interrelated. 
Europe is secular and European values are secular. And within Europe, there is 
diversity on all levels, but there is also a unity in this, the unity of secular values. 
How does Europe survive as a civilisation in the age of globalisation? I shall 
unfold here a major idea, which has occupied my mind for the past fifteen years or 
so. The idea sounds odd, but I shall explain it to you. I contend that there is simul-
taneity, Gleichzeitigkeit, of globalisation and fragmentation. And this is what affects 
European identity at the present in the age of crossing civilisational borders.   
I elaborated on this idea in a contribution to the two-volumes Handbook of 
Global Communication, edited by Robert Fortner. Chapter 4 of that book is of mine, 
and the title of the chapter is “The Simultaneity of Globalization and Fragmenta-
tion.” 9 The argument is that Europe is now embedded in a global structure. Glob-
alisation means the shrinking of the world. People have a high degree of mutual 
awareness nowadays. When you leave after this lecture ends, you go home and may 
turn on the TV or the radio and you can find out what is going on in the world, for 
example in countries of the Arab Spring. The Spring has turned into a nasty winter 
marked by the killing going on in Syria and Libya and elsewhere. You can learn 
about the crisis in Greece. You can know what is happening in other parts of the 
world, even without being there. This is a mutual awareness, an interconnectedness 
that has never existed before in world history to this extent. This is globalisation, 
but it only covers the structures, the economy, the sphere of politics and media. 
We have a world economy, we have an international system of states, we have 
global communication. Despite all of this there is no global culture, there is no 
Weltkultur. This shrinking of the world does not in itself create a unity of outlook. 
People have a worldview, but it is not shared with the worldview of people of 
other cultures. Everybody has his or her own worldview. And there is also a civili-
sational worldview. Civilisational worldviews differ from one another just as much 
as personal ones do. Higher civilisational awareness of the other does not mean 
that people share the same value system. And what may follow is inter-civilisational 
value conflict. Please do not confuse this notion with a clash of civilisations. If you 
clash with somebody, you cannot talk to one another, because you are at war. But 
if two parties have a conflict and both are rational, they sit down and negotiate and 
reach a conflict resolution. Conflicts can be resolved. And in international rela-
tions, conflict resolution is one of the basic areas of research and also an important 
aspect of scholars consulting politics. Nonetheless, Huntington speaks of a clash 
of civilisations and he is wrong on this. He contends that there is a clash between 
Islam and the West. I do not share this view.  
                                                     
9 Bassam Tibi, “Global Communication and Cultural Particularisms: The Place of Values in the 
Simultaneity of Structural Globalization and Cultural Fragmentation,” in The Handbook of Global 
Communication and Media Ethics, 2 volumes, eds. Robert S. Fortner and P. Mark Fackler (Chichester, 
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), volume 1, 54-78. 
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Among the most gratifying occurrences in my professional life is that the President 
of Germany, Roman Herzog, awarded me the Cross of Merit 1st Class, Bundesver-
dienstkreuz Erster Klasse, in 1995. A few years after the ceremony, Roman Herzog 
asked me to contribute to his book Preventing the Clash of Civilizations10, which is a 
book against Huntington’s thinking. Despite all odds, Huntington was such a fine 
person that, when the book came out in New York in 1999, he gave me a phone 
call and said: “Bassam, I need to talk to you.” And I said: “Of course.” We went to 
the Harvard Faculty Club. And before even saying “Hello, how are you?,” he said: 
“What is your problem? What is the problem of your President Herzog?” I said: 
“The problem is, we are in disagreement with you.” And then we had a glass of 
wine and said toast. But people defame me in Germany, saying: “Professor Tibi is 
an adept of Huntington.” This is nonsense. I disagree with the late Huntington, 
but I refuse to join any vilification in loyalty to the culture of a free debate. 
I coined the term “inter-civilisational conflict,” and my major contribution in 
English on this topic is: Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Inter-Civilizational Bridg-
ing.11 I received the Bundesverdienstkreuz from President Herzog for my mediation 
and bridging,” Brückenbau, “between the civilisations.” It is possible to do that. If 
you take European identity as a model at face value, it is possible to engage in 
bridging. And so the idea that I present to you is the following: Cultural fragmenta-
tion means that people are not in agreement with regard to values. The world is 
globalised. There is a shrinking of the world, structurally and in terms of commu-
nication. But in terms of values, there is no agreement, there are no shared univer-
sal values. Not even human rights are shared. There is a Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, but rights are not shared. In 1993, the United Nations organised a 
huge conference in Vienna to commemorate the Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948. People were in disagreement in arguing: “There are claims for the existence 
of Asian human rights, Islamic human rights, African human rights.” These claims 
are expressions of cultural fragmentation. How can one deal with these cultural 
tensions? I think that we can do the job in engaging in dialogue and by bridging. In 
this way one can reach a conflict resolution.  
5. 
In the addressed context the question arises: Can Europe maintain its identity in an 
age of globalisation without risking the exclusion of migrants? Among these new-
comers are Muslims, but people also come to Europe from all over the world. In 
the past I have visited different countries in West Africa, one of them is the former 
                                                     
10 Bassam Tibi, “International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging,” in Preventing the Clash of Civiliza-
tions: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Roman Herzog (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999), 107-126. 
11 Tibi, Islam in Global Politics. 
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Belgian Congo. People there know everything that is going on in the world 
through the media. Once you leave Kinshasa, after a hundred kilometres you are 
already in a jungle. And there you cannot pay with money, so you exchange cloth-
ing for wooden artefacts, wonderful sculptures Also in Senegal, I encountered 
young boys: “I give you three shirts and you give me four sculptures and we are in 
agreement.” I gave them the three shirts. And one of them said: “Monsieur, vous êtes 
raciste. Mister, you are a racist.” I said: “I am sorry, how can you accuse me of an 
evil like that?” He said: “You are thinking I’m an African, I’m not well informed. 
Your shirts are old-fashioned.” I said: “I didn’t know that.” But he knew that the 
colour was not modern. They read the relevant magazines, so they know stuff like 
this. This is globalisation. The knowledge of these people about Europe and about 
the prosperity here becomes a source of will to migration. How can Europe man-
age this? 
People want to come to Europe. At least 40 to 50% of the new migrants are 
Muslims. They flee poverty in their home countries, and also despotic rule. The 
number has been increasing. In 1950, there were less than one million Muslims 
living in Western Europe. Today, there are 25 to 30 millions. By the middle of the 
century, there will be 50, maybe 60 million Muslims living on the continent. Will 
Europe be able to digest this migration and continue to be European in terms of 
identity? This is the core question. I participated in a symposium at Berkeley 
named “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe.” We published a book on our 
findings, under the title Euro-Islam or Muslim Europe?12 This book title refers to two 
scenarios: either Muslims become European and Islam will be Europeanised in the 
process, or Europe could actually be gradually Islamised in one hundred years as 
some Islamists envision the future.  
Which one is it going to happen? I plead for a Leitkultur as a way for Europe to 
both accommodate in an inclusive manner immigrants – and to maintain its identi-
ty. Leitkultur does not refer to a homogeneous culture nor to hegemony. Leitkultur 
is rather a guiding culture, based on a cross-cultural consensus between migrants 
and Europeans over five core issues: democracy, separation of religion and politics, 
human rights, civil society and religious pluralism. 
However, what is actually happening in Europe today is that there is an ethni-
cisation of Islam. To be sure, Ethnicity runs counter to the idea of integration and 
citizenship.13 I am a Muslim from Syria. I am different from a Turkish Muslim or a 
Senegalese Muslim or a Bengali Muslim. We don’t have the same ethnicity. You 
can share citizenship, but you cannot be Kurdish and Turkish at the same time. 
                                                     
12 Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar Alsay-
yad, symposium “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe,” Berkeley, 1998 (Lanham, Md, Oxford: 
Lexington, 2002).    
13 See the reference in note 1 and my article on this subject-matter: Bassam Tibi, “Ethnicity of Fear? 
Islamic Migration and the Ethnicization of Islam in Europe,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 
Vol.10, 1 (2010), pp.126-157. 
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You cannot be African and European in the ethnic sense at the same time. But you 
can share values, you can share citizenship. Although Muslims do not create an 
ethnicity there is a progressing ethnicisation of Islam in Europe becoming poten-
tially a source of an “ethnicity of fear,” because it could indeed lead to violent con-
flicts14. There was a warning signal for that. In 2005, there was an uprising in the 
banlieues, the suburbs of the major French cities, which are basically inhabited by 
Muslims of North and West Africa. It was in fact a Muslim ethnic upheaval, but 
people refused to take this seriously. Even the French government said that the 
uprising had nothing to do with Islam. People refused to acknowledge the “ethnic-
ity of fear”, as well as the related conflicts. 
6. 
The conclusion I draw as an international relations scholar, is that Europe’s out-
look in the future, is a difficult one. So if you ask me: “What is the future of Euro-
pean identity?”, my answer would be: It depends on ethnic Europeans and on 
migrants, including Muslim migrants. What is going to happen to Europe in the 
future? Will people fight each other or will they find a basis of agreement for living 
together in cross-culturally sharing a value system of a civil society that serves as a 
Leitkultur? I have indicated the alternatives that are presenting themselves as re-
gards Europe’s future identity in the title of my chapter in the Cornell Research 
Project book Religion in an Expanding Europe: I coined the formula “Europeanizing 
Islam or the Islamization of Europe”15 in that book published by Cambridge Uni-
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How (Not) to Fix European Identity? 
Lars Klein 
Does European Identity Matter? 
Throughout the ‘European sovereign debt crisis,’ there has been much debate 
about how to best handle this crisis politically, but little mention of the deeper 
reasons for why people in other European countries should be prepared to cover 
the debts of Greece or other troubled states. Politicians have been tending to ex-
plain the entanglements of national economies, the dynamics of the currency mar-
ket and the sheer necessity to come to a European solution. One either might take 
it as a good sign that there did not seem to be any need for further explanation. Or 
one might see that many chances have been missed all these years to solidify the 
basis of European politics. This basis has previously been discussed under the label 
‘European identity,’ prominently in the course of the Iraq War of 2003 and the 
failed referenda on the European Constitution.  
This article discusses the debate on European identity in a historical perspec-
tive and outlines the ways in which a common identity could be sensed or dis-
missed. The title refers to both the attempt to pinpoint a European identity and to 
restore it, as there has arguably been some damage done to the European unifica-
tion process.1 The question raised will be: How to trace and to define a common 
European identity? What for? Would a clear idea of a European identity help to 
overcome the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union? Or would it be 
better not to fix any European identity and to leave its meaning open for debate? 
No Function beyond Bookkeeping? 
The breakdown of the ‘master-narratives’ and the reclaiming of histories and iden-
tities have been major issues of postmodern and postcolonial theories.2 The con-
cept of ‘identity’ has been coined by philosophers, social scientists and psycholo-
                                                     
1 Whenever I speak of ‘European identity’ here, I understand it according to the definition of ‘identi-
ty’ given in: Simon Clarke, “Culture and Identity,” in The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis, ed. Tony 
Bennett and John Frow (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), 510. 
2 The term ‘master-narrative’ is used according to: Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
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gists and has been considered a “growth industry in the academy.”3 It has been 
deconstructed, claimed to be fragmented or damaged, even dismissed as such. 
Although one thus might easily have the impression that this term is a soft one, it 
is actually nothing the like.  
Since its appearance on the European stage in the 1970s, identity has been ra-
ther a hard than a soft topic. Independent of all academic debates, the idea to es-
tablish a European identity in politics has been pursued as a means to further es-
tablish Europe as a world actor.4 The enforcement of such an identity in the 1970s 
can be considered a consequence of globalization, as the world struggled with the 
oil crisis and the financial system experienced major shifts with the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system. European statesmen like the French President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt sought to find 
solutions on European and international levels. And with an “eroding political 
legitimacy at the national level” during the neoliberal 1980s, “[i]dentity became the 
concept in this search for compensation.”5 Ultimately, the “twin notions of civili-
zation unity and cultural diversity,” which have later been translated into “unity in 
diversity,” gained importance.6 
The European Union has largely achieved the immediate aims of the European 
unification process – the reconciliation of nations, security, mobility and, within 
limits, prosperity. As these achievements are being turned into a ‘lived reality,’ it is 
held that Europeans got used to them to such a degree that the EU loses its inte-
grating powers.7 This raises the question about the role the EU can play for Eu-
rope as well as beyond. A “Europe that has no function beyond bookkeeping,” 
Adolf Muschg has warned as early as 2003, “loses its basis as a society of solidari-
ty.”8 Faced with the ways in which Greece has been forced to cut costs in order to 
comply with the demands of European and financial institutions, one would have a 
hard time disagreeing with those who consider the EU a purely economic endeav-
our or speak of a Europe that was “built in Brussels and Strasbourg” as a “a sort of 
                                                     
3 Linda Martin Alcoff, “Who’s Afraid of Identity Politics?” in Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the 
Predicament of Postmodernism, ed. Paula M. L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-Garcia (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000), 312. 
4 Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, “Imagining European Identity: French Elites and the American Challenge in 
the Pompidou–Nixon Era,” Contemporary European History 19.2 (2010): 146. 
5 Bo Stråth, “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 5.4 (2002): 390. 
6 Gfeller, “Imagining European Identity,” 149. 
7 Bettina Thalmeier, “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer europäischen Identitätspolitik,” in Europäische 
Identität: Voraussetzungen und Strategien, ed. Julian Nida-Rümelin and Werner Weidenfeld (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007), 175. 
8 Adolf Muschg, “‘Core Europe’: Thoughts about the European Identity,” in Old Europe, New Europe, 
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy et al. (London: Verso, 2005), 21. 
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civilizing power that imposes a certain way of life on indigenous peoples.”9 In a 
similar vein, Jürgen Habermas warned of the success of “neoliberal orthodoxy,”10 
which seemed to be achieved with the initiatives by Angela Merkel and Nicolas 
Sarkozy during the ‘European sovereign debt crisis.’ He called for reclaiming “po-
litical creative powers on the supranational level.”11 
On the European level, the financial crisis overshadowed the revolts in many 
Arab countries, which, interestingly, left European politicians passive, at times 
helpless in their reactions and again divided. Though these issues raised the ques-
tion of the underlying principles of European politics, recent debates were less 
concerned with values and identity but rather with political bodies and ways to 
enable the EU to deal with the still unfolding crisis. Here, Habermas aimed for a 
strengthening of democratic institutions and has once again called for speeding up 
the process of integration.12 His ideas, however, were in sharp conflict with those 
of the political elite as represented by Merkel and Sarkozy. Nevertheless, Habermas 
again underlined his vision of an EU-Europe that stands for an important step in 
the development of a cosmopolitan world domestic politics.13 
Searching for a Basis of European Integration 
Most often when a fostered integration is called for, it is by referring to a Europe-
an identity, which supposedly still is not strong enough to carry a Europe of 27. 
But what is it that defines Europe; that gives a hint of its identity? And why would 
it be relevant anyhow to define it? Postmodernists may consider Europe a telling 
example of the breakdown of master-narratives, as there are 70 plus languages 
spoken14 on a continent that has always had many centres and many peripheries.15 
Wolfgang Schmale speaks of a discourse on Europe that was a quest for historical 
roots that would be “the consequence of a long history rather than its aim or re-
sult.”16 “In other words,” writes Willfried Spohn, “the evolutionary thesis of the 
making of a European identity states a crucial long-term trend, but this trend has 
                                                     
9 These words were meant ironically. See Thomas Mergel, “Europe as Leisure Time Communication: 
Tourism and Transnational Interaction since 1945,” in Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary 
Histories, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 133. 
10 Jürgen Habermas, Ach, Europa: Kleine politische Schriften XI (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 85 
(own translation). 
11 Ibid., 86. 
12 Jürgen Habermas, “Wir brauchen Europa! Die neue Hartleibigkeit: Ist uns die gemeinsame Zu-
kunft schon gleichgültig geworden?” Die Zeit, 20 May 2010. 
13 Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011), 39-96. 
14 Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity,” European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 9. 
15 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Modernity and the Construction of Collective Identities,” International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology 39.1 (1998): 140-3. 
16 Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 
32. 
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to be contextualized in the complex, contradictory and by no means, predeter-
mined movement of European […] integration.”17 
One context in which identity is of major relevance for the EU is its ‘democratic 
deficit.’ In his smirking text Brussels, the Gentle Monster or The Disenfranchisement of 
Europe, Hans Magnus Enzensberger holds that the ‘democracy deficit’ has been 
understood as “a chronic deficiency disease that seemingly is not easy to cure,” 
while it had never been a medical mystery in the first place but rather an intention-
al policy decision.18 The voter turnout at European parliament elections does not 
seem to point to a strong interest of the people in their European representation. 
But these figures alone do not suffice to substantiate a mere disinterest in Europe. 
According to Eurobarometer 71 from 2009, 53% of all European citizens consid-
ered EU membership of their respective countries a good thing. That was at least 
10% more than the voter turnout at the elections for the European Parliament of 
the same year. In 2010, and thus before the implementation of the European Sta-
bility Mechanism and subsequent actions, Europeans had more confidence in the 
EU with regard to handling the financial crisis than in other national or interna-
tional bodies; 82% wanted the EU to play an even bigger role.19 Michael Bruter, 
among others, has shown that a European identity was actually unfolding.20 Eu-
rope has been identified by a common currency and easy mobility, travels, com-
munication. 
This feeling of Europeanness by the Europeans was much-discussed in 2003, 
when the European Convention presented its draft for a European Constitution. 
At the same time, a fierce debate on the necessity of a new Iraq War unfolded. 
Drawing on both, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida started their famous initi-
ative on What Binds Europeans Together and suggested a definition of Europe against 
an ‘other,’ namely the United States.21 Processes of ‘othering’ have a long tradition 
in transatlantic relations and their (mis)understandings as well. In this sense, this 
idea was not new, neither in form nor in content. Did it get us closer to a defini-
tion of ‘European identity’? Habermas and Derrida proposed to widen national 
                                                     
17 Spohn is referring to Eastern European integration in his text. See Willfried Spohn, “National 
Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe,” in Collective Memory and European Identity: 
The Effects of Integration and Enlargement, ed. Willfried Spohn and Klaus Eder (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005), 13. Cf. Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, 178. 
18 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Sanftes Monster Brüssel oder Die Entmündigung Europas (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 
2011), 52 (own translation). 
19 “Eurobarometer 74: Öffentliche Meinung in der Europäischen Union,“ Autumn 2010, ed. Europe-
an Commission,  
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_de_de_nat.pdf (accessed 5 March 
2011). 
20 Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
21 For the text cf. Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans 
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe,” Constellations 10.3 
(2003): 291-7. 
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identities so that they could encompass a European dimension.22 John McCormick 
further elaborated on the features it might entail in his discussion of “Euro-
peanism.”23  
Indeed, Europeans seemed united in their opposition against a looming war in 
Iraq. In order to make their voices heard on 15 February 2003, millions protested 
against a looming war, among them an estimated one million people in Rome, 
10,000 in Zagreb, half a million in Berlin and in London, up to two million in Ma-
drid, 100,000 in New York, and “about thirty people” in Budapest.24 The figures 
point at least to two conflicting positions that were based on different experiences: 
Many, including Joschka Fischer and others, referred to the Second World War in 
order to explain why they could “not easily go out there and tell my people: ‘Well, 
let’s go to a war.’”25 For others, including the authors of the Letter of Eight,26 it 
seemed more pressing not to alienate the United States that had been guaranteeing 
European freedom for decades. The initiative proved Isaiah Berlin right in his 
diagnosis of a “naïve craving for unity and symmetry at the expense of experi-
ence.”27 
How to deal with this situation? The concept of ‘core Europe’ might offer a 
way out, a concept that was originally outlined by two protagonists of the German 
Christian Democrats in 1994, Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers.28 Habermas 
and Derrida elaborated on their idea and suggested to focus on those countries 
that were most likely to adhere to common positions already. This ‘core Europe’ 
was meant to consist of Germany, France and the Benelux countries. Other mem-
ber states were welcome to join policy-making processes once they were ready to 
accept the agreed ‘European’ positions. Eastern European intellectuals in particular 
felt excluded and reacted with disbelief and anger. To them, talking of ‘core Eu-
rope’ meant to cancel the search for a common basis to European politics.29  
                                                     
22 See: Craig Calhoun, “Cosmopolitan Europe and European Studies,” in The Sage Handbook of Euro-
pean Studies, ed. Chris Rumford (London: Sage, 2009), 647. 
23 John McCormick, Europeanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
24  The figure for Budapest stated according to Esterházy’s own counting. For the figure and his 
remarks, see Péter Esterházy, “How Big is the European Dwarf?,” in Old Europe, New Europe, Core 
Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy et al. (London: Verso, 2005), 76. 
25 Joschka Fischer (paper presented at the Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, 8 Febru-
ary 2003). 
26 Published on 30 January 2003, written by the heads of state of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. See: Jose Maria Aznar et al., “Lead-
ers’ Statement on Iraq: Full Text,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm 
(accessed 5 March 2012).  
27 Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 5. 
28 The paper was issued on 1 September 1994. See Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, “Überlegun-
gen zur europäischen Politik,” http://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.PDF (accessed 5 
March 2012). 
29 Esterházy, How Big is the European Dwarf? 
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Would that mean to not only have a core group of states but also European fea-
tures that are to be added to national identities, so that they overlap here and 
there? Willfried Spohn argues against any dualistic model where one either feels 
European or is more attached to the nation. He emphasises the constant interac-
tion between many different identities.30 Bo Stråth adds that Europe, the nation 
and the region,  
 
constitute three levels of abstraction, which in practice and in politics are en-
tangled. […] Ideas of belonging are overlapping, inclusive and exclusive in 
complex and contradictory patterns, where it would be far too simple to put 
a European identity against national ones. Europe has been and is both an 
active element of national, and of other identifications and, at the same time, 
something different and separate from national and other identifications. 
Europe is both We and the Other.31 
 
Building on “a new conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging” 
We are left with the diagnosis that although much has been done in terms of estab-
lishing a common European identity – both bottom-up and top-down –, a com-
mon conscience of European identity has not been established. What was seen 
positively by Stråth is formulated in negative terms by Gerard Delanty. He holds 
that Europeans were not  
 
particularly united among themselves. It is unlikely that they will unite 
against an Other. If there is not a European self or subject, there cannot be 
an easily defined Other. There is neither a European state nor a European 
people, although there do appear to be Europeans. The newly articulated 
European self-understanding […] cannot be seen as a unified collective 
identity based on a pre-existing community linked by a hyphen to the shared 
political community of the liberal public sphere.32 
 
As much as a European public sphere is considered a precondition for an evolving 
European identity, as much are the difficulties in establishing it overestimated. A 
minimalist version would mean for national public spheres to open for each other 
in “osmotic ways.”33 This opening, of course, rests on the interest for the other 
and for a European view.  
If we understand the difference between political and cultural identity to be 
similar to Aleida Assmann’s division into political and cultural memory, one could 
consider political identity as a top-down approach and cultural identity as a more 
                                                     
30 Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe,” 4. 
31 Stråth, “A European Identity,” 390. 
32 Gerard Delanty, “What Does It Mean to Be a ‘European’?,” Innovation 18.1 (2005): 19. 
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How (Not) to Fix European Identity? 63 
democratic, the bottom-up approach.34 Identity is worked on from both ends and 
it is their interplay that counts – and that is not yet achieved. The ‘democratic defi-
cit’ cannot be levelled out by attaching core values to the EU and its constitutional 
treaties. In contrast, not fixing a European identity would not equal giving up on 
Europe but could mean accepting diversity, acknowledging different experiences 
and different conclusions from them. The basis for European politics thus would 
be the mere willingness to cooperate out of choice and necessity at the same time, 
to do so in a way that allows for diversity and in the understanding to aim for unity 
and peace. These are conditions under which to collaborate that need to be reiter-
ated and substantiated, not by politicians but by the producers of cultural memory: 
writers, academics, intellectuals. During the ‘European sovereign debt crisis,’ their 
lacking engagement has been met by the clear choice of politicians to enforce elite 
decisions. Implicitly, Habermas has diagnosed the silence of intellectuals, when he 
claimed that there had to be a sense of what is missing and could be different, 
some fantasy to sketch alternatives and the courage to polarise.35  
This form of a European identity can only be based on “a new conceptualiza-
tion of culture and feelings of belonging” that Bo Stråth refers to, of which 
“[a]mbivalence, transition and being more historically informed are some key ele-
ments.”36 Openness on the margins, the ability to think of and practice borders in 
a non-linear way, to understand them as spaces of crossover, of mediation and 
translation, these are the features Wolfgang Schmale names with reference to 
Etienne Balibar in an eminently positive fashion as Europe’s strengths.37 There 
needs to be an arena for an open debate about Europe, for an ongoing “search for 
equilibrium in unstable niches,”38 which would be based on restlessness in the 
attempt to find the “common disquieting element,” as Péter Esterházy writes.39 If 
this basis is taken seriously, it cannot be met by a true financial government but by 
strengthening the European Parliament, by elections, referenda and most of all by 
open debates. 
  
                                                     
34 Aleida Assmann, “Memory, Individual and Collective,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political 
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Cosmopolitanism and European Identity   
John McCormick  
Introduction 
The idea of cosmopolitanism has been revitalized since the mid-1990s as one of a 
multitude of explanations for contemporary society, taking its place alongside (and 
overlapping with) such concepts as globalization, multiculturalism, postmodern-
ism, post-industrialism, and late capitalism.1 Much has been said in particular about 
the cosmopolitan qualities of the European Union (EU), which Archibugi de-
scribes as the “the first international model which begins to resemble the cosmo-
politan model.”2 Roche claims that Europe is “leading the world in the construc-
tion of a globally relevant regional international and trans-national order and gov-
ernance system,”3 and Delanty argues that to be European is less about culture and 
politics and more about an orientation to the world that fits with the cosmopolitan 
spirit.4 
And yet the debate about the cosmopolitan qualities of the EU has to date 
been almost entirely theoretical,5 and little effort has been made to apply cosmo-
politan notions to the practical realties of European integration. A modest excep-
tion to the rule is offered by Frith, who makes an attempt to see how cosmopoli-
tan principles are reflected in gender issues in the EU and concludes that the issue 
of gender equality “offers further evidence that cosmopolitan democracy should 
not be dismissed as simply utopian dreaming […].”6 However, cosmopolitan ideas 
                                                     
1 For background, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism,” in Perpetual Peace: Essays 
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Press, 1997), 25-57; Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
2 Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in Re-imagining Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), 219. 
3 Maurice Roche, “Cultural Europeanization and the ‘Cosmopolitan Condition’: European Union 
Regulation and European Sport,” in Cosmopolitanism and Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liver-
pool University Press, 2007), 128.  
4 Gerard Delanty, “What Does it Mean to be a ‘European’?,” Innovation: The European Journal of Social 
Sciences 18.1 (2005): 11-22. 
5 See, for example, Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds., Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a 
New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 
(London: Routledge 2001); Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the 
World State (New York: Routledge, 2004); Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, eds., The Political Philos-
ophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan 
Global Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Robert Fine, Cosmopolitanism (London: Routledge, 2007).  
6 Robert Frith, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender,” Political Studies 56.1 
(2008): 231. 
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are clearly at the foundation of European positions on human rights, the environ-
ment, capital punishment, and conflict resolution, and can also help us better un-
derstand European perceptions about the dynamics of the international system and 
the way that Europe conducts its collective foreign policy. By living for so long so 
closely to other cultures with other languages and histories and by having learned 
so expensively the costs of nationalism, Europeans – perhaps more than the peo-
ples of any other societies – have been obliged to learn how to cooperate and to 
respect differences.  
This article is an attempt to apply cosmopolitan ideas to the realities of the 
European experience, focusing on two areas in which those ideas are relatively 
clear and in which Europe is distinctive from other parts of the world. The first 
area concerns attitudes towards patriotism, where the idea of love of country has 
been sullied by its association with war and conflict and Europeans have moved 
away from association with states towards association instead with ideas (otherwise 
known as constitutional patriotism). The second example of cosmopolitan ideas at 
work in Europe is offered by its preference for multilateralism in international 
affairs. Regional integration has helped move Europeans away from realist ideas 
about the self-interest of states and an anarchic global system more towards the 
idea that states can and should define and defend common interests.  
Understanding cosmopolitanism  
Cosmopolites hold that all humans belong to a single community, in which they 
are subject to the same moral standards and have a responsibility for other hu-
mans. Local and global concerns cannot be separated or divorced and, rather than 
the world being separate from the community or state in which each of us lives, it 
is in fact the only community that matters. Cosmopolites accept the foreign hospi-
tably, argue that all humans should be treated equally, and emphasize the im-
portance of drawing on different traditions and cultures and of remaining open to 
other ways of life.7 David Held defines it as a “moral and political outlook which 
builds on the strength of the liberal multilateral order, particularly its commitment 
to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and which seeks to 
specify general principles on which all could act” and that could serve as “the guid-
                                                     
7 See discussion in Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early 
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), Introduction; Thomas W. 
Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Ethics 103.1 (1992): 48-75. Simon Caney, Justice beyond 
Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6. 
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ing ethical basis of global social democracy.”8 For Beck, it is about issues of global 
concern becoming part of the everyday local experiences of ordinary people.9 
Cosmopolitanism has conventionally been portrayed as little more than an ide-
al, compelling in theory (to some) but essentially impractical and impracticable (to 
others). There were many – from Diogenes and the Stoics to Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thinkers, Voltaire, Bentham, Kant and Marx – who reflected upon 
the community of mankind and the duties that humans had to all other humans. 
With the rise of 19th century nationalism, however, cosmopolitan ideas were mar-
ginalized and were to remain largely dormant until the second half of the 20th cen-
tury when they were given new life by the cumulative effects of two world wars 
and the subsequent threat of nuclear and environmental destruction.10 Cosmopoli-
tan principles were at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
its focus on rights as the entitlement of all, regardless of race, gender, religion, 
national or social origin, or the political, jurisdictional, or international status of the 
country or territory to which people belong. They also underlay the concept of 
crimes against humanity, whose origins are conventionally traced through the 1907 
Hague Convention to the postwar Nuremburg and Tokyo trials. 
The end of the Cold War and the widening awareness of the effects of globali-
zation have brought cosmopolitanism to a wider audience, although it is a concept 
still debated more by philosophers and sociologists than by political scientists or 
economists. It has been associated with a belief in global political institutions, but 
this idea of world government is controversial; rather than implying the surrender 
of sovereignty or security, cosmopolitanism instead expects world citizens to place 
the welfare of human society above the more narrow pursuit of national interests. 
In terms of international relations theory, it stands in clear distinction to realism, 
and is based on what Caney describes as a “society of states” approach, which 
“maintains that a just global order is one in which there are states and the states 
accept that they have moral duties to other states.” 11  
That Europe is not yet more routinely discussed in cosmopolitan terms is 
probably due to unresolved questions over the identity and meaning of Europe 
and over the character and personality of the EU. The many doubts pertaining to 
the achievements of European integration have diverted the debate away from the 
prospects for the kind of supra-European society that cosmopolitanism implies. 
And yet many Europeans – even if they are not yet necessarily cosmopolites on a 
global scale – are becoming cosmopolites on a regional scale. Increasingly, they 
                                                     
8 David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 171-8. 
9 Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies,” Theory, Culture and Society 19.1-2 (2002): 
17-44. 
10 Derek Heater, What Is Citizenship? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 136.  
11 Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
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believe that local, state, and regional European concerns cannot be separated or 
divorced and that Europe is as important for their political and economic welfare 
as the communities or states in which Europeans live or the nations with which 
they identify. As the hold of the European state declines, as the meaning of nation-
alism is redefined, and as the focus of citizenship and patriotism changes, so the 
loyalty of Europeans is shifting away from an exclusive focus on the state or the 
nation, and is moving towards identity with the ideas and values that Europeans 
have in common. 
Patriotism 
If there is one area in which many Europeans have clearly adopted cosmopolitan 
qualities, it is in regard to patriotism. Defined generally as love of country, patriot-
ism can be value-based (driven by support for the merits and achievements of a 
country) or egocentric (driven rather less rationally by a personal association – a 
patriot loves his or her country simply because it is theirs).12 It has far from disap-
peared in Europe: in France the tricolour is omnipresent and presidents repeatedly 
speak of the importance of national pride; in Britain almost any anniversary involv-
ing the monarch is an opportunity for an explosion of patriotic fervour; and inter-
national sporting contests inevitably lead to much flag-waving. There have also 
been repeated instances of economic patriotism as Europeans debate the sale of 
‘national’ business and corporations to foreign buyers, and – particularly in the 
wake of the economic downturn of 2007-2009 – much evidence of the ambiva-
lence that many Europeans feel about globalization.  
But with such exceptions, there are few Europeans today who are willing to 
wear patriotism on their sleeves in the way in which their forbears once did. Patri-
otism has been sullied in Europe by its historical association with nationalism and 
by it co-option in recent decades by assertive nationalists using national symbols to 
express their opposition to immigration. So far has this gone in Britain, for exam-
ple, that the British Union Jack has – absurdly – come to be associated in the 
minds of some with racism, nationalism, and opposition to multiculturalism. More 
tellingly, however, patriotism has been weakened by the declining allegiance of 
Europeans with the states that have for so long been the cradles and the nurseries 
of patriotism. 
Polls reflect the distinctive views of Europeans. The World Values Survey in 
2003-04 found that less than half the residents of most European states were “very 
proud” of their nationality13, and when a Pew Global Attitudes survey presented 
the statement “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others,” 
only 33-40 % of Germans, Britons, and French agreed, compared to 60 % of 
                                                     
12 Igor Primoratz, ed., Patriotism (New York: Humanity Books, 2002). 
13 World Values Survey 2003-04, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed June 2009). 
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Americans.14 Where Americans are more patriotic and repeatedly describe their 
country as the greatest on earth, the one most blessed by God, and the one where 
democracy and the free market allow ordinary people to achieve more with their 
lives than is possible anywhere else, this comparative and superlative element is 
almost entirely missing from the utterances of most Europeans. They may take 
pride and comfort in being Polish or French or Swedish, but they will rarely claim 
that they have greater opportunities or are more blessed by God.  
Patriotism is also often criticized for being too parochial and for encouraging 
the promotion of state or national interests at the expense of broader and more 
universal interests. Europeans now not only debate patriotism, but they also debate 
the object of such patriotism. Against the background of a declining attachment to 
the state and a growing attachment to the nation, what are the prospects for a new 
European patriotism? The answer depends upon the extent to which Europeans 
can be convinced that they have enough in common and that their self-identity 
need not rest alone on association with states or nations. In this respect, constitu-
tional patriotism holds potential as a means to understanding European perspec-
tives. This is understood as a belief that the universal principles of the democratic 
constitutional state are the only acceptable basis for identification with a state.15 
While it has been dismissed by some16 as a useful way of understanding the Euro-
pean experience, it has not yet been explored in more than theoretical terms. 
Would it be better to not fix any European identity and to leave its meaning open 
for debate? 
Multilateralism  
The European Security Strategy included a call for an international order based on 
“effective multilateralism,” a phrase that sparked something of a minor firestorm 
of academic and political debate. The keys to effective multilateralism are rules, 
cooperation, and inclusiveness as well as the building of a sustainable consensus 
among states.17 Since the EU is by definition a multilateral institution, Europeans 
are familiar with most of its possibilities and pitfalls, and while the results have not 
always been ideal, to the extent that we learn from our mistakes, Europeans have 
had much opportunity to learn. 
                                                     
14 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a Changing World (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 
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of Constitutional Law 6.1 (2008): 117-36.  
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In contrasting American and European perceptions and approaches, Kagan argues 
that the former “are less inclined to act through international institutions, less likely 
to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, and more scep-
tical about international law […].” By contrast, he claims, Europeans are quicker to 
appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion.18 
One of the contrasts is evident in the way in which European leaders have placed a 
premium on cooperation and on the promotion of values rather than of interests. 
In their approach to numerous problems, including terrorism, arms control, non-
proliferation, international trade, the environment, and human rights, the Ameri-
cans have emphasized self-interest while the Europeans have worked to be more 
inclusive. 
Europeans are also distinctive from Americans in their reluctance to use their 
militaries other than in situations for which an international mandate – preferably 
one arranged through the United Nations – has been achieved. To be sure, the 
United States has worked to build multinational coalitions, as in Korea and during 
the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, but it has also indicated its willingness to deploy its mili-
tary even in the face of international opposition; the case of Vietnam comes to 
mind, as does the US willingness to invade Iraq in 2003 with or without the back-
ing of the UN and thus of the international community. Most EU states rejected 
the idea of invasion without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution and 
the Greek presidency issued a statement arguing that it was “committed to the 
United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order” and that “the 
primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the [UN] Securi-
ty Council.” Once the invasion was under way, the EU demanded a central role for 
the UN in the rebuilding of Iraq. Indeed, the EU-UN relationship has become a 
key feature in the dynamics of international relations, Eide going so far as to sug-
gest that the EU is “in many ways becoming the UN’s main Western partner.”19 
Patrick notes the importance of American calculations of exceptionalism (the 
belief that the US must stand as an example and either encourage others to follow 
its lead or else go it alone), its domestic institutional structure (with the mandate 
shared between President and Congress making it harder for the US to assume 
multilateral obligations), and its sheer power (making it more inclined to lead than 
to cooperate, and to pursue self-interest where needed).20 On all three counts, the 
European view is markedly different: there is no longer a prevailing sense of Euro-
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pean exceptionalism, nor a sense that Europe has a mission to change others in its 
image; parliamentary government makes it easier for executives to win the support 
of legislatures for new treaties or strong positions in international organizations; 
and Europe’s self-doubt about its power has combined with the effects of Europe-
an regional integration to encourage it to work to achieve a consensus rather than 
rocking the boat. 
It has only been relatively recently, notes Maull, that the EU has paid much at-
tention to thinking through how multilateralism can best be promoted at a global 
level, the key qualification for success, he believes, being “the ability to form and 
sustain broad-based coalitions.”21 For Brenner, effective multilateralism requires 
not only broad international support and legitimacy but also the capacity to gener-
ate initiatives and the political leadership to set the agenda, define deadlines, mobi-
lize resources, and promote effective implementation.22 As the tradition of Euro-
pean Cold War deference to external powers fades into history, so the EU in par-
ticular is showing its willingness and capacity to pursue all these qualities. 
Supporting multilateral cooperation is “a basic principle” of EU foreign policy, 
declared the European Commission in 2003, and the UN is regarded as the core 
channel for pursuit of that principle: the EU should consider itself a “driving 
force” in pursuing UN initiatives on sustainable development, poverty reduction, 
and international security (while also giving new impetus to UN reform).23 Eide 
argues that one of the EU’s greatest strengths in recent years has been “its ability 
to co-opt, enhance and gradually reshape other international organizations.” After 
having seemed to be at odds with many of those organizations in the 1990s, he 
suggests, it has since come to be accepted as a positive force by reworking the 
capacities and goals of bodies such as NATO, the African Union, and the Organi-
zation for Cooperation and Development in Europe. These advances “have given 
the EU a strategic reach far greater than its […] assets warrant.”24 
Because the conventional view is to see power in terms of state interests, and 
since states have a near-monopoly over the maintenance and deployment of mili-
tary power, we find it hard to appreciate the possibility that suprastate arrange-
ments might exert significant influence. Multilateralism, in particular, because it 
demands international agreement and thus the watering down of state positions in 
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the interests of reaching collective agreement, is portrayed by hawks as weakness 
and as a slippery slope to appeasement. But the new dynamics of the international 
system, in which interests are defined less in state or territorial terms and increas-
ingly in collective terms, fits centrally with – and has been most actively promoted 
by – Europeanist perceptions about the most effective means for managing and 
deploying influence. Those means place the emphasis on the tools needed to 
achieve a democratic and positive peace.  
 
Conclusions  
Cosmopolitanism offers considerable possibilities as a means of tying down and 
better understanding the European experience. As noted earlier, however, the bulk 
of the academic discussion has been purely theoretical, with few attempts to move 
out of the ivory tower into the practical realities of life on the ground for ordinary 
Europeans. This is unfortunate, not least because of the many questions posed in 
regard to European identity and of what it means to be European. This paper of-
fers a modest attempt to illustrate cosmopolitan ideas in regard to ideas about 
patriotism – which illustrate changing Europeans notions about identification with 
the state – and to ideas about multilateralism – which illustrate changing European 
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Individual, Collective, Social  
Identity as (Most) Contested Social Science Concept  




Conceptualising identity in social science seems a mission impossible as its onto-
logical and epistemological status is subject to a sometimes fierce dispute among 
scholars representing well-established disciplines such as psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, political science or international relations. Identity is, therefore, both 
a contested and a crucial social science concept.1 It is too complex, too dynamic to 
be captured within a single theoretical paradigm and it is too important to be given 
up in scientific inquiry as it appears to be an existential imperative of the human 
condition to ‘have identity’ as well as to ‘understand identity’ as a fundamental 
dimension of a given form of social order.2 Marilynn B. Brewer is particularly out-
spoken in illustrating the ambiguity of identity as a social science concept:  
 
If one naïvely enters a bibliographic database in the psychological and social 
sciences and searches on the keyword ‘social identity,’ the result is a dizzying 
array of citations to books and articles from dozens of different literatures – 
from psychoanalytic theory to the sociology of social movements. It quickly 
becomes clear that the term has no single, shared meaning; the problem with 
trying to extract any common definition is that the term is integrally embed-
ded in separate theoretical structures and literatures with little or no cross-
citation or mutual influence. As a consequence, one needs some kind of a 
                                                     
1 For further discussion of this problem, see for instance: Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 
“Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29.1 (2000): 1-47; Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Gie-
sen, “The Construction of Collective Identity,” European Journal of Sociology 26.1 (1995): 72-102; Lynn 
Jamieson, “Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European Citizenship 
Identity,” Sociológia 34.6 (2002): 507-32; Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (London: Routledge, 1996). 
2 Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina, “EU Governance and European Identity,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance 4.2 (2009): 12. 
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roadmap to negotiate among the different associative paths that lead to and 
from the concept in its different manifestations.3 
 
As it seems evident that we need some kind of such a conceptual roadmap to be 
able to integrate and synthesise constructively different theoretical approaches to 
identity studies, one must clarify what is the common ontological and epistemolog-
ical denominator of such inquiry. Thus, symbolic interactionism could be intro-
duced here as an inclusive and coherent analytical framework for an in-depth in-
quiry on identity construction as seen from an interdisciplinary perspective.  
What makes symbolic interactionism a particularly valuable analytical proposi-
tion when studying identity construction in contemporary society, taking into ac-
count cognitive ambiguity of the concept? An answer to this question could be 
found precisely in the condition of contemporary society – in this sense post-
modern society with emphasis given to fluidity, ongoing re-interpretations of 
norms, values, patterns of behaviour that constitute social order. Living in a socie-
ty, which does not provide a safe haven from pressure of answering the daily exis-
tential question of who I am, reinforces temporality and an open-ended character 
of identity construction. Thus, identity is being formed in a process of permanent 
redefinition of symbolic meanings of categories, which serve as frame of reference 
of self-identification. As Stuart Hall argues:  
 
[I]dentity is actually something formed through unconscious processes over 
time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always 
something ‘imaginary’ or fantasized about its unity. It always remains in-
complete, is always ‘in process’, always ‘being formed’. [...] Thus, rather than 
speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of identification, and 
see it as an ongoing process. Identity arises, not so much from the fullness 
of identity which is already inside us as individuals, but from a lack of 
wholeness which is ‘filled’ from outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves 
to be seen by others. Psychoanalytically, the reason why we continually search 
for ‘identity’, constructing biographies which knit together the different parts 
of our divided selves into a unity, is to recapture this fantasized pleasure of 
fullness (plenitude).4 
 
Symbolic interactionism with its emphasis on changeability and the interactive 
character of identity construction bridges the gap between behavioural and social 
sciences in the sense that it integrates the subjective construction of meanings 
related to self-understanding with the objective (inter)action in the process of de-
fining the ‘self’ through relation to the ‘other.’ This relation becomes an ever more 
                                                     
3 Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology,” 
Political Psychology 22.1 (2001): 115. 
4 Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity,” in Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, ed. 
Stuart Hall et al. (London: Blackwell, 1996), 608. 
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important pattern of identity construction in a society within which spatial and 
symbolic mobility becomes a dominant way of life and walk of life. This is espe-
cially true for European society. As we may argue: 
 
[T]he ongoing process of transnationalisation of economic, political, social 
and cultural patterns of everyday life in contemporary societies in Europe – 
with a decisive role of European citizenship based on individual freedom of 
movement within the EU – reinforces the need to adopt a ‘thin’ identity dis-
course as more relevant in understanding the scope and meaning of identity 
transformations. This brings us to the imperative to redefine the balance be-
tween the individual and the collective dimensions of identity.5 
 
Consequently, adopting a symbolic interactionism perspective on studying identity 
formation enables us to move beyond the ontological dilemma that is exemplified 
in the nominalism versus holism discourse on identity. Opposition between the 
individual and the collective ontology of identity is transcended by the introduction 
of the social as a space where the individual and the collective meet, merge and 
transform each other. The social is the space where the individual and the collec-
tive gain concrete meaning as they emerge as a consequence of social role playing. 
According to Sheldon Stryker, followed by Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, the 
individual is always deeply embedded in a given social structure within which ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ or ‘we’ and ‘them’ come into being through recognition of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ as actors playing different roles within society.6  
Thus, “self as reflection of society”7 finds its epistemic explanation in the sym-
bolic construction of identity as a process negotiating meanings attached to con-
crete forms of behaviour. The interactionist credo could be summarised as follows: 
identity is a process. It is a form of symbolic activity.8 Consequently, as we may 
assume after Tomasz Leszniewski: 
 
[T]he source of identity is placed in the interactive area shared with others. It 
emphasises a social character of the identity structure and a total dependence 
                                                     
5 Grzegorz Pożarlik, “La citoyenneté européenne, nouvelle construction sociale: Implications pour la 
développement d’une identité collective dans l’Europe contemporaine,” in Citoyenneté et Nationalités en 
Europe, ed. Gilles Rouet (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2011), 125-6. 
6 Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings, 
1980), cited in Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity,” in 
Handbook of Self and Identity, ed. Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford Press, 
2003), 134. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Zdzisław Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity: Essays in Political Anthropology (New York: SUNNY 
Press, 1993). 
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of an individual on the social environment. […] The basis of activity is in the 
framework of human relations.9 
Arguing in a similar tone is Alexander Wendt, who explains the interdependence 
between the specific role-playing by an individual and the constitution of self-
understanding which emerges in the social web of interactions: 
 
Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while 
taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. [...] [In this sense 
social identities take the form of] cognitive schemas that enable an actor to 
determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role 
structure of shared understandings and expectations.10 
 
One more important aspect of this very debate on the ontological and epistemo-
logical dimension of identity formation needs to be taken into account, namely the 
problem of multiplicity of identity formations. This problem has been conceptual-
ised in the scholarly debate as the ‘one identity versus many identities dilemma’.11  
Related to this dilemma is Piotr Sztompka’s diagnosis that in late modernity 
social structure is in a state of constant flux. The society cannot be analysed in 
terms of a fixed and replicable matrix of bonds, a set of common norms or values. 
Therefore late-modern or better post-modern society is in a state of permanent 
becoming rather than being.12 
As we cannot reduce identity formation in late modernity to a single identity 
narrative, “identity has become multidimensional, multi-layered, differentiated. It is 
produced as personal construction built of a multiple repertoire of options. People 
‘craft themselves’, rather than receive themselves ready-made.”13 
This introduces the problem of an order or hierarchy of identities. The sym-
bolic interactionist perspective emphasises the definitional lack of a durable hierar-
chy of identities as identity is a social construct that is constituted within the realm 
of ongoing social interactions. In this sense, identity cannot be acknowledged as 
social fact in the meaning that it was introduced by Émile Durkheim, who claimed 
that social fact could be acknowledged as a form of acting both ritualised and 
ephemeral, which sets boundaries within which both the individual and the society 
                                                     
9 Tomasz Leszniewski, Tożsamość jednostki w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie [Identity of the Individual in a 
Changing Society] (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2008), 356. 
10 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political 
Science Review 88.2 (1994): 385. 
11 For further discussion of this problem, see for instance: Jamieson, “Theorising Identity.” 
12 Piotr Sztompka, Socjologia: Analiza społeczeństwa [Sociology: An Analysis of the Society] (Kraków: ZNAK, 
2010). 
13 Piotr Sztompka, “From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Collective Identities and Symbolic 
Boundaries in the New Europe,” European Review 12.4 (2004): 493-4. 
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are constrained but at the same time are self-aware of their unique character, which 
in turn enables them to perform the roles of independent actors.14  
The multiple characters of identity construction result in yet another funda-
mental cognitive dilemma that researchers face when trying to grasp the full com-
plexity and dynamics of identity formation. The conceptual interdependence be-
tween identity and identification constitutes a major dilemma in identity studies. 
This dilemma has been present in numerous studies on European collective identi-
ty especially.15 A convincing, as it may seem, answer to this dilemma was suggested 
by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. Following their argumentation, we may 
acknowledge identity as a particular state of reflection of the subject, which defines 
symbolic boundaries of a self-other or an in-group-out-group relation. Conse-
quently, identification would denote a process of internalisation of rules of conduct 
that constitute a frame of reference for actual behaviour.16 
…and Its Application 
Irrespectively of scholarly disagreement as to the ultimate meaning of the very 
concept of identity, which is also clearly observable within the symbolic interac-
tionist environment, we may emphasise that this analytical perspective offers a 
valuable explanatory platform especially for the empirical investigation of crucial 
social processes such as consequences of migration and professional mobility on 
identity transformations in contemporary European society. 
One example of applying the symbolic interactionism perspective to the empir-
ical inquiry of the interplay between migration and identity transformation is a 
monograph by Dariusz Niedźwiedzki, who analysed implications of the so-called 
pendulum migration of Polish workers to Belgium after the Eastern enlargement 
of the EU in May 2004 on the dynamic of their identity transformation.17 The 
author attempted to conceptualise the interplay between three closely interwoven 
dimensions of identity transformation among pendulum migrants. In doing so, he 
analysed the dynamics of transformation of meanings attached to pendulum mi-
grants to the symbolic meaning of social habitat of the place of origin, the place of 
work and residence and the symbolic world constituted by pendulum migrants for 
                                                     
14 Ėmile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes (New York: Free Press, 1982), 50-
9. 
15 See for instance: Gerard Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity,” in Making the European Polity: 
Reflexive Integration in the EU, ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen (London: Routledge, 2005), 127-42; Cathleen 
Kantner, “Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding: The Case of the Emerging Euro-
pean Identity,” European Journal of Social Theory 9.4 (2006): 501-23; Klaus Eder and Wilfried Spohn, 
Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub-
lishing, 2005). 
16 Pożarlik, “La citoyenneté européenne,” 126. 
17 Dariusz Niedźwiedzki, Migracje i tożsamość: Od teorii do analizy przypadku [Migration and Identity: From 
Theory to Case Study] (Kraków: Nomos, 2010). 
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themselves and by themselves. In conclusion of his work, Niedźwiedzki argues 
that 
  
the concept of pendulum migration is an indispensable instrument for de-
scribing and understanding phenomena occurring in contemporary devel-
oped societies. These phenomena include dynamic forms of socialisation. 
[...] These types of socialisation signify the cohabitation of different peoples 
and cultures, their intermingling and encounters that occur in a multifaceted 
social space. [...] Migration has an effect on the self-identification of those 
moving as well as on how they identify others.18  
 
Apart from a wide applicability of symbolic interactionism to the study of migra-
tion and its impact on identity transformation, one should also underline profes-
sional mobility and its influence on identity transformation as yet another area 
where we find symbolic interactionism a valuable explanatory perspective. Here 
research on identity transformation of Erasmus students seems particularly inter-
esting and promising. One of the empirical works we should mention in this con-
text is Vassiliki Papatsiba’s analysis of the political and cultural impact of Erasmus 
mobility on identity formation of Erasmus students.19 Having surveyed evaluation 
reports submitted by Erasmus students, Papatsiba finds a relatively visible impact 
of Erasmus mobility on the individual sense of European identity. However, this 
transformation does not constitute a fixed orientation. As he concludes: 
 
[A]cquiring a feeling of belonging in an enlarged Europe, enriching national 
identities with the desired European dimension remained a somewhat ran-
dom result of experiential learning. This type of learning depends on situa-
tions, on encounters, as well as on the individual’s psychology. In the reports 
that were analysed, its potentialities but especially its limited effects for an 
important number of students were observed.20 
 
Another example of the applicability of the symbolic interactionist perspective to 
identity studies is Ulrike Liebert’s analysis of European identity formation in the 
context of German identity transformation.21 In her analysis of German elite dis-
course based on the public intellectuals’ debate on European identity, Ulrike 
Liebert points at the “German self-understanding in the post-national constella-
tion” as a key process framing two co-existing major projects of European identity 
                                                     
18 Ibid., 353. 
19 Vassiliki Papatsiba, “Political and Individual Rationales of Student Mobility: A Case-Study of 
ERASMUS and a French Regional Scheme for Studies Abroad,” European Journal of Education 40.2 
(2005): 173-88. 
20 Ibid., 183. 
21 Ulrike Liebert, “Two Projects of European Identity,” in Collective Identity and Democracy: The Impact of 
EU Enlargement, ed. Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach (Oslo: ARENA 2010), 29-60.  
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discourse in contemporary Germany.22 The first project refers to “democratic con-
stitutional European identity”23 as conceived by Jürgen Habermas, who builds his 
argumentation upon the assumption that 
 
[a] shifting of legitimation from the side of results to that of the co-
determination of political programmes that affect citizens of all member 
states equally, though not necessarily in the same ways, will not be possible, 
without the development of an awareness of shared belonging to a political 
community that extends across national boundaries.24 
 
The second project refers to “European cultural identity based on a community of 
values”25, which challenges the Habermasian ideal of European identity as a post-
national identity rooted in post-national constitutional patriotism. Here Kurt 
Biedenkopf is cited by Liebert as the most visible proponent of a pre-existing 
community based upon a historical and cultural background of European we-
feeling constituted by adherence to a common set of values.26  
A sort of third way project of European identity is suggested by Liebert in 
conclusion of her discussion of German discourse on European identity. Liebert’s 
idea is very much constructed in line with symbolic interactionist premises. “Doing 
Europe” seems more accurate than only “debating European identity,” so the ar-
gument goes.27 More precisely:  
 
The negotiation of what – under conditions of complexity – holds Europe-
ans together, that is which democratic and constitutional principles and 
which common values form their common core – involves multiple sites 
and agents, among which not only European presidencies and national gov-
ernments but also parliaments, civil society and public spheres are indispens-
ible.28 
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion of this brief analysis of the symbolic interactionism perspec-
tive and its applicability in contemporary identity studies, it should be emphasised 
that it offers a relatively wide window of opportunity to go beyond well-
established, thus limited, theoretical and methodological paradigms of researching 
                                                     
22 Ibid., 33. 
23 Ibid., 41. 
24 Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 70, cited in Liebert, “Two 
Projects of European Identity.” 
25 Liebert, “Two Projects of European Identity,” 47. 
26 Ibid., 47. 
27 Ibid., 54. 
28 Ibid. 
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identity. More specifically, it allows us to overcome reductionism of orthodox 
nominalism and holism by placing identity in the social as an interactive space 
where the self is reflected in the society and the society is reflected in the self. This 
seems to be a valuable explanatory perspective on studying identity transformation 
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Zeichen als Wunder? 
Eine der Geschichte entnommene Anekdote 
Bill Bell 
Seitdem Homi K. Bhabhas „Zeichen als Wunder: Fragen der Ambivalenz und 
Autorität unter einem Baum bei Delhi im Mai 1817“ erstmals als Artikel im Critical 
Inquiry im Jahr 1985 erschienen ist, hat sich dieser Text zu einem locus classicus post-
kolonialer Studien entwickelt.1 Als wichtiges Dokument aus dem Fundus des Post-
kolonialismus unserer Zeit wurde der Essay unter anderem 1994 als Kapitel in Die 
Verortung der Kultur sowie in zahllosen Anthologien und Sekundärwerken abge-
druckt. Darüber hinaus wurde der Text in mehrere Sprachen übersetzt. Homi K. 
Bhabha begründet einen Diskurs, dessen Hauptwortschöpfungen – „Hybridität“, 
„schlaue Höflichkeit“, „Mimikry“ – sich im Verlauf der vergangenen 25 Jahre 
dermaßen weit verbreiteten, dass sie die postkoloniale Imagination geradezu kolo-
nisiert haben und das mit einer einfallsreichen Energie, wie sie in der schöngeisti-
gen Welt der Kulturtheorie selten zu finden ist. 
Ich habe an dieser Stelle nicht die Absicht, die eindrucksvolle und dynamische 
Darbietung europäischer Kulturkritik zu rezitieren, die Bhabhas Essay prägt, der-
weil er sich – geschickt und pflichtgetreu – durch die Ökumene der Koryphäen 
Freud, Foucault, Lacan und Derrida hindurch bewegt, noch will ich die subtile 
Weise thematisieren, in der der Essay auf Konzepte zusteuert, die inzwischen als 
gängig gelten dürfen. Stattdessen möchte ich aufzeigen, wie der Essay, insbesonde-
re im Hinblick auf seine anekdotische Geschichtsschreibung, mehr Probleme auf-
wirft, als Bhabha in diesem Rahmen absehen oder gar auflösen kann. 
                                                     
Ich bin all jenen Kollegen dankbar, mit denen ich dieses Essay vor seinem Erscheinen diskutiert 
habe, im Besonderen Georgia Axiotou, Peter Cudmore, John Frow, Gladson Jathanna, Michelle 
Keown, Anca-Raluca Radu, Kirsten Sandrock, Barbara Schaff und Peter van der Veer. Ganz beson-
deren Dank schulde ich Rosinka Chaudhuri und Abhijit Gupta dafür, dass sie ihre aus eigener Unter-
suchung des Gegenstands gewonnenen Erkenntnisse mit mir geteilt haben. 
1 Homi K. Bhabha, „Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a 
Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817,” Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985): 144-65. Die Originalfassung des vorlie-
genden Artikels zitiert Bhabas Essay durchgehend in der Version, in der es in The Location of Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 145-74, erschien. Eine deutschsprachige Fassung des Essay ist: „Zeichen 
als Wunder: Fragen der Ambivalenz und Autorität unter einem Baum bei Delhi im Mai 1817“ in Die 
Verortung der Kultur (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 2000), 151-80. Die Zitate aus The Location of Culture 
entstammen der deutschen Übersetzung, die Zitate aus Sekundärwerken und aus historischen Quel-
len erscheinen hier in neu übersetzter Fassung. Anm. d. Ü. 
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Seit dem Erscheinen von Bhabhas Essay ist die Beziehung zwischen Kritik und 
Geschichte – und im Besonderen der Einsatz historischer Anekdoten zum Zwecke 
der Polemik – in verstörender und ungelöster Weise in der kritischen Praxis prä-
sent geblieben. Carolyn Porter beobachtet in der Verwendung der isolierten Anek-
dote, wie sie bei Bhabha üblich ist, eine Tendenz „hin zum ‚kolonialen Formalis-
mus‘, der sich die ‚seltsamen Dinge‘, die man jenseits des Literarischen finden 
kann, aneignet, derweil der gesellschaftliche und historische Hintergrund, der sie 
hervorgebracht hat, ausgeblendet wird.“ Solch eine Herangehensweise, argumen-
tiert Porter, bedeute ganz unmittelbar ein „Plündern und Auslöschen“ jener „dis-
kursiven Praktiken, auf die sich das Argument beruft.“2 Mit dem Ansprechen der-
selben Tendenzen, wie sie sich in Bhabhas einflussreichem Essay manifestieren, 
will ich nicht eine Rückkehr zum grand recit der Geschichte heraufbeschwören. 
Vielmehr möchte ich drei Gegengeschichten unterbreiten, die eine Reihe von Fra-
gen aufwerfen, die in jenem paradigmatischen Diskurs, der sich nahtlos und selbst-
sicher zwischen theoretischer Stellungnahme und historischer Behauptung hin und 
her bewegt, unter den Tisch gefallen sind. 
1 Und worin liegt die Bedeutung der Bibel? 
Bhabha wählt als Ausgangspunkt seiner Argumentation die folgende Episode, wie 
sie 1818 im Missionary Register erschien und die Unterhaltung zwischen einem ein-
geborenen Katecheten und 500 seltsamen Konvertiten in einem heiligen Wäldchen 
in der Nähe von Delhi beschreibt. Es handelt sich um eine Anekdote, auf die 
Bhabha in seiner Argumentation an strategischen Momenten zurückkommt und 
auf deren Grundlage die pauschaleren historischen und theoretischen Behauptun-
gen des Essays aufbauen. „In der ersten Maiwoche des Jahres 1817”, schreibt 
Bhabha, „reiste Anund Messeh, einer der ersten einheimischen Missionare Indiens, 
hastig und aufgeregt von seiner Missionsstation in Meerut zu einem ganz in der 
Nähe von Delhi gelegenen Wäldchen.”: 
 
Dort fand er etwa 500 Menschen im Schatten der Bäume sitzend vor, Män-
ner, Frauen und Kinder, die, genau wie man es ihm geschildert hatte, in Lek-
türe und Gespräch vertieft waren. Er wendete sich einem der älter ausse-
henden Männer zu und sprach ihn an, worauf es zu folgendem Gespräch 
kam.  
„Wer um Himmels willen sind all diese Menschen, und wo kom-
men sie her?“ „Wir sind arm und niedrig, und wir lesen und lieben dieses 
Buch.“ – „Was ist das für ein Buch?“ „Das Buch Gottes“ – „Lasst mich 
doch einmal einen Blick darauf werfen.“ Als Anund das Buch öffnete, wurde 
er gewahr, daß es das Evangelium unseres Herrn war, das in die hindustani-
                                                     
2 Carolyn Porter, „Are We Being Historical Yet?,” South Atlantic Quarterly 87.4 (1988): 743-86 (799). 
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sche Sprache übersetzt worden war und von dem die Menge eine reichliche 
Anzahl von Exemplaren zu besitzen schien: einige waren GEDRUCKT, an-
dere hatten die Leute selbst aus den gedruckten Ausgaben ABGESCHRIE-
BEN. Anund wies auf den Namen Jesu und fragte: „Wer ist das?“ „das ist 
Gott! Er gab uns diese Buch.“ – „Wo habt ihr es bekommen?“ „Ein Engel 
vom Himmel gab es uns, auf dem Markt von Hurdwar.“ – Ein Engel?“ „Ja, 
für uns war er der der Engel Gottes: aber er war ein Mensch, ein gelehrter 
Weiser.“ (Bei diesen übersetzten Bibeln kann es sich nur um die Bücher ge-
handelt haben, die vor fünf, sechs Jahren von der Missionsstation in Hurd-
war verteilt worden sind.) „Die handgeschriebenen Bücher schreiben wir 
selbst, da das unsere einzige Möglichkeit ist, mehr von diesem gesegneten 
Wort zu bekommen.“ – „Diese Bücher“, sagte Anund, „lehren die Religion 
der europäischen Sahibs. Es ist IHR Buch; und sie haben es in unserer Spra-
che gedruckt, damit auch wir daran teilhaben.“ „Ah! Nein“, erwiderte der 
Fremde, „das ist unmöglich, denn sie essen Fleisch.“ – „Jesus Christus“, sag-
te Anund, „lehrt, daß es ohne Bedeutung ist, was man isst oder trinkt. ES-
SEN ist nichts vor Gott. Nicht das, was in den Mund eines Menschen hineingelangt, 
besudelt ihn, sondern das, was aus dem Mund herauskommt, das besudelt den Menschen: 
denn die Niedertracht kommt aus dem Herzen. Aus dem Herzen kommen 
böse Gedanken, Morde, Ehebrüche, Hurerei, Diebstähle; und diese sind es, 
die die Menschen besudeln.“  
„Das ist wahr; aber wie kann es das Buch der Europäer sein, wenn 
wir doch glauben, daß es Gottes Geschenk an uns ist? Er schickte es uns, in 
Hurdvar.“ „Gott gab es vor langer Zeit den Sahibs, und SIE sandten es 
uns.“ … Die Unwissenheit und Einfalt vieler Leute ist sehr verblüffend, 
denn sie haben noch nie zuvor von einem gedruckten Buch gehört, und sein 
bloßes Erscheinen war für sie wie ein Wunder. Das auf diese Weise erwor-
bene, immer weiter wachsende Wissen löste größte Erregung aus, und alle 
waren sich der Anerkennung der Überlegenheit der Doktrinen diese Heili-
gen Buchs gegenüber allem, was sie bisher gesehen oder gehört hatten, einig. 
Bald zeigte sich Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Kastenunterschieden, und 
die Einmischung und die tyrannische Autorität der Brahmanen wurden als 
immer drückender und unerträglicher empfunden. Schließlich beschlossen 
sie, sich von ihren übrigen Hindubrüdern zu trennen und selbst aus ihrer 
Mitte eine Gruppe der vier oder fünf Leute auszuwählen, die am besten le-
sen konnten, damit sie die Öffentlichkeit aus diesem neu erworbenen Buch 
unterrichteten. … Anund fragte sie: „Warum seid ihr alle weiß gekleidet?“  
„Die Gott ergebenen Menschen sollen weiße Gewänder tragen“, war die 
Antwort, „als Zeichen dafür, daß sie rein und ihrer Sünden ledig sind.“ – 
Anund bemerkte: „Ihr solltet GETAUFT werden, im Namen des Vaters, 
des Sohnes und des Heiligen Geistes. Kommt nach Meerut: Dort gibt es ei-
nen christlichen Pater, und er wird euch zeigen, was ihr tun soll.“ Sie ant-
worteten: „Jetzt müssen wir zur Ernte nach Hause; aber da wir die Absicht 
haben, uns einmal im Jahr zu treffen, werden wir vielleicht nächstes Jahr 
nach Meerut kommen.“ … Ich erklärte ihnen das Wesen des Sakramentes 
und der Taufe, worauf sie antworteten: „Wir sind bereit, uns allen anderen 
Bräuchen der Christen zu fügen, aber nicht dem Sakrament, denn die Euro-
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päer essen das Fleisch der Kuh, und das ist für uns unmöglich.“ Darauf ant-
wortete ich: „Diese WORT stammt von Gott und nicht von den Menschen 
und wenn ER eure Herzen verstehen läßt, dann werdet ihr es RICHTIG be-
greifen.“ Sie antworteten: „Sobald unser ganzes Land dieses Sakrament emp-
fängt, werden wir es auch tun.“ Darauf bemerkte ich: „Die Zeit ist nah, wo 
alle Länder die WORT empfangen werden!“ Sie antworteten: „Das ist 
wahr!“3 
 
Der zentrale Tropus, um den herum Bhabha seine Lesart dieses seltsamen Augen-
blicks ausformuliert, ist einer, der sich, so argumentiert er, im 19. Jahrhundert „so 
beständig wiederholt“, dass er „triumphal eine Literatur des Empire begründet“, 
nämlich „die plötzliche, zufällige Entdeckung des englischen Buchs.“ Sobald die 
Bibel in Erscheinung tritt, steht sie für Bhabha im Einklang mit einer von ihm als 
„koloniales Begehren und Disziplin“4 bezeichneten Abstraktion, welche geradezu 
auf eine Begegnung mit Indern wartet, in der sie verändert, anverwandelt, hybridi-
siert wird.  
Die „Bibeln”, die in Hardwar verteilt wurden, enthielten sehr wahrscheinlich 
Ausgaben des Neuen Testaments in Hindi, angefertigt in der baptistischen Missi-
onsdruckerei in Serampore.5 William Carey, jener Missionar und Drucker, welcher 
ihre Herstellung beaufsichtigt hatte, war zu einem Zeitpunkt in Indien eingetrof-
fen, um dort seine Druckerei aufzubauen, als die britische Kolonialpolitik der Prä-
                                                     
3 Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 151. Bhabha transkribiert den Bericht aus The Missionary Register, 
Januar 1818: 18-9. 
4 Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 152. 
5 Chamberlain hätte in Hurdwar keine Ausgaben der Heiligen Schrift in Braj-Bhakha verteilen kön-
nen, wie Bhabha spekuliert (166). Erst als er dort angekommen war, im April 1814, erhielt er ein 
Paket aus Serampore, in dem er die ersten Druckfahnen seiner Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments in 
Braj-Bhakha vorfand. Siehe: William Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain (London: Wightman and 
Cramp, 1826), 347. In einer aus Kalkutta stammenden Depesche vom 21. August 1817 wird behaup-
tet, dass man bei den Pilgern von Delhi „lediglich 2 oder 3 gedruckte Ausgaben“ vom „Neuen Tes-
tament in Hindustani“ vorgefunden habe. Auf einem dieser Bücher „wurde der Name von Mr. 
Chamberlain gefunden. Demgemäß kam man dahinter, dass Mr. C. der Engel gewesen war. Er hatte 
ein paar Ausgaben beim Jahrmarkt von Hurdwar verteilt.“ Siehe: American Baptist Magazine, März 
1818: 298. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass es sich dabei um Ausgaben von The New Testament of Our Lord 
and Saviour J.C.; translated into the Hindustanee (Hindi) Language by the Missionaries at Serampore handelte, 
erstmals 1811 von der Serampore Mission Press veröffentlicht; von Henry Martyn unter der Beihilfe 
von Mirza Fitrat und „anderen gelehrten Eingeborenen“ revidiert und 1814 von der Serampore Press 
neugedruckt. Siehe: J. T. Zenker, Bibliotheca orientale (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1861), 429-30.  
John Chamberlain scheint auch eine Vielzahl anderer Druckwerke aus Serampore beim Jahr-
markt in Hurdwar verteilt zu haben. Im Jahr 1818 entdeckte man, dass sich im Besitz der hier fragli-
chen Pilger 11 Ausgaben des Evangeliums nach Matthäus und eine Ausgabe des Evangeliums nach 
Markus befanden (Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 205), obwohl diese womöglich auf anderem Wege 
erworben worden waren. Ein weiterer Missionar berichtet, dass zwei Brahmanen kostenlos Ausgaben 
des Evangeliums nach Lukas in Hindi und von The Gospel Messenger erhalten hatten, letzteres ein 
Traktat mit bengalischen Versen von Ram Ram Basu, zusammengestellt von Chamberlain und eben-
falls in Serampore gedruckt. Siehe: Thomas Smith, The History and Origin of the Missionary Societies (Lon-
don: Kelly and Evans, 1824), 523; John Murdoch, English Translations of Selected Tracts Published in India 
(Madras: Scottish Press, 1861), ix-x. 
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senz von Missionaren auf dem Subkontinent ganz offen feindselig gegenüberstand. 
Sie drohte sogar damit, jeden Missionar zu verhaften, „der das Territorium der 
[Ostindien-]Gesellschaft unerlaubterweise betritt.“ Da er ihn als eine Gefahr für 
die öffentliche Sicherheit ansah, hatte der Generalgouverneur Carey im Jahr 1799 
untersagt, seinen Druckereibetrieb in Kalkutta einzurichten. Angesichts des Aus-
bleibens einer Genehmigung der Briten fand Carey Zuflucht in Serampore, das 
damals unter dänischer Kontrolle stand und wo er „frei von der Behelligung durch 
die britischen Behörden“ war.6 Dort vollzog sich, trotz der Einmischung von Re-
gierungsstellen, die Übersetzung und der Druck jener Bücher.  
Aber aus Sicht der britischen Behörden war kaum jemand so lästig wie John 
Chamberlain, jener Missionar, welcher tatsächlich die Bücher auf dem Jahrmarkt in 
Hardwar verteilt hatte. Als er im April 1814 in dem am Ufer des Ganges gelegenen 
Hardwar – einem bedeutenden Wallfahrtsort für Hindus, Muslime und Sikhs – 
eintraf, hatte er sich nicht vorstellen können, welcher Erfolg auf ihn warten würde. 
Innerhalb von zehn Tagen, so beschreibt es ein Augenzeuge, war seine Gemeinde 
auf „viele tausende“ angewachsen. „Sie saßen herum und horchten mit einer Auf-
merksamkeit, die einer christlichen Zuhörerschaft zur Ehre gereicht hätte. Als sich 
der Missionar allabendlich zurückzog, begleiteten ihn die Ovationen der Massen: 
‚Möge der Padree (beziehungsweise Geistliche) ewig leben.“‘7 Der Erfolg von 
Chamberlains geistlicher Tätigkeit führte zu seiner Ausweisung aus dem Bezirk – 
auf Anweisung des Generalgouverneurs und vollzogen durch bewaffnete Sicher-
heitskräfte. Die britischen Behörden, die seine Anwesenheit als politisch gefährlich 
ansahen, reagierten schnell und der „Engel“, der die Ausgaben des Neuen Testa-
ments auf dem Jahrmarkt in Hardwar verteilt hatte, sah sich gezwungen, nach Se-
rampore zurückzukehren.8 
Derartige Vorkommnisse sollten uns nachdenklich stimmen, wenn wir die Fra-
ge beantworten wollen, ob dieselben Bücher Teil einer konzertierten und koordi-
nierten Kampagne von Missionaren und Vertretern der Behörden gewesen sind 
oder nicht. Saurabh Dube konstatierte in diesem Zusammenhang „eine bösartige 
Binsenweisheit unter Historikern und Theoretikern des kolonialen Diskurses, nach 
der die Konstruktion wirkungsmächtiger Bilder des nichtwestlichen Anderen durch 
eine geeinte und siegreiche koloniale Elite mit einer gleichförmigen westlichen 
                                                     
6 John Clark Marshman, The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, Embracing the History of the 
Serampore Mission (London: Longman, 1859), Bd. 1, 120-2. 
7 Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 350. 
8 Zum Zeitpunkt seiner geistlichen Tätigkeit in Hardwar agierte der Missionar unter der Patronage 
und dem Schutz von Begum Samru, der kaschmirischen Herrscherin des Fürstentums von Sirdhana. 
Nach Chamberlains Entlassung befahl sie ihren eigenen Soldaten, ihm bewaffneten Schutz zu gewäh-
ren, und richtete mehrfach erfolglose Appelle an die Kolonialregierung, Chamberlain den Verbleib in 
Sirdhana zu erlauben. Siehe: William Carey, Oriental Christian Biography (Kalkutta: Baptist Mission 
Press, 1850-2), Bd. 2, 228. Siehe ebenfalls: Baptist Missionary Magazine, März 1818: 298; Lucius Edwin 
Smith, Heroes and Martyrs of the Modern Missionary Enterprise (Providence, RI: Potter, 1856), 98. 
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Mentalität erfolgte.“9 So offeriert Bhabha die folgende, kurze geschichtliche Zu-
sammenfassung: 
 
Es waren Grants Wahl in den Aufsichtsrat der Ostindischen Kompanie 
1974 und ins Parlament 1802 und sein energisches Eintreten für die missio-
narischen Ideen der Clapham-Sekte, die zur Wiederaufnahme einer „Fröm-
migkeitsklausel“ in die Satzung der Ostindischen Kompanie im Jahre 1813 
führten. 1817 betrieb die Kirchliche Missionsgesellschaft bereits einund-
sechzig Schulen, und 1818 arbeitete sie den „Burdwan-Plan“ aus, einen zent-
ralen Lehrplan für den Unterricht in der englischen Sprache. Das Ziel dieses 
Planes nimmt fast wörtlich Thomas Macaulays berüchtigte „Minute on Edu-
cation“ vorweg: „einen Stamm gut ausgebildeter Arbeiter zu schaffen, die 
das Englische so weit beherrschen, daß sie als Lehrer, Übersetzer und Ver-
fasser nützlicher Werke für die Masse der Bevölkerung wirken können“. 
Anund Messehs monotones Widerholen von Kapiteln und Versen und seine 
kunstlose Übersetzungstechnik sind Bestandteile einer der kunstvollsten 
Technologien der kolonialen Macht.10 
 
Die Vorstellung, wonach die missionarischen Bestrebungen in Indien vor und nach 
1813 ein kulturelles Unternehmen gewesen sind, das in Komplizenschaft mit der 
offiziellen Regierungspolitik stand, wäre mit den Erfahrungen von Carey und 
Chamberlain nicht in Einklang zu bringen gewesen. Und sie standen in dieser Hin-
sicht nicht alleine. Eine Reihe von Forschern beschreibt die „tiefgreifenden Mei-
nungsunterschiede“ über die Rolle missionarischer Tätigkeiten lange Jahre nach 
Inkrafttreten der „Frömmigkeitsklausel“ und verweist darauf, dass zahlreiche 
Chargen in der Kolonialverwaltung am liebsten „den Missionaren den Zutritt ver-
weigert und Sitten und Bräuche Indiens unbehelligt gelassen“ hätten.11 Gauri Vis-
wanathan merkt in diesem Zusammenhang an, dass, obwohl die Satzung von 1813 
als „ein Sieg der Missionare erscheinen“ mag, „diese bestürzt  auf die anhaltende 
Überwachung ihrer Aktivitäten reagierten, die in unerträglicher Weise an Strenge 
                                                     
9 Saurabh Dube, „Travelling Light: Missionary Musings, Colonial Cultures and Anthropological 
Anxieties,” in Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics, hrsg. Raminder Kaur und John 
Hutnyk (London: Zed, 1999), 36. Auch Bart Moore-Gilbert stellt fest, dass „Bhabhas einheitliche 
Konzeption des ‚kolonialen Untertanen‘ [….] der historischen Wirklichkeit nicht gerecht wird.“ 
Siehe: Bart Moore-Gilbert, Writing India, 1757-1900: The Literature of British India (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1995), 202. Für meine eigene, revisionistische Interpretation der monologi-
schen Sichtweise des Empire siehe: Bill Bell,  „Commentary: Selkirk’s Silence,” Times Literary Supple-
ment, 18. März 2011: 14-5. 
10 Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 156. 
11 Martin Ballard, The Age of Progress, 1848-1866 (London: Methuen, 1971), 47. Siehe auch: Penelope 
Carson, „An Imperial Dilemma: The Propagation of Christianity in Early Colonial India,” The Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 18.2 (1990): 169-90; John L. Comaroff, „Images of Empire, Con-
tests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, hrsg. Frederick Cooper und Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 163-97; Karen Chancey, „The Star in the East: The Controversy over Chris-
tian Missions to India, 1805-1813,” The Historian 60.3 (1998): 507-22.  
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zunahm.“12 Im Jahr 1822 erklärte Thomas Munro, der Gouverneur von Madras, in 
unmissverständlicher Weise: „In jedem Land, jedoch besonders in diesem, wo die 
Herrschenden so wenig an der Zahl und von anderer Rasse als die Bevölkerung 
sind, ist es das Gefährlichste überhaupt, sich in die religiösen Befindlichkeiten 
einzumischen.“13 
Macaulays berüchtigtes „Memorandum zur Bildung“ und dessen Aufruf zur 
Förderung der englischen Sprache in Indien – ein Gegenstand, auf den viele post-
koloniale Interpretationen der indischen Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert zurück-
greifen – mögen in Schulen und Universitäten, die der Kolonialverwaltung unter-
standen, umgesetzt worden sein. Aber in den Missionsschulen der Außenbezirke 
wurden mit Nachdruck weiterhin einheimische Sprachen und Religionen gelehrt. 
Wie auch immer die erklärten Ziele des Burdwan-Planes lauteten, nicht alle stan-
den rückhaltlos zu der Verpflichtung, die englische Sprache zu verbreiten: So gab 
es im Jahr 1828 zehn Schulen in und um Burdwan, „in denen rund 1000 Kinder 
die bengalische Sprache gelehrt wurden.“14 Die Rolle, die Englisch in Indien ein-
nahm, beschäftigte Carey bei der Vorbereitung seiner Übersetzungen sehr. Wie er 
später selbst schrieb: „Es war spürbar, dass die staatliche englische Bildungspolitik 
– zweifellos unbeabsichtigt, aber mit diesem Ergebnis – zur Abkühlung der auf-
blühenden Andacht und Hingabe sowie der religiösen Empfindungen der Schüler 
führte.“15 Davon überzeugt, dass Sanskrit (das er als „Vater aller östlichen Spra-
chen“ bezeichnete) eine größere Affinität zum Griechischen der Bibel als zum 
Englischen besaß, versammelte Carey in Serampore eine Gruppe einheimischer 
Wissenschaftler, um antike religiöse Texte aufzubereiten, die einer Vielzahl von 
Traditionen und einer Bandbreite von Dialekten entstammten. In einem Schreiben 
an Careys Cousin hinterließ William Ward 1811 die folgende, lebhafte Beschrei-
bung der Betriebsamkeit in der Druckerei:  
 
                                                     
12 Gauri Viswanathan, „The Beginnings of English Literary Studies in British India,” The Postcolonial 
Studies Reader, hrsg. Bill Ashcroft et al., 2. Aufl. (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 376. 
13 George Robert Gleig, The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro (London: Colburn and Bentley, 
1830), Bd. 2, 118. Zu den gefährlichen Folgen, für die Munro und andere der Einmischung durch 
Missionen die Schuld zuschoben, gehört der Sepoy-Aufstand von 1806. Jahrzehnte später sollten 
viele ähnliche Vorwürfe gegenüber christlichen Missionaren im Zusammenhang mit den ethnischen 
Spannungen erheben, die den Aufstand von 1857 entfacht hatten. In den folgenden Jahren blieben 
die Konflikte zwischen britischen Christen und der offiziellen Politik der Regierung bitter. Ein aufge-
brachter Kommentator merkte 1862 in der Calcutta Review an: „Warum werden die heiligen Bücher 
der Hindus und der Koran […] in den Universitäten der Regierung gelesen, derweil die Bibel […] 
ausgeschlossen bleibt? Warum duldet man, dass der Direktor für Volksbildung aus englischen Schul-
büchern alle Andeutungen auf das Christentum, wie vage sie auch sein mögen, entfernen lässt, wäh-
rend die bengalischen Textbücher, die von der Regierung für diejenigen ausgewählt wurden, die ihre 
Prüfungen in der Landessprache bestehen möchten, weiterhin in unaussprechlicher Weise Obszönitä-
ten und Schmutz enthalten?“ (217). 
14 Charles Williams, The Missionary Gazeteer (London: Westley and Davies, 1828), 19. 
15 George Smith, The Life of William Carey (London: John Murray, 1885), 456. 
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Wenn man eintritt, sieht man Ihren Cousin, in einem engen Raum sitzend 
und bekleidet mit einer weißen Jacke, beim Lesen oder Schreiben oder wie 
sein Blick durch das ganze Büro schweift, das mehr als 170 Fuß lang ist. 
Dort kann man Inder beobachten, die mit der Übersetzung der Heiligen 
Schrift in die verschiedenen Sprachen oder mit der Korrektur von Druck-
fahnen beschäftigt sind. Man nimmt Notiz von in Kästen ausgelegten 
Schrifttypen in Arabisch, Persisch, Nagari, Panjabi, Marathi, Chinesisch, 
Oriya, Burmesisch, Kanaresisch, Griechisch, Hebräisch und Englisch. Hin-
dus, Muselmanen und indische Christen – alle sind sie beschäftigt mit Ab-
fassen, Korrigieren, Verteilen. Als nächstes kommen vier Männer, die die 
Bögen mit der Heiligen Schrift in den verschiedenen Sprachen drucken; an-
dere falten diese Bögen und liefern sie in dem großen Lagerraum ab; und das 
Binden erfolgt durch sechs Muselmanen.16 
 
Genauso wie man christliche Schriften in einer Vielzahl von Sprachen reproduzier-
te, druckte der Betrieb in Serampore auch eine beachtliche Anzahl von indischen 
religiösen Texten. Shivanath hat auf die Bedeutung von Careys Unternehmen für 
das frühe Aufblühen der indigenen Literatur verwiesen.17 Swapan Majumdar be-
merkt in diesem Zusammenhang, wie Carey, dadurch dass er „Panditen für Sansk-
rit und Munshis für das Persisch-Arabische zusammenbrachte, um die bengalische 
Prosa nachhaltig zu verändern“, ein Zentrum zur Förderung der indischen Litera-
tur schuf: „Von Religionsgesprächen und populären Geschichten, Chroniken und 
Legenden bis hin zu maßgeblichen Ausgaben literarischer Texte.“18  
Für Carey war sein Druckereiunternehmen Teil eines größeren Engagements 
zur Förderung der einheimischen Sprachen angesichts dessen, was er als feindli-
chen englischen Einfall ansah. In dem Manifest, das er für die Mission in Serampo-
re abfasste, argumentierte er, wie wichtig es sei, dass die religiösen Gemeinden von 
Indern geleitet würden, die in der Lage wären, das „religiöse Anliegen viel eher als 
zur eigenen Nation gehörig zu kennzeichnen“. Wie die reformorientierten Hindus, 
mit denen er Bündnisse schmiedete, kämpfte Carey gegen kastenbedingte Un-
gleichheit, gegen das Töten von Kindern und gegen Witwenverbrennungen (Sati) – 
bei deren Verbot im Jahr 1829 er eine bedeutende Rolle spielte –, aber betreffs der 
„unschuldigen Sitten der Menschheit“ vertrat er (genau wie jene reformorientierten 
Hindus) die Sichtweise einer strikten Nichteinmischung: 
 
Wir haben es als unsere Pflicht angesehen, die Namen von eingeborenen 
Konvertiten nicht zu ändern, hierbei aus der Heiligen Schrift ablesend, dass 
auch die Apostel die Namen der ersten Christen nicht abänderten, die sich 
                                                     
16 S. Pearce Carey, William Carey, 6. Aufl. (London, 1925), 283. 
17 Shivanath, „Modern Dogri Literature,” in Modern Indian Literature: An Anthology, hrsg. K. M. George 
(Neu-Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1992), Bd. 1, 96. 
18 Swapan Majumdar, „Literature and Literary Life in Old Calcutta,” in Calcutta, the Living City, hrsg. 
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vom Heidentum abgewandt hatten. […] Wir denken, dass das überragende 
Ziel […] nicht darin besteht, die Namen, die Bekleidung, das Essen und die 
unschuldigen Sitten der Menschheit zu verändern. […] Genauso wie es nicht 
angemessen wäre, die Namen heidnischer Götter unter Christen zu bewah-
ren, ist es weder notwendig noch vernünftig, jedem einzelnen Mann nach 
seiner Konversion einen neuen Namen zu geben, da hierdurch die Abläufe 
in Familien, zwischen Nachbarn usw. unnötig gestört würden.19 
Die Ausgaben der christlichen Bibel – übersetzt aus dem Koine des Griechischen in 
die verschiedenen indischen Mundarten –, die 1814 von Chamberlain auf dem 
Jahrmarkt in Hardwar verteilt wurden, waren nicht ganz jenes Sinnbild eines 
konzertierten Vorhabens der Engländer, welches sich Bhabha vorstellt. Übersetzt 
von einheimischen Gelehrten, gedruckt von einem kolonialen Exilanten, verteilt 
von einem politischen Aufrührer, war dem „englischen Buch“ das Phänomen der 
komplexen kulturellen Begegnung keineswegs fremd – und eigentlich war es auch 
überhaupt nicht englisch. Die Bibeln aus Serampore waren hybrid, als sie in Hard-
war eintrafen. 
 
2 Sag mir, wer sind all diese Leute? 
„Man stelle sich die Szenerie vor“, schreibt Bhabha: 
 
die Bibel – übersetzt vielleicht in einen nordindischen Dialekt wie das Brig-
bhasha, kostenlos oder für den Preis einer Rupie verteilt inmitten einer Kul-
tur, in der im allgemeinen nur Hindus mit Kastenzugehörigkeit ein 
Exemplar der Geheiligten Schriften besitzen – wie sie von den Einheimi-
schen ehrfürchtig sowohl als Neuheit als auch als Hausgottheit in Empfang 
genommen wird. […] Worin besteht bei der Offerierung der Hindi-Bibel der 
Wert des Englischen? Er besteht […] damit die Einheimischen sich dem 
brahmanischen „Wissensmonopol“ widersetzen und sich aus ihrer Bindung 
an die eigenen religiösen und kulturellen Traditionen lösen[.]20 
 
Ein grundlegendes Problem dieser Analyse besteht darin, dass die Eingeborenen, 
denen wir in dieser Anekdote begegnen, nicht wirklich praktizierende Hindus wa-
ren. Anand Messehs Frage, als er den 500 mysteriösen Fremden zum ersten Mal 
begegnet – „Sag mir, wer sind all diese Leute? und woher kommen sie?“ – bleibt in 
der Erzählung des Katecheten unbeantwortet. Aber zwei Monate später wurde das 
Geheimnis gelüftet. Am 14. Juli 1817 berichtete der Missionar Henry Fisher, „diese 
armen Fremden, die uns so beschäftigt haben, werden als Saadhs bezeichnet.“ Bei 
weiteren Nachforschungen entdeckte Fisher in mindestens fünf Dörfern in der 
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Umgebung von Delhi Mitglieder dieser Sekte, die einer monotheistischen Konfes-
sion verpflichtet waren und sich vor langer Zeit vom Hinduismus abgespalten 
hatte. Als Folge davon waren sie, so die Beobachtung von Fisher, Ausgestoßene, 
die fortwährenden „unerbittlichen“ Verfolgungen ausgesetzt waren, einschließlich 
regelmäßiger Züchtigungen und Erpressungen durch die Brahmanen.21 
Die Sekte hatte sich im Jahr 1543 von der Hauptströmung des Hinduismus ab-
gespalten, als sie von einem religiösen Propheten namens Birbhan gegründet wor-
den war, einem Mann, den die Saadhs als das personifizierte Wort Gottes ansahen. 
Um das Jahr 1658 herum nahmen sie die Lehren des Jogi Das an, der einige der 
Kernvorstellungen des Christentums in die Sekte einführte, die ihm möglicher-
weise durch jene frühen katholischen Missionare vermittelt worden waren, die 
damals in Indien wirkten.22 Von da an hatten die Saadhs ihren Glauben an den 
Einen Gott (Satnam), an Monogamie und an die Ablehnung aller Kastenunter-
schiede bewahrt. Ihre religiösen Hauptschriften, Pothis (das Buch), wurden auf 
öffentlichen Versammlungen während einer alljährlichen Wallfahrt verlesen, deren 
Hauptzweck darin bestand, ein Forum zur Beilegung interner Zwistigkeiten und 
zur Klarstellung der Politik und Doktrin der Gemeinschaft zu schaffen. So erklärt 
sich auch, warum sie sich 1817 in dem Wäldchen in der Nähe von Delhi, einem 
traditionellen Wallfahrtsort der Saadhs, aufhielten. Die Kernelemente des Geba-
rens und des Glaubens der Saadhs waren in Form von zwölf Geboten (Hukms) 
niedergelegt, die in den von Jogi Das vermittelten Schriften festgehalten waren, 
den Adi Updesh (oder „Ersten Maximen“), in denen wir offensichtliche jüdisch-
christliche Elemente entdecken können: 
 
 
1. Erkenne nur einen Gott an, der dich geschaffen hat und dich vernichten 
kann, über dem niemand steht und dem allein Verehrung gebührt; nicht 
der Erde, noch Stein, noch Metall, noch Holz, noch Bäumen, noch ir-
gendeinem geschaffenem Ding. Es gibt nur einen Herrn und nur das Wort 
des Herrn. Derjenige, der über Falschheit nachsinnt, übt bereits Falschheit 
aus und begeht eine Sünde, und wer eine Sünde begeht, stürzt in die Hölle.  
2. Sei bescheiden und demütig, richte deine Liebe nicht auf Weltliches, folge 
treu deinen Glaubenssätzen, und vermeide Verkehr mit allen, die anderen 
Glaubens sind, esse nicht das Brot eines Fremden. 
3. Lüge niemals, noch spreche zu irgendeiner Zeit Übles zu oder von irgen-
detwas, das der Erde oder des Wassers ist, oder Bäumen oder Tieren. Lass 
die Zunge damit beschäftigt sein, Gott zu preisen. Stehle niemals, noch 
Reichtum, noch Ländereien, noch Tiere, noch Weideland. Unterscheide 
zwischen deinem eigenen Eigentum und dem eines anderen, und sei zu-
frieden mit dem, was du besitzt. Male dir niemals Böses aus. Lasse deinen 
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Blick nicht auf unziemlichen Dingen ruhen, noch auf Männern, noch auf 
Frauen, noch auf Tänzen, noch auf Darbietungen.  
4. Lausche keiner üblen Unterhaltung, noch irgendetwas anderem denn Lob 
für den Herrn, noch Erzählungen, noch Klatsch, noch Rufmord, noch 
Musik, noch Gesang außer religiösen Liedern; aber dann darf die einzige 
musikalische Begleitung im Geiste sein. 
5. Begehre niemals irgendetwas, weder Gegenstände noch Reichtum; nimm 
einem anderen nichts weg. Alle Dinge werden von Gott geschenkt, sofern 
du Vertrauen in ihn hast, wird dir gegeben werden. 
6. Wenn man dich fragt, was du bist, sage du bist ein Sadh, spreche nicht von 
Kasten, ergehe dich nicht in Streitigkeiten, halte fest in deinem Glauben, 
leg deine Hoffnungen nicht in Menschen. 
7. Trage weiße Kleidung, benutze keine Farbstoffe, noch Kollyrium, noch 
Zahnpasta, noch mehndi (Henna), noch lege Markierungen auf deine Per-
son oder deinen Kopf, die dich in Gruppen einteilen, noch trage Perlen-
schnüre oder Rosenkränze oder Schmuck.  
8. Esse und trinke niemals berauschende Stoffe, noch kaue pan, noch rieche 
an Duftstoffen, noch rauche Tabak, noch kaue oder rieche Opium; erhebe 
deine Hände und beuge deinen Kopf nicht in Gegenwart von Götzenbil-
dern oder von Menschen. 
9. Nimm nicht das Leben von anderen, noch drohe persönliche Gewalt an, 
noch lege ein verdammendes Zeugnis ab, noch nimm irgendetwas mit 
Gewalt zu dir. 
10. Lasse einen Mann eine Ehefrau und eine Frau einen Ehemann nehmen, 
lasse einen Mann nicht die Essensreste einer Frau zu sich nehmen, aber 
eine Frau darf dies mit denen eines Mannes, so wie es Sitte sein mag. Lasse 
die Frau dem Manne gehorchen. 
11. Nimm nicht die Tracht eines Bettelmönches an, noch erbitte Almosen, 
noch nimm Geschenke an. Hab keine Furcht vor Nekromantie, noch ma-
che Gebrauch von ihr. Lerne kennen, bevor du vertraust. Die Treffen der 
Gläubigen (Sadhus) sind die einzigen Stätten zur Wallfahrt, aber verstehe, 
wer die Gläubigen (Sadhus) sind, bevor du sie grüßt. 
12. Lass den Sadhus nicht abergläubisch hinsichtlich der Tage, noch der Mond-
läufe, noch der Monate oder des Geschreis beim Auftauchen von Vögeln 
oder Tieren sein; lasse ihn nur nach dem Willen Gottes streben.“23 
 
Fishers ursprünglicher Eindruck war im Großen und Ganzen korrekt. Mehr als 
drei Jahrhunderte lang waren die Saadhs Ausgestoßene gewesen, die alle Formen 
von Polytheismus sowie die heiligsten Rituale und Glaubensvorstellungen der 
Brahmanen zurückgewiesen hatten. Seit der Gründung hatte der Saadhismus als 
strenggläubige monotheistische Sekte fortgelebt, deren Angehörige einen asketi-
schen Lebensstil pflegten, was eine Reihe von Europäern dazu veranlasste, sie mit 
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der „Gesellschaft der Freunde“ in Verbindung zu bringen, möglicherweise weil sie, 
wie die Quäker, der Vorstellung einer fortschreitenden Erweckung offen gegen-
überstanden: „Jedem Saadh, der annimmt, unter dem Einfluss desselben göttlichen 
Geistes zu stehen, von dem sie glauben, dass er auch ihren Gründervater beseelt 
hat“, so die Beobachtung Fishers, „steht es absolut frei, eigene Gedanken bei ihren 
religiösen Versammlungen öffentlich vorzutragen und wiederholen zu lassen. […] 
Solange diese nicht im Widerspruch zu ihren überlieferten Überzeugungen stehen, 
wird niemand daran Anstoß nehmen.“24 
Die Antworten, welche die Saadhs Anand Messeh gaben, scheinen zu bestätigen, 
dass sie glaubten, die Bibeln, die sie in Hardwar erhalten hatten, seien mit demsel-
ben „göttlichen Geist“ durchdrungen. Warum sonst hätten sie sich der mühevollen 
Arbeit unterzogen, sie von Hand zu kopieren? Ihre Antwort – dass dies nicht eu-
ropäische Bücher seien, sondern dass vielmehr Gott sie gesandt habe – war kein 
Akt von „spektakulärem Widerstand“, wie Bhaba es sich ausmalt, sondern viel-
mehr die einfache Entgegennahme einer „von Gott eingegebenen“ Schrift, die 
ohne die Vermittlung von Menschen auskam (2 Tim 3, 16). Die Vorstellung der 
Saadhs, wonach die „belesenen Gelehrten“, die ihnen die Bücher ausgehändigt 
hatten, gleichzeitig „Engel“ waren, erscheint zudem als wörtliche Wiedergabe einer 
Bibelstelle, in der davon die Rede ist, dass Gott engelsgleiche Boten ausgesandt 
habe, um die in alle Winde verstreuten Auserwählten an einem Ort zu versammeln. 
„Gastfrei zu sein vergesset nicht“, hatte der heilige Paulus geschrieben, „denn 
dadurch haben etliche ohne ihr Wissen Engel beherbergt.“ (Hebr 13, 2) Noch 
hatten die Saadhs, wie Bhabha uns nahelegt, irgendeine beliebige „Hausgottheit” in 
ihrer Bibel erkannt – eine Vorstellung, die auf fundamentale Weise mit ihrem strik-
ten Monotheismus im Konflikt gestanden hätte –, sondern es war das genaue Ge-
genteil: die Bestätigung eines bereits tief verankerten Glaubens an den Einen Wah-
ren Gott und ihre Anerkennung der Bibel als „Gottes Geschenk für uns“ – eine 
weitere Etappe in der Entwicklung einer Religion, deren Anhänger, vor vielen 
Generationen bereits, der Brahmanen und ihrer Hausgötter abgeschworen hatten. 
Daher ist es wenig verwunderlich, dass diese „armen“ Eingeborenen einen Text 
wertschätzten, der ihre eigenen traditionellen Glaubensvorstellungen bestätigte – 
und das in einer von Verboten und Kastenunterschieden bestimmten Welt, einer 
Welt, in der lediglich eine Elite heilige Schriften besitzen konnte, vom Lesen der-
selben gar nicht zu reden. Das Nachlassen des Einflusses der traditionellen religiö-
sen Führer Indiens – zum Teil die Folge des Wirkens von Christen und ihres Bu-
ches – stellte entrechteten Gruppen wie den Saadhs eine größere Legitimation in 
Aussicht. Am Ende erscheint es, als ob ihre Reaktion auf eine Bibel, die sich auf 
unproblematische Weise mit ihrer eigenen Weltsicht in Einklang bringen ließ, we-
niger damit zu tun hatte, dass weiße Menschen sich zwischen die indische Landbe-
                                                     
24 Asiatic Journal and Monthly Miscellany, Juli 1819: 74. 
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völkerung und ihre religiösen Führer drängten, sondern vielmehr aus der dankba-
ren Erkenntnis entsprang, dass der Feind eines Feindes ein Freund ist.25 
In seinem Eintreten für „eine Abkehr von den Unbeständigkeiten der Inter-
pretation“ hin zu was er als „diskursive Transparenz“ bezeichnet, übergeht Bhabha 
die komplexe Dynamik des Lesens.26. Und dadurch dass er eine Frage stellt und 
gleich auch beantwortet – „Und wie sah der Diskurs der Einheimischen aus? Wer 
könnte das sagen?“27 –, umgeht er das Problem, wie und was die Saadhs tatsächlich 
an jenem Tag gelesen haben mögen. Stattdessen verlässt sich Bhabha auf eine kru-
de Überinterpretation der Absichten der Eingeborenen, um sie jenen theoretischen 
Konzepten anzupassen, die a priori und durchgehend seine Lesart der Episode 
bestimmen: „Durch die merkwürdigen Fragen der Einheimischen hindurch kön-
nen wir im historischen Rückblick sehen, wogegen sie durch das Hinterfragen der 
Präsenz des Englischen […] Widerstand leisteten […] Wenn die Einheimischen 
eine indische Version des Evangeliums verlangen spannen sie die Kräfte der Hyb-
ridität für sich ein, um sich der Taufe zu widersetzen und das Projekt der Bekeh-
rung in eine unmögliche Lage zu bringen.“28 Auf das Ende seiner Argumentation 
zusteuernd, schlägt Bhabha vor, dass die Geschichte gelesen werden sollte „als 
Frage der kolonialen Autorität, ein agonistischer Raum“, bestimmt von „Augenbli-
cken bürgerlichen Ungehorsams […] Zeichen spektakulären Widerstands. […] War 
es dieser Geist schlauer Höflichkeit, der die einheimischen Christen dazu brachte, 
so lang mit Anund Messeh zu disputieren, um sich dann, bei der Erwähnung der 
Taufe, höflich zu entschuldigen: ‚Jetzt müssen wir zur Ernte nach Hause … viel-
leicht werden wir nächstes Jahr nach Meerut kommen “ (179-180). 
„Viel eher als das Erforschen der Geschichte eines einzelnen Treffens, bei der 
ein Katechet das ‚englische Buch‘ mit Leuten aus einem Dorf diskutierte“, so 
schreibt ein Kritiker von Bhabhas Essay, wäre es hilfreich gewesen, „eine stärker 
historische Analyse der Reaktionen der Landbevölkerung“ zu unterbreiten.29 Der 
Hinweis, dass die Saadhs, dadurch, dass sie sich artig entschuldigten, einen Akt 
„schlauer Höflichkeit“ vollzogen, mag den Zwecken von Bhabhas Argument ent-
sprechen, aber ein genaueres Verständnis des Kontextes, in dem dieser Austausch 
über Taufe stattfindet, legt den Schluss nahe, wo die „diskursive Transparenz“ 
tatsächlich liegt. Anfang Mai, zur Hochzeit der Erntesaison, hätte es für den Kate-
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cheten wenig Veranlassung gegeben, den Worten dieser armen Subsistenzbauern, 
die sich nach Hause begeben mussten, um dort ihre Ernte einzubringen, keinen 
Glauben zu schenken. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Wallfahrt ihnen auferleg-
te, 80 Meilen hin zur Missionsstation und zurück zu reisen – dies möglicherweise 
zu Fuß, ohne angemessene Verpflegung und zur heißesten Zeit des Jahres –, ist es 
kaum verwunderlich, dass sie zögerlich waren, Anands Vorschlag aufzugreifen. 
Nichtsdestotrotz fährt Bhabha fort, indem er argumentiert, die Weigerung der 
Pilger, die Kommunion zu empfangen, sollte ebenfalls als ein „Modus diskursiver 
Störung“ betrachtet werden, welcher „die logische Ordnung des Diskurses der 
Autorität“ herausfordere.30 Im Indien des 19. Jahrhunderts lag nichts besonders 
Subversives in der Weigerung, die Eucharistie mit den Missionaren mit zu feiern, 
weil „die Europäer das Fleisch von Kühen essen“. Der tatsächliche „Diskurs der 
Autorität“, von dem die Antwort der Saadhs Zeugnis ablegt, war der Kodex der 
Brahmanen zu Reinheit und Verboten. Die zwei unverzeihlichen Sünden in der 
hinduistischen Gesellschaft bestanden darin, Rindfleisch zu essen und, daraus fol-
gend, mit jenen zusammen zu speisen, die dies tun. Beide Handlungen waren An-
lass genug für den völligen Ausschluss aus der Kaste. Hätten sie zusammen mit 
den Missionaren die Kommunion eingenommen, wären die Saadhs Gefahr gelau-
fen, die wenigen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Rechte zu verlieren, die sie besaßen. 
Ihre Zurückweisung des Sakraments war weniger Widerstand gegen „die wunder-
same Äquivalenz von Gott und Engländern“31 als ein Ausdruck echter Angst – 
Angst vor wirtschaftlicher Exilierung, sozialem Ausschluss und physischer Gewalt. 
Wie einer der Saadhs später bemerkte: „Wir werden schon genug verfolgt […,] 
aber wenn wir auch noch Rindfleisch und Schweineblut äßen, was würde dann aus 
uns werden?“32 
Angesichts solcher Spannungen brachten viele koloniale Verwaltungsbeamte 
ihre Ablehnung der Einführung christlicher Rituale zum Ausdruck, welche zur 
Unterminierung einheimischer Hierarchien führen könnten. Derweil war das Re-
gelwerk der Missionare, welches die Verabreichung der Kommunion ordnete und 
ihr Legitimation gab, weit entfernt davon, genau festgelegt zu sein. Einige christli-
che Gemeinden nahmen eine liberale Haltung bezüglich der Bewahrung von Kas-
tenunterschieden und des Verbots des Kommensalismus (Tischgemeinschaft) ein, 
während andere auf der Abschaffung des Kastenwesens unter Gläubigen beharrten 
und für eine stärker inklusive Kommunion eintraten. Andere wiederum betrachte-
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ten das Problem nur als einen „zivilrechtlichen Unterschied“ und machten Vor-
kehrungen, wonach „die Konvertiten aus verschiedenen Kasten […] nicht einmal 
gemeinsam am Abendmahl teilnähmen.“ Solche adaptiven Praktiken wurden von 
Richard Heber toleriert, als dieser 1823 Bischof von Kalkutta wurde, während sein 
Nachfolger Daniel Wilson eine härtere Gangart gegenüber Kastenunterschieden 
und getrennter Kommunion einnahm.33 Kurz gesagt, zu keiner Zeit hatte es eine 
einheitliche Herangehensweise bezüglich der praktischen Anwendung der Eucha-
ristie in Indien gegeben. Zu behaupten, die Sakramente seien Teil einer „logi-
sche[n] Ordnung des Diskurses der Autorität“34 gewesen, kommt der Nichtbeach-
tung jener heftigen konfessionellen Konflikte gleich, welche jahrhundertelang die 
Bedeutung der Kommunion in Europa umgeben hatten, Konflikte, die sich auf 
anderen Kontinenten und in anderen Kontexten fortsetzen sollten.  
Ein letztes Problem bei Bhabhas Interpretation dieses Moments in der Anekdote 
hängt mit deren massiver Verkürzung zusammen.35 Bhabhas elliptische Bearbei-
tung des Textes fasst das Geschehen so, dass der Eindruck entsteht, der Austausch 
über das Sakrament habe sich in Gegenwart der 500 Pilger am gleichen Tag abge-
spielt. Tatsächlich enthält die ursprüngliche Anekdote, so wie sie in The Missionary 
Register erschien, zwei Episoden. Der abschließende Austausch (überliefert in ei-
nem von Anand später selbst verfassten Bericht) fand eine Woche nach dem ur-
sprünglichen Treffen statt, das heißt, als die 500 sich bereits „in verschiedene Rich-
tungen verstreut“ hatten und der Katechet einige wenige Zurückgebliebene in 
einer benachbarten Ortschaft auffand. Es ist genau dieser Kontext, in dem wir die 
folgende Antwort wiederfinden: „Wenn unser ganzes Land dieses Sakrament an-
nimmt, dann werden wir es auch tun.“ Mit anderen Worten: Hätte der Austausch 
am ersten Tag stattgefunden – während der jährlichen Versammlung, bei der die 
Saadhs Fragen bezüglich ihrer Doktrin entschieden36 – dann wäre der Sprecher 
unter Umständen tatsächlich in der Lage gewesen, die Bedingungen von Anands 
Offerte zu akzeptieren.  
Einige Saadhs kamen schließlich tatsächlich nach Meerut. Zu ihren christlichen 
Konvertiten zählte der Stammesälteste „David“ Jysingh, der von Fisher am 1. 
Weihnachtstag des Jahres 1818 getauft wurde und anschließend in seinem Heima-
tort Kowallee als Bibellektor und Lehrer fungierte. In Ermangelung eines amtie-
renden Geistlichen integrierten die Mitglieder der Gemeinde derweil eigene For-
men der Taufe und Kommunion in ihre religiöse Praxis.37 Im darauffolgenden Jahr 
                                                     
33 Missionary Chronicle, Jg. 6 (1838), 72. 
34 Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 176. 
35 Neben der Auslassung von Textstellen enthält Bhabhas Transkription der Episode nicht weniger 
als sechs Abweichungen, zumeist orthografischer Art, von dem ursprünglichen Bericht aus dem 
Missionary Register.  
36 John Evans, A Sketch of the Denominations of the Christian World (Amherst: Adams, 1832), 228-30. 
37 „Die Unterhaltungen mit ihnen offenbarten fortwährend, wie sie der Herrschaft menschlicher 
Furcht unterstanden, obwohl es sich um arme und unwissende Landbevölkerung handelte. ‚Was 
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organisierte Fisher, mithilfe von Geldmitteln, die von wohlgesonnenen indischen 
und europäischen Spendern stammten, den Bau einer Schule und einer Kapelle 
„auf Grundlage eines festen Plans“, dadurch eine neue Siedlung absteckend, wel-
cher die Saadhs später in Andenken an ihren Schirmherren den Namen „Henree-
pore“ verliehen.38 In Henreepore schickten die Saadhs ihre Kinder zur Schule, 
nahmen sonntäglich am Gottesdienst in der Kapelle teil und lebten weiterhin unter 
dem Schutz der Church Missionary Society. In den folgenden Jahren scheint das 
Verhältnis zwischen den Saadhs in Henreepore und den europäischen Christen 
von gegenseitigem Respekt und von Dialog geprägt gewesen zu sein, was den 
Saadhs hohes Ansehen unter jenen Missionaren einbrachte, mit denen sie in Kon-
takt kamen.39 Ihre anhaltende Überzeugung, dass die christliche Bibel mit ihren 
eigenen heiligen Schriften vereinbar war, ist verständlich. Mehr als anderthalb 
Jahrhunderte zuvor hatten sie durch den Adi Updesh christliche Doktrin aufge-
nommen. Als sie beim Jahrmarkt von Hardwar das ehrwürdige Geschenk des Mis-
sionars erhielten, stellten sie lediglich eine Verbindung zu ihrer eigenen religiösen 
Vergangenheit wieder her. Ihr Diskurs war ebenfalls einer, der bereits hybrid war. 
  
3 Wer war Anand Messeh? 
Und wie verhält es sich nun mit Anand Messeh, jenem Bibellektor, der im Mai 
1817 „überstürzt und erregt eine Reise von seiner Mission in Meerut“ antrat? Seit-
dem er der Vergessenheit entrissen wurde, hat dieser einfache Katechet mit seinem 
                                                                                                                                  
werden alle unsere Brüder sagen! Was werden die Nachbarn denken!‘, war als Antwort stets zur Hand 
auf alle [von Anund vorgebrachten] Argumente. Eine Art Kompromiss wurde von ihnen vorgeschla-
gen. ‚Du geh hin‘, sagten sie zu Anund, ‚und predige den Gott Messias zu den Nachbarn im Dorf 
und finde heraus, was sie denken, und komm zurück und berichte uns: und in der Zwischenzeit 
werden wir Brot und Wasser zu uns nehmen und Christus‘ gedenken; und da wir keinen Pater haben, 
werden wir selbst unsere Stirn mit Wasser besprengen und feierlich geloben, an Christus zu glauben!“ 
Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 205-6. Die Wasserkommunion wurde durch die gesamte Geschichte des 
Christentums hindurch praktiziert, besonders in Abwesenheit amtierender Geistlicher und bei Min-
derheiten wie den Saadhs, bei denen Alkohol verboten war. Sie wird noch immer angewandt von 
Unitariern, Methodisten und den „Heiligen der letzten Tage“. Siehe: Hans Leitzmann, Mass and Lord’s 
Supper: A Study in the History of the Liturgy (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 202-3. David Jysingh beschrieb gegen-
über Fisher, wie die Saadhs letztendlich die Eucharistie praktizierten: „Am Abend wird das Brot auf 
eine schmale Erhebung abgelegt und nach einem kurzen, im Stegreif vorgetragenen Gebet unter den 
Anwesenden verteilt. Ein mit Brause gefülltes Gefäß, als ‚Schale der Brüderlichkeit‘ bezeichnet, wird 
ebenfalls herumgereicht.“ Christian Herald and Seamans’s Magazine, Jg. 6 (1819): 217. 
38 Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East 1819-1820 (London: R. Watts, 1820), 
144-5; James Hough, The History of Christianity in India from the Commencement of the Christian Era (Lon-
don: Seeley and Burnside, Church Missionary House, 1839-1860), Bd. 5, 315-7. 
39 „Dies ist in Wahrheit eine heidnische Sekte, aber ihre Mitglieder übertreffen einige Christen der-
maßen in der Milde ihres Gemüts und in der Reinheit ihres Lebens, dass ihnen eine Erwähnung in 
diesem Werk nicht verwehrt werden konnte.“ Evans, Denominations of the Christian World, 230. 
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Eifer, indische Landsleute zu taufen, in postkolonialen Studien eine Präsenz aus 
zweiter Hand und von zweitem Rang angenommen. Maßgeschneidert dafür, die 
Komplizenschaft von indischen Untertanen mit europäischer Macht zu repräsen-
tieren, ist die Geschichte seines vermaledeiten Eifers seit seiner Wiederauferste-
hung von den Toten im Jahr 1985 immer wieder neu und anders erzählt worden. 
Ein Interpret erspäht in der Anekdote den Beleg für die Naivität eines eingebore-
nen Konvertiten, welcher „der Autorität der Druckkultur und im speziellen der 
europäischen Form der Wissensvermittlung“ vollends zugestimmt habe.40 Für 
einen anderen „scheint die Figur des Anund Messeh das perfekte Beispiel dafür zu 
sein, wie der Eingeborene sich danach sehnt, so wie der Kolonisator zu werden – 
in Kleidung, Sitten und Glauben –, dadurch das vorgebliche Wohlwollen des Ko-
lonisators bekräftigend, derweil man in Wirklichkeit dessen Überlegenheit bekräf-
tigt; Anund Messeh kann anglifiziert werden, ein Funktionsträger der englischen 
Herrschaft, aber er kann nicht englisch werden.“41 Der arme Anand Messeh! 
Nach seinem eigenen Zeugnis wurde Paramanand in einem Dorf in der Nähe 
von Delhi geboren, womöglich irgendwann in den 1790er Jahren. Benannt nach 
einem der berühmtesten Dichterheiligen der Hindus aus dem 16. Jahrhundert,42 
war er ein frommes Mitglied der Kaste der Brahmanen, Indiens elitärer religiöser 
Klasse. Schon in jungen Jahren wurde er ein Gelehrter und fungierte als Geistli-
cher unter seinen Landsleuten. Später ließ er sich in Delhi nieder, wo er, im Ein-
klang mit seinem Amt, regelmäßig Lesungen aus den hinduistischen Schriften vor 
seinen großenteils des Lesens unkundigen Anhängern abhielt, die hinduistische 
Religion lehrte und als Geistlicher Trauungen und Beisetzungen leitete. So gefestigt 
war er in seinem Glauben an den Brahmanismus, dass er „völlig überzeugt war, 
dass unsere Bildnisse wahre Götter und alle anderen Religionen falsch seien.“43 
Um das Jahr 1812 herum jedoch zeigte er sich in zunehmendem Maße unzu-
frieden mit der Religion, in die er hineingeboren worden war. In seinen Memoiren 
beschreibt er den Augenblick seiner Ernüchterung: 
 
Der Ort lag nicht weit entfernt und ich eilte dorthin und bat um die Erlaub-
nis, diesen wundersamen Gott betrachten zu dürfen. Die Brahmanen stan-
den um mich herum und befahlen mir, mich zurückzuziehen. Jedoch davon 
überzeugt, dass, wenn dies wirklich Gott sei, seine Macht groß sein müsse 
und er dazu in der Lage wäre, mein Herz zu reinigen und es wie pures Gold 
zu machen, entschloss ich mich dazu, mich auf meine Stärke zu verlassen 
                                                     
40 Vanessa Smith, Literary Culture and the Pacific: Nineteenth-Century Textual Encounters (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998), 95. 
41 Jefferess, Postcolonial Resistance, 43. 
42 Siehe: A. Whitney Sanford, Singing Krishna: Sound Becomes Sight in Paramanand’s Poetry (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2008). 
43 Paramanands Memoiren sind wiedergegeben in: Michael Wilkinson, Memorials of an Indian Missionary 
(London: Wertheim, Macintosh and Hunt, 1857), 187ff. 
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und allen Widerstand zu durchbrechen und ihn zu berühren. Das tat ich 
auch, erreichte mein Ziel und rieb meinen Messingring über das Götzenbild, 
jedoch war es immer noch ein Messingring. Ich erkannte, dass das Götzen-
bild ein großer schwarzer Stein war, den man grob in eine menschliche Ge-
stalt mit vier Händen gehauen hatte. Es war ungefähr zwei Fuß hoch. Sechs 
Monate lang jedes Jahr ist es für gewöhnlich mit Schnee bedeckt und 
dadurch vor Bloßstellung geschützt, aber in den wärmeren Monaten, dann 
wenn die Sonne den Schnee hat wegschmelzen lassen, drängen sich tausende 
aus allen Richtungen heran, um aus der Ferne einen Blick zu erhaschen, um 
die üblichen Tribute zu offerieren und um sich selbst einen eingebildeten 
Nutzen durch das Betrachten zu verschaffen. Ich meinerseits war angewi-
dert, erledigt und von Erschöpfung übermannt – und ich kehrte mit einem 
Gefühl der Enttäuschung nach Hause zurück.“44 
 
Es dauerte nicht lange und er wurde von John Chamberlain, einem baptistischen 
Missionar in Sirdhana, als Übersetzer eingestellt, derweil er sich immer stärker zu 
den Schriften der Christen hingezogen fühlte: „Ich verharrte […] für längere Zeit 
zwischen zwei Ansichten. Schließlich eröffnete ich dem Missionar, dass ich ein 
Christ werden wollte; aber ich erbebte, als ich das sagte, und innerhalb meiner 
eigenen vier Wände war ich ein strengerer und abergläubigerer Hindu denn je. Ich 
fürchtete die möglichen Konsequenzen des Zorns meiner eigenen Götzen.“45 An-
schließend suchte er mehrmals um die Taufe nach, was von Chamberlain wieder-
holt abgelehnt wurde, da dieser von den Glaubensgelübden seines einheimischen 
Gehilfen nicht überzeugt war. 
 Noch am 10. März 1814, nur einen Monat bevor Paramanand Chamberlain 
zum Jahrmarkt nach Hardwar begleitete, hatte der Missionar weiterhin Zweifel: 
„Die Hindus werden sehr zurückhaltend“, schrieb er, „was mit Paramanunda zu-
sammenhängt, wie ich annehme.“46 Einen Monat später wurde der Verdacht 
Chamberlains zur Gewissheit: 
 
Ich erinnere mich besonders an ein Vorkommnis, als wir, aus Hardwar zu-
rückkehrend, wo der Missionar gewesen war, um Bücher unter jenen Einge-
borenen zu verteilen, die jährlich diesen Ort aufsuchen, zur Nacht Rast ge-
macht und unseren abendlichen christlichen Gottesdienst abgehalten hatten. 
Ich suchte nach einer Möglichkeit, im Geheimen meine eigenen Gebete zu 
verrichten und war, nachdem ich einen geeigneten Platz im Schatten gefun-
den, mein Götzenbild gewaschen und gereinigt sowie es auf seinem Platz aufge-
stellt hatte, mit meinen Kniefällen und Gebeten beschäftigt, als der Missio-
nar mich plötzlich inmitten meines Treibens überraschte. Ich war verwirrt 
und beschämt, meiner eigenen Doppelzüngigkeit und Torheit gewahr: Je-
                                                     
44 Wilkinson, Memorials, 188-9. 
45 Wilkinson, Memorials, 188-191. 
46 Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 345. 
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doch von solcher Macht waren meine angeborenen Auffassungen, wonach, 
falls die hinduistischen Götzen tatsächlich Götter waren, ihre Rache für 
meine Missachtung ihrer Autorität und Macht unerträglich sein werde und 
sie mich mit schmerzhaften Krankheiten plagen oder mit Lepra überziehen 
würden. Daher nahm ich an den Morgen- und Abendgebeten des Missionars 
teil und vollzog meinen eigenen Götzendienst, bevor ich mich zur Ruhe be-
gab; daran glaubend, dass, falls ich durch den Kontakt mit Christen verun-
reinigt werde, dies meine Reinigung sichere.47 
 
Nachdem sie nach Sirdhana zurückgekehrt waren, schrieb der entnervte Chamber-
lain: „Purumamunda hat mir Kummer bereitet, aber er erscheint reumütig und 
wünscht, getauft zu werden; ich scheue jedoch davor zurück, ihn zu taufen.“48 
Nach Chamberlains Weggang nach Serampore im späteren Verlauf des Jahres hielt 
sich Paramanand an den CMS-Missionar Mr. Thompson, wiederum um die Taufe 
bittend, was ihm abermals verweigert wurde. Kurz darauf erfuhr er die gleiche 
Reaktion beim Kaplan in Meerut.49 
Im Jahr 1815 begegnen wir Paramanand als Angestellten unter der Oberauf-
sicht von Reverend Henry Fisher, einem Vertreter der Church Missionary Society 
in Meerut. Da er die Verantwortung für fünf Schulen im Bezirk trug, bezog Para-
manand ein großräumiges Quartier, das von der CMS oberhalb des Großen Tores 
der Stadt zur Verfügung gestellt worden war, und hielt dort Bibelstunden für die 
lokale Bevölkerung ab.50 Ein Jahr später verwirklichten sich seine Ambitionen und 
Fisher, der „allen Grund sah, an die Aufrichtigkeit seiner christlichen Gelübde zu 
glauben, taufte ihn am 1. Weihnachtstag des Jahres 1816, als er den Namen Anund 
Messeeh annahm.“51 
Am 6. Mai 1817 reiste Anand nicht, wie Bhabha glauben machen will, „hastig 
und aufgeregt von seiner Missionsstation in Meerut zu einem ganz in der Nähe 
                                                     
47 Wilkinson, Memorials, 191-2. 
48 Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 353. Es ist anzunehmen, dass Chamberlains Befürchtung mit 
der Tatsache in Verbindung stand, dass die britischen Missionare sich in zunehmendem Maße zu-
rückhaltend hinsichtlich der Übernahme geistlicher Ämter in der Kirche durch einheimische Konver-
titen zeigten. Ein Jahrhundert zuvor waren jesuitische Missionare dadurch in Verruf geraten, dass sie 
Massentaufen von Nichtgläubigen abhielten in dem Versuch, ihren Erfolg in Indien und anderswo 
herauszuheben. Im Jahr 1833 mahnte ein von einer Anzahl führender Mitglieder der Missionsgesell-
schaften unterzeichneter offener Brief an die Calcutta Review zur Zurückhaltung gegenüber der Taufe 
von Personen „aus der Liebe zu einer Bereicherung und einem schlechten Ruf heraus.“ (Juli 1833: 
330). The Wesleyan Missionary Register kehrte im Jahr 1860 auf dieses Thema zurück: „Als die Briten 
Ceylon in Besitz nahmen, gab es dort 500.000 getaufte Eingeborene, Mitglieder der holländischen 
Kirche. Man hatte sie für ihre rein nominellen Gelübde zum Christentum mit weltlichen Hoffnungen 
und mit weltlichen Ängsten gewonnen. Lediglich getauften Einheimischen stand der Weg zu Stellun-
gen im öffentlichen Dienst frei und wenn ein Mann vom Christentum abfiel, kostete ihn dies etwas 
mehr als seine Stellung.“ Wesleyan Missionary Notices, 25. Mai 1860: 107. 
49 Wilkinson, Memorials, 193. 
50 Missionary Register, 1818: 11. 
51 Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 4, 474-5. 
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von Delhi gelegenen“ 52, sondern in Wirklichkeit machte er sich auf den Weg nach 
Delhi, um seine Frau und Familie zu besuchen. Einige Zeit darauf hielt er sich bei 
einem hinduistischen Tempel in der Stadt auf, wo er, im Schatten einiger Bäume, 
auf „eine Anzahl von Fremden aus mehreren Ortschaften westlich von Delhi“ traf, 
womöglich einige derselben Saadh-„Konvertiten“, die er beim Jahrmarkt von 
Hardwar getroffen hatte. Acht Monate später erschien in der religiösen Presse die 
erste von mehreren bemerkenswerten Erzählungen, welche der brahmanische 
Konvertit angefertigt hatte. Nachdem man seit der Ankunft in Indien nur wenige 
Bekehrungen hatte verbuchen können, ist es kaum überraschend, dass sich inner-
halb der Gemeinschaft der Missionare eine gewisse Begeisterung einstellte ange-
sichts der Erzählung von den 500 seltsamen Konvertiten, die in der Ausgabe des 
Missionary Register vom Januar 1818 abgedruckt wurde. Aber die Begeisterung war 
kurzlebig, und sehr bald wurden schwere Zweifel hinsichtlich ihrer Authentizität 
angemeldet. Derweil er keinen Grund dafür hatte, „die wesentlichen Punkte der 
Erzählung“ anzuzweifeln, sah sich Thomason (der sie dem Register ursprünglich 
unterbreitet hatte) im Juli dazu gezwungen, Vorsicht anzumahnen, da er den Ver-
dacht hatte dass Anands Geschichte „weniger bemerkenswert, als man es uns be-
deutet hatte“, gewesen sei.53 Auf Thomasons Bitte hin unterzog Leutnant Macdo-
nald, der in Delhi stationiert war, Anand im Juni einem Kreuzverhör über die Vor-
kommnisse jenes Tages, musste aber mit Bedauern feststellen, dass er nicht in der 
Lage, die Geschichte von den Saadhs selbst bestätigen zu lassen und somit „außer-
stande sei, über die Angelegenheit exklusiv zu sprechen“. „Ohne solch eine per-
sönliche Nachforschung“ fühlte auch er sich „in keiner Weise kompetent“ den 
Bericht über die Vorkommnisse zu bewerten.54 Ein Jahr später war Anands Demü-
tigung komplett, als das Asiatic Journal enthüllte, man habe ihn „wiederholt ge-
warnt, sich nicht von seiner blühenden Phantasie zu übertriebenen Darstellungen 
dessen verleiten zu lassen, was er der Aufmerksamkeit und der Mitteilung für Wert 
erachten möge.“55 
Obwohl er für die Church Missionary Society möglicherweise peinlich werden 
konnte, blieb der erste brahmanische Konvertit nichtsdestotrotz eine wertvolle 
Trophäe – und wertvoll auch auf andere Weise – für die Missionare, die ermuti-
gende Erzählungen von Bekehrungen Eingeborener in einer Zeit, da die Resultate 
mager waren, bitter nötig hatten. In den darauffolgenden Jahren hatte Anand noch 
                                                     
52 Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 152. 
53 Missionary Register, Januar 1818: 20. 
54 Im Mai 1818 unterrichtete der Herausgeber des Missionary Register seine Leser: „Wie in unserem 
früheren Artikel zu diesem Gegenstand nachzulesen ist, hat Mr. Thomason vorgeschlagen, Vorsicht 
walten zu lassen dabei, diesen Informationen Glauben zu schenken, zumindest in vollem Umfang, bis 
die Einzelheiten genauer bekannt seien. In einem Brief, welcher der jüngsten Botschaft beigefügt war, 
weist er auf diese Vorsicht erneut hin; und er stellt fest, dass [….] diese in einigen Punkten von jenen 
abweicht.“ Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 206. 
55 Asiatic Journal, Juli 1819: 75.  
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spektakulärere Geschichten zu erzählen, in denen er von seiner Verfolgung durch 
Hindus und Moslems berichtete und darüber, wie er über viele Eingeborene, mit 
denen er über das Christentum sprach, rhetorisch triumphierte. Es scheint, als 
habe er sich in Meerut große Mühe gegeben, Fisher davon zu überzeugen, dass er 
sich von seinen alten Sitten abgewandt habe. Fisher beschreibt, was nach einer von 
ihm gehaltenen Predigt über die grausamen Strafen, welche von Brahmanen aufer-
legt wurden, geschah: 
Ich fragte meine kleine Gemeinde, was sie von all dem hielten. Sie saßen 
still, die Augen niedergeschlagen und schwer seufzend. Nach geraumer Zeit 
wandte sich Anund an Matthew Phiroodeen und, seine Arme um seinen 
Hals schlingend, rief mit einem tiefberührenden Ausdruck von Zuneigung 
und Dankbarkeit gegenüber Gott aus: „Ach, mein Bruder! mein Bruder! sol-
che Teufel waren auch wir einst! aber jetzt (und er erhob seine Augen zum 
Himmel und richtete seinen ganzen Körper auf), Jesus! Jesus! mein Gott! 
mein Retter!“ Es war sehr bewegend.56 
Zweifelsohne ermutigt von solch exemplarischen Verhalten – wiewohl Fishers 
ambivalente Wortwahl „affecting“ (bewegend/affektiert, Anm. d. Ü.) hier interes-
sant ist –, gründete Fisher um das Jahr 1820 herum das Saadh-Dorf Henreepore, 
wo er Anand mitsamt Familie im neuerrichteten Missionshaus einsetzte.57 Doch 
schon bald schielte Anand nach höheren Weihen. Im Dezember 1824 wurde er 
Reginald Heber vorgestellt, dem Bischof von Kalkutta. Als Fisher den Bischof 
darum bat, seinen eingeborenen Katecheten die Weihe zu verleihen, zeigte sich 
Heber alles andere als beeindruckt: „Er ist ein hochgewachsener, grobschlächtig 
aussehender Mann, dessen Gesichtszüge kaum auf besonderen Intellekt hindeu-
ten.“58 Anfang des Jahres 1826 begegnen wir Anand als einem Lehrer von Einge-
borenen in Delhi, wo er der strikten Überwachung von Fishers Sohn unterstand, 
der dort als Kaplan wirkte. Doch schon bald darauf erregte er abermals das Miss-
fallen des Klerus und wurde nach dem etwa 70 Meilen nördlichen gelegenen Kar-
nal abgeschoben, auf Betreiben des Co-Kaplans in Kanpur: „in der Hoffnung, dass 
wir von hieran beobachten können, dass sich ein gnadenvoller Zweck durch die 
Wandlung seiner Bestimmung ausdrücke.“59 
Im Laufe des folgenden Jahrzehnts scheint Anand das Vertrauen der Amtskir-
che zurückgewonnen zu haben. Am 21. Juni 1836 schrieb Bischof Wilson, der 
Nachfolger von Heber, aus Simla, dass er bei seinem Besuch in Meerut das „eigen-
tümliche Vergnügen“ gehabt habe, Anand zu befragen, und er hielt ihn nun „für 
                                                     
56 C. M. S. Report 21, 181. Missionary Register 1821: 471, 472.  
57 Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 5, 315-7.  
58 Reginald Heber, Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India (Philadelphia: Carey, 1828), 
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59 Missionary Register, Februar 1828: 100. 
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einen sehr außergewöhnlichen Mann; gewandt, stark, einfach in seiner Hingabe zu 
Christus, gut unterwiesen in der Bibel, demütig.“ Bei diesem Treffen unterbreitete 
der Katechet einen Brief des verstorbenen Bischof Heber, angeblich im Jahr 1824 
geschrieben, „der mich tief berührte.“ Er schloss damit, Anand, „im Falle meines 
Todes, wem auch immer mir als Bischof von Kalkutta folgen möge“ anzuempfeh-
len. Wilson ordinierte Anand am 11. November, eine Feier, welche der Bischof 
„sehr bewegend“ fand, „da er der erste Brahmane ist, der von unserer Kirche ordi-
niert wurde. Er ist eine ausgezeichnete, edle Gestalt, spirituell ausgerichtet, wohlbe-
lesen in der Heiligen Schrift, voller Schlichtheit und Hingabe zu Christus, derweil 
tapfer wie ein Löwe. Er hat so wenig von den eingeborenen Fehlern des Dünkels 
und des Mystizismus an sich, wie ich dies noch nie beobachtet habe.“60 
Im Jahr 1842 wurde Reverend Messeh als Geistlicher der CMS in Meerut ein-
gesetzt, eine Stellung, die ihm und seiner Familie einen ansehnlichen Wohnsitz 
garantierte, möglicherweise einen oder zwei Diener sowie ein regelmäßiges Ein-
kommen von 80 Rupien im Monat.61 Innerhalb weniger Monate wurde er jedoch 
erneut zur persona non grata. „Schwerwiegende Vorwürfe“, bestätigt von der CMS, 
wurden gegen ihn erhoben, was zu seiner Entlassung führte. Rückblickend be-
hauptete Bischof Wilson, womöglich aus einem Anflug von Verlegenheit heraus, 
dass er schon immer Vorbehalte gegenüber Anands Ehefrau gehabt habe, die „eine 
Heidin blieb und ihr Einfluss war unheilvoll.“62 Es gibt Andeutungen in Wilsons 
Bericht, wonach der Konvertit auf seine alten brahmanischen Sitten zurückverfal-
len war, wobei seine jüngsten Verfehlungen beschrieben wurden als Folge „des 
großen Wagnisses, eingeborene Konvertiten als Anwärter auf heilige Ämter in 
Vorschlag zu bringen, derweil ihre erwachsenen Kinder und Familienmitglieder 
Heiden bleiben.“ Zudem warnte Wilson vor der „Zweckmäßigkeit, eingeborenen 
Geistlichen ärztliche Tätigkeiten zu erlauben und sie unbegleitet mit der Absicht 
herumreisen zu lassen, das Evangelium zu verbreiten, wenn die anfallenden Kos-
ten der Reise nachträglich von der Gemeinschaft getragen werden müssen.“63  
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viele Jahre später ans Licht kam, als ein Missionar, der Anand beschäftigt hatte, um von ihm Hindi zu 
lernen, die Royal Commission davon unterrichtete, dass „Paramanund [….] über viele Jahre hinweg, 
derweil er noch Anhänger des Hinduismus war, die Angewohnheit der Einnahme von Opium hatte. 
Jede erdenkliche Anstrengung wurde unternommen, um ihn von der Angewohnheit zu heilen, aber 
alles war vergebens. Ich habe ihn oftmals dabei beobachtet, wie er mit geschlossenen Augen an 
meiner Seite schritt, und nur unter größten Anstrengungen gelang es mir, ihn wachzuhalten, während 
er mich in der Sprache unterrichtete. Er selbst hat oft gesagt, dass ihm die Schande seiner Lage tief-
bewusst sei, dass er aber unter gar keinen Umständen ohne seine tägliche Dosis Opium leben kön-
ne.“ Zeugnis abgelegt von Thomas Evans in Kalkutta am 23. November 1893: The First Report of the 
Royal Commission on Opium (London: HMSO, 1894), II: 46. 
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Im Jahr 1845 war er abermals als „amtierender Geistlicher” eingestellt, diesmal in 
Agra, nachdem sein Ansehen zum wiederholten Male wiederhergestellt worden 
war, „ehrwürdig in seinem Alter und, obwohl nicht in der Lage, besonders aktiv 
Dienst zu verüben, […] eine Zierde für seinen heiligen Charakter.“ Alle früheren 
Verfehlungen waren wiederum vergeben und es wurde berichtet, dass die Hoff-
nungen hinsichtlich Anands spiritueller Standfestigkeit sich nun „im Übermaß 
erfüllt“ hätten.64 Jedoch im Mai 1857, als die „Große Meuterei“ um sich griff und 
die anderen Missionare Zuflucht in der Festung von Agra fanden, hatte Anand 
ganz andere Absichten. Der letzte Bericht, den wir besitzen, findet sich in einer 
Depesche vom 26. Juli: „Sie werden mit Bedauern vernehmen, dass die meisten 
unserer einheimischen Christen in beklagenswerter Weise im Angesicht der ge-
genwärtigen Prüfungen versagt haben. Ich hatte die schmerzliche Pflicht, Parama-
nund, einen unserer Prediger, auszuschließen, nachdem er die Tracht eines Byragee 
bzw. eines heiligen Hindu angenommen hatte! Und er hat Christus abgeschwo-
ren!“65 Es sieht so aus, als ob er sich von Agra aus auf den Weg zur Geburtsstätte 
von Krishna in Mathura machte, wo, wie der Baptist Missionary Herald berichtete, 
Paramanands „Annahme der traditionellen Tracht ihn nicht vor Verrat schützte 
und es wird behauptet, er sei, von der Hand eines grausamen Moslems erschlagen, 
ums Leben gekommen.“66 
Die Verhaltensregeln der Mimikry scheinen tatsächlich an jenem Tag in dem 
Wäldchen bei Delhi in Kraft gewesen zu sein, aber nicht dergestalt, wie Bhabha es 
sich ausmalt. Könnte es nicht sein, dass der Katechet, der den „biblischen Dis-
kurs“ seiner englischen Herren anwandte, im Endeffekt der wahre Imitator gewe-
sen ist? Waren seine wiederholten Bekundungen zu christlichem Glauben im End-
effekt Teil einer vier Jahrzehnte andauernden Kampagne „schlauer Höflichkeit“, 
sein Verlangen nach Taufe und Ordination eine äußere Zurschaustellung, welche 
eine tieferliegende Verbundenheit mit jener Religion verschleierte, in die er hinein-
geboren worden war? Wenn das der Fall ist, dann erscheint seine Antwort gegen-
über den Saadhs im Jahr 1817 – „Diese Bücher lehren euch die Religion der euro-
päischen Sahibs. Es ist IHR Buch“ – plötzlich weitaus weniger als Ausdruck von 
Glauben an die Religion der weißen Männer, eher wie eine Verlautbarung des reli-
giösen und kulturellen Skeptizismus. Könnte es nicht sein, dass der Mann, der 
schon als kleiner Junge im Erzählen mysteriöser Geschichten über wundersame 
und umkehrbare Verwandlungen geschult worden war – Geschichten, welche dazu 
bestimmt waren, auf den Seiten des Missionary Register wieder aufzutauchen –, die 
ganze Zeit über nur eine Jahrhunderte alte Praxis imitierte, die er von seinen 
brahmanischen Lehrmeistern ererbt hatte? 
                                                     
64 Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 4, 475. 
65 Brief von Thomas Evans, 26. Juli 1857. Missionary Herald, 1857: 725. 
66 Missionary Herald, 1857: 72. Siehe auch: Thomas Evans, A Welshman in India: A Record of the Life of 
Thomas Evans, Missionary, hrsg. David Hooper (London: Kingsgate, 1908), 252. 
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Das Letzte, was wir von Paramanand erfahren, stammt aus der Feder des Missio-
nars Michael Wilkinson, der ihm die letzte Ehre in folgender Weise erwies: „Sein 
milder und friedfertiger Charakter brachte ihm einen Respekt ein, der das übliche 
Maß übertraf. Vor allem unter den Sikhs wurde er wirklich verehrt. Möge er am 
Ende Frieden finden!“67 Der Nachgeordnete kann als furchteinflößende Figur 
erscheinen, die dann wieder auftaucht und neue Geschichten vorträgt, wenn man 
es am wenigsten erwartet. Und wie die Geschichte der Bibel, der Pilger und des 
Katecheten zeigt, können die Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit unendlich komple-
xer sein, als sie im ersten Licht erscheinen. 
 
4 Schlussfolgerung 
Spielen die Lebensumstände indischer Bauern im Jahr 1817 im Endeffekt wirklich 
eine Rolle? Ich denke, sie tun es. Sollten Historiker sich mit der Frage auseinander-
setzen, was Ausgestoßene vor zwei Jahrhunderten tatsächlich über die Bibel dach-
ten? Ich denke, sie sollten. Die Frage, die Anand Messeh gestellt hatte, „wer sind 
all diese Menschen?“ – eine Frage, die aus dem Verlangen heraus, andere zu ver-
stehen, entstanden ist –, ist es stets wert, gestellt zu werden. Diese der Geschichte 
entnommene Anekdote ist nicht einfach, oder überhaupt, eine Erzählung über 
arme Hindus, die „schlaue Höflichkeit“ als ein Mittel kulturellen Widerstandes 
anwenden, noch über die Tendenz indigener Christen, für ihre europäischen Her-
ren zu sprechen. In einer Welt, in der sich Brahmanen selbst als Christen reinkar-
nieren, Inder in Furcht voreinander leben und Zeichen als Wunder angenommen 
werden, können historische Details unbequem sein. Der gewaltsame Tod von Pa-
ramanand, jenem Christen, der ein Götzenanhänger wurde, steht stellvertretend 
nicht nur für die Herausforderungen, mit denen sich Standardvorstellungen über 
die Komplizenschaft von Eingeborenen im Kontext „kolonialer Autorität“ kon-
frontiert sehen, sondern dient auch als Mahnung, dass wir, wenn wir theoretische 
Abstraktionen wie „Hybridität“, „schlaue Höflichkeit“ und „Mimikry“ anwenden, 
aufpassen müssen, weder Individuen als geschichtslos erscheinen zu lassen, noch 
eine Geschichte ohne ihre Akteure zu schreiben.  
 
 




                                                     
67 Wilkinson, Memorials, 202. 
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Empire at home 
Janny de Jong 
Introduction 
In the 1970s, the study of colonial empires had become “one of the deadest of 
dead fields within history,” one historian writes.1 Another, describing her impres-
sions about the field of imperial history as an undergraduate at a British university 
in roughly the same period, recalled that imperial studies seemed to be a very mas-
culine enterprise, “centrally concerned with what chaps in the past, mainly of the 
pale variety, did to, or for, yet more chaps who were often not pale.” Linda Colley, 
specialist in British history and the author of the last quote, then proceeds with 
telling how very much the field has changed, and how mistaken she had been. Her 
conclusion reads that imperial history is anything but a boring, musty and fairly 
limited field. Quite the contrary: there were “few subjects more indispensable for 
forging a proper understanding both of this country and the world in general.”2 
Colley does not simply mean the history of the impact of the British Empire and of 
British inventions on the world.3 Indeed, she puts forward that imperial history is 
much broader than that. For, she argues, the world may be post-colonial, post-
imperial it is not. Imperial components and traditions are clearly visible in, for 
instance, India, China as well as the United States.4  
The tremendous changes in the field of colonial and imperial history in the last 
two to three decades are remarkable indeed. There has been a veritable burst of 
scholarship on colonial and imperial issues. One of the most important changes is 
the inclusion of other disciplines and diverse methodologies. Influences from es-
pecially cultural and social studies have had a large bearing on the focus and con-
tent of imperial and colonial history. 
                                                     
1 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 13. 
2 Linda Colley, “What is Imperial History Now?,” in What is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 132-4.  
3 See Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003) for an 
example of a historian who argues precisely this point. 
4 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850 (Westminster, MD: Knopf, 2004), 
378.  
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Since decolonisation, ‘colonial history’ had become a somewhat tainted, old-
fashioned word. At many universities, the name of the specialisation changed into, 
for instance, non-western history, world or global history.5 The perspective devel-
oped from a predominantly Eurocentric focus to one centred on internal or re-
gional developments in the former colonies. What anthropologist Eric Wolf once 
ironically called “the people without history” needed a closer look and, of course, 
new, inclusive histories.6 The area studies that were the result of this in due course 
posed new problems with regard to the definition of the region or area, the relation 
between the local and the broader contexts and the sometimes different perspec-
tives of native and non-native scholars.7 And then, in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
globalisation became a catchword. This had important consequences for historical 
research as well.8  
Fresh insights were also called for with regard to the impact of colonialism and 
imperialism ‘at home.’ After all, these phenomena still cast their shadows on pre-
sent day life, culture and politics. Also, to understand the West-European mental 
space of especially the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, as well as politics, 
social issues and culture, it was deemed necessary to investigate the colonial history 
once again. This article aims to sketch these developments to see what importance 
these topics have for contemporary European studies. 
Perception of Europe and European Transformations 
This article originally was presented at a scientific conference in 2010, at which 
some of the core questions of the Erasmus Mundus Master programme of Excel-
lence Euroculture: Europe in the Wider World were critically examined as a basis for 
further scientific research. To my opinion, two of these questions are highly rele-
vant for colonial and imperial studies; namely, firstly, whether, to what extent and 
in which forms a common and unique European culture exists and how this is 
related to other regional or non-European cultures, and, secondly, how Europe 
                                                     
5 Janny de Jong, Gé Prince and Hugo s’Jacob, Niet-westerse geschiedenis: Benaderingen en thema’s (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1998).  
6 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
Wolf’s book pointed already at the importance of multidisciplinarity in the field of non-western 
studies and at ways to include the histories of peoples and regions without written sources or only 
sources of outsiders.  
7 One example may serve as explanation: Eric Thompson, “Research and Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165.4 (2009): 612-22 reviews 5 recent publications on 
Southeast Asia and notes differences between American traditions of Area Studies in contrast to 
international and an intra-regional field of scholarship. See pages 613 and 614.  
8 See for an overview of these developments Janny de Jong, “World History: A Brief Introduction,” 
and “Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians,” in World and Global History: Research and Teach-
ing, eds. Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and Andrew Dilley (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011), 1-11 and 
13-24.  
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and how cultural transformations are perceived within Europe and from the 
outside.  
In the Master programme Euroculture, the first question is the point of depar-
ture for courses that study various cultural and political traditions within Europe as 
well as global influences on these traditions. In colonial studies, as well as world 
and global history, this same question leads to studies about the influence of Eu-
rope (or the diverse European colonial powers) on other regions and countries, 
and the influence that the colonial relationship may have exerted on the policy, 
status, economy and culture of the metropolis. This may range from a more gen-
eral view on the role of trade relations, to the particular form of colonial rule or the 
introduction of western knowledge and technologies. Also one might think of 
social studies that focus on familial ties and the importance of ruling families.9 Of 
course it should also be noted that there were many sorts of colonial settlements: it 
matters whether the expansion abroad was meant to be temporary in tropical re-
gions, as was the case in, for instance, the Netherlands Indies, or permanent, like 
the British and French settlements in North America or the Dutch and English 
settlements in South Africa.  
The second question, “How is Europe and how are cultural transformations 
perceived within Europe and from the outside?” would in the field of colonial 
studies involve the inquiry into a broad range of very different influences. Migra-
tion of people from the former colonies to Europe after decolonisation, content 
and role of ethnographic museums as well as the changes in the way of presenting 
these materials, colonial institutions and libraries, influences on art and architec-
ture, on food, music are just a selection of the wide range of influences. In the 
master programme, these same issues might be addressed but obviously that field 
is wider than just these influences alone. 
Of course, an answer to the question how Europe is perceived abroad is not 
simple to give. Nobody will even think that the perception of the various countries 
in Europe, or the West for that matter, is the same in countries like Iraq, Kenya, 
China, Japan, Mexico, India or Indonesia. It goes without saying that the different 
political, social, economic, cultural and historical contexts need to be taken into 
account. The following example illustrates that the context indeed is very im-
portant. In the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called ‘world-system approach,’ especially 
elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein, was popular as a Marxist-inspired general 
methodology to explain the history of the West (centre) and its relations with the 
Third World (periphery) with a semi-periphery in between.10 Yet, this approach 
                                                     
9 Julia Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Susan Legêne, De Bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel: Japan, Java, 
Tripoli en Suriname in de Negentiende-Eeuwse Nederlandse Cultuur van het Imperialisme (Amsterdam: Kon-
inklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 1998); Jean Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and 
Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 
10 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
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never gained any foothold in Japan, because it did not address the central issue of 
the specific relations between Japan and the outside world. In other words, this 
world-system model supposedly was global, explaining the development of trade 
and commercial relations between various regions in the world, yet the point of 
departure was Eurocentric. Japanese historians obviously did not envisage their 
position as semi-periphery.  
The idea of a semi-periphery as such seemed to marginalise people. World his-
torian Felipe Fernández-Armesto, for instance, writes in his book Millennium: “Part 
of the mission of this book is to rehabilitate the overlooked, including places often 
ignored as peripheral, peoples marginalized as inferior, and individuals relegated to 
bit-parts and footnotes.”11 The East was not, and indeed has never been, simply a 
passive bystander – nor is this true for other parts of the world. 
Eurocentrism and Power 
‘Europe’ is often more a metaphor than a specific geographical place. As the Indi-
an historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty, wrote, it is a “hyperreal” Europe, even an imagi-
nary space. The problem was that Europe remained the “sovereign, theoretical 
subject of all histories,” even if the topic was Chinese or Indian history. 
Chakrabarty pointed, for instance, to the fact that third-world historians referred to 
works in European history, but this did not work the other way round. . It simply 
seemed impossible to avoid ‘Europe.’ What needed to be done, therefore, was to 
‘provincialise’ Europe, in other words, to show that Europe and the West are 
simply one source of power and knowledge among others.12  
Chakrabarty is associated with a group of academics, especially from South 
Asia, who practices what is loosely called subaltern studies. The idea behind it was 
to give a voice to the people ‘from below,’ whom in the former colonial and impe-
rial studies had not received enough attention. These studies formed part of the 
broader field of postcolonialism theories and studies.13 
One of the most famous writers in postcolonial studies is Edward Said, whose 
Orientalism (1978) focused on just how the contacts of Europe/the West were 
permeated by colonialism and imperialism and what this meant for Europe itself. 
Every European or American, Said stated, “comes up against the Orient as a Eu-
                                                     
11 Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Millennium (London: Bantam Press, 1995), 8. 
12 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); and his “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks 
for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” in Representations 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories (1992): 
1. See also: C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 470; he is in favour of a decentralisation of world history.  
13 For an extensive overview see: Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001). 
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ropean or American first, as an individual second.”14 Western scholarship on ‘the’ 
Orient was in his opinion inextricably tied to imperialist power. 
 Said paid no attention to the fact that there have been very different traditions 
in Orientalist scholarship; many so-called orientalists did not have any direct rela-
tionship to any imperial power and studied, for instance, Islam purely out of intel-
lectual curiosity. But indeed anthropological knowledge, for example, often had 
served to back up political domination of non-western peoples; anthropologist 
Bernard S. Cohn, for instance, had demonstrated this earlier.15  
Through more emphasis on the ‘culture of colonialism,’ literature, and social as 
well as intellectual matters, the focus lay less on aspects related to economy, inter-
national politics and military power, that once had dominated imperial studies. 
This was less the case in studies related to the concept of globalisation. Globalisa-
tion was, and is, often related to trading patterns and contacts. In an interesting 
overview of the field of global history, Patrick O' Brien, a specialist in global eco-
nomic history at the London School of Economics, described the task for global 
historians as follows: “to craft new, more inclusive and persuasive general narra-
tives that might hold together without the fishy glue of Eurocentrism.”16  
There are historians who have moved from colonial/imperial or area studies to 
world or global history. One might mention the names of Christopher Bayly and 
Jürgen Osterhammel here.17 Taking a long-time perspective, such as is customary 
in world history, makes colonial empires only one form of empires that have existed 
in time. Historians Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, one specialised in Russian 
history, the other a specialist on African history, for instance, maintain that the 
focus on Europe and the West as “uniquely powerful agents of change” is mislead-
ing. For empires, the key question was how to maintain control over large geo-
graphical spaces. Various strategies (“repertoires”) were used to achieve that end. 
Burbank and Cooper also put forward that the legacy of empires still is visible in 
the contemporary world: though China, Russia and the United States do not usual-
ly refer to imperial images, “imperial pathways made them what they are.”18  
And then, interest revived as well in new forms of colonial and imperial stud-
ies. In other words, metropolitan history, politics and culture became once again 
the point for departure.  
                                                     
14 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 5 and 11. 
15 Bernard S. Cohn, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
16 Patrick O’Brien, “Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of 
Global History,” Journal of Global History 1.1 (2006): 33. 
17 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhun-
derts, 5th rev. ed. (München: Beck, 2010). 
18 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 21.  
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Empire at Home: Eurocentrism as a Stimulus for Research 
New studies that focus on metropolitan culture and politics have come to the fore. 
Of course, the history of colonialism and imperialism is researched differently than 
during the period of colonialism itself, for instance by taking into account the 
“chaotic pluralism” of interests at home and allies and agents. The Empire Project 
that British historian John Darwin started shows that the history of the British 
Empire should be seen as a combination of various linkages of imperial politics.19 
The new research stresses the impact of the Empire ‘at home.’ This has been 
called the New Imperial History in Great Britain. These studies show, for instance, 
how culture, identity and modernity were shaped in relation to the Empire (Kath-
leen Wilson), what role propaganda, popular culture and museums played (John 
MacKenzie), what influence empire had on readers and politics, on constructions 
of class, sexuality, citizenship and how it was narrated in histories (Catherine 
Hall).20 It had long been customary to think that the Empire had not had a major 
impact on the domestic history. These studies argued against that perception. In 
his study on the ideological origins of the British Empire, David Armitage shows 
how long the pedigree of the neglect of empire actually was in British domestic 
history. External contacts usually had been treated separately from the internal 
history of Britain, in spite of the strong connection between the two.21 The history 
of colonial and imperial contacts may not always be a pleasant subject, but it is a 
very important one to address. Colonial amnesia leads to a distorted view on histo-
ry. 
The fact that only British studies in this field are mentioned above does not 
mean that these are limited to Great Britain only. In various countries, for instance, 
research has been done on colonial monuments and colonial heritage.22 Issues 
referring to cultural heritage, museums, the role of media, lobby groups, the imag-
ining of empire, the role of political organisations, political ideology etc. are all of 
high relevance for a proper understanding of contemporary Europe. As are social 
issues related to migration, immigration from former colonies and attitudes to-
                                                     
19 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11-7.  
20 Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 
1660-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: 
Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John M. MacKenzie, ed., Imperialism and Popular 
Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: 
The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
21 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 12-23. 
22 See in particular Robert Aldrich, Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums and 
Colonial Memories. (Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and his review of French 
historiography on colonialism “ Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scène: Recent Works on French 
Colonialism." The Historical Journal 45, no. 04 (2002): 917-36.  
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wards the multicultural society. Therefore the study of colonial empires and their 
consequences both in the world at large and ‘at home’ certainly is not the deadest 





Adams, Julia. The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Mod-
ern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.  
Aldrich, Robert. Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums and 
Colonial Memories. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
——— “ Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scène: Recent Works on French Colo-
nialism.” The Historical Journal 45, no. 04 (2002): 917-36. 
Armitage, David. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
Bayly, C. A. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Compari-
sons. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.  
Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics 
of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.  
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Differ-
ence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.  
——— “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ 
Pasts?” Representations 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories 
(1992): 1-26. 
Cohn, Bernard S. An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays. Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press, 1987. 
Colley, Linda. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850. Westminster, MD: 
Knopf, 2004.  
——— “What is Imperial History Now?” In What is History Now?, edited by David 
Cannadine, 132-47. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2005.  
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-
1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 
2003. 
Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. Millennium. London: Bantam Press, 1995.  
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 124 
Hall, Catherine, and Sonya O. Rose, eds. At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Cul-
ture and the Imperial World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
Jong, Janny de. “Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians.” In World and 
Global History: Research and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and 
Andrew Dilley, 13-24. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011. 
——— “World History: A Brief Introduction.” In World and Global History: Re-
search and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and Andrew Dilley, 
1-11. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011. 
——— Gé Prince and Hugo s’Jacob, Niet-westerse geschiedenis: Benaderingen en thema’s. 
Assen: Van Gorcum, 1998. 
Legêne, Susan. De Bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel: Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname 
in de Negentiende-Eeuwse Nederlandse Cultuur van het Imperialisme. Amsterdam: 
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 1998.  
MacKenzie, John M., ed. Imperialism and Popular Culture. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1986.  
——— Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
O’Brien, Patrick. “Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the 
Restoration of Global History.” Journal of Global History 1.1 (2006): 3-39.  
Osterhammel, Jürgen. Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. 
5th rev. ed. München: Beck, 2010.  
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. 
Taylor, Jean Gelman. The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial 
Indonesia. 2nd ed. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.  
Thompson, Eric. “Research and Regionalism in Southeast Asia.” Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165.4 (2009): 612-22.  
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, 1974.  
Wilson, Kathleen, ed. A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain 
and the Empire, 1660-1840. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
——— The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Wolf, Eric R. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982.  
Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001. 
 
Contesting Cultural Memory 
Rethinking Postcolonial Identities in Europe 
Margriet van der Waal 
Introduction 
Every year around the end of November, a sense of déjà vu approaches me, when a 
seemingly recurring event announces itself: the annual, ‘national,’ albeit marginal 
debate on the alleged racism of the figure of ‘Zwarte Piet’ (Black Pete) in the 
Dutch ‘Sinterklaas’ celebrations.1 In 2011, the debate promoted to a slightly more 
centre-stage location after the rather violent arrest of two demonstrators at the 
annual arrival of Sinterklaas, because they refused to remove t-shirts displaying the 
text, “Zwarte Piet is racisme.”2 The two arrested protestors, Quinsy Gario, a per-
formance poet, and Kno'ledge Cesare, a hiphop MC, were in fact carrying out an 
art project with the intention to stimulate a public debate about racism and the 
figure of Zwarte Piet in the Netherlands. This debate, on Zwarte Piet, racism, and 
Dutch colonial history including slavery, usually fizzles away a few days after De-
cember 5th, as it did also this time.  
                                                     
1 The celebration of Sinterklaas is a national children’s festival, more or less an invented tradition 
created by the end of the 19th century. Celebrated annually on the 5th of December, Sinterklaas is a 
form of national theatre that stages the arrival of a good-natured old man sporting an impressive 
beard and red mitre, a white horse, and a handful of black, fumbling and foolish ‘helpers,’ all called 
Zwarte Piet. For a historical overview, see Frits Booy, Op Zoek naar Zwarte Piet: Een Speurtocht naar de 
Herkomst, de Ontwikkeling en de Betekenis van de Dienaar van Sinterklaas, 2nd ed. (Eindhoven: Stichting 
Nationaal Sint Nicolaas Comité, 2008); Eugenie Boer and J. I. A. Helsloot, Het Sinterklaas Boek 
(Zwolle: Waanders, 2009). For a more critical consideration of this tradition, see Mieke Bal, Travelling 
Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Allison 
Blakely, Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1993). 
2 “Zwarte Piet is racism.” Amateur visual images of the arrest were posted on the internet site 
YouTube, see “Schokkend Arrestaties Intocht Sinterklaas Dordrecht !!!! Amateur Beelden,” YouTube 
video, 3:05, amateur video taken on 12 November 2011, posted by “justlikethischannel,” 12 Novem-
ber 2011, http://youtu.be/8Qp6yUIPUTY (accessed 1 March 2012). Only after tweets about the 
video footage on YouTube were posted, did the Dutch news media start reporting on the incident. 
See Karlijn Van Houwelingen, “T-shirt met Zwarte Piet is Racisme Verboden bij Intocht,” Algemeen 
Dagblad, 14 November 2011; Hans Beerekamp, “Demonstreren tegen Zwarte Piet is Gevaarlijk,” 
NRC Handelsblad, 14 November 2011. For international commentary, see Jessica Olien, “In Holland, 
Santa Doesn’t Have Elves: He Has Slaves,” Slate, 1 December 2011, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/holidays/2011/12/zwarte_piet_holland_s_favorite_racist_christ
mas_tradition_.html. 
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However, there seems to be a recent shift in the discourse about perceived racism 
in the Dutch public debate which puts this ‘Zwarte Piet’ protest in a rather differ-
ent light. An important impetus for this shift was the publication of the novel Al-
leen Maar Nette Mensen (Only Decent People)3, published in 2008. Both, the novel and 
the Zwarte Piet incident, reveal how current-day European identities are informed 
by historical narratives of a traumatic past, for instance colonialism and slavery. 
Although it might seem obvious enough to keep the colonial past of many Eu-
ropean countries in mind when considering how European cultural identities are 
formed and understood, it seems that when European identity formation is con-
sidered, one might just as well speak of “the most canonized frame of reference”4, 
which only entails the “internecine rivalries among European countries, the role of 
the United States, and the bi-polar division of the world order embodied in the 
Cold War.”5 A postcolonial Europe project, however, seeks to move beyond this 
canonised frame of references to consider the current heterogeneous complexity of 
migration and post-colonialism within the European context and its resultant ine-
qualities beyond the conventional “residual figures” to newly emerging identities.6 
Such a project demands closer scrutiny of how socio-cultural subject positions are 
formulated and articulated in the light of the commemoration of problematic and 
painful pasts. 
In this article, a reworked and updated version of the paper given at the Eu-
roculture conference in 2010, I would like to consider this discourse on past trau-
ma (colonialism and slavery) within current-day, postcolonial Europe as a particu-
lar and important facet of research into the cultural dimensions of European inte-
gration.  
 
The Case of Alleen Maar Nette Mensen 
In an exhilarating form of modern-day Dutch, author Robert Vuijsje tells the com-
ing-of-age story of David, an identify-confused young Jew from Amsterdam’s fash-
ionable Old South quarter, who is constantly mistaken for being Moroccan. He is 
in search of the love of his dreams, a shapely black woman. Frequently sojourning 
between the richest and poorest parts of Amsterdam, David’s adventures take him 
from Amsterdam’s posh Old South quarter to the Bijlmermeer, a region of derelict 
high-rise flats populated by migrants from various parts of the global south and 
                                                     
3 Robert Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen (Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 2008). 
4 Peo Hansen, “European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection,” European 
Journal of Social Theory 5.4 (2002): 483. 
5 Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Postcolonial Europe, or Understanding Europe in Times of the Post-
colonial,” in The Sage Handbook of European Studies, ed. Chris Rumford (London: Sage, 2009), 69-70. 
6 Graham Huggan, “Perspectives on Postcolonial Europe,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing 44.3 (2008): 
241-9. 
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remembered in cultural memory as the site of an El Al airplane crash in 1992. De-
scribed elsewhere as “once a vibrant upper-middle class community,” it had fallen 
into a state of dereliction by the late 1990s and boasts “the highest unemployment 
and crime rates in the country.”7 The area was home to some of the city’s poorest 
and most marginal citizens until recent urban renovation projects were quite suc-
cessfully started. It is here, in the Bijlmer (short for Bijlmermeer), with its signifi-
cant population of migrants from former Dutch colonies (especially from Surinam 
and the Dutch Antilles), that David hopes to find the elusive, but much desired 
“Sherida chain who is also an intellectual.”8 Dumped finally by both his Suri-
namese girlfriend Rowanda and his former girlfriend from school (Naomi, from a 
similar ‘proper’ background as himself), and disillusioned with Dutch middle-class 
culture, David meets Naima, a Moroccan cashier from the local supermarket. She 
is not an “illiterate cave-dweller from the mountains, her family came from Casa-
blanca”9, and the novel ends with the promise of a new relationship between the 
two. 
Even though the novel was already in its 25th print run less than two years after 
its publication, the first months of the novel’s published life were rather unevent-
ful. A heated public debate on whether or not the book is racist and sexist, howev-
er, ensued when it was nominated for a Dutch literary award (the Libris literatuur-
prijs). This discussion was stirred further when the novel won an equally prestig-
ious Flemish literary prize (the “Gouden Uil”). The jury report on this text – with 
its short chapters, sms language, and staccato style – added fuel to the fire with its 
description of the text written in “Dutch that swings like an African boob, a 
rhythm that fits more tightly than a black ass in too small a tiger print legging 
[…].”10 When these accusations of sexism, racism, colonial attitude and such were 
pronounced against Vuijsje, he responded with a reaction typical within the literary 
field: it is not Vuijsje, the author, who should be held responsible for the pro-
nouncements in the novels, because it’s the character David (despite obvious auto-
                                                     
7 Georgina Y. Stal and Daniyal M. Zuberi, “Ending the Cycle of Poverty through Socio-Economic 
Integration: A Comparison of Moving to Opportunity (MTO) in the United States and the 
Bijlmermeer Revival Project in the Netherlands,” Cities 27.1 (2010): 5. 
8 “Sherida chain” is David’s metonymic description for a black woman who wears a golden chain 
with a pendant with the name of the wearer in golden, curly letters. Sherida, according to David, is a 
woman who has been living her whole life in the Netherlands, but whose existence is located entirely 
outside of Dutch society. See: Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen, 36-7. This familiarity with Dutch 
society but lack of participation in it is considered a desirable feature by David, who spurns the me-
diocre, middle-class qualities of “Dutch society.” Whether this lack of participation is the result of 
agency or of structure is a problematic issue not considered by David. The “Sherida chain” refers to a 
name necklace, with “Sherida” being a popular, female Suriname name. This kind of jewellery was 
initially worn within hip hop circles, but became more mainstream after being worn by Carrie Brad-
shaw in the TV series, Sex and the City.  
9 Ibid., 286. 
10 Guy Mortier, “Gouden Uil 2009,” Leesplein.nl, http://www.leesplein.nl/assets/juryrapporten/uil-
volw-2009.html (accessed 9 March 2012). 
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biographical links between David and Vuijsje that have been pointed out by the 
author himself) who takes this position.11 
Contesting Cultural Memory 
Although restricted here to offer neither a detailed close-reading of the novel nor 
closer scrutiny of the public reactions to the novel’s publication, I would like to 
consider how the novel brings not only the historical moment of colonialism and 
slavery into focus, but also that other European trauma: the Holocaust. This ena-
bles me to reflect on how cultural memory could be used to critically consider the 
process of defining postcolonial, European cultural identity.  
David, an avid diarist, offers – without any motivation for penning down these 
thoughts – some observations on the Dutch “multicultural society”:  
 
“Blacks think about slavery every day. Except for blacks, no one ever thinks 
about slavery. 
Jews think about the Second World War every day. Except for Jews, no one 
thinks about the Second World War.”12  
 
A short while later, when David visits the home of his Surinam girlfriend, Ro-
wanda, for the first time, he engages in a discussion of some sort about slavery and 
his own Jewishness with Rowanda’s mother, Janine. The mother argues that the 
Dutch owe the Afro-Surinamese community costs of repair for slavery, because 
Jews were paid such costs after the war. During dinner, David then poses the fol-
lowing two “hypothetical” questions to Rowanda:  
 
‘What is worse? That your parents were slaves or being born in Africa.’ She 
said that I should not nag. I (David) posed another hypothetical question. 
‘What is worse? Massacring a whole race, or trading part of a race?’ 
Now Janine did hear it. She cried: ‘Slavery was actually much worse than the 
war with the Jewish people.’ She hit with her hand against the blue tiles. ‘We 
were also massacred. And raped. Otherwise there would not be any half-
bloods.’13 
 
                                                     
11 Elsbeth Etty, “‘Schrijvers Durven het Publieke Debat niet Aan’,” NRC Handelsblad, 3 July 2009. See 
also: Thomas Vaessens, De Revanche van de Roman: Literatuur, Autoriteit en Engagement (Nijmegen: 
Vantilt, 2009). 
12 Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen, 10. At the time of writing this contribution, the novel has not yet 
been translated into English nor has the rights been sold to an English publisher, because the book is 
found to be “too controversial” (according to a telephone conversation with the author’s literary 
agent on 12 March 2012). Translations are my own.  
13 Ibid., 68. 
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The reader is here confronted with rethinking how histories of trauma and victimi-
sation are understood within different communities and how such histories inter-
connect with each other – not only in the past, but also and crucially, I might add, 
in the present within the context of memory culture. The danger implied in the 
quotation from Only Decent People is a memory culture delineated along ethnic lines, 
and within current-day European context the problems entailed with ethnicity-
based processes of identification and identity construction need not be expounded. 
Michael Rothberg, in Multidirectional Memory (2009), addresses this dilemma of 
seemingly competing memory cultures by turning specifically to Holocaust and 
slavery memory and asking what happens when “different histories confront each 
other in the public sphere?”14 As Rothberg explains, there are a number of possible 
ways of dealing with the phenomenon when “social actors bring multiple traumatic 
pasts into a heterogeneous and changing post-World War II present.”15 One op-
tion is that the interaction of different memories in contemporary multicultural 
society stimulates a competition of victimhood, where one memory, the ‘dominant’ 
one, comes to replace the other, competing memories. The other option, suggests 
Rothberg, is that of “resonance.” This “resonance” approach entails that instead of 
pitting memory as “a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources,” memory is to be 
considered as “multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-
referencing, and borrowing.”16 Memory culture as site of identification, argues 
Rothberg, need to be considered in terms of “elements of alterity and forms of 
commonality with others.”17 
It is exactly this lack of envisioning alterity and commonality with others that 
Only Decent People addresses. In a newspaper interview, Vuijsje summed up the cul-
ture of victimisation in the Netherlands as follows: 
 
The Surinamese cry out how terrible it is that they once were slaves. 
Moroccans bemoan the fact that they cannot find internships. Then I 
say, we Jews were killed. I find it ridiculous, this bidding against each 
other, but I think that I understand the tendency toward victimhood 
among minorities better than a regular blond Dutch person.18  
 
The seeming inability of a “regular blond Dutch person” to understand the per-
ceived victimhood among minorities as more than simply knee-jerk reactions of 
political correctness display itself remarkably in the public discussion around 
                                                     
14 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Elsbeth Etty, “Zwart, Sexy en Gevuld,” NRC Next, 5 January 2010. Translation my own. 
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‘Zwarte Piet’ specifically and the treatment of Dutch colonial history encompass-
ing slavery more generally.19 Referring to a recently broadcast TV series on slavery, 
where a white presenter explained slavery’s history to a black actor and comedian, 
who then embarks on a search for his roots, economist and historian Sandew Hira 
compares this specific representation of slavery’s history “as if the Germans would 
tell the Jews what the Holocaust was and that it was not so bad.”20 On the Inter-
net, various comments can be found on forums linking the Sinterklaas tradition 
and Holocaust memories. Two online examples will suffice. Example one com-
pares the Sinterklaas festival, and by extension slavery, to the Holocaust:  
 
Slavery is for black people what the Holocaust is for the Jews. Imag-
ine that the Jewish community would be reminded of the horrible 
past because of an age-old tradition. Would we accept that? Slavery is 
not less serious because it happened longer ago. It is crazy that a chil-
dren’s festival (i.e. Sinterklaas) is characterised by a very flat represen-
tation of our dark past.21 
 
Example two considers the lack of a critical public debate on slavery in compari-
son to the taboo on Holocaust denial: “During our colonial past a large group of 
‘minorities’ were also treated inhumanely and killed but about that you may 
say/find/disagree/deny anything. Why is that different from the Holocaust?”22  
Although these remarks clearly reflect the typical “forum logic” of many Inter-
net commentary, lacking nuance and complexity, their mere utterance suggests the 
semiotic necessity to investigate the articulation of memory and the representation 
of an array of traumatic events (the Holocaust, slavery, colonial legacies, genocide) 
through complex sign systems that have in their essence no meaning themselves, 
but obtain meaning as a result of the context(s) in which they are read.  
Conclusion 
A project on the relation between cultural memory and constructions of cultural 
identity within current-day Europe is the kind of endeavour that fits the bill of the 
Euroculture programme well. In fact, a Euroculture student recently undertook 
                                                     
19 See for example: Chris van der Heijden, “De Zwarte Canon,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 7 March 
2012. 
20 Sandew Hira, De Slavernij: Het Witwassen van Een Zwarte Bladzijde uit de Nederlandse Geschiedenis (Den 
Haag: International Institute for Scientific Research, 2011), 5. 
21 Wolf, “Zwarte Piet: Racistisch of Niet?,” Debat Op 2, 2 December 2011, 
 http://debatop2.ncrv.nl/nieuwsblogs/zaterdag-zwarte-piet-racistisch-of-niet (accessed 1 March 
2012). Translation my own. 
22 Triple S, “Die Leip Net by Powned +ontkennen Holocaust,” Forum.Fok.nl, 24 November 2011, 
http://forum.fok.nl/topic/1742693 (accessed 1 March 2012). Translation my own. 
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just such a kind of research programme, which resulted in a thesis on the topic of 
how second and third generations of Turkish migrants in Germany perceive the 
Holocaust.23 Her research, an empirical sociological investigation, resonates well 
with the kind of questions one may pose to works of art, such as Vuijsje’s novel. 
Both projects pick up on circulating sentiments regarding cultural memories in a 
postcolonial European context, untangling the discourse on racism, trauma, and 
memory that constitute conceptions of European identity. 
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Entering the Third Dimension 
A CMM (Coordinated Management of Meaning)  
Analysis of Transculturalism in Inter/Action 
Elizabeth M. Goering 
Introduction 
This story begins on a Sunday morning. I am listening to a radio interview with 
Vincent Harding, a key figure in the American civil rights movement. A bit later in 
this article, it will become obvious why I’m choosing to share my experience with 
you in narrative form, but for now I would ask you to just listen to my story. I had 
just received the call for papers for the conference where this article was to be 
presented, so in the back of my mind, I was thinking about the theme for the Eu-
roculture Intensive Programme, “Europe: Space for Transcultural Existence?” with 
that troubling question mark at the end, as well as the topic for this conference, 
“Gauging European Transcultural Dimensions.” I have to admit that I had been 
perplexed by Angela Merkel’s death knell for multiculturalism and her claim that 
“multiculturalism has utterly failed”1, a verdict that since has been reasserted by the 
Prime Minister of Britain2 and the President of France3. So on this Sunday morn-
ing, I am lying in bed, listening to this interview, and here on the radio is Vincent 
Harding asking similarly disquieting questions about the multicultural “experi-
ment” of America. “Is America even possible?” he asks.4 And in his answer, he 
evokes a stanza from a poem by the American poet Langston Hughes: “O, let 
                                                     
1 Kate Connolly, “Angela Merkel Declares Death of German Multiculturalism,” The Guardian, 17 
October 2010, Main section. 
2 “British PM: Multiculturalism Has Failed – David Cameron’s Remarks on West’s Policy Draw Fire 
from Muslim Community,” msnbc.com, last modified 6 February 2011, 
 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41444364/ns/world_news-europe/t/british-pm-multiculturalism-
has-failed/. 
3 “France’s Sarkozy: Multiculturalism Has Failed,” CBNNews.com, last modified 11 February 2011, 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/February/Frances-Sarkozy-Multiculturalism-Has-
Failed/. 
4 Vincent Harding and Krista Tippett. Civility, History, and Hope – On Being Podcast, 51 min, 9 sec.; On 
Being, MP3, http://www.publicradio.org/tools/media_player/popup.php?name=being/ 
programs/2011/02/23/20110224_civility_history_hope_128. 
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America be America again—The land that never has been yet—”5 It is almost 
enough to make those of us who would like to believe in the possibility of spaces 
for transcultural existence throw up our hands in despair. 
But, I am optimistic enough to still believe – in spite of the sceptics – that 
transcultural spaces are, indeed, possible. I am also realistic enough to know that 
they are very difficult to achieve and likely can only be spotted in fleeting mo-
ments. Also, given my own disciplinary background in the field of communication 
studies, I am convinced that if transcultural spaces are possible, they must be con-
structed through interaction, through our talk. That led me to this research project, 
in which I am exploring the following research question: How are transcultural 
spaces communicatively constructed? 
To answer this question, I needed to identify moments where one might 
glimpse efforts to create transcultural spaces, and I found the artefacts for my 
analysis in film. Movies are a logical choice for this analysis because, as some 
scholars suggest, they are “equipments for living.”6 Brummett explains this notion, 
suggesting that movies “do not merely pose problems, they suggest ways and 
means to resolve the problems insofar as they follow discursively a pattern that 
people might follow in reality.”7 In this paper, I will analyze one particular film, The 
Class, a French movie released in 2008 under the original title Entre les Murs. This 
movie captures in near documentary style the interaction in a culturally diverse 
classroom in a “tough Parisian neighbourhood.”8 By focusing on this one film, I 
am hoping to demonstrate transculturalism in action or, perhaps more accurately, 
in interaction and to identify some of the discursive patterns that may equip us for 
living in a culturally diverse world. But first, I want to introduce you to the theoret-
ical perspective that informs my work: Coordinated Management of Meaning. 
Coordinated Management of Meaning 
Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) is a communication theory first 
introduced by W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen in the 1970s.9 The per-
spective is almost more of a worldview and a set of tools than a well-formulated 
theory. One of the foundational assumptions made by CMM is that communica-
tion is constitutive. In other words, we create and give meaning to the world in 
                                                     
5 Langston Hughes, “Let America Be America Again,” in The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes, ed. 
Arnold Rampersad (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 189. 
6 Stephen Dine Young, “Movies as Equipment for Living: A Developmental Analysis of the Im-
portance of Film in Everyday Life,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 17.4 (2000): 448. 
7 Barry Brummett, “Burke’s Representative Anecdote as a Method in Media Criticism,” Critical Studies 
in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 164. 
8 The Class (Entre les Murs), DVD, directed by Laurent Cantet (2008; Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures 
Home Entertainment, 2009).  
9 W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning: The Creation of Social 
Realities (New York: Praeger, 1980). 
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which we live through our interaction. As Barnett Pearce puts it, “‘[w]e’ consist of 
a cluster of social conversations, and [...] patterns of communication constitute the 
world as we know it.”10 A second key assumption of this perspective is that com-
munication episodes, or “clusters of social conversation,” are the central processes 
whereby we humans co-create our social worlds. Furthermore, the theory recog-
nizes that communication episodes are patterned. In other words, the “reality” that 
is constituted through our interaction is not random; rather it is constructed 
through patterned sequences of interaction. Sometimes the constructed reality is 
desirable, but often we get stuck in unwanted repetitive patterns, or URPs.11  
By analyzing communication patterns, we can ‘see’ the world we are co-
creating. With its emphasis on the constitutive function of communication, CMM 
invites us to ask: “What are we making together? What do we want to make to-
gether in the future?” CMM is interested in how communication “calls into being 
‘better’ social worlds.”12 If we are stuck in URPs, CMM invites us to reconstitute 
our world. If multiculturalism has “utterly failed,” CMM invites us to analyze the 
communication patterns that have constituted that ‘failure’ and imagine ways to 
reconstitute our reality. 
The Communicative Constitution of Transcultural Spaces 
In his contribution to this collection of articles, Martin Tamcke suggests that trans-
cultural communication is possible if we recognize that “I am not you, as you are 
not me. Yet I am not just separated from you, as you are not just separated from 
me. There is something of you in me, as there is something of me in you. There-
fore, when we have to interact, I deal with you in me, as you deal with me in you 
for a better understanding of each other, as a value in itself.” So let us examine the 
communication patterns in the culturally diverse space of The Class and see wheth-
er they succeed in creating a space for transcultural communication.  
A Pattern is Born 
The movie begins at the start of another school year in a diverse high school in a 
rough Parisian neighbourhood. In the first scene we will analyze, the teacher, 
François Marin, is calling his students to order by tapping on his desk and urging 
the students to “Calm down now!” Mr. Marin begins to establish some ground 
                                                     
10 W. Barnett Pearce, Communication and the Human Condition (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1989), 11. 
11 Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce and Lonna Snavely, “A Theory of Rule-structure and Types 
of Episodes and a Study of Perceived Enmeshment in Undesired Repetitive Patterns (URPs),” in 
Communication Yearbook 3, edited by Dan Nimmo (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979). 
12 J. Kevin Barge and W. Barnett Pearce, “A Reconnaissance of CMM Research,” Human Systems 15.1 
(2004): 16. 
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rules for the class, stating “Remove your hood, please” and “Stop stirring things 
up.” These reminders are followed by a lecture on how much time the students 
will waste over the course of the school year if they take 15 minutes to settle down 
each day. “We lose thousands of minutes,” he argues. The teacher then proceeds 
to compare this class to other schools that “do the full hour.” “Imagine how far 
ahead they get in a year,” he observes. The students’ response is to challenge the 
teacher, pointing out: “We never do an hour. You always say that. Teachers say we 
do an hour’s class, but we never do. [...] 8:30-9:25 doesn’t make an hour. Stop say-
ing other schools do an hour. They don’t.”  
In this opening episode, the students and their teacher begin establishing 
communication patterns that constitute the day-to-day experience in this class-
room. The teacher acknowledges that the student is right about the hour not being 
a full 60 minutes. After admitting that the students are right (“All right, it’s 55 
minutes. That’s an important point. All I’m saying is that we waste time. Like 
now.”), Mr. Marin seeks to redirect the conversation by asking students to “take 
out a sheet of paper” and make name plates for themselves. However, the pattern 
established in the initial interaction is repeated as one student immediately chal-
lenges the teacher: “Why write our names? [...] You know us. We had you last 
year.” The teacher calmly and logically explains: “Esmerelda, half the kids here are 
new. Be happy. That way people will know your name.” Esmerelda, however, does 
not back down and refuses to follow the teacher’s directive: “I’m not doing it. I 
won’t if you won’t.” In the end, the teacher gives in, acknowledging: “You’re right. 
For those of you who don’t know me, I’m Mr. Marin.” 
In this scene, it is easy to see the origins of communication patterns that are 
counterproductive to transcultural communication. One glaring pattern is particu-
larly apparent in this classroom. It begins with the teacher issuing a directive, 
which is immediately followed by a student challenging the teacher’s power. The 
teacher calmly, but often in a patronizing tone, explains his request or rule, general-
ly admitting the legitimacy of part of the student’s claim. In the end, the students 
reluctantly accept his explanation – until the pattern repeats itself on another issue. 
We see this pattern emerge right from the start, and throughout the film, the stu-
dents challenge the teacher on nearly everything from simple requests to word 
choices to whether he can require them to read in class. This pattern is quickly 
becoming an unwanted repetitive pattern – a URP. 
A Reified URP 
While the first scene allows us to see the birth of an unwanted repetitive pattern, 
this next scene illustrates that this URP has, indeed, become reified within this 
group. Furthermore, we see that the communication pattern has implications for 
identity and for the possibility of creating a transcultural space within this class-
room.  
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In this clip, Mr. Marin is trying to explain the meaning of the word “succulent.” He 
writes the sentence “Bill enjoys a succulent cheeseburger” on the board, and the 
immediate response from one of the students, in keeping with the pattern de-
scribed above, is “Cheeseburgers stink.” After a brief discussion about the relative 
merits of cheeseburgers, another student proffers another challenge: “What’s with 
the Bills.... The name Bill. You always use weird names.... Why don’t you use 
Aïssata or Rachid or Ahmed or...?” Another student chimes in: “You always use 
whitey names.” Consistent with the pattern that has become institutionalized with-
in this group, the teacher seeks to logically explain his position. First he notes that 
Bill is not such a weird name; after all: “A recent U.S. President was called Bill.” 
Then he takes on the challenge about his choice of “whitey names,” arguing: 
“Khoumba, if I start choosing names to suit all your origins, it’ll never end.” In the 
end, he backs down, asking: “What do you suggest?”  
 At this point, the class seems to be so trapped in this unwanted repetitive 
communication cycle that one wonders if learning can take place at all. Further-
more, the cosmopolitan, transcultural space one might have hoped could be creat-
ed in this richly diverse classroom seems increasingly illusory.  
Remember, though, that one of the fundamental assumptions of CMM is that 
humans co-create their social worlds. That means that if we are co-constructing 
undesirable “realities,” we can re-construct them. But how? How do we break out 
of URPs?  
To help us answer that question, let me introduce you to another important 
concept in CMM: CMM assumes that communication consists of practices and 
resources.13 Practices are behaviours, what we do, and resources are the materials, 
such as language skills, personality traits, or technology, that inform practice. Prac-
tice and resources are essentially reflexive building blocks. We act in ways that our 
resources allow. And research shows that we tend to continue acting in repetitive 
cycles until resources are “put at risk.” To break out of URPs, we must put re-
sources at risk. One way to do that is through “restorying,” and to understand that, 
I need to explain the role of stories in coordinating meaning.  
We shape meaning through the intermingling of “stories lived” and “stories 
told.”14 As we enter any new experience, we do so with expectations that are 
shaped by the stories that have been told to us by others about the experience and 
by our own lived stories.  We interpret the “stories told” through frames con-
structed by our “stories lived,” and as we live the experience, new stories will be 
told to us, new stories will be lived, and meanings will emerge from the blending of 
those stories.  In seamless iteration, stories told are processed through stories lived, 
and meaning is constructed and reconstructed.     
                                                     
13 Pearce, Communication and the Human Condition, 23. 
14 W. Barnett Pearce, “Some Personal Reflections,” Human Systems 15.3 (2004): 206.  
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Indeed, stories have a great deal of power when it comes to the management of 
meaning! In particular, they have the power to disrupt unwanted repetitive pat-
terns. Transcendent storytelling can be used to create “fertile turbulence” that can 
give interactants a chance to “rewrite” their story.15  
Reconstituting Social Worlds through Restorying 
In The Class, Mr. Marin assigns each student to write and tell his/her “self-
portrait,” or story. In this next clip, Esmeralda, a student who has played a key role 
in constituting the URPs that are the communicative reality of this group, shares 
her story: “My name is Esmeralda Ouertani. I’m 14. I live on Allée du Père Dhuit 
Paris 20 with my two parents and my three brothers and sisters. Later, I’d like to 
be a policewoman because people say all policemen are bad and so we need good 
ones. If not, I’d like to be a rapper.”  
The next student to share his story is Wei, a 15-year-old Chinese immigrant. 
Wei discloses: “My hobby is playing video games, at least four hours a day. I find it 
hard using French correctly. It’s so hard expressing myself that others don’t under-
stand me. That’s why I don’t communicate much. I hardly ever go out. Nothing 
much interests me outside. The environment doesn’t suit me here since I’m allergic 
but I don’t know to what.” 
Of course, sharing stories involves risk. Rabah, the next student Mr. Marin 
calls on to share his self-portrait, is hesitant to read his story, but he does: “My 
name’s Rabah. I’m 14. I listen to rap. I love my village in Kabylia and go there 
every year. […] I have two brothers but I don’t like school. I don’t like tramps. I 
like Zidane. I like to talk and I like Psy 4 de la Rime’s videos.”  
Now, do not get me wrong. Sharing stories is not a panacea that magically re-
constitutes undesirable communication patterns. In fact, one student responds 
dismissively to Wei’s story: “Allergic to yourself, that’s what.” But stories do plant 
the seeds that allow social worlds to be reconstituted as the participants in an inter-
action get to know one another better. By sharing their stories, the students open 
the possibility of transcultural connection.  
Glimpses of Transcultural Communication 
Later in the film, the students meet in the computer room to finish up their stories, 
and it is at this point that we catch a glimpse of successful transcultural communi-
cation. One student, Souleymane, has chosen to tell his story through photos, and 
the teacher suggests he add legends to his photos. Mr. Marin asks: “What could 
                                                     
15 W. Barnett Pearce and Kimberly A. Pearce, “Transcendent Storytelling: Abilities for Systemic 
Practitioners and Their Clients,” Human Systems 9.3-4 (1998): 167-85. For an intriguing analysis of 
transcendent storytelling, see Liliana Castañeda Rossmann, “Remembering the Alamo: Cosmopolitan 
Communication and Grammars of Transcendence,” Human Systems 15.1 (2004): 33-44. 
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you put? Who is she?” “My mother,” the student replies. “You could say she’s 
your mother. Then you could explain why she’s making this gesture to the photog-
rapher,” suggests the teacher. The student explains: “They’d pissed her off. [...] She 
hates photos.” The teacher recommends: “So write that. My mother hates having 
her photo taken. That’s a legend. Understand? Do that with all the photos and 
you’re set.” 
When Souleymane is finished, the teacher posts the photos for all to see: “If 
you’ve finished, come and take a look at Souleymane’s masterpiece.” As the stu-
dents look at the pictures, there is no doubt that they have “found the you in me 
and the me in you” that makes transcultural spaces possible.  
Conclusion 
So what lessons can we learn about creating transcultural spaces from this analysis? 
First, this analysis suggests that it is possible to create spaces for transcultural 
communication, at least fleetingly, if we are willing to put resources at risk and 
“create fertile turbulence” through the exchange of personal stories. Furthermore, 
to create transcultural spaces through the exchange of stories, we need to be 
thoughtful about interpreting lived stories, telling our own stories, and listening to 
stories told by others. The movie also highlights the importance of creating a cli-
mate in which people feel comfortable sharing their stories. Finally, this analysis 
reveals that the creation of transcultural spaces is episodic. It is not that an un-
wanted repetitive pattern is fixed one time and all is well. In fact, in this film, the 
class falls back into its URPs, culminating in an episode where a student is injured, 
and Souleymane, the student responsible, is called to a hearing where he will likely 
be expelled. But, for a fleeting moment, this class was able to create a space that 
facilitated transcultural communication. Our challenge is to identify the communi-
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Towards a Transcultural Europe?
 
 
On the Path to Transculturality 
Martin Tamcke 
Introduction 
Whenever a student in my department enters the academic field of intercultural or 
interreligious coexistence or interaction, she or he will come across a text I wrote 
some years ago. While in intercultural interaction, this phrase should be present in 
the discussions of my students: 
 
I am not you, 
as you are not me. 
Yet I am not just separated from you, 
as you are not just separated from me. 
There is something of you in me, 
as there is something of me in you. 
Therefore, 
when we have to interact, 
I deal with you in me, 
as you deal with me in you 
for a better understanding of each other, 
as a value in itself. 
 
Interactions between cultures and religions always go this way, and there is always 
both: On the one hand, it can lead to a deeper understanding; on the other hand, 
when restricted or stopped at an early stage, it can lead to tensions. But everything 
that has happened in this interaction is present – all the time in both directions, 
and often somewhere in between. But where I find you in me and where you find 
me in you, there is the starting point of a next step on the path from intercultural 
interaction to transcultural existence. 
A Historical Example 
In 1909, the German missionary Detwig von Oertzen met two Muslims, “two 
older Mohammedan spiritual figures,” who had “wrapped the green scarf of the 
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Prophet’s offspring round their long kaftan.”1 Von Oertzen briefly outlines the 
course of the conversation and mentions “that the two were brothers.” They had, 
he said, already identified themselves as “followers of Christ.” The elder used “to 
be for a long time the leader of a Mohammedan dervish monastery,” whereas the 
younger was “a very well educated expert on Islam, a so-called Müderri,” a title 
equivalent to that of “Doctor of Theology,” as von Oertzen explains to his read-
ers. Von Oertzen’s report goes as follows: While studying the Islamic writings 
opposing Christianity, they both got to study the Bible, became visibly convinced 
of the biblical truth and confessed it publicly. In order to be won back for Islam, 
they were sent to Arabia. But the attempt failed. At their return, their belief was 
even stronger, and so they had to flee. They sought protection in Bulgaria. But the 
Bulgarian government agreed to give them protection only if they would enter a 
Bulgarian orthodox monastery. Considering the local Muslims, the government 
could not help them further.2 But since they intended to work in society, with-
drawing in a monastery was out of the question. Von Oertzen’s concluding judge-
ment illustrates his point of view: “To our opinion, they were completely con-
vinced in their minds of the truth contained in the Holy Scripture and the Christian 
message; but I could not tell to what extent their hearts are now revived.” 
Another missionary describes them on 23 March 1909, in a publication in 
Germany, as “Mullahs from Macedonia who, after intense research, got to 
acknowledge the truth of the Gospel.”3 What a pity! This is closer to the reality, at 
least regarding the geography, but it still misses the intentions of the two men, 
because the missionary wanted to show that they were won now for the Christian 
side, which to him was also the European side. Like von Oertzen, this missionary 
also needed a ‘success-story’ and did not take into account the real position of the 
two men. 
From 1909 onward, Mehmed Nesimi and Ahmed Kessaf had started to write 
for journals issued in Bulgaria articles which stirred quite a sensation. This led to a 
strong reaction on the side of the Bulgarian Muslim media. Both were born in 
Pashmakli (Smolyan), southwest of Plovdiv. Nesimi obtained the Müderri diploma 
at a medrese; therefore he was an educated teacher of religion. Up to his arrival in 
Plovdiv, he held sermons at the mosque in Paschmakli. Kessaf attended the me-
drese only for a short time, joining the army afterwards as a military spiritual guide 
and serving in the 18th reserve regiment of the Second Army in the Greek-Turkish 
War. After six years, he was discharged and started working as a miller in his 
hometown. He was registered as sheik of the Rifaiye order. In 1907, they travelled 
                                                     
1 Detwig von Oertzen, Ein Christuszeuge im Orient (Gießen: Brunnen, 1961), this and the following 
quotations 67-8 (translation my own). 
2 Ibid., 68 (the following as well). 
3 Gabriel Goltz, Eine christlich-islamische Kontroverse um Religion, Nation und Zivilisation: Die osmanisch-
türkischen Periodika der Deutschen Orient-Mission und die Zeitung Balkan in Plovdiv 1908-1911 (Münster: Lit, 
2002), 15 (translation my own). 
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via Edirne to Izmir, where they got into trouble because of Nesimi’s sermons and 
sailed afterwards to Jeddah, which was the next step of their planned pilgrimage to 
Mecca. Interrupting the journey in Beirut, they came into contact with Maronite 
Christians and finally travelled to Damascus. However, they never reached Mecca. 
After the restoration of the Constitution, they returned to Bulgaria via Izmir, Edir-
ne and Thessaloniki. Meanwhile, they wanted to come closer to Christianity, and 
for that reason they appealed to the Metropolitan of Plovdiv. But here they were 
discouraged in their enterprise and advised to go to Sofia. However, the Armeni-
ans in Plovdiv led them to Awetaranian, a Turkish convert from Islam to Christi-
anity, who took for himself an Armenian name after his baptism. Both Mullahs 
attracted international attention later on. Between 1909 and 1910, they taught Is-
lamic studies at a seminar in Potsdam – Nesimi taught Arabic and Qur’anic inter-
pretation, and Kessaf Sufism and Sufi philosophy. Later, they worked at the de-
partment of manuscripts of the Royal Library. Ahmed Kessaf died on 8 September 
1912, Nesimi on 5 February 1942. Their truly comprehensive literary work has not 
been thoroughly explored yet, but it aroused great interest on the side of the aca-
demics of their time, for instance Martin Hartman, the founder of the German 
Society for Islamic Studies, who refers several times in his Opus Magnum The Is-
lamic Orient to their work4, or William Henry Temple Gairdner, the director of the 
Church Missionary Society in Cairo at that time, who used their texts.5 
The argumentation of Nesimi and Kessaf is at a first glance simple and sche-
matic.6 They constantly distinguished between progress and civilisation on the one 
hand and backwardness and savageness on the other hand. They were interested in 
what is useful or damaging. Thus, this progress is related to liberty and equality. In 
their opinion, backwardness was obvious where, for example, women were exclud-
ed from public places.7 The hermeneutical criterion would be a sort of benefit-
oriented interpretation which promotes the inner truth. An independent process of 
making a legal decision would rely on reason and on the Qur’an. Religion should 
be reformed and fit the time. Both scholars spoke against a basic opposition be-
tween Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Religions could be adjusted to one another 
by means of interpretations. 
It is noteworthy that none of them used the Bible, but both argued on the ba-
sis of certain Qur’anic verses and Prophet’s traditions, using at the same time Is-
lamic theological and juridical works. Both scholars were called “apostates, who 
                                                     
4 On Hartmann, see: Gotthard Jäschke, “Islamforschung der Gegenwart: Martin Hartmann zum 
Gedächtnis,” Die Welt des Islams 23 (1941): 111-21. 
5 On Temple Gairdner, see: Constance E. Padwick, Temple Gairdner of Cairo (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929); Michael T. Shelley, “Temple Gairdner of Cairo Revisited,” 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10.3 (1999): 261-78. 
6 Goltz, Eine christlich-islamische Kontroverse, 86-91. 
7 Ibid., 98-101. 
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deserted their religion” by their Muslim opponents.8 The two offended men denied 
having become Christians. They pointed to the freedom of conscience as some-
thing that should be entirely normal in a civilised society. By reason of the equality 
principle, no religion can be disdained. Therefore, they equally loved Muslims, 
Christians and members of other religions. Unlike them, they were striving to 
acknowledge the truth irrespective of religion and to preserve the mysteries of all 
religions in their hearts. They understood themselves as healed of the religious 
fanaticism sickness and serving now the friendship and love among all people. 
But they shared in their own manner a moral founded on western values. The 
background question referred to was what was necessary for the survival of the 
Ottoman Empire. The content of their argumentation basically corresponded to 
the Islamic reformatory speech. However, their approach of a truth prevailing over 
religions, their religiosity independent of a specific religion and the challenging 
analogy between the slogan of the French Revolution and the Christian knowledge 
naturally attracted the accusation of atheism. They both had their roots in the Mus-
lim mystical milieu of the Balkans. Their concept of the unity of being originated 
from Ibn Arabi and it played an important role in the context of the Second Con-
stitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire; both declared to have studied Ibn Arabi. 
They and their liberal-mystical contemporaries were all concerned with a religious 
synthesis, but also with a synthesis between the modern scientific knowledge and 
the religious understanding. 
No wonder, then, that in Germany, because of their views, their Christianity 
was contested. The dominating view of the Protestant missionaries in Bulgaria 
included them both in the field of interculturality in such a manner that they ap-
pear as alienated from one side and incorporated in the other. Because of their 
mingling with Christian or Western ideas, the Muslim view of their opponents in 
the controversy excluded them from Islam. Unlike these perspectives, the two 
scholars document the dream of transculturality in an impressive way. It is this 
reality which will open up the transcultural space that can mainly be studied today 
on the basis of individual migrants’ biographies. 
Outlook on the Academic Discourse 
I am not you and you are not me, but I can see something in your life which ap-
pears to be something from my life, and furthermore I explore what unifies you 
and me. 
Can I face you in a manner that I am allowed to learn from you, so that I can 
absorb what belongs to you and not to me? Can I overcome our differences to-
wards what unifies you and me, without neglecting our respective characters? How 
can I preserve the new that arises when I have to combine two cultures in one 
                                                     
8 Ibid., 118-20. 
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identity, e.g. if I am a Turkish Muslim in Germany or an Oriental Christian in the 
Islamic world? Can I only understand the other if I ‘convert’ to his or her religion 
or culture? What happens to me after this ‘conversion,’ when I come back, with a 
new perspective, to my own position? Do I have to ‘re-convert’? Are patchwork-
identities the only thing possible? How can we preserve the respective individuali-
ties and yet be open for a deeper understanding of the Other? Freedom, love, jus-
tice, equality: these are keywords that are never definitely defined but always in 
flow, proved in life. They are always illusion and yet reality. Religion and culture 
can shape the meaning of these values but also have to match themselves with 
them. 
In their recently published book Interkulturalität, Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ina 
Braun define ‘transculturality’ like this: transculturality is a common culture beyond 
cultural peculiarities.9 They refer to Wolfgang Welsch who holds that the complex-
ity of particularistic culture and hybridity are adequately reflected in the concept 
‘transculturality,’ in order to overcome those separate entities which are implied in 
the concepts of ‘interculturality’ and ‘multiculturality.’10 However, Welsch’s thesis 
provoked massive critique. For example, Ralf Elm states that the concept of 
‘transculturality’ does not capture the “collective deep structures and basic orienta-
tions”;11 Bernhard Waldenfels claims that there is “no space beyond cultures […] 
that can be called transcultural”;12 Christoph Antweiler simply called Welsch’s 
approach “badly idealistic.”13 All critics are more or less concerned with separation, 
differentiation and diversity within cultures. This is what Yousefi and Braun also 
demonstrate in a straightforward comment on Welsch: “What is ignored here are 
the enduring differences.”14 They ask the rhetorical question: “Those Turks who 
helped to build up Germany 50 years ago and who are a ‘part’ of this society today, 
are they transcultural?”15 
I would answer: Yes, they are. Of course, they are not completely ‘transcultur-
al’; they are also intercultural, bi- or poly-cultural, hybrid, often highly particularis-
tic, sometimes multicultural. When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Er-
dogan, speaking to the Turks in Germany, declared that assimilation is a “crime 
                                                     
9 Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ina Braun, Interkulturalität: Eine interdisziplinäre Einführung (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), 108 (translation my own). 
10 Wolfang Welsch, “Transkulturalität: Zwischen Globalisierung und Partikularisierung,” Jahrbuch 
Deutsch als Fremdsprache 26 (2000): 330 and 336 (translation my own). 
11 Ralf Elm, Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie: Grundbedingungen eines 
Dialogs der Kulturen (Bonn: ZEI, 2001), 14 (translation my own). 
 Ralf Elm, Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie: Grundbedingungen eines 
Dialogs der Kulturen (Bon 
n: ZEI, 2001), 14 (translation my own). 
nterkultureller Ethnologie (Nordhausen: Bautz, 2007), 91 (translation my own). 
14 Yousefi and Braun, Interkulturalität, 109 (translation my own). 
15 Ibid. 
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against humanity,”16 or when German politicians announced that this country has 
reached the “limits of integration,” these statements demonstrate human short-
comings which result from particular interests.17 They say, however, nothing about 
the potential for transcultural existence, which transcends these very particular 
interests and focuses on those aspects which are common for all people. Is Europe 
already as senile as thinking and acting only in its own interest, regardless of its 
responsibility for the world? Does Europe lack visions and ideas for its future, so 
that it settles for doing only the least manageable things? Transcultural existence 
does not mean an existence beyond all cultural peculiarities, as the critics say. It is 
more like a passage through all particularism and interaction toward a common 
ground or a common aim – firstly with a look on the region or place where we live, 
secondly with a look on the entire globe. 
Transcultural existence is not a vision, nothing that politics is supposed to 
bring about; rather, it is a reality that has always been noticeable in human life (at 
least from the outer view). In any case, when concepts or theories claim to univer-
sally explain reality, their inventors are certainly blind to the richness and fullness 
of life and world. In contrast, the concept of ‘transculturality’ adheres to the single 
and united reality of all humans, which is probably not achievable at all, yet always 
effective. Transculturality is never simply given but always effective when there is 
the possibility to evolve. 
One author who thought and wrote about these issues with deep insight was 
Albert Schweitzer. He coined a phrase that I think is as profound as it is simple: “I 
am life that wants to live among life that wants to live.”18 Is this idealistic? I don’t 
mind. For I think it is above all this: human and visionary and beneficial for the 






                                                     
16 The speech is documented online: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-
im-wortlaut-assimilation-ist-ein-verbrechen-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-1.293718 (in German transla-
tion, accessed 29 March 2012). 
17 Cf. the debate after Erdogan’s speech, as summarized, e.g., by Helen Pidd, “Germany Hits Back 
after Turkish PM Erdogan Tells Immigrants to Resist Assimilation,” The Guardian, 28 February 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/turkish-pm-addresses-immigrants-germany (ac-
cessed 29 March 2012). 
18 A valuable resource for further reading in Schweitzer is Albert Schweitzer’s Ethical Vision: A Source-
book, ed. Predrag Cicovacki (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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“Here We Go Again” 
The Supposed Failure of Multiculturalism  
in Historical Perspective 
Janny de Jong 
Introduction 
“Here we go again.” That was the weary reaction of a British official to the speech 
British Prime Minister David Cameron held on 5 February 2011 at the Munich 
Security Conference about the need to change British policy towards minorities in 
Great Britain.1 “State multiculturalism” had encouraged different cultures in Brit-
ain to live different lives, Cameron had argued, while failing to provide a sense of 
togetherness and a “vision of society” to which these cultures want to belong.2 
This by no means constituted a new insight in the supposed problem of ‘separate-
ness,’ and anything but a fresh solution to it. Indeed, the stress on Britishness, the 
need for patriotism and common values were hobbyhorses of the Labour Prime 
Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as well. Though in all fairness Cameron 
also propagated to build “a stronger pride in local identity,” these more subtle 
tones were lost in the heavy media attention the speech received.  
Proclaiming multiculturalism dead seems to have become the favourite pastime 
of leading politicians in Europe. After all, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel had uttered similar statements. The most 
common approach towards the perceived failure of multiculturalism is the 
strengthening of a sense of national belonging and collective identity. For ethnic 
minorities, integration now often seems to imply assimilation.  
This is paradoxical if one considers the official motto of the European Union 
(EU): ‘unity in diversity.’ The motto is best known as an antidote to the fear that 
national identities will be eclipsed by ‘Europe.’ Yet, the slogan has also been ap-
plied to minorities. The year 2008, for instance, was proclaimed European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue; the poster used for the annual celebration of Europe Day 
                                                     
1 “David Cameron’s Muddled Speech on Multiculturalism,” The Economist, 11 February 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/02/britain_and_multiculturalism (accessed 29 
December 2011). 
2 “PM’s Speech at the Munich Security Conference,” 10 – The Official Site of the British Prime 
Minister’s Office, 5 February 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference/(accessed 29 December 2011). 
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on the 9th of May that year showed a boy and a girl, each of different complexion, 
painting a globe while the caption read “it is not them and us, it is you and me.”3 
However, increasingly the theme of diversity has become unpopular in the national 
context, especially since the rise of rightist populist parties playing the anti-
multiculturalism card. Already in 2001, Finnish social geographer Anssi Paasi used 
the expression “political dynamite” when referring to the links between bounded 
space, culture and identity. He mentioned the substantive growth of rightist parties 
in this respect. In the meantime, this development has only gained more momen-
tum: no longer can the support of rightist parties in, for instance, the Netherlands 
or Finland be described as “close to zero,” as Paasi in 2001 was still able to do.4 
Though these more recent rightist parties and movements all have their own char-
acteristics, they agree upon the dislike of foreigners, especially Muslims. 
This does not mean that criticism on the supposed failure of integration of 
ethnic minorities is limited to rightist parties only. Indeed, in the Netherlands, it 
was a social democratic sociologist, researcher at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation5, 
who in 2000 published an op-ed called “The Multicultural Tragedy” in the quality 
national newspaper NRC Handelsblad. It inspired a large debate on the merits of the 
multicultural society both in the media and in parliament, though his ideas about a 
fundamentalist Islam and the costs of mass immigration as well as his pleas for a 
more assertive nationalism by then already were not exceptional.6 A more recent 
example is the German Social Democratic Party member Thilo Sarrazin, who stat-
ed without much ado in Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen: 
“[W]e do not want national minorities.” Muslim immigrants – often poorly educat-
ed and with large families – made Germany more stupid, he claimed. From the 
outset, this utterly polemical book drew much attention and it broke selling records 
of non-fiction books immediately. With 13 editions and a total number of 1.5 mil-
lion published copies, it unsurprisingly ended in position number one on the 2010 
top-selling list.7 
                                                     
3 Europa – Official Website of the European Union, no date, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/gallery/2008/index_en.htm /(accessed 29 December 2011). 
4 Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity,” European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 18.  
5 The Wiardi Beckman Sichting voor de Sociaal-Democratie is the scientific institute closely related to the 
Dutch social democratic party Partij van de Arbeid. 
6 Leo and Jan Lucassen point to a number of predecessors, mainly Social Democrats, in their Win-
naars en Verliezers: een Nuchtere Balans van Vijfhonderd Jaar Immigratie (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2011), 25-31. 
For the article see Paul Scheffer, “Het Multiculturele Drama,” NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000, 
http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html (accessed 6 January 2012). See also Paul 
Scheffer, Het Land van Aankomst, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2007). 
7 “Sarrazin bricht Verkaufsrekord,” Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,726206,00.html; “Thilo Sarrazin, Alle Artikel und Hintergrunde,” Spiegel 
Online, no date, http://www.spiegel.de/thema/thilo_sarrazin/ (both accessed 30 December 2011). 
See also: “An Immigration Row in Germany: Sarrazin vs the Saracens,” The Economist, 1 September 
2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/immigration_row_germany (accessed 
30 December 2011). 
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How should this flood of negative news on immigrants, asylum seekers and the 
supposed failure of the multicultural society be explained? In order to provide an 
answer to this question, a historical perspective may be helpful, also to explain the 
different approaches within Europe. Firstly, however, the term multiculturalism 
should be examined more closely. 
Multiculturalism versus Assimilation 
The term multiculturalism came into use in the 1960s and 1970s. In the academic 
literature on multiculturalism, Canada plays an important role because the Canadi-
an government at an early stage, in 1971, officially announced a multicultural policy 
to meet issues of ethnic and cultural diversity. Diversity in Canada already was 
institutionalised because of the English-French duality; this circumstance helped to 
address the issue of meeting the challenge that the growing number of ethnic mi-
norities of immigrant origins posed. In 1971, at the official launch of the policy, 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau put forward that the various immigrant groups 
should not be required to assimilate and in this process lose their own ethnic iden-
tity. The idea was that keeping one’s ethnic identity would actually enhance the 
social cohesion in the state, provided that social inclusion and participation of the 
immigrants were assured as well.8 The importance of these last provisions is often 
overlooked. 
Multiculturalism was devised as an alternative for and protest against the idea 
of assimilation. Assimilation is often seen as typically French, because ideally there 
is only one, French culture which every French citizen must adhere to. This 
French policy was already dominant in the 19th century, when colonies such as 
Algeria were proclaimed an integral part of France (1848). Citizenship for indige-
nous Algerians was possible, but only if they renounced Islam. Therefore, the re-
publican conception of citizenship in France is closely connected to a radical secu-
larism (laïcité). French citizenship does not “allow, at least in theory, any body of 
citizens to be differentially identified, for example as Arab,” writes sociologist 
Tariq Modood. Laïcité implies that religion should not be part of politics and the 
public sphere.9 The charter drafted by France’s High Council for Integration 
(HCI), that applicants for French nationality need to sign as of January 2012, con-
tains for example the following statement: “[A]pplicants will no longer be able to 
                                                     
8 Jeffrey G. Reitz, “Assessing Multiculturalism as a Behavioural Theory,” in Multiculturalism and Social 
Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity, ed. Jeffrey G. Reitz et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 6.  
9 Tariq Modood, “Muslims and European Multiculturalism,” OpenDemocracy, 15 May 2003, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_1214.jsp (accessed 3 January 2012). 
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claim allegiance to another country while on French soil.”10 Dual nationalities are 
possible, though this unsurprisingly has also come under attack.  
Of course the French idea of assimilation is not the only reading of what assimila-
tion entails. In settler societies, such as, for instance, the United States, early re-
search has been conducted on how the various immigrants could merge into one 
nation. In this respect, the metaphor of the melting pot has been used. One could 
also mention the four stages scheme of sociologist Robert E. Park (1926) (con-
tacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation) that supposedly 
structures race relations.11 Park’s theories, also about the so-called ‘marginal man,’ 
were quite influential. 
The point is not only that the ideas of both multiculturalism and assimilation 
are not clear-cut and mean different things in different contexts; there is also fuzz-
iness about what integration entails. In a recent article on Turkish integration in 
Germany, the definition of what constitutes the most successful integration reads 
as follows: “[I]immigrant communities resemble the upper and middle classes of 
the majority society; members become blended almost seamlessly, leaving behind 
their cultural differences.”12 In this definition, the most successful or perfect inte-
gration therefore means assimilation.  
The idea behind multiculturalism, however, is that integration is possible with-
out dropping all cultural differences. Integration is a “dynamic and two-sided pro-
cess of change,” the Annual Report Integration 2008 of the Dutch government agency 
Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (Netherlands Institute for Social Research) states: it 
starts with the willingness to build opportunities to acquire a position in society. 
Successful integration does not necessarily imply that all norms and values or be-
haviour of the majority population are copied. On the other hand, there are also 
limits to multicultural accommodation.13 The question thus is how to accommo-
date cultural diversity and strengthen the democratic state at the same time. 
The issue has become more complex because of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center in 2001 and the bombings in Spain (2004) and England (2005). In 
Great Britain, a government Preventing Violent Extremism programme, for in-
stance, solely concentrated on Muslims. In 2010, a report of the House of Com-
                                                     
10 “France Makes It Harder to Become French,” France 24, 30 December 2011, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20111229-france-tightens-screws-immigration-election-looms-
sarkozy-gueant-citizenship (accessed 3 January 2012). 
11 “Assimilation,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Encyclopedia.com, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045000060.html (accessed 3 January 2012). 
12 Ahmet Yükleyen and Gökçe Yurdakul, “Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish 
Organizations in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities 29.1 (2011): 64.  
13 Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, ed., Jaarrapport Integratie 2008 (Annual Report Integration 2008) (The 
Hague and Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2008). See also Michael Murphy, Multicultural-
ism: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2012), chapter 7. 
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mons on this programme criticised this one-sided focus as “unhelpful” and “stig-
matising.”14 
The focus preferably should shift to integration in relation to citizenship.15 
Proper education plays a key role here because it promotes social mobility. This 
policy is not ‘sexy,’ though, or in any case not sexy enough to ‘sell’ it to the public. 
Therefore, there is more stress on the idea of national identity, unity, history, patri-
otism and national values. In France, for instance, a Ministry of National Identity 
was set up in 2007, in an attempt, writes Tzvetan Todorov, to capture part of the 
popular vote. Todorov, Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recher-
che Scientifique in Paris, is himself a naturalised Frenchman whose country of 
origin is Bulgaria. He neatly makes a distinction between civic rights and identity. 
Of course a newcomer to a country can be required to respect its laws, but “public 
duties and private feelings, and values and traditions are not all on the same level. 
Only totalitarian states make the love of one’s country obligatory.”16  
Yet, various European countries have now installed exams for prospective citi-
zens, in which values play a distinctive role. New citizens should be able to show 
that they are capable of understanding the way of living in their prospective coun-
try. In the Netherlands, these exams use elements that refer to the Dutch public 
performance of sexual identity, such as gay marriages. Values also play a role in the 
criticism of the head scarf and more recently the niqaab and the burkha. In the 
Netherlands, it is not so much the secular society on which the debate is centred, 
like in France, but (sexual) liberty and gender issues.17 In 2011, the same motiva-
tion was used in the bill to ban clothing (such as the burkha) that covers the face. 
The Dutch cabinet argued this general ban was necessary to “protect the character 
and good habits of public life in the Netherlands.”18 
Citizenship, Migration and Globalisation 
Citizenship is, of course, closely related to the state. Multiculturalism as well as 
assimilation can be described as strategies to ensure a cohesive state. This question 
has grown in importance because the evolution of global international migration 
                                                     
14 House of Commons, Community and Local Government Committee, ed., Preventing Violent Extrem-
ism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10 (London: The Stationary Office, 2010), 3.  
15 Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham and Marco Giugni, Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural 
Diversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
16 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations, translated from the French 
by Andrew Brown, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 80-1. 
17 See for an elaboration on this issue Peter van der Veer, “Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the 
Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands,” Public Culture 18.1 (2006): 111-24.  
18 “Ministerraad Stemt in met Wetsvoorstel Verbod Gelaatsbedekkende Kleding,” press release of the 
Department of Internal Affairs, 16 September 2011, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk/documenten-en-publicaties/persberichten 
/2011/09/16/ministerraad-stemt-in-met-wetsvoorstel-verbod-gelaatsbedekkende-kleding.html 
(accessed 26 February 2012).   
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has increased the ethnic diversity, especially in modern industrial societies. No 
longer is immigration limited to traditional settler societies such as the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand or Canada. Approximately 200 million people 
worldwide do not live in their country of origin. In this respect, multiple identities 
seem the natural form.19 
Though globalisation encourages migration and immigration, this does not mean 
that a ‘mass migration’ process is going on in every European country. In fact, one 
should be differentiating between the various countries and various migration 
flows. There is, for instance, a large difference between former colonial powers of 
Western Europe that all have significant numbers of repatriates and migrants from 
their former colonies, and the countries who did not have a colonial empire and 
are situated in Central and Eastern Europe. There also no longer exists such a 
thing like ‘mass migration.’ The OECD Factbook 2011 showed that in fact the net 
immigration rate in many European countries reduced in the last decennium, main-
ly because of a more severe immigration policy (Figure 1). Yet, debates in (social) 
media and politics seem to suggest that the numbers of migrants as well as the 
problems are increasing. There is, in other words, a growing rift between the actual 
reality and the perceived image. Media play a distinctive role here. 
  
                                                     
19 See for recent figures on migration worldwide: OECD Factbook 2011: Economic, Environmental and 
Social Statistics (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932502923 (accessed 10 January 2012); “In Praise of a Second (or 
Third) Passport: Multiple Identities Are Natural. Citizenship Laws Should Catch Up,” The Economist, 
7 January 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21542413 (accessed 10 January 2012). 
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The Public Debate and the Role of the Media: The Dutch Case 
The Dutch case illustrates that public debates have also become more and more 
aggressive in tone. Where in the 1970s and 1980s the tone in public debate was 
very careful and politically correct, offensive and even insulting remarks are now 
accepted to a high degree as a normal pattern.  
In the international debate on multiculturalism, the Netherlands plays an im-
portant role. The country that once was pictured as a prototype and role-model of 
a tolerant nation, where various religions and political convictions co-existed har-
moniously, proved to be not the multicultural heaven after all. Migration historians 
Leo and Jan Lucassen aptly call the period from 1975 to 1990 “the multicultural 
myth.” They point out that the idea to foster the cultural identity of the newcomers 
only formed a rather small element in the policy towards ethnic minorities: since 
the first official government report, published in 1979, the core business was to 
ameliorate the social and economic conditions of ethnic minorities, as well as to 
ensure legal equality. It is ironic that especially the Social Democrats were hesitant 
and careful with regard to policies to safeguarding the cultural identity of migrants. 
                                                     
20 OECD Factbook 2011: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932502961 The three-year averages referred to concern the years 2007 
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In addition, cultural identity policies were meant to be temporary as a transition to 
full integration.21 What is important, however, is that a taboo existed on discussing 
negative consequences of immigration, or issues that could be used as ammunition 
by right-wingers.  
The murders of the flamboyant populist politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (by an 
animal activist) and of the controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim 
activist in 2004 fuelled an already very aggressive debate. The political arena 
seemed to have changed in the time span of only a few years. The rosy myth of 
tolerance was traded in for a bleak vision of a society where the core values were 
seemingly threatened by “hordes of immigrants and newcomers.” A particularly 
negative role in this whole was played by Islam. Islam became the “unifying sym-
bol” of unwelcome foreigners, whether these were asylum seekers or former guest 
workers.22 Yet, Islam in reality can hardly be the common denominator, not only 
because there are many different groups and subgroups; it is also not the religion 
of all immigrants. 
A couple of publications investigated the change in tone in Dutch public de-
bate as well as whether multicultural policies really had failed. British-Dutch Ian 
Buruma wrote an intriguing report on his inquiry into the reasons for the apparent 
changes in tolerance and multicultural policies. In Murder in Amsterdam, he particu-
larly pointed to the role of the memory of the Second World War and the sad story 
of the Jewish minority, as an important impetus to defend the multicultural ideal.23 
Others, like journalist Frans Verhagen, tried to give a balanced view on what can 
be considered a success and what still needs improvement. A long historical per-
spective was taken by Lucassen and Lucassen, who investigated the main claims 
held against immigration. Interestingly, both Verhagen and Lucassen and Lucassen 
used the word ‘nuchter’ in their respective titles.24 The English translation, ‘estab-
lishing the hard facts,’ misses the double meaning: ‘nuchter’ in the meaning of 
‘without fuss’ traditionally scores very high in the self-image of Dutch culture.  
It is not only the tone; the framing of the public debate is also very important. 
Especially Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant PVV (Partij voor de 
Vrijheid, Freedom Party), is very apt at getting much media attention with very 
simple methods like tweets and fierce rhetoric. By giving attention to these tweets, 
media play a very significant role in keeping this party in the public attention. Qual-
ity newspapers like NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, and the Volkskrant all publish or 
comment on these tweets, because, as one editor of Trouw explained, Twitter has 
                                                     
21 Lucassen and Lucassen, Winnaars, chapter 2.  
22 Van der Veer, “Pim Fortuyn”: 116.  
23 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Pen-
guin, 2006). 
24 Frans Verhagen, Hoezo Mislukt?: De Nuchtere Feiten over de Integratie in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw 
Amsterdam, 2010); Lucassen and Lucassen, Winnaars.  
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become a form of political ‘drama’ 25, just like debates on television or radio. But 
there is more to it than that. De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, of the Dutch Scientific 
Institute for Journalism, investigated in 2011 how many tweets were quoted in 
newspapers. The report warned that the PVV leader was given a kind of luxury 
position in the Dutch news. Because he only uses Twitter as a transmitter of politi-
cal messages and accepts no invitations for interviews, it is one-way traffic without 
the possibility of posing critical questions or entering debate. In addition, because 
the PVV supported the Dutch minority government but did not form a part of it, 
it was not possible to force the PVV leader to comment on these issues in parlia-
ment. Not surprisingly, the most quoted tweet of Wilders was about the multicul-
tural society in which the Social Democratic Party was congratulated with the 
“mass immigration” to the Netherlands and the import of “many criminals and 
underprivileged.”26 
Very instructive for the way a populist party like the PVV operates and is able 
to influence public opinion was the establishment of a registration point in Febru-
ary 2012, where problems with and complaints about migrants from the Eastern 
part of Europe could be filed online. Of course, the economic malaise since 2008 
has had its impact here as well. Earlier, in the provincial elections, the Polish 
community had also been accused by the PVV of crime, drunkenness and stealing 
away jobs, thus reinvigorating the old fear of the ‘Polish plumber.’ Immediately, 
the Embassy of Poland protested and the PVV’s initiative sparked a lot of atten-
tion. Media subsequently reported the rise of support for the PVV in polls. This 
media coverage in itself again strengthens the electoral position of the party, be-
cause research has demonstrated that voters are most attracted to news that refers 
to the competition between parties and in elections tend to favour winners over 
losers.27 
Conclusion 
Multiculturalism has become framed in the public debate as a failure, as a soft ap-
proach to real problems. Even though it is fairly easy to show that this perception 
is not correct, this does not mean that this bad image will disappear all of a sudden. 
                                                     
25 “Tweet van Wilders was Onzin, maar Nieuwswaardige Onzin,” Trouw, 15 January 2012, 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4328/Opinie/article/detail/3121720/2012/01/15/Tweet-van-Wilders-
was-onzin-maar-nieuwswaardige-onzin.dhtml (accessed 22 February 2012). 
26 “Politiek 2.0: Debatteren in 140 Tekens”, De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, 28 December 2011, 
http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 February 2012). Unsurprisingly, Twitter also has led to 
alternative forms of political lobbying. Ethical norms of journalism do not count. See Tom Jan 
Meeus, “Dankzij Twitter is de Commentator ook Lobbyist,” NRC Weekend, February 25/26 2012, 27.  
27 “Job Cohen in het Nieuws: van Gedoodverfde Premier tot Grote Gedoger van de Premier,” De 
Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, 21 Februari 2012, http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 February 
2012). 
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The problems connected to the public discussions about immigration and Islam 
are very significant because they reflect upon the values of a democratic society.  
To a large degree, playing the immigration/Islam card is a way of getting atten-
tion: it seems to work as a simple method to gain political support. Media play a 
significant and active role, especially by using tweets as ‘news.’ Internet and social 
media in particular change the ways news are gathered and digested. Social media 
have grown into an alternative news source, with their own rules. Twitter especially 
is not suited for a deliberate and nuanced debate: it encourages polarisation and 
strong views. 
History is important in this respect, not so much to produce a patriotic vision 
of the nation but to show how immigration and migration developed and, by doing 
so, to create a more balanced view on migration and the role that this phenome-
non has played and still plays in society. Populism will hardly help creating solu-
tions to the big issues that are at stake. Clarity of what democracy stands for is 
crucial, especially in the period of economic crisis that evolved since 2008.28 In the 
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Is It Really Dead? 
John McCormick 
Introduction 
There has been considerable speculation in recent years regarding the alleged fail-
ure of multiculturalism in Europe. Much has been made, for example, of the asser-
tions in 2010 and 2011 by the leaders of three major European states regarding the 
divisions within their respective societies. In October 2010, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel declared that multiculturalism in her country had “failed utterly,” 
and that the suggestion that Germans and foreign workers could live “happily side 
by side” with one another had been an illusion. In February 2011, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron argued that 30 years of “state multiculturalism” in Britain 
had failed because it had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives and 
had weakened the collective identity of Britain. A few days later, French President 
Nikolas Sarkozy declared multiculturalism in his country to have been a “failure,” 
arguing that France had been too concerned about the identity of those arriving 
from outside and not concerned enough about its own identity. 
It is important to note that all three sets of comments were made by conserva-
tive political leaders in the context of recent Muslim immigration from outside of 
Europe. For Merkel, the (unspoken) issue was guest workers (primarily Turkish 
and Muslim) and for Cameron and Sarkozy the issue was the growing Islamic seg-
ments of their respective societies. Cameron was making a speech about national 
security in the face of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists, to which – he 
argued – many young Muslims were drawn because of the “question of identity.” 
They found it hard to identify with traditional Islam but also with Britain, because 
Britain had allowed “the weakening of our collective identity.” Where Britain was 
ready to criticize racism on the part of white citizens, Cameron continued, it had 
been too cautious and fearful to stand up to objectionable views held by racial 
minorities. What the country now needed was “a lot less of the passive tolerance of 
recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism” involving the promotion 
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of values such as democracy and the rule of law.1 His comments were immediately 
criticized by many Muslim groups for placing too much of the onus on minority 
communities to integrate while failing to say how the wider community might aid 
in that process. 
Given the context of the three sets of remarks, the choice of the term ‘multi-
culturalism’ was unfortunate, not least because of the difficulties inherent in ac-
cording it a generally acceptable definition, and more particularly because the three 
leaders were not in fact talking about culture at all, but were using the term as code 
for religious and racial diversity. In other words, they were not so much bemoan-
ing the failure of multiculturalism as of multiracialism and of the assimilation of 
Islam. But they could not have admitted that efforts to cross racial or religious 
boundaries had failed without generating considerable controversy, and thus they – 
like many other observers – opted for the softer and more politically correct no-
tion of multiculturalism. And yet Europe in truth has long had a tradition of effec-
tive and vibrant multiculturalism. Many Europeans may still identify with states 
and nations, and may have limited tolerance of recent immigrants, but they have 
rarely been able to isolate themselves from their neighbours and have long adapted 
to the exchange of ideas and values that have come from the blending of their 
cultures. 
This article will argue not only that multiculturalism in Europe is not dead, but 
that it is in fact central to the meaning and identity of Europe. It will contrast the 
European experience with the melting-pot philosophy that has been central to the 
experience of the United States and Brazil, and will argue that the European expe-
rience is more akin to that of Canada or Australia. It will suggest that the problems 
often ascribed to the failure of multiculturalism are in fact a function of race and 
religion rather than of culture, and that it is not the co-existence of different cul-
tures that has created tensions in Europe so much as racism and the difficulties of 
blending European secularism with the preferences of its Muslim residents. 
Defining Multiculturalism 
The core problem with understanding the place of multiculturalism in Europe is 
that the term is applied differently in different circumstances by scholars and poli-
cymakers2 (assuming, that is, that they define it at all). A review of the literature 
reveals that the term is applied not only to culture (a term which raises its own 
definitional challenges) but also to race and ethnicity, and even occasionally to 
gender, sexual orientation, religion, and social class. In the few cases where the 
term is defined, it is often given a meaning that is specific to a particular circum-
                                                     
1 “PM’s Speech at the Munich Security Conference,” 10 – The Official Site of the British Prime 
Minister’s Office, 5 February 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference/(accessed 28 December 2012). 
2 Conrad William Watson, Multiculturalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000). 
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stance. Thus Modood defines it as “the political accommodation of minorities 
formed by immigration to western countries from outside the prosperous West”,3 
and notes his particular interest in political multiculturalism, which he defines as 
“the recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, 
democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national identity.”4 
He sees multiculturalism, then, as an issue of immigration rather than of culture. 
For Kymlicka, efforts to understand multiculturalism are confused by the ambigui-
ty that exists between the notions of ‘multinationalism’ and ‘polyethnicity’. He 
associates the first with coexistence within a political unit of previously self-
governing societies, and the latter with immigration.5  
The absence of clear and consistent applications means that multiculturalism 
can mean whatever we want it to mean, thus undermining its value as a conceptual 
tool. This article uses it in the specific sense of a policy or practice based on toler-
ance and respect for the identities of different cultures within a society. In this 
regard, it stands in contrast to monoculturalism, or the belief that societies should 
have a single culture, and that efforts should be made to ensure its ‘purity’ and to 
exclude all other cultures. It also contrasts with assimilation, or the belief that dif-
ferent groups should be integrated into the dominant culture by denying and 
quashing their distinctive qualities and values. 
In the American and Brazilian contexts, assimilation is reflected in the melting 
pot philosophy (or myth, as many would have it) through which attempts have 
been made to fuse multiple nationalities, races and cultures, and to build homoge-
nous societies out of heterogeneous societies. In the American case, the term 
‘melting pot’ was first used in the context of immigration from Europe, and was 
equated with Americanization, or cultural assimilation and acculturation. For 
Hirschman, it became “the symbol of the liberal and radical vision of American 
society […or] a political symbol used to strengthen and legitimize the ideology of 
America as a land of opportunity, where race, religion, and national origin should 
not be barriers to social mobility.”6 It was mainly concerned with the assimilation 
of white Europeans into an idealized version of Anglo-America; race and religion 
were marginal considerations. The racial diversity of the United States – and the 
persistence there of racism and racial inequality – later led to numerous questions 
about the achievements of assimilation, spawning the alternative metaphors of 
‘mosaic’ or ‘salad bowl’ to describe an arrangement in which different cultures mix 
but remain distinct. 
                                                     
3 Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 5. 
4 Ibid., 2. 
5 Will Kymlicka, “Social Unity in a Liberal State,” Social Philosophy and Policy 13:1 (1996): 105-36. 
6 Charles Hirschman, “America’s Melting Pot Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 398. 
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In the case of Brazil, meanwhile, the evidence is clear that black Brazilians are po-
litically, economically and socially disadvantaged relative to their white peers.7 The 
term ‘exclusion’ is often used to describe the status of blacks or the poor, connot-
ing the lack of social integration “manifested in rules constraining the access of 
particular groups or persons to resources or limiting their access to citizenship 
rights.”8 The argument has long been made that Brazilians are stratified by class 
and not by race, but disagreements with this analysis are growing, and the long-
held image of Brazil as a non-racial society is under review. 
Multiculturalism recognizes and generally applauds cultural diversity, promot-
ing accommodation and inclusiveness, allowing intermingling to take place, wit-
nessing the borrowing and adaptation of ideas, allowing different cultures to retain 
their distinctive qualities, and making efforts to encourage and sustain distinctions 
by way of language, heritage, and the channels through which different cultures 
can be expressed and understood, including art, traditions, cuisine, and social 
norms. In this sense, its European form is similar to its application in Canada, 
where efforts are made to make immigrants feel welcome, and where multicultural-
ism is constitutionally protected: the Canadian Charter of Freedoms and Rights 
includes the proviso that it should be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”  
In some respects, ‘multiculturalism’ is a conceptual cousin of ‘cosmopolitan-
ism’, or the idea that all humans belong to a single moral community that trans-
cends state boundaries or national identities. This has been identified as a useful 
analytical tool for the European case.9 The cosmopolitan view holds that all hu-
mans belong to a single community in which they are subject to the same moral 
standards and have a responsibility for other humans, accepting the foreign hospi-
tably, and emphasizing the importance of drawing on different traditions and cul-
tures, and of remaining open to other ways of life.10 As Beck puts it, if nationalism 
is based on the principle of “either/or,” then cosmopolitanism is based on the 
principle of “both/and.”11 David Held defines it as a “moral and political outlook 
                                                     
7 See Edward E. Telles, Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press: 2004). 
8 Charles Gore and José B. Figueredo, ed., Social Exclusion and Anti-Poverty Policy: A Debate (Geneva: 
International Institute for Labour Studies, 1997). 
9 For example, see Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in Re-imagining 
Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin 
Köhler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 198-228; Gerard Delanty, “What Does it Mean to be a ‘Eu-
ropean’?,” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences 18:1 (2005): 11-22. 
10 See discussion in Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early 
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), Introduction; Thomas W. 
Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103:1 (1992): 48-75; Simon Caney, Justice beyond 
Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6. 
11 Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Ulrich Beck and Edgar 
Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
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which builds on the strength of the liberal multilateral order, particularly its com-
mitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and which 
seeks to specify general principles on which all could act.”12 
Europe as a Multicultural Society 
Europe has long been multicultural because it has long been a region of invaders 
and immigrants who have repeatedly moved across cultural and political borders to 
blend ideas and philosophies. This was initially a limited form of multiculturalism, 
because feudalism, imperialism and – later – the class pressures of industrialization 
meant that cultural exchange was based on physical or structural violence deter-
mined by leaders and elites; it was not until the end of World War II that most 
Europeans began to personally experience different cultures. Furthermore, the 
state and the nation have both long exerted a strong grip on European imagina-
tions, encouraging ordinary Europeans to define their identities according to the 
experiences that were closest to them and that meant the most to them. Greater 
social and personal mobility has combined since the end of World War II with the 
easing and eventual near-removal of cross-border controls and the era of mass 
tourism to greatly increase the opportunities for Europeans to experience other 
cultures within the region, both directly and indirectly. 
The habit among Europeans of integrating core values and features from al-
most every new group with which its cultures have come into contact has been 
such that it is difficult anymore to be sure what constitutes a feature of the ‘home 
culture’ and what does not. Nineteenth century nationalism was based on the pro-
motion of the nation-state, and yet many European states remained both multi-
national and multicultural, and remain so today. The consequences are reflected in 
the contemporary data: while there are only 40-44 sovereign states in Europe (de-
pending on how Europe is defined), there are – according to Pan and Pfeil13 – 
nearly 340 indigenous national minorities, to which 105 million people – or one in 
seven Europeans – belong. Within the EU member states alone, there are an esti-
mated 160 national minorities, the number having been greatly increased by eastern 
enlargement. About one in ten EU citizens speak a minority language, and all but 
the smallest of European states has at least three indigenous national minorities, 
and in most cases many more.14 Almost all European states, in other words, con-
sist of multiple cultures. 
                                                     
12 David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2004), 171, 178. 
13 Christoph Pan and Beate Sibylle Pfeil, National Minorities in Europe (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue 
University Press, 2004). 
14 See also Panikos Panayi, An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities (Harlow: 
Longman, 2000). 
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Where the debate over multiculturalism in Europe has become confused is that in 
almost all recent references, the term has been used in the context of immigrants 
from outside the region (Turks to Germany, North Africans to France, South 
Asians to Britain, and so on), and has thus focused on racial and religious minori-
ties. These make up a small number of the total population, in both absolute and 
relative terms: only about 25 million of the legal residents of the EU (about 3-4 per 
cent of the population) belong to an ethnic minority, a proportion that pales by 
comparison to the United States (where such minorities make up 23 per cent of 
the population), Russia (20 per cent), Canada (16 per cent), or China (8.5 per cent). 
But multiculturalism in the European context is more appropriately and accurately 
understood in regard to three groups of indigenous minorities: 
 
 National minorities who live in one state but are the kin of national major-
ities in neighbouring states. These include, for example, ethnic Hungarians 
in Romania and Slovakia, ethnic Germans in Romania and Poland, ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, ethnic Poles in Belarus and Lithua-
nia, ethnic Czechs in Slovakia and vice versa, and ethnic Ukrainians in Po-
land. There are an estimated 25 million members of such minorities, along 
with 23 million Russians living in the Soviet successor states. 
 
 Transnational minorities that are divided among two or more states but do 
not form a majority in any. These include the Basques and Catalans of 
Spain and France, and the Frisians of Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
 Indigenous minorities living within a single state, such as the Scots and the 
Welsh of Britain, the Corsicans and Bretons of France, and the Galicians 
of Spain. 
 
There has been a growing debate about the meaning and definition of the notion 
of ‘national minority,’ which has confusingly spilled over into debates about eth-
nicity and national identity, and has been a particular focus of the work of both the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Council of Eu-
rope. A Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was 
adopted by the latter in 1995, taking the broad perspective of providing for respect 
for ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities. 
Every European state has cultural minorities, ranging in proportion from lows 
of about 4-7 per cent of the total population in Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Poland, to highs of 17-20 per cent in Bulgaria, Switzerland, Slovenia, and the ex-
ceptional case of Belgium with its split between Flemings (58 per cent), Walloons 
(31 per cent), and Germans (1 per cent). In spite of their generally much greater 
proportions (relative to racial and religious minorities), these cultural minorities are 
much less apparent on political or social radars, and they generally suffer far less 
European Multiculturalism 169 
discrimination or hostility (notable exceptions being offered by the case of the 
Roma and by the example of the post-Yugoslavia conflicts in the Balkans). In the 
case of Britain, for example, residents of Scottish, Welsh and Irish heritage consti-
tute about 15 per cent of the population, but have become so much a part of the 
social fabric that it is often difficult to distinguish among the different groups. 
Much the same could be said for Spain, where about 11 per cent of the population 
comes from national minorities, including Castilians, Leones, Catalans, Galicians 
and Basques. 
The debate about multiculturalism in Europe tends to overlook these groups, and 
yet they are meaningful as an indication of the cultural diversity of the region, and 
are not typically associated with the same tensions deriving from issues related to 
racial and religious diversity. Many make demands for the preservation of their 
languages and religions, to be sure, and may campaign for greater autonomy, but 
their presence does not always lead to conflict (the problems of Northern Ireland 
and the Basque country being among the notable exceptions). The rise of states, 
rather than always recognizing national and cultural differences, usually had the 
opposite effect of bringing multiple cultures and nationalities under a common 
political authority. The rise of the European Union has further emphasized multi-
culturalism as Europeans have been freer to travel, and as the media have more 
actively reported events and stories in other European states. All along, core as-
pects of multiculturalism – including the right to practice different religions, to 
celebrate holidays associated with different cultures, to run businesses catering to 
cultural minorities, and to join religious and cultural organizations – have mainly 
survived unchanged. 
That the rhetorical shift against multiculturalism in Europe has been driven 
less by culture than by race and religion is reflected both in its timeline and in the 
nature of the academic debate. Its origins are traceable to the arrival of the first 
waves of non-white immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s; concerns grew in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London in 2001, 2004, and 2005; 
Islamic militancy has been at the heart of the declarations of the failure of multicul-
turalism, and the dynamics of the debate are reflected in the titles of books such as 
Londonistan15 and The Coming Balkan Caliphate.16 
Laqueur bemoans the “last days of Europe,” arguing that the region is threat-
ened by a collision between falling birth-rates and uncontrolled immigration from 
Asia, Africa or the Middle East.17 Because few such immigrants have a desire to be 
integrated into European society, he warns, there has been a continent-wide identi-
                                                     
15 Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (Washington D.C.: Encounter, 2007). 
16 Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). 
17 Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: Thomas Dunne, 
2007). 
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ty crisis; immigrants have congregated in ghettoes, and widespread educational 
failure has combined with religious or ideological disdain for the host country, and 
with resentment and xenophobia among native Europeans, to create growing polit-
ical and social tensions and extremist violence. Caldwell makes similar arguments, 
suggesting that Europe became a multi-ethnic society “in a fit of absence of mind,” 
and notes that while governments have done much to accommodate the newcom-
ers, public opinion is reacting against these efforts.18 Modood argues that multicul-
turalism as public policy is in retreat in Europe, as states assert that minority 
groups either integrate or accept the dominant social and cultural mores as the 
price of citizenship. He does, however, condition this statement by noting that the 
obvious target is Muslims.19  
Racism and Islamophobia aside, to suggest that Europeans are open to multi-
culturalism should not ignore the long history of xenophobia and stereotyping in 
which many Europeans have engaged. The examples of European-on-European 
hostility run the gamut from the Anglo-French love-hate relationship dating back 
centuries, historical tensions between Britain and Ireland, the residual animosity of 
some of its neighbours towards Germany (particularly since the two world wars), 
anti-Polish feelings in Germany in the first half of the 20th century, and anti-Polish 
sentiment in France and Britain in the wake of the advent of the iconic Polish 
plumber. It might also be found in the residual attempts of France to defend its 
language against the inroads of English, but the latter seems to have been accepted 
as a fait accompli in much of the rest of Europe.  
As noted earlier, if anything has died or failed in Europe it is not so much mul-
ticulturalism as multiracialism and tolerance for Islam, and in this regard the prob-
lem is more one of recent non-white immigration than of movement across inter-
nal borders in the wake of the single market. The problem is reflected in the insti-
tution of language and civics training or tests for new immigrants or citizens in 
Britain, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany, the ban on the wearing 
of Muslim headscarves in some parts of Europe, and the adoption in the Nether-
lands of an explicit policy of assimilation. It is also reflected in the support given to 
European anti-immigrant political parties, particularly in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, and the growth of Islamophobia. Caldwell suggests 
that the Islamic challenge stems from the strength and self-confidence of Islam, 
which contrasts with the insecurities, malleability, and relativism of European cul-
ture; but this rather overlooks the deep divisions within Islam, its sensitivity and 
the rapidity with which it takes offence, and gives little weight to the idea that Eu-
ropeanism is a growing political, economic, and social force.20 
                                                     
18 Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West (London: 
Allen Lane, 2009), 3. 
19 Modood, Multiculturalism. 
20 Caldwell, Reflections.  
European Multiculturalism 171 
Writing about the dispute over headscarves in France, Bowen argues that it con-
ceals underlying concerns as varied as the role of religion in schools, the develop-
ment of separate communities, the threats posed by radical Islam, and gender dis-
crimination.21 The rise of Islam certainly poses challenges to notions of European 
secularism, with the need to meet demands for separate schools and recognition of 
cultural norms regarding the family and the place of women in society while at the 
same time protecting the principles of liberal democratic modernity. Ironically, 
Islam is often criticized by Europeans for its treatment of women, and yet racial 
and religious discrimination is alive and well in Europe, as reflected in a Pew Glob-
al Attitudes Survey that found negative views towards Muslims and Jews that were 
notably higher in Europe than in the United States, and growing. Almost half of 
Spaniards had unfavourable opinions about Jews, for example, as did 36 per cent 
of Poles and 20-25 per cent of Germans and the French, compared to just 7-9 per 
cent of Americans and Britons. As for Muslims, about half of Spaniards, Germans 
and Poles had unfavourable opinions, as did 38 per cent of the French and 23 per 
cent of Americans and Britons.22 
Conclusion 
If culture is understood to mean the set of values, attitudes, tastes and expectations 
shared by a group, and if it is associated primarily with national identity, then Eu-
rope is distinctly multicultural and multinational in character, and has been for 
centuries. Europeans have not always agreed, and the region (or parts of it) was 
regularly divided by war and conflict for most of its recorded history, until the 
general peace achieved following World War II. But different cultures routinely 
achieved accommodations with one another, learned from each other, and formed 
shared and typically workable systems of government. While residual inter-cultural 
tensions continue to be found in Europe today, they rarely lead to significant levels 
of conflict, and – indeed – one of the great achievements of postwar Europe has 
been the recognition of its cultural diversity, encouraged in most European states 
by policies in which cultural differences have been revived, protected and celebrat-
ed, notably through the sustenance of minority languages. To suggest that multi-
culturalism in Europe is dead or has failed is, under the circumstances, absurd. 
Where Europe has failed, however, has been in its efforts to assimilate racial 
and religious minorities, specifically in the form of (mainly) postwar immigrants 
from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean, and in the form of the 
growing Muslim minority found in most European states. The failure to which 
                                                     
21 John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
22 Pew Research Center, “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe,” 
survey released 17 September 2008, http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-
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Merkel, Cameron, Sarkozy and others have referred, then, is not one of culture but 
of race and religion. The social tensions that Europe faces today are generated not 
so much by concerns about cultural diversity, which has long been at the heart of 
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Multiculturalism versus Transculturality 
European Film 
Maria Pilar Rodríguez 
Introduction 
This article1 offers an illustration of recent European films that contradict official 
political discourses regarding the notion of multiculturalism by offering a closer 
position to the concept of transculturality. After a recent political declaration in 
which German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that attempts to build a multicul-
tural society in Germany had utterly failed2, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
similarly condemned multiculturalism3, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy 
joined the chorus of critics.4 Such political discourses tend to emphasise the ethnic, 
linguistic and religious assimilation of immigrants into the social and political struc-
ture of the nation, as well as the progressive abandonment of their native customs 
and practices. 
 In the last decade, European countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands have all witnessed the rise of a conservative 
discourse that has shifted the gravitational centre of immigration politics toward 
the right. While political discourses frequently ignore the supranational dimension 
of the term European, contemporary film-makers adequately address the shift from 
the national to the transnational that has occurred in European cinemas and socie-
ties. Such shift has been fuelled by, among other reasons, the long legacy of colo-
nialism, the ongoing process of European integration, the consequences of the 
collapse of communism, continuing European mobility and contemporary diaspor-
ic displacements. As a result, European cultures and societies have witnessed a 
                                                     
1 A longer version of this article titled “From the National to the Transnational: European Films and 
Political Discourse” can be found in Conjuctions and Disruptions: Communication, Information and Media 
Studies in Europe, ed. María J. Pando Canteli, Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2011, 151-62. 
2 “Merkel says German Multicultural Society Has Failed,” BBC News, 17 October 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 21 March 2011). 
3 “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron,” BBC News, 5 February 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 21 March 2011). 
4 “Nicolas Sarkozy Declares Multiculturalism Had Failed,” The Telegraph, 11 February 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-
multiculturalism-had-failed.html (accessed 21 March 2011). 
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previously inconceivable diversification, fragmentation and hybridization.5 In that 
respect, certain contemporary European films have redefined our understanding of 
European identity and represent a challenge to contemporary national political 
discourses. There is a fundamental contradiction between Europe’s distinctive 
diversity and the homogenising, official narratives that insist upon denying the 
reality of a system based on coexistence and interaction. 
Multiculturalism and Transculturality 
As a political ideal, multiculturalism means “equal opportunity accompanied by 
cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”6 Multiculturalism in gen-
eral is defined in terms of public acceptance of immigrants and minority groups as 
distinct groups or communities, which are distinguishable from the majority with 
regard to language, culture and social behaviour; and which have their own associa-
tions and social infrastructure. The words by David Cameron deserve a more de-
tailed comment in relation to Asian British cinema. Critical debate amply supports 
the idea that, compared with other countries in Europe, Britain has produced some 
of the most culturally dynamic and pleasurable examples of hybridity. Asian British 
films such as Bhaji on the Beach (Gurinder Chadha, 1993), East is East (Damien 
O’Donnell, 1999), Anita and Me (Metin Hüseyin, 2002), Bend it Like Beckham (Gu-
rinder Chadha, 2002), and Love + Hate (Dominic Savage, 2005) stand out as inter-
nationally recognised productions set in multicultural Britain narrated through a 
social realist framework. Interviewed after the German premiere of Bend it Like 
Beckham, director Gurinder Chadha happily claimed that she had a letter from To-
ny Blair saying how much he loved the film, and added, “he enjoyed it especially 
because it represented his Britain, a very diverse, multicultural Britain.”7 Blair’s 
words in 2002 stand out in sharp contrast to Cameron’s statement nine years later. 
This contradiction is even more remarkable, if we explore critical interpretations of 
the film which claim that, within Britain, multiculturalism is used for social control 
through the masking of social injustice and the dilution of social protest. Rajeev 
Balasubramanyam describes multiculturalism in Britain, as exposed by films such 
as Bend it Like Beckham, in such merciless terms: 
 
Multiculturalism does not refer to the ideology of liberalism or cultural ac-
ceptance, and it is not a simple description of British society. It is, instead, a 
                                                     
5 European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe, ed. Daniela Berghahn 
and Claudia Sternberg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), iv. 
6 Eugenia Siapera, Cultural Diversity and Global Media: The Mediation of Difference (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2010), 31. 
7 Ellen Dengel-Janic and Lars Eckstein, “Bridehood Revisited: Disarming Concepts of Gender and 
Culture in Recent Asian British Film,” in Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000+: New Perspectives in Literature, Film 
and the Arts, ed. Lars Eckstein et al. (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005), 45. 
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technology of social control, racism, and the maintenance of the caste hier-
archy, an instrument of delusion, oppression, and censorship in contempo-
rary British society. Whilst multiculturalism masquerades as a celebration of 
the defeat of racism, it is in fact its opposite – a vehicle to suppress cultural 
diversity in contemporary Britain.8 
He adds that such films rarely refer to contemporary social injustices in Britain, but 
rather to past social injustices and in them British society usually represents pro-
gressiveness whereas Asian characters are always associated with backwardness and 
grossly caricatured. In general, even in more benign readings of the film, there is a 
shared agreement on the fact that Chadha’s film ingeniously negotiates British 
mainstream conservatism with artistic and commercial techniques extracted from 
the moral universe of Bollywood, which appeal to the exoticism of English view-
ers.9 This would explain the enthusiastic response by Tony Blair, whereas the rejec-
tion of multiculturalism by David Cameron (and other European leaders) is a re-
cent phenomenon which will require a much more detailed analysis.  
In this article, I will follow the concept of transculturality as defined by Wolf-
gang Welsch, since it stresses the global and local interconnectedness of cultural 
forms in a more comprehensive manner than multiculturality, which underlines the 
problems which different cultures have living together within one society. Trans-
culturality encompasses a number of ways of life and cultures, which also interpen-
etrate or emerge from one another and which are in general characterised by hy-
bridization.10 Along these lines, I will now very briefly analyse two films which will 
facilitate an exploration of the notions of assimilation, integration and hybridiza-
tion as exposed in the first fictional film by Yasmina Benguigui titled Inch’Allah 
dimanche (Inch’ Allah Sunday), which opened in 2001, and in Gegen die Wand (Against 
the Wall), by Fatih Akin (2004). In both of them, a transcultural ideology can be 
seen in such strategies as the presence of multilingual practices, the portrayal of 
“in-between,” fluid and hybrid characters, and the elaboration of new urban and 
domestic spaces created through interactions between cultures. 
Inch’Allah Dimanche 
Inch’Allah Dimanche is set in 1974 and tells the story of Zouina, who leaves her 
native Algeria, with her three young children and domineering mother-in-law, to 
join her husband in France, where he has lived and worked for the past ten years. 
                                                     
8 Rajeev Balasubramanyam, “The Rhetoric of Multiculturalism,” in Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000+: New 
Perspectives in Literature, Film and the Arts, ed. Lars Eckstein et al. (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
2005), 42. 
9 Dengel-Janic and Eckstein, “Bridehood Revisited,” 55. 
10 Wolfgang Welsch, “Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today,” in Spaces of Culture: 
City, Nation, Work, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213. 
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The opening of the film informs us about the immigrant family regrouping, which 
took place in France around those years. In the aftermath of World War II, France 
attempted to replenish its weakened workforce by recruiting men from the former 
French colonies of North Africa. In the mid-1970s, the French government re-
laxed its immigration policy to allow the families of Algerian men to join them. 
The director has often expressed her desire to recuperate the memories of Algerian 
women, such as her own mother, who left when she was eighteen. At the opening 
scene of departure, when Zouina leaves Algeria, torn between her mother’s heart-
breaking appeal (“don’t leave me”), and the advice provided by her sister (“go with 
your children”), Benguigui chooses to recount the trauma of immigration and exile, 
“not through the eyes of men, as in second generation beur films of the 1980s and 
1990s, but from a female perspective.”11 
The film presents a conscious effort to establish a connection between French 
and francophone African immigrant communities. Following Homi Bhabha’s de-
scription, “[w]e find ourselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross 
to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and 
outside, inclusion and exclusion”,12 I would like to explore the extent to which the 
film represents an “in-between” or hybrid Franco-African experience. Through 
imagery and metaphor, Benguigui challenges French hegemonic representations of 
peoples of African descent and France’s representations of its own culture and 
identity.  
The hybrid nature of Zouina’s experience starts with the title of the film itself, 
which mixes two languages as well as two religious practices. This same notion 
applies to the different characters: in the construction of subjectivities, the idea of 
authenticity belongs to an obsolete past which only causes misery and stagnation, 
whereas the ability to adapt and change according to new positions propitiates our 
identification with the protagonist. Characters in the film can be divided into three 
groups. The first one includes Madame Donze, the French neighbour, Aïcha, the 
mother-in-law, and Malika, another Algerian woman who has been living in France 
for the past fifteen years. 
Madame Donze is the next-door neighbour, who, along with her husband, is 
desperately obsessed with winning the competition awarded to the most beautiful 
garden. She represents the stagnation of the French middle-class, who has re-
mained attached to old habits and does not appreciate any fluid transformation in 
their lives. The beauty of the garden requires the encyclopaedic knowledge of the 
old erudition which has to be found in old and dusty manuals, as well as the tran-
quillity and the daily cares of the couple. Immobility and surveillance are equally 
essential to assure the preservation of the garden. To her horror, the arrival of the 
                                                     
11 Maryse Fauvel, “Yamina Benguigui’s ‘Inch’Allah dimanche’: Unveiling Hybrid Identities,” Studies in 
French Cinema 4:2 (2004): 148. 
12 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004), 7. 
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noisy Algerian family jeopardises her chances of winning the prize. She literally 
sees the invader, the barbarian and the potential danger posed by this woman and 
her children, who destroy her quiet haven with their noise, their laughter and their 
games. As Maryse Fauvel says: “Their cooking odours and exotic clothing disturb 
their tranquillity and their version of Frenchness.”13 It is possible to extend such 
notion even further, and apply Slavoj Žižek’s idea suggested in the article “Enjoy 
the Nation as Yourself,” in which he applies his metaphor of enjoyment to explain 
the formulation of a national identity: “In short, what bothers us about the ‘other’ 
is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ 
that pertains to this way: the smell of ‘their’ food, ‘their’ noisy songs and dances, 
‘their’ strange manners, ‘their’ attitude to work.”14 
It is not by coincidence that Madame Donze constantly uses a legalistic ap-
proach when voicing her complaints. When Zouina attempts to prepare the coffee 
in the yard, Madame Donze cries: “You don’t have the right to do this here.” Mad-
ame Donze reproduces what has been the assimilative discourse which the French 
government has traditionally favoured over integration. As Emmanuel Ma Mung 
explains, the integration of foreigners has been and still is thought of as the inte-
gration of future nationals rather than the integration into society of people who 
retain their foreign character, and adds: “The foreigner is tolerated only on condi-
tion that he/she disappears – not physically by returning to his/her country of 
origin, for example –, but one could say, semantically, by abandoning his/her for-
eign character.”15 Madame Donze reminds the Algerian family that they are in 
France now, and they should behave according to the regulations of the French-
ness that they represent. 
Aïcha, the mother-in-law, is similarly drawn to the past and the authenticity of 
her Algerian culture. She is there to perpetuate Algerian traditions and customs: 
she sits in a sheepskin on the ground, waits for her daughter-in-law to serve her, 
prays, and never leaves the house. Among her functions, she must prevent Zouina 
to mingle with the French community. In sum, as Fauvel puts it, “[s]he is an Alge-
rian guarantee against integration in France.”16 She is the one in charge of the 
household; from the very beginning she addresses the immigration officers and 
greets her son without letting Zouina intervene in either occasion. Malika is similar 
in her preservation of past traditions and customs. 
                                                     
13 Maryse Fauvel, “Yamina Benguigui’s ‘Inch’Allah dimanche’: Unveiling Hybrid Identities,” Studies in 
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15 Emmanuel Ma Mung, “French Immigration Policy during the Last Twenty Years,” in Immigration in 
Europe: Issues, Policies and Case Studies, ed. David Turton and Julia González (Bilbao: University of 
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The second group of characters is formed by French citizens who defy stereotypes. 
They include Nicole, the divorced neighbour, the shopkeepers, the policeman and 
the bus-driver. They are all open to dialogue and do not reject the immigrant fami-
ly because of their differences.“ Zouina acts as a catalyst for the evolving identities 
of other characters, identities that move outside of fixed categories and hierarchies 
that assume the existence of essential fixed identities.”17 Through them, the film 
illustrates the articulation of hybrid cultures that occur when identity norms are 
displaced between diverse groups. 
Zouina represents the third group. Unlike the other Algerian women, she does 
not stay cloistered at home, isolated from the outside world. Moreover, she quickly 
becomes a member of the community of neighbours. She defies her husband’s 
authority by going out on Sundays when he is choosing a lamb for the celebrations. 
She is curious about the world around her: she listens to the radio, imitates the 
French shoppers and takes the bus alone. This provokes the anger of her mother-
in-law, who says: “La France lui a tournée la tête. Elle veut faire comme les Fran-
çaises.” (“France has gone to her head. She wants to act like the French.”) Such an 
accusation is only partly true, since the young woman negotiates her identity by 
adopting certain characteristics of French women without renouncing her own 
culture. She feels that what Nicole proposes, to go out alone dancing, is still a sin, 
but talks to Malika (to her horror) about love and sexuality, which she has learnt 
about from listening to the radio. The tensions between the different aspects of 
her subjectivity are visually translated by two types of spaces and shots. The im-
prisonment that she experiences in closed spaces, such as the house and the yard, 
is transmitted through close-medium shots, framed by the door and the windows, 
whereas the freedom she experiences outdoors is filmed through long shots in 
open spaces. In the final scene, after her illusion of finding a soul-mate is shattered, 
she realises that she urgently needs to re-arrange her family situation. She imposes 
her new will on her husband, and for the first time, exchanges a direct look with 
him and tells her mother-in-law to keep quiet and to leave her alone. Her new 
resolution, “[f]rom now on I will be the one to take the children to school,” is but 
a small step in a long-term liberation plan, and with that perspective the film clos-
es. The film goes beyond the mere portrayal of Zouina and her family and insists 
on the need to expose a new in-process situation regarding national identities for 
France and other European countries, a situation which is aptly described by Ma 
Mung: “Immigrants are now increasingly demanding multiple belonging, not being 
either from here or over there, but from here and over there. Integration can no 
longer aim at incorporation into the nation French-style.”18 
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Gegen die Wand 
Regarding the film Gegen die Wand, authors such as Fatih Akin, according to David 
Coury, celebrate the diversity within Germany and through that diversity help re-
define German identity and the identity of German film. Coury adds:  
 
Akin, himself a Turkish-German filmmaker, makes films that reflect what 
Roland Robertson has termed the ‘glocal’, that is, films spatially grounded in 
a local milieu (combining the global and the local, in this case the neigh-
bourhoods of Hamburg), that thematically take up global themes, quite of-
ten the ‘clash’ of cultures between Germans, Turks and the in-between spac-
es negotiated by Turkish-Germans like himself.19 
 
Since the film has received both critical and commercial success, and many aspects 
of the film have been sufficiently analysed, I will restrict my remarks here to a brief 
commentary on the hybrid and fluid nature of the characters and spaces depicted 
in the film, and the notion of multilingualism. The protagonists of the film, Sibel 
and Cahit, meet for the first time in a psychiatric clinic, after having tried to com-
mit suicide; this is the beginning of a passionate love story marked by longing, 
loneliness and loss, but especially by two German characters of Turkish descent 
portrayed as dislocated subjectivities in a constantly fluid motion. They locate 
themselves in such liminal places as hospitals and hotels (where part of the action 
takes place), and their efforts to build a real home are frequently destroyed by their 
own restlessness. The movie, as Karin Lornsen underscores, stresses the dissimilar-
ity of the two main characters, Sibel and Cahit, who appear polymorphic and an-
tagonistic despite a shared Turkish heritage, and adds: “Their differences in age, 
gender, language ability, social ties, and interests erode widespread notions of a 
uniform, maladjusted post-migrant entity promoted by German media.”20 Lornsen 
classifies characters in the film as German-German (G-G), German-Turkish (G-T), 
Turkish-German (T-G) and Turkish-Turkish (T-T). The second letter represents a 
switching (on any kind) to another culture, and the G-T and T-G categories en-
compass hybrid characters. This group, which characterises the protagonists, “op-
poses conventions of either/or choices as well as a simple intermediate position.”21 
In fact, Sibel and Cahit are constantly in transit, between life and death, leaving 
homes and cities, switching languages, changing clothes and modifying habits, 
                                                     
19 David Coury, “Contemporary German Cinema through the Lens of Cultural Studies,” in 
Basque/European Perspectives on Cultural and Media Studies, ed. María Pilar Rodríguez (Reno: Center for 
Basque Studies, University of Nevada, 2009), 288. 
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tive Identities in Fatih Akin’s ‘Gegen die Wand’ (2004),” in Finding the Foreign: Proceedings of the Thir-
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castle: Cambridge Scholars, 2007), 14. 
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hairstyles and drug and alcohol addictions. Sibel seeks freedom from her Turkish 
cultural heritage to end up returning to a certain kind of domesticity and order in 
Istanbul after many excesses. Her final decision to remain with his family rather 
than leave with Cahit very much contradicts her initial statements and actions in 
Hamburg, where instant pleasure and gratification prevailed. Both characters- ex-
perience multiple physical and psychological transformations along the film, which 
respond to the different shades of cultural expression which they experience. 
Lora Markova claims that to a great extent the representation of multilingualism in 
European cinema corresponds to the portrayal of transcultural identities and re-
flects European transnational hybridity; she mentions Fatih Akin as one of the best 
representatives of such tendency.22 In this film, linguistic shifts are an organic part 
of the plot and the characters that he constructs. In Gegen die Wand, the characters 
speak in German, Turkish and English; and in a combination of them. Some char-
acters always speak one language with one another, while others alternate them. 
Sibel and her brother speak only Turkish with their parents, but use a mixture of 
German and Turkish with each other; Sibel speaks in German with Cahit, but there 
are two very relevant moments in the film in which English is used by Cahit; in 
both of them he is liminally positioned by the spatial configuration and by his in-
terlocutor. In similar terms, the soundtrack is composed of both diegetic and non-
diegetic American, Turkish and European music; as in the dialogues, there are song 
lyrics in English, Turkish, and German. After Niko’s death (Sibel’s lover acci-
dentally killed by Cahit, who is subsequently imprisoned), Turkish music is more 
frequently played by Sibel, anticipating her move to Istanbul in the second part of 
the film.23 
Conclusion 
In these films, as in many others, the audience is confronted with a multi-layered 
reality formed by transcultural characters in which multilingualism is a constant 
presence. The efforts by Angela Merkel and other political leaders to encourage 
assimilation and to encourage monolingualism by the compulsory and urgent need 
to learn the local language appear as an oversimplification in a world in motion, in 
which hybridity reveals itself as a much more effective strategy. Against political 
and institutional discourses, cinematic practices offer the viewers a dialogue about 
the social and cultural fabric of societies across the world which revitalises the 
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concept of European film and makes us aware of our own involvement and partic-
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Envisaging Transcultural Realities 
through Literature in Europe 
The Case of Ireland 
Asier Altuna-García de Salazar 
Introduction 
“Mapping Ireland’s future is even more difficult because so many of the old land-
marks have disappeared,” states Fintan O’Toole in his 2010 Enough is Enough. How 
to Build a New Republic.1 O’Toole ponders how Irish identity has become an orphan 
of its main pillars – “twin towers” he names them: Catholicism and nationalism.2 
Besides, in the Ireland of the 21st century, as Michael Cronin states, terms which 
were previously attached to the reality of Ireland, such as anomalous, different, 
exceptional, do not seem to stand the test any longer.3 But what is meant by that? 
Compared to other European countries, Ireland has not been affected differently 
by the new economic, social, cultural and identitarian discourses that have emerged 
and are still being reformulated on the island as a response to globalisation. The 
exceptionality of the reversal of the stigmatising Irish emigration pattern into net 
immigration, the miraculous economic boom of the Irish Celtic Tiger in the global 
economy, the “heartfelt Irish céad mile fáilte – one hundred thousand welcomes” to 
all by Irish President Mary McAleese4, which represents indeed an extensive belief 
in the “politics of recognition” and a “new pluralist agenda”5 in Irish society before 
recession and the bail-out, all these seem to avert a changing Ireland which is un-
dergoing the end of monoculturalism.6 More importantly, this new Ireland is expe-
riencing an attendant “shift” and “opening-out” of concepts such as identity, eth-
                                                     
1 Fintan O’Toole, Enough is Enough: How to Build a New Republic (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 3. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Michael Cronin, “Small Worlds and Weak Ties: Ireland in the New Century,” Journal of Irish Studies 
22 (2007): 63-93. 
4 Elisa Joy White, “‘You’re Very Welcome’: Considering the African Diaspora, Race and Human 
Rights in the Republic of Ireland,” Journal of Irish Studies 24 (2009): 15-26. 
5 Gerard Delanty, “Irish Political Community in Transition,” The Irish Review 33 (2005): 17. 
6 Marion Banks, “Modern Ireland: Multinationals and Multiculturalism,” Information Society and Justice 
2.1 (2008): 63-93. 
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nicity, culture and nationalism.7 What this article will address is what Michael Cro-
nin terms as the “shift from extrinsic alterity to intrinsic alterity,”8 when concepts such 
as identity, ethnicity and culture are examined. For Cronin, by doing so the critic of 
any culture – the Irish one in our case under study – would pay greater attention to 
“those elements within the culture that speak of contact with the wider world ra-
ther than seeing foreignness, difference or alterity as elements without, or external 
to, the culture.”9 This article will analyse how new realities are envisaged in current 
Irish literature. It will follow very much Wolfgang Welsch’s approach to transcul-
turalism in its two main levels: the macro level in which contemporary cultures are 
“multiply characterized by hybridization”;10 but, especially, the process of transcul-
turalism at the micro level of individuals in today’s Europe as it can be seen in Irish 
writing. 
For many, an inter- and multicultural Ireland was the plausibly politically correct 
current picture to be projected to the world. The myriad of peoples, national affili-
ations, cultures and languages that have coloured the Emerald Isle over the last 
two decades have made it possible for many to assert that “multicultural Ireland is 
here to stay.”11 However, time has shown that issues such as multiculturalism and 
even interculturalism do not seem to have provided a valid answer for the emerg-
ing realities in Europe, as the public statements and reactions by German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel or French President Nicholas Sarkozy attest. With a perspective 
of two decades, the same can be said of Ireland when these concepts are thorough-
ly analysed. Gavan Titley highlights that, whereas in the case of Ireland multicul-
turalism seemed to provide a cosy way of managing cultural difference – as in many 
other European countries one would add –, there was no real examination of the 
assumption that cultures and identities are not static, and that social synergies and 
dynamism in a global age were producing new social, identitarian and even national 
discourses.12 In truth, Ireland has not been any different or anomalous in this re-
spect. Titley sees culture as a “free-floating signifier,” which “has become the main 
rhetoric through which debates over identity, belonging, legitimacy and entitlement 
are refracted.”13 
                                                     
7 Jennifer Todd, “Trajectories of Identity Change: New Perspectives on Ethnicity, Nationality and 
Identity in Ireland,” Field Day Review 3 (2007): 107-17. 
8 Cronin, “Small Worlds”: 70. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Wolfgang Welsch, “On the Acquisition and Possession of Commonalities,” in Transcultural English 
Studies: Theories, Fictions, Realities, ed. Frank Schulze-Engler and Sissy Helf (Amsterdam and New York: 
Rodopi, 2009), 7. 
11 Banks, “Modern Ireland”: 90. 
12 Gavan Titley, “Everything Moves? Beyond Culture and Multiculturalism in Irish Public Dis-
course,” The Irish Review 31 (2004): 14. 
13 Ibid.: 13. 
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The purpose of this article is to consider, through the analysis of some instances of 
Irish literature, how a transcultural individual can be envisaged in today’s Ireland. 
Ultimately, this analysis of transculturalism at the micro level will question the 
validity of a traditionally staunch Irish monoculturalism and the belief of an eter-
nally fixed Irish identity. At macro social, cultural and political levels, transcultural-
ism is finding it difficult to establish its meaning and scope not only in Ireland and 
Europe but also in the wider world. From the topical concepts of us and the other, 
there arises not only the need to address how national, nationalist, postnational and 
transnational realities can be envisaged, but, also, how those former pillars of 
Irishness referred to above are transgressed, reformed and newly accommodated. 
The brief analysis of writings by Irish writers Roddy Doyle, Margaret McCarthy 
and Hugo Hamilton, which dwell on issues such as dysfunction, dislocation, trau-
ma, cultural and linguistic awareness, will highlight the portrayal of a transcultural 
Irish reality that is no disconnected or hybrid conglomerate of features. Instead, 
these instances address transculturalism in Ireland at the macro and micro levels 
and represent an exemplar of a current social, cultural and identitarian phenome-
non that finds expression in literature at a European level. This article will ap-
proach how transculturalism, which is very much here to stay, represents a synergy, 
an interaction and an evolutionary process within the social, the political, the cul-
tural and identitarian macro and micro discourses intrinsic to an Ireland in the era 
of globalisation. 
How Irish Should You Be? “The Fáilte Score” 
Approaching nationality and monoculturalism in 21st  century Ireland shows how 
inadequate methods and myths from the past are. What once were the main check-
list features of Irish nationality do not seem to stand the test any longer. As former 
Irish President Mary McAleese stated in her foreword to a booklet on multicultur-
alism north and south of the border, “we are gradually moving away from the ho-
mogeneity and old certainties which have traditionally been the hallmarks of Irish 
life.”14 But this is no anomalous development as such; rather, it is the confirmation 
that 21st  century Ireland participates in globalisation and, as Gerard Delanty states, 
that “the Global Ireland points to a conception […] different from National Ire-
land.”15 The global character of Irish society and economy, together with immigra-
tion patterns that have opened the island to a myriad of languages, traditions and 
cultures, as it is the case with other neighbouring European countries, have fos-
tered a new way of defining nationality. Far from being the imagined or invented 
results of 18th and 19th century ethnic and national constructions and the Irish Ire-
                                                     
14 Mary McAleese, “Foreword,” in Multi-Culturalism: The View from the Two Irelands, ed. Edna Longley 
and Declan Kiberd (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), viii. 
15 Delanty, “Irish Political Community”: 13. 
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land drive of the beginning of the 20th century, or the product of the somewhat 
static and isolated multicultural discourses, today’s Irish nationality exudes trans-
culturalism.Roddy Doyle’s short story “57% Irish” was first published in the multi-
cultural online and paper magazine Metro Éireann and then collected and released in 
book format under the title of The Deportees and Other Stories (2007). Doyle’s stories 
reflect a concern for the ensemble of diversity in Ireland. “57% Irish” represents a 
serious fictional exemplar of the need to deconstruct – so as to better comprehend 
– an Irish-only consciousness. With Doyle’s humour throughout, the story ap-
proaches the very futile definition of Irish nationhood and citizenship in terms of 
percentage. It shows how those check-list features of what being Irish traditionally 
stood for cannot be valid any longer. The main task of the protagonist, Ray Brady, 
is to design a method to measure nationality. Awarded a research grant for his 
project “Olé Olé Olé – Football and the Road to Irishness,” his goal is to measure 
love of country in today’s Ireland.16 Ray’s research reaches a turning point when he is 
required by the Minister for the Arts and Ethnicity (ironically the former Minister 
for the Arts and Tourism) “to make it harder to be Irish” although Ray has to 
“make it look easier.” The reason behind the Irish government’s interest is to 
comply with Europeanisation, or, as the Minister stated, “Fucking Europe.” Euro-
pean ministers are “not happy with the Fortress Europe tag. It keeps them from 
their sleep. So, the walls are coming down.”17 Accordingly, Ray Brady creates a 
measuring tool to indicate the proper level of Irishness: “The Fáilte Score.” But 
what could be the items to ask for at a time when everyone knows more about 
Irish culture than ever before because of global Ireland and the commodification 
of Irish culture? This was the real issue for a quiz on Irishness to be designed: U2, 
James Joyce, Guinness, Riverdance, Brian Boru, the Irish Tenors, the GAA cen-
tenary tape, The Best of Eurovision, the Pope’s mass in Galway, The Commitments, even 
Anal Nation, Once Again, an instance of Irish porn18, are all burnt onto one CD and 
then exposed to various individuals strapped to a chair and screened thoroughly to 
measure and record any reaction to those items; a repository of Irishness in 21st 
century Ireland. The results puzzle Ray Brady. His brother’s score, 19%, turns out 
to be a failure; he could not even be considered Irish. His mother scores only 38%; 
even the Minister gets a 57%, “a feckin’ C minus,”19 the Minister retorts; the aver-
age mark, Ray replies, which makes the Minister the “average Irishman.” But his 
experiment also provides the highest score of all, 97%, “the most Irish man in the 
country”: a Ghanaian. Even Ray’s Russian girlfriend scored 83%. Far from being 
dislocated or “the other,” these newcomers to Ireland do not feel “strangers in 
their own country.” Originally designed to hamper the naturalisation of deportees, 
                                                     
16 Roddy Doyle, The Deportees and Other Stories (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), 101. 
17 Ibid., 105. 
18 Ibid., 109-10. 
19 Ibid., 115. 
Envisaging Transcultural Realities through Literature in Europe 189 
exiles and immigrants, Ray’s test proves otherwise. Eventually, the Irish govern-
ment of the story could not handle the results nor Irish ethnicity any longer and 
decided to merge the ethnicity component of the new ministry with the Depart-
ment of the Marine. Doyle’s “57% Irish” represents a clear stance of the lack of 
validity of former constructs and pillars of Irish identity. Besides, he poignantly 
denounces the failure of the governmental institutions (the macro level) in under-
standing and accepting the reality of the new Irish nation (the individuals at the 
micro level); a reality that can neither be acculturated nor assimilated. In this vein, 
Doyle’s portrayal advocates the necessity of re-shuffling identitarian and national 
discourses and validating the politics of recognition and pluralism of 21st century 
Ireland so as to extend a wider acceptance of citizenship, both in cultural and polit-
ical terms, as it is the case with many other nations in Europe nowadays. 
These new discourses are here to stay and have come to blur and redefine the 
idea of “the nation-state and the distinctiveness of individual societies.”20 Indeed, 
Doyle’s “57% Irish” represents not only an attempt to categorise new concepts 
that may enable the approach to these new realities but also the necessity to do 
away with what Yolanda Onghena terms as the fear to refer to “diversity as some 
sort of disturbing other, an intruder with the capacity to destabilise our security,”21 
i.e. our solid and monolithic monocultures. To overcome this fear, Ireland should 
come to terms with the recognition of transculturalism as the very opposite re-
sponse to static, solid monocultures and fixed identities and see it as a useful tool 
for the recognition of identity reformulation processes. 
“This is why I say there is no in-between state” 
In the introduction to My Eyes Only Look Out, Margaret McCarthy states that she 
believes that at the outset of the Millennium and in the cases of race and immigra-
tion in Ireland, “it is difficult to predict the future beyond speculation and careful 
optimism.”22 McCarthy advocates that, “despite the disproportionate amount of 
attention that has been focused on the arrival of asylum seekers and other immi-
grants,” Ireland still seems to remain “more or less monocultural.”23 Her collection 
summarises overall reactions to a hyphenated reality (Irish-something or some-
thing-Irish), nationhood, patriotism, nationalism and language accent. McCarthy 
collects thus reactions produced by the protagonists of the accounts as well as by 
those who surround them in a volume that points to transculturalism, showing the 
failure of the much-celebrated multicultural mosaic and inter-culturality, of which 
                                                     
20 G. Honor Fagan, “Globalization and Culture: Placing Ireland,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 581 (2002): 134. 
21 Yolanda Onghena, “Transculturalism and Relation Identity”, Quaderns de la Mediterránia 31 (2008): 
182. 
22 Margaret McCarthy, My Eyes Only Look Out (Dingle: Brandon, 2001), 10. 
23 Ibid. 
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these mixed-race Irish are the most evident result. Among the many accounts we 
find Luzveminda O’Sullivan’s, crowned Rose of Tralee in August 1998, Seán Óg’s, 
Gaelic football and hurling star, Ian’s, the first coloured guard in Ireland, or Curtis 
Fleming’s, a black Irishman football player for Middlesborough and Crystal Palace. 
Proud of their Irishness through their personal accounts – which recollect trauma, 
dysfunction and cultural awareness – these Irish reject in-betweenness, which for 
some is nonexistent as it is only a facile reduction of their physical appearance and 
place of birth. These Irish are what Welsch terms cultural hybrids which are nei-
ther determined nor defined by a single nation,24 nor by culture, one would add.  
Most of these biographical instances exude a transcultural stance in which to 
define a new arena for analysis. But their responses also show the difficulty faced 
by these Irish in coming to terms with their, let’s say, internal and external alterity. 
Even if they are and feel truly Irish, in order to find self-esteem in society they 
have to resort to answers such as “I’m International,”25 I’m Irish “even though I 
don’t look it,”26 I am “no in-between state,”27 “to me, there is no middle ground”28 
and “there is something out there for me.”29 Others are deeply concerned by their 
constant need to succeed more than what is usually expected, as people are always 
watching and assessing them. McCarthy denounces the failure of assimilative accul-
turation in Ireland, as it is the case in other European nations. Instead, these ac-
counts exude transculturalism so as to reformulate the foundations of Irish society. 
These accounts advocate, as Onghena states, that “a new, composite and complex 
reality emerges; a reality that is no mechanical mixture of characters, nor mosaic, 
but instead a new original and independent phenomenon.”30 McCarthy envisages 
the representation of this transcultural reality and synergy as a way to promote the 
interaction and commonalities Welsch demands from a future transcultural society 
in Europe and also in the wider world.31  
From “walking on the wall” to “I can feel the touch of solid ground  
under my feet” 
As a final instance, this article will briefly consider Hugo Hamilton’s novels The 
Speckled People (2003) and The Sailor in the Wardrobe (2006). The novels are biograph-
ical accounts of Hamilton’s own, somewhat dysfunctional, childhood and youth. 
                                                     
24 Wolfgang Welsch, “Transculturalism – the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today,” in Spaces of Culture: 
City, Nation, World, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213. 
25 McCarthy, My Eyes, 111. 
26 Ibid., 31. 
27 Ibid., 162. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 233. 
30 Onghena, “Transculturalism”: 183. 
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Although born in Dublin, the young Hamilton’s world is characterised by entan-
glement at many levels: personal, cultural and linguistic. Hamilton’s father is a 
staunch Irish nationalist, who shamefully hides in his wardrobe a father’s past in 
the British army and wants his children to speak only Irish and live in Gaelic cul-
ture. His mother, on the other hand, is a German immigrant who has escaped 
from a Nazi past, and talks to them only in German, not wanting her children to 
forget their German ancestry. The young Hugo Hamilton, addressed as Hanno in 
the novels, wants to be free to choose between cultures and languages, desiring at 
times to speak English, the language of connection to a world of popular culture 
and modernity; but only in his mind can he be free, as “you’re still free to go any-
where you like inside your own head.”32 His transcultural individuality clashes with 
a social discourse, a macro level, as he does not want to be special: “out there in 
Ireland you want to be the same as everyone else, not an Irish speaker, not a Ger-
man or a Kraut or a Nazi.”33 For Hamilton, his is not a special but a new reality 
that is appearing in Ireland. His is a synergy into the social, the cultural and identi-
tarian: 
My father says we have nothing to worry about because we are the 
new Irish. Partly from Ireland and partly from somewhere else, half-
Irish and half-German. We’re the speckled people, he says, the ‘brack’ 
people, which is a word that comes from the Irish language, from the 
Gaelic as they sometimes call it. My father was a schoolteacher once 
before he became an engineer and breac is a word, he explains, that 
the Irish people brought with them when they were crossing over in-
to the English language. It means speckled, dappled, flecked, spotted, 
coloured. A trout is brack and so is a speckled horse. A barm brack is 
a loaf of bread with raisins in it and was borrowed from the Irish 
words bairín breac. So we are the speckled Irish, the brack-Irish. Brack 
home-made Irish bread with German raisins.34  
 
But Hamilton wants to depart from a hyphenated reality and be truly transcultural, 
so as to understand and comprehend cultures beyond one’s own cultural construc-
tion and that of the other. The young Hanno’s world progresses from the inner 
security of his dysfunctional home (Irish and German only) where he can be him-
self and out there, where “there is a different country.”35 His “you can’t love two 
countries”36, exclaimed under his father’s influence, turns into doubt about his 
own identity and nationality. At the end of The Speckled People, Hanno comes to the 
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33 Ibid., 3. 
34 Ibid., 7. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 Ibid., 120. 
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understanding that “maybe your country is only a place you make up in your own 
mind”37 and he decides to walk metaphorically on the wall of identity, most proba-
bly knowing that he could fall on either side, but nobody can stop him and he is 
intent on going ahead. 
Hamilton begins his second novel pondering on the original sin we are all born 
with, i.e. your inheritance in terms of identity, historical past, language. Hamilton 
does not believe we are born innocent. Instead, he follows his mother’s wise words 
and has to earn his own innocence; Hanno has to “grow up and become inno-
cent.”38 His identity construction process undergoes deconstruction to start anew. 
He has to un-remember everything. To live transculturally, a partial deculturation 
paves the way to new cultural phenomena.39 Hamilton surpasses English, Irish and 
German to become himself. What is central for him is not staunchly differentiated 
mosaic diversity but merging and interaction. Hamilton decides he is “not going to 
be kept in the wardrobe”40 and un-becomes his threefold identities, thus becoming 
transcultural. The young Hanno becomes fully himself and participates in a dis-
course that frees him from staunchly monolinguistic and monocultural frame-
works, thus allowing him to communicate freely around meanings, languages and 
cultures. From “walking on the wall” Hanno feels now “the touch of solid ground 
under [his] feet”41 at the end of his second novel. He transcends all the static sys-
tems of reference and turns into a transcultural citizen of the world. 
Transculturalism together with cosmopolitanism in the political and communi-
ty spheres are the alternatives to staunch positions of the past, both in Ireland and 
the rest of Europe. As Delanty argues, “one can simultaneously be Irish, European 
and member of an ethnic community” if one’s identity is “articulated through dis-
cursively mediated identities and critical dialogue.”42 What is at stake when identi-
ties, and the Irish one in particular for our case here, are reformulated is the trans-
concept. Whether transnational or transcultural identities at the micro level and 
nations at the macro level are being reformulated, always bearing in mind the es-
sence of free-floating signifiers, transformation and intrinsic alterity. In the end, “a new 
social imaginary is needed, that will question who participates in what, how and 
why.”43 In today’s Europe, transculturalism seems the answer to “the moribound 
ideology of the nation-sate.”44 As with the case of Ireland analysed here, Europe 
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should also advocate the reformulation of identity, culture and a new social order 
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Transcultural Encounters  
in Re-Inscribing Identity 
European Memories and  
Ethnic Writing in Canada 
Anna Pia De Luca 
Introduction 
In the light of new migrant literary studies, concepts of tranculturality and transcul-
turalism, according to Sabrina Broncato, contribute to an awareness of “the pro-
cesses of formation of cultural identity in all of their complexity,” because they 
“place emphasis on the dialectical nature of cultural influences, in tending towards 
a conceptualisation of interaction where nothing is ever completely ‘other’ (foreign 
and unknown).”1 Furthermore, as underlined by Welsch, transculturality implies “a 
culture and society whose pragmatic feats exist not only in delimitation, but in the 
ability to link and undergo transition.”2 Within this framework of mobility, trans-
formation and cultural interaction, cultural identities resist any form of fixity and 
become fluid, pliable and open to redefinition and reconstruction. By attempting 
to understand transculturalism as framework, the purpose of this paper is to ana-
lyse the ways in which the inscription and contextualisation of ethnic identity (and 
European memory) is achieved and represented in migrant literary writings in Can-
ada. 
In 1971, Canada became the first country in the world to officially adopt a 
multiculturalism policy. The term multicultural dates back to the 1970 report of the 
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, arriving in 1988 with the 
passing of Bill C 93, known as the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. The Canadian 
experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony 
and cross-cultural understanding. The mapping of a Canadian identity, in constant 
flux as a result of Canada’s kaleidoscope of multicultural, multiracial and multilin-
gual enclaves, has generated a polyphonic literature in which the so-called ‘ethnic’ 
                                                     
1 Sabrina Broncato, ‘“Glocality’ and Cultural Identity,” This Century’s Review 4 (2006), 
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writers can give voice not only to personal perspectives of displacement and aliena-
tion but above all to new and original literary forms which underline their cross-
cultural experiences such as communication with alterity, plurilinguism, self-
translation, autobiography, myth and intertextual symbolism, which interact with 
what Frank Schulze-Engler defines as “the transcultural imaginary”3 of our mod-
ern global world. 
The main frame of reference found in Canadian ethnic minority texts is the re-
current shift between cultures, and as their juxtaposition frequently intimates, the 
characters find themselves on the borderline of conflicting loyalties, which often 
creates a sense of helplessness and anxiety. These shifting perspectives, which 
foreground the multiplicity and ambiguity of identity, are often reflected through 
an irony which both cultivates and exposes differences and contradictions. In this 
way, irony becomes a destabilising factor to avoid the affixation of a single particu-
lar meaning to the events depicted in the texts. In Splitting Images, a critical study on 
ethnic literature, Linda Hutcheon in fact affirms: “Irony is one way of coming to 
terms with this kind of duplicity, for it is the trope that incarnates doubleness.”4 
Second-generation writers analyse the difficulties faced by immigrant parents who 
were socially marginalised in a new world where the language was alien, but in 
particular where it had created a generational gap between parents and children in 
conflict over the diversity of cultural views and speaking languages. For these chil-
dren, the private space of the family, which includes relatives and villagers, be-
comes a battlefield for their own physical and emotional struggles, and the public 
sphere, with its social pressures from peer groups, becomes the space for conflicts 
inherent in a definition of identity, always in tension between new and old world 
values and where concepts such as displacement, dislocation and confrontation are 
often reiterated. The authors are placed on the threshold of both worlds where 
they reveal those asymmetric dualisms that characterise their daily living. 
Cross-cultural Spaces of Food 
In defining ethnic and cultural spaces, literature has always assigned to food an 
interesting and significant role, in particular to the very act of eating a meal which 
can generate a series of values that range from the social to the human. Besides 
giving nourishment to the body, food can take on an infinite number of meanings. 
For immigrants, the sharing of food underlines the cultural and ethnic identity of 
the family and its cross-cultural experiences in the new world. Thus the dishes that 
revolve around immigrant tables have an aura of historical memories of their home 
communities, of rituals, values, beliefs and also their transformations in the new 
                                                     
3 Frank Schulze-Engler, “Transnationale Kultur als Herausforderung für die Literaturwissenschaft,” 
ZAA: Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik 50.1 (2002): 79. 
4 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1991), 49. 
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world. As underlined by Enoch Padolsky, food has long been regarded as a useful 
and important ethnic marker, particularly in terms of identity issues.5 From an 
ethnic perspective, the assumption has been that one’s identity can be induced 
from the foods that significantly reflect an ethnic language, culture, history, tradi-
tion and religion. However, if food locates us geographically and physically, it also 
locates us in specific and sometimes limited cultural spaces that, from a cross-
cultural perspective, can be either very satisfying or very ambivalent.  
For authors such as Fred Wah, a writer born in Canada of Chinese, Scottish, 
Irish and Swedish hybrid roots, food becomes a powerful narrative and symbolic 
element. In his biographical memoir Diamond Grill, the narrative core and setting of 
the short sections of his larger story is the Chinese restaurant of the same name 
opened in 1950 in Nelson, British Columbia, by the author’s father. From this 
habitat, where the family works and grows, Wah converts food into a metaphorical 
medium to explore, through memory, his anxiety and torment caused by an obses-
sive difficulty in accepting his hybrid ethnic identity. The restaurant becomes a 
stage where Wah acts out his various identities, while the swinging doorway, which 
separates the Chinese cooking area at the back from the fundamentally white Ca-
nadian dining area in the front, serves as a threshold for that ‘in-between’ space 
where Wah’s identity is moulded and reshaped. Emblematic are his opening words 
as he hurries to the kitchen to bring an order to a customer: “I pick up an order 
and turn, back through the doors, Whap! My foot registers more than its own im-
print, starts to read the stain of memory.”6 In this effervescent atmosphere, the 
Chinese language/culture at the back is tangibly juxtaposed to the one at the front, 
as Wah audibly and easily moves across the threshold, calling attention not only to 
his perception of marginalisation and cultural diversity, but at the same time to a 
capacity to negotiate and understand his own personal ethnicity. In preparing the 
‘mixed grill,’ Wah adds, blends, combines and incorporates different ingredients as 
he mixes and cooks everything together, thus literally and metaphorically recon-
structing a variegated cultural identity in order to gain the self-perception and self-
esteem necessary to accept and defend his multiracial and transcultural identity. 
Thus, in the end, the Diamond Grill restaurant becomes a place of cultural and 
ethnic discoveries and recoveries, where Wah, as understood by Beauregard, en-
deavours “to theorize Canada as a hybrid cultural space”,7 but where hybridity is 
not a random choice but rather cross-cultural contact. 
                                                     
5 Enoch Padolsky, “You Are Where You Eat: Ethnicity, Food and Cross-cultural Spaces,” Canadian 
Ethnic Studies 37.2 (2005): 19. 
6 Fred Wah, Diamond Grill (Edmonton: NeWest, 1996), 1. 
7 Guy Beauregard, “Rattling a Noisy Hyphen,” review of Diamond Grill, by Fred Wah, Canadian Litera-
ture 156 (Spring 1998): 172. 
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Language and Doubleness 
In the works of many ethnic writers, the relationship between language and dou-
bleness is a recurrent pattern, both on a structural and on a thematic level. The 
language of the immigrant is often neither idiomatic to his or her homeland nor to 
his or her host country, but to somewhere in-between. Consequently, in their 
search for an identity, the immigrants struggle, as it were, with two childhood lan-
guages, that of their past and that of their present. But this dichotomy is also often 
enriching, since many writers mould and come up with different languages and 
make use of diverse syntactical, semantic and phonological indicators or dialect 
languages to give voice to their experiences. 
Within the context of Italian-Canadian literature, recent works by female writers 
are of particular interest, firstly because women of Italian descent often had to 
struggle against class, gender and ethnic status. In addition, living within the con-
straints of a patriarchal family, they were rarely able to achieve complete emotional 
and social independence, often relying on the use of subterfuge to elude the role of 
passive and submissive daughter imposed upon them by a stringent authoritarian-
ism within their ethnic community. Female writers like Gianna Patriarca, Mary di 
Michel and Genni Gunn experiment with plurilinguistic texts, using Italian or di-
verse dialects which aim to recuperate a lost language or identity. Patriarca’s poetry 
is fundamentally written in English, but many of her poems reach a finer level of 
lyricism with her inclusion of Italian titles, words, verses and self-translations, 
which give emphasis to her linguistic and cultural duplicity. 
In mapping the boundaries of Toronto’s Little Italy, Patriarca takes on the role 
of distant female observer, analysing the power relations that take place between 
men and women, parents and children, young and old, within families, friendships 
and diverse ethnicities. The spaces her women inhabit are private spaces: those of 
the kitchen, the basement apartment, the church, a sick room in a hospital, Villa 
Colombo for the elderly and social clubs in Little Italy where paesani (fellow coun-
try neighbours) meet to talk and pass their time in female crafts. The main themes 
of Patriarca’s early poetry unfold in her first two collections, Italian Women and 
Other Tragedies and Daughters for Sale, where she underlines the conflicts that arise 
from a patriarchal ideology that seeks, through the mechanisms of female submis-
sion, to suffocate even the voices of those who are determined to be heard. Patri-
arca travels through the past, recalling experiences as an immigrant daughter, sto-
ries and anecdotes of family, memories linked to old photographs and letters, but 
in particular she moves through the collective memories of all those women and 
children who had suffered at the hands of immigration sponsors without scruples 
or fathers and husbands too drunk or violent to show any form of compassion. 
In the first poem, “Italian Women,” which gives the title to the collection, Pa-
triarca offers a double-edged challenge to stereotyped male visions of oppressive 
Italian women in black. The narrating voice, the i (eye) that scrutinises with suffer-
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ance, but also with ironic distance, creates an ambiguous tension between self and 
other: 
 
these are the women 
who were born to give birth 
 
they breathe only  
leftover air 
and speak only 
when deeper voices  
have fallen asleep 
 
i have seen them bleed 
in the dark 




i have seen them wrap their souls 
around their children 
and serve their own hearts 
in a meal they never  
share.8 
 
Patriarca’s depiction of the older immigrant women from Italy is one of sympa-
thetic understanding and poignant insight. Some are guilt-ridden and self-effacing 
women whose dreams of a better life burn in the lit candles offered to marbled 
saints in local Catholic churches. Her female world view is always bifocal: religious 
rites are juxtaposed with pagan beliefs, thus we find the pious with the irreverent, 
saints with devils, the good with the bad, joy with sadness, past with present, but 
always conditioned by the art of story-telling. In her poems, she is able to meta-
phorically present the two extremes of a female world based on silence and yearn-
ing but also on hope and tenderness. It is the voice of the poet who remembers, 
protects and transmits with compassion but never with contempt. 
Particularly intent are also her poems that tell stories of older women both in 
Italy and Canada, such as “Paesaggi,” where Patriarca affectionately observes an 
Italian woman left behind, waiting for a husband who has emigrated and who may 
never return. The shade of her face, like the endless waves that distance her from 
her husband, are “of fine white marble.” And “sun bleached” are also the cobbled 
stones, where her husband’s steps had “left no prints,” as if he had never left or 
had furtively escaped. But like Mariana in the poem by Tennyson, unrelentingly 
“for a thousand seasons,” she waits for him to appear by the gate, “in the morning 
                                                     
8 Gianna Patriarca, Italian Women and Other Tragedies (Toronto: Guernica, 1994), 9.  
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/ in the evening / when the rain came / from the ocean into silence.”9 Though 
seemingly antithetic, even the fate of the mail-order bride was not dissimilar to that 
of the women left behind, as can be understood in the poem “Daughters for Sale,” 
where Rosaria, a widow in a resting home, recalls the period when, after the war, 
she had married the photograph of a man recognisable “only from the waist up,” 
“sent from across the ocean,” “a man in an envelope.” She believed that this man 
was to become her “passport,” her “ticket to paradise.” But now, as she sits alone 
by the fountain at Villa Colombo and waits for sons too busy to visit her, she re-
members only her husband’s “very large hands,” which nonetheless were “not 
large enough to touch me.” What remains of her life of solitude are her memories 
of the Sicilian sun and “the way it walked on my flesh / warm like an angel and 
sometimes with the / fiery steps of a devil,” while, in the virtual spaces of “this 
perfect garden of cement and wrought iron” constructed to resemble an Italian 
piazza, she knows that “the sun wears shoes.”10 
A consideration, at this point, must be made with regards to those writers of 
second-generation immigrant families who already had a sense of their Canadian-
ness, but lacked or lost the perception of their Italianness. Often the process of re-
appropriating their submerged identity occurs after a long postponed return visit to 
Italy. The theme of the journey, represented in ethnic texts either in autobiograph-
ical form or as a metaphor for self-discovery, gives the authors a retrospective view 
regarding their sense of displacement and becomes the catalyst whereby they can 
reconsider their immigrant experience and the nature of their identity. Mary di 
Michele, one of the most prominent Italian-Canadian writers whose works have 
been anthologised in diverse Canadian mainstream publications, sees such a jour-
ney as a rite de passage where the spiritual, psychological and cultural consequences 
are evident in her later works. The power politics of the gaze, which according to 
feminist critics renders the observed female frustrated and powerless, however, has 
a double edge in her poems. Throughout her works, di Michele, as the speaking 
subject, guides the reader into the threshold of perception to observe the poet 
observing herself. It is the reader who is encouraged to be the voyeur. Films, fami-
ly snapshots, cameras and mirrors reflect back that desirable other, so that the read-
er’s attention shifts back and forth in a tentative search for truth under the surface 
of the unreliable narrating voice. The collection Mimosa, published in 198111, is a 
perfect example of this authorial interpolation, where a series of monologues be-
tween two sisters in opposition, Marta and Lucy, and an elderly immigrant father, 
Vito, call into question not only family values and concepts of authority, but above 
all the emotionally ambivalent feelings each have for the other and which the two 
                                                     
9 Ibid., 12-3. 
10 Gianna Patriarca, Daughters for Sale (Toronto: Guernica, 1997), 15-7. 
11 Mary Di Michele, “Mimosa,” in Mimosa and Other Poems (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press/Valley 
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sisters, though not without feelings of guilt, try to explain. The correlation between 
language and transcultural values permeates much of the poems, while the formal 
juxtaposition of the three points of view affords a three-dimensional perspective 
on the experience of immigration and its ensuing sense of fragmentation. The texts 
are filled with irony, culminating in the fact that while Marta, the obedient and 
respectful daughter resentfully demanding attention, is not loved by Vito, on the 
other hand his favourite, Lucia, though a poet, is unable to express her sincere love 
for him. As underlined by Linda Hutcheon, the title poem is not only “about dou-
bleness and fragmentation, about the ideal and the real, past and present,” but 
above all through the three points of view, the father’s, Marta’s and Lucia’s, the 
reader is confronted with how Marta’s overt dependence on hypocrisy “conditions 
any interpretation”12 one may have of family relationships. However, it could be 
argued that the identities of the two sisters seem to fuse to become that of one 
woman narrating her schizophrenic tension between female desire and filial duty.  
Masking Identities 
Unlike Patriarca’s or di Michele’s literary works, those of Genni Gunn13 are atypi-
cal in that Gunn refuses to be labelled as Italian-Canadian with its confining and 
limiting effects, but prefers rather to assume the mask of a cryptic identity,14 as 
eloquently testified both by the choice of camouflaging her real name, Gemma 
Donati, and her exclusive use of the English language. In her poetic works, in par-
ticular, the question of ethnic identity is never the focal point of her attention, just 
as the transcultural dimension of her writings is never limited to the rescue of the 
cultural heritage of her Italian origins. Her attention is centred on universal themes, 
on blending and embracing diverse geographic, psychic and interior spaces in order 
to create metaphoric sequences and mythological cross-references which establish 
links – both inter- and transcultural – with the various cultures of the world. 
In her most recent collection of poems, Faceless, Gunn explores the theme of 
the mask and its multiple possibilities of exposing the dilemma between being, 
appearing and regenerating. The genesis of the series of poems in the cycle “Face-
less,” which gives the title to the collection, is the amazing chronicle of the first 
facial transplant carried out in 2005 on a French woman whose dog had disfigured 
her in its attempts to awaken her from a suicidal sleep induced by an over-dose of 
                                                     
12 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images, 58. 
13 The following sections of this paper, regarding the writers Genni Gunn and Janice Kulyk Keefer, 
were part of a previously published article but which are here shortened and revised. See Anna Pia 
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14 The term is taken from an essay by Linda Hutcheon, “A Crypto-Ethnic Confession,” in The Anthol-
ogy of Italian-Canadian Writing, ed. Joseph Pivato (Toronto: Guernica, 1998), 314-23. 
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sleeping pills. The traumatic experience of the woman, who awakens with a man-
gled face, becomes the backdrop for subsequent poems where the poet explores 
the paradox inherent in hiding behind various masks which shift or change accord-
ing to the situation or convention. Faceless, she is unable to recognise herself: 
“without your face / you could be no one.”15 Even the futile attempt of the wom-
an to camouflage herself under layers of make-up and brand-name clothes in order 
to be noticed and accepted by others, paradoxically makes her more anonymous 
and invisible, as evinced by Gunn’s metaphoric and intertextual reference to Hun-
Dun, “a faceless bird-like entity, and a representation of Chaos”16 in Chinese my-
thology, who eventually died when the gods of the periphery, in trying to create 
order from chaos, drilled seven holes to restructure his face. 
Particularly striking is the final vision of the woman with half a face, like the 
grotesque statues on display at the Body Worlds exhibit in Los Angeles, statues 
with skinless bodies: 
 
through which we glimpse the gears 
the turning of our motor hearts 
no wonder we don’t recognize 
our selves without our skins17 
 
This vision of self as half, however, initiates a catharsis in the woman who finds 
herself obliged to put aside her usual disguises and look deep into herself for the 
first time. By accepting to mask herself behind the transplanted face of another 
suicidal victim, the woman finally obtains redemption, for she acknowledges that 
everyone wears multiple masks, masks of self which make us what we are: whole 
and authentic. As underlined by Deborah Saidero, the parable of the woman with-
out a face, which Gunn presents in these poems, seems particularly relevant to the 
traumatic experience of the migrant woman, who, because of her geographic, cul-
tural and linguistic dislocation/relocation, finds herself donning a series of diverse 
masks to protect herself from derision and prejudice.18 The difficult process of 
recuperating and reconstructing a new identity, therefore, implies a need to recon-
sider the restrictive borders of one’s own ethnic condition in wider terms that are 
both transcultural and interrelated. 
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Trauma and Memory 
The reliance on narrative devices as memoirs and oral tales is also present in Janice 
Kulyk Keefer’s The Green Library, where the chronicling of a half-century of 
Ukrainian history from 1941 to 1993 and the trauma of dislocation for the DPs 
who ended up in Canada after the Second World War is achieved through the 
fragmented reconstruction of Eva Chown’s unknown family history, which is 
gradually disclosed to her as she pieces together the various stories she hears from 
the people who reappear from her past. In recalling the troubled history of the 
half-starved DPs who, after the war, were “brought in all the way from Germany, 
on boats, just like cattle”19 to work in Canada’s lumber camps and, when no longer 
needed, were dismissed to a life with few possibilities of survival, investigates the 
‘departure-arrival-return’ motif which informs the experience of diaspora and 
which explores the difficulties and hardships of immigrant assimilation versus the 
desire to return ‘home.’ Thus the return journey pattern of this ethnic novel tries 
to dissipate the haunting obsession with returning to a place which is no longer 
home but which continues, nevertheless, to hinder the experience of fully belong-
ing in the new nation. Within the novel, the intermingling of private memories and 
public history undermines the clichés of historical representation and points to-
wards a somewhat mythical approach to history, where meaning exists only in 
relation to other stories offered by other people in other places and in different 
times. The relationship between the ordinary and the extraordinary, between the 
normal and abnormal, functions to undermine the power of historical stereotypes 
to shape the characters’ lives and to debase imposing truths which have been made 
to appear as normal. When Eva finds the cut-out photo of a boy who strikingly 
resembles her son Ben, mysteriously slid through her front door, her ordinary life 
is suddenly disrupted together with her normal identification of herself as Eva 
Chown, the daughter of a well-off, upper middle-class Torontonian couple. Her 
descent journey into an unknown and unsuspected past discloses an utterly differ-
ent and unreal world, constructed upon stories that never tell “the whole truth”20 
and that, at times, modulate almost imperceptibly into lies. Yet, despite her aware-
ness of the inherent fictionality of the stories she hears and the unsanctioned his-
torical documents she reads, it is through these that Eva slowly comes to 
acknowledge the past as something that inexorably “keeps bleeding into the pre-
sent and won’t be staunched.”21 
As Eva follows the trail of memory and unearths her family secrets and cultur-
al roots, past, present and future fuse, making her the receiver and the bearer not 
only of the untold and repudiated stories of all those Displaced Persons who im-
migrated to Canada, leaving their identities behind, but also of those, who, like her 
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20 Ibid., 197. 
21 Ibid., 198. 
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Ukrainian grandmother Lesia Levkovych, were victims of the Nazi suppression of 
the Ukrainian language and culture, or of those who, in present-day Ukraine, 
struggle to construct their future after centuries of subjection to Tsarist and Soviet-
style imperialism. In addition, by resisting victim/victimizer oppositions, The Green 
Library presents the Ukrainian people as both oppressed and oppressors, thus un-
derlining both the painful and brutal historical events of Ukraine’s colonial past 
and precarious present as well as acknowledging their equally leading role in diffus-
ing anti-Semitism within and outside national borders. In revoking the country’s 
innumerable invasions and conquerors, the author admits the part of responsibility 
that Ukraine’s aristocracy and intellectuals had in starving the peasants to death. In 
a similar manner, she acknowledges the Ukrainians as collaborators of the Nazis in 
the persecution of the Jews who were sent off to die at Babyn Yar. The recognition 
of historical similarities among different peoples, who have ambivalently been both 
the oppressed and the oppressors, functions to deconstruct savage disagreements 
and expose the treachery of power relations where victims can turn into victimizers 
and perpetuate hierarchical relations. 
Eva’s vertical journey into the past, thus, discloses an important sense of con-
nection with others. Although Eva’s physical and psychic journey ultimately leads 
her to discover the identity of her biological father, a “bohunk”22 with whom her 
mother had had a brief affair, it is above all through a host of female characters, 
which includes her half-senile mother Holly, her parents’ former Ukrainian house-
keeper Mrs. Moroz, her ex-schoolmate Oksanna and her grandmother Lesia, that 
she becomes aware both of her identity as a woman and of the importance of her 
ethnicity for self-definition: “their lives, their stories – she carries them in her 
bones, in whatever she makes of herself.”23 
Conclusion 
For Canada’s many immigrants, the postulation within these many texts of a post-
national concept of home has far-reaching consequences, since it enables them to 
develop a sense of belonging to their Canadian homeland, without obliging them 
to deny their other homes in the process. Thus a far better logo for Canada’s mul-
ticultural inhabitants who, like her reference to Janus, “the Roman God of thresh-
old and doorways”24, are split between ‘here’ and ‘there,’ the new iconographic 
model proposed by Kulyk Keefer points towards a transcultural experience which 
challenges the fixed and fragmented separation of the multicultural mosaic and 
urges the crossing of all borders and boundaries, not only between self and other 
                                                     
22 Ibid., 77. 
23 Ibid., 261. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
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or between past and present, but also between the different selves that co-exist 
within a person’s variegated and constantly changing identity. 
As a final consideration, the retrieval of a lost cultural heritage and ancestry 
has enabled these Canadian writers to establish a meaningful sense of connection 
with the people who had inhabited their adolescent memories. The writing of eth-
nicity on the part of Canada’s writers, which Kulyk Keefer in her article “Coming 
Across Bones” has fittingly termed “historiographic ethnofiction,” involves a per-
sonal struggle between the past and the present, history and memory, between 
stories and real life experiences. Thus writing and reading ethnicity becomes a 
means to foster comparative awareness and “to acknowledge and explore,” as 
Kulyk Keefer underlines, “the connective differences between us.”25 Here a liminal 
space of understanding is created and accepted, a space which rejects the stereo-
typical markers of ethnicity. The re-appropriation of the histories, myths, minority 
languages and cultures of these hyphenated immigrants aids the process of re-
inscribing self and coming to terms with personal identity, which in the Canadian 
multicultural context is created through borrowings, crossings and repositioning of 
boundaries that once marked difference but now offer infinite possibilities of crea-
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The situation of migration is in many respects a tremendously interesting field of 
society which organises the dynamic processes of the reconstruction of social iden-
tity of the people who become entangled within in it. It is a unique testing ground 
through which run complex interests, cultural determinants and collective identifi-
cation. The challenges posed to migrants in the contemporary world increasingly 
expose the element of social reality which in theoretical terms is described as life in 
a world in which the collective basis for the construction of social identity is be-
coming more numerous, more diverse, irregular, incoherent and of a fragmentary 
nature. As a result, the foundations are becoming increasingly heterogeneous but 
also more open to redefinition than ever before.1 
It has been tried to explain this fluidity of social life in relation to numerous 
metaphors stemming from the phenomenon of “liquid modernity”.2 The identity 
of the modern migrant seems to be the quintessence of these variables of identity, 
where the explicit nature of the typical adaptation strategies adopted by migrants of 
the last 20 years has been influenced by political change, changing technology and 
culture to become its current weakened state. European integration has opened up 
an even bigger workplace for migrants, while cheap and large scale transportation 
and communication links have increased their mobility range to an unprecedented 
level. This in turn has led to an increasingly mobile society and culture, where the 
borders delineated by the reality of the nation have become even less adequate for 
millions of Poles and other Europeans. 
The challenge for this article is to contribute to the theoretical, as well as em-
pirical, discourse on issues closely related to migration and identity reconstruction 
and their implications for understanding Europe as a transcultural space where 
“what needs to be recognized, therefore, is […] the dialogical nature of all identi-
                                                     
1 Matthias L. Maier and Thomas Risse, Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses (IDNET 
Final Report), 2003, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/030625_risse_idnet.pdf (accessed 12 
April 2012). 
2 Zygmunt Baumann, Płynna rzeczywistość (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 2006). 
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ties and, consequently, that different cultural identifications can and will, in a mul-
ticultural society, cut across each other’s reified boundaries.”3 Studying migrants’ 
lives leads us to understanding a crucial aspect of the current condition of the 
world where the intermingling, ‘transculturality’ and overlapping of different 
groups in a multicultural society show us the fact that cultures mutually, yet une-
qually, influence each other, continuously evolving and reconfiguring themselves. 
This is why it is important to remember that social identity should be regarded as a 
frequent and never-ending process where something happens rather than as some-
thing one possesses. 
This article is based on a research project conducted in 2008 in Leuven (Bel-
gium) by the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University and the 
Modernity and Society 1800-2000 Unit at the University of Leuven. The research 
consisted of 40 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Polish migrants of all ages 
and social classes, dozens of informal conversations and one month of participant 
observation. 
Social Capital in the Life of Migrants 
One can identify many reasons why the role of social networks, regulated by de-
fined norms, should be treated as an important aspect of the social integration of 
migrants. What is most important for this article is the fact that it has been often 
observed that the quantity and quality of social contacts determines the reconstruc-
tion of the social identity of migrants.4 This happens mainly because people are 
simply influenced by the society surrounding them. This influence is defined best 
as “the process which leads to a change in behaviour, opinions and feelings of an 
individual who is influenced by what others do, how they think and what they 
feel.”5 People simply imitate the behaviour of others, they give in to real or imag-
ined pressures or they conform to those who they consider to have power or au-
thority. This is the process that is best described by the saying “Tell me who your 
friends are, and I will show you who you are.” 
That is why the latest theoretical reflections on social capital of migrants have 
brought a significant distinction of its two functional types: bridging and bonding 
capital. In this context, many researchers point to the fact that in the attempt to 
define the significance of social capital in pluralistic societies, that which is of most 
importance is not the amount of social capital but its quality: if it is bridging or 
bonding. Where bonding capital is understood as inward-looking, reinforcing ex-
                                                     
3 Gerd Baumann, The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), 119. 
4 Dariusz Niedźwiedzki, Migracje i tożsamość: Od teorii do analizy przypadku (Kraków: Zakład 
Wydawniczy Nomos, 2011), 199-265. 
5 Bogdan Wojciszke, Człowiek wśród ludzi: Zarys psychologii społecznej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar, 2002), 246. 
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clusive identities and a homogenous group, bridging capital, on the other hand, is 
outward-looking, linking heterogeneous groups together. The ultimate ideal of 
bridging social capital is the transcendence of different identities, as Putnam com-
ments: “To build bridging social capital requires that we transcend our social and 
political and professional identities […].”6 This distinction is of significant im-
portance in reference to research on the reconstruction process of the dynamics of 
the social identity of migrants, where the mere fact of having social capital, without 
defining its character, says little about their sense of group belonging, loyalty and 
identification. 
Migrants build and maintain networks of social relations with members of the 
host society and this has a great influence on the strategy of their adaptation, the 
process of acculturation and the trajectory of reconstruction of social identity. The 
shape and condition of a migrant’s social capital is of great importance not only for 
them but also for the host society. It can, to a large extent, be an indicator of their 
process of social and cultural integration. 
The experience of migration is first and foremost a change in the social frames 
of reference which organise the life of migrants. As it is known, identity cannot be 
devoid of context, without a mirror in which the subject of interaction can see 
him- or herself, interpret the meaning of these interactions and through them rein-
terpret the image of the self. It exists in a state of constant dialogue between the 
individual and the partners of interactions. As a result of this dialogue, the image 
or imagination of the self is constantly being redefined. This essential assumption 
of the procedural and contextual mechanism of constructing identity is, in this 
research, the basis of understanding the changes that take place in the social identi-
ty of migrants, which is dependent on the quantity and quality of social capital 
which they have access to. The more contact they have with members of the host 
society, the quicker the process of internalisation of new modes of behaviour, sys-
tems of norms, values and meanings can be. The creation of cultural capital in the 
host society, as well as its reproduction in the sending society, is a long-term pro-
cess, full of tension, conflicts and opposing pressures. 
Investment in certain networks of contacts may, on the basis of conversion, 
bring advantages in other types of capital. Each migrant has a limited pool of re-
sources that he can take advantage of in the process of building own social capital. 
Some resources have a reconstructive character, such as money. Social encounters 
are often tied up with the spending of money; therefore not everyone can afford to 
develop a social life. Other resources cannot be reconstructed: the decision to 
spend a holiday with one set of friends automatically excludes a holiday with oth-
ers. Amongst migrants in Leuven, the distribution of these resources occurred in a 
space dictated by two important dimensions. The first dimension was brought 
                                                     
6 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000), 411. 
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about by the need to maintain contacts with social networks left behind in the 
homeland and by the social reality in Leuven. The second dimension was set by the 
tension connected with the need to build social capital amongst the host society on 
the one hand and by upholding contacts with other Polish migrants on the other. 
In other words, every migrant had to make a more or less conscious decision of 
whether to uphold social relations in Poland or in Belgium and, when in Belgium, 
whether contact with compatriots or with the inhabitants of Leuven were more 
important. 
The dynamics of tension between the two opposing poles, Leuven – place of 
origin, most often brought about the need to avoid the trap described in sociologi-
cal literature as the “double absence.”7 The essence of this trap rests on the theory 
that migrants, pendulum migrants included, often stop participating in social net-
works which they belonged to in their society of origin, while at the same time they 
are not able to build the appropriate networks in the host society, by which they 
experience a double exclusion. In their place of origin they are increasingly seen as 
‘Belgians,’ whereas in the place of migration they are still considered as ‘others.’ 
This is where the “double absence” comes from, which according to Sayad may be 
the main cause of psychological discomfort for the migrant. This process may of 
course be double-sided. On the one hand, for the migrants the compatriots left in 
the country of origin become increasingly more foreign with every visit home. On 
the other hand, the reality of the host society never becomes a significant point of 
reference; the process of acculturation was never completed, nor was there a feel-
ing of belonging and identification in the new environment and with the social 
networks. The migrants remain suspended in a permanent liminal state.8 
The second dimension was determined with reference to different aspects of 
the migrants’ reality: one is pragmatic, the other is in a sense phatic. The building 
of social capital in the host society would often result in more or less quantifiable 
effects: it increased the chances of a better paid job and accommodation, it gave 
hope to the chance of finding a place in a nursery or pre-school for one’s kids, it 
provided the opportunity to learn the language quicker and more effectively, it 
would often build the foundation on which one could feel settled and, because of 
this, have a greater confidence in oneself. These utilitarian needs could, of course, 
be met by depending on networks existing amongst Polish compatriots in the host 
society. However, besides this purely instrumental dimension, all migrants talked 
about the profound need to maintain contact with other Poles in order to satisfy 
the purely phatic function of contact with people who share the same cultural base. 
The value of the contact was simply the contact itself. What was valuable was the 
reference to identical or very similar symbolic resources used in the process of 
symbolic interaction. This purely phatic function seemed to be decidedly wide-
                                                     
7 Abdelmalek Sayad, The Suffering of the Immigrant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
8 Zdzisław Mach, Niechciane miasta (Kraków: Universitas, 1998). 
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spread. Even those respondents who openly confessed that they avoided contact 
with other Poles confirmed that from time to time they do meet with their com-
patriots, just because they would not be able to obtain the same satisfaction else-
where that results from the mere possibility to, for example, speak in their native 
language. One of the reasons for seeking partners to form a network of contacts 
based on their non-instrumental character were most likely the rather small social 
distances within the community of migrants living in Leuven. What was decidedly 
characteristic of these social networks was the wide range in the socio-economic 
standing of the participants to be found within them. The variables which usually 
are at the base of forming informal networks in the country of origin, namely age, 
education, economic standing and career, played a much lesser role amongst the 
migrants in Leuven. The most important variable was a common culture and simi-
lar experience, as well as the pure satisfaction of having the possibility to com-
municate easily in a system of natural cultural codes. 
These two dimensions, indicating the poles of tension around which Polish 
migrants built and reproduced their social capital, also indicated the framework of 
their social activities as well as the strength of social affiliations and emotional 
identification. The type of social capital that a migrant enjoyed often indicated the 
strength of group belonging and collective identification. 
Social Capital vs. Social Identity 
The results of empirical research done on the community of Polish migrants in 
Leuven allow us to formulate a thesis about the existence of a discernible relation-
ship between the quantity and the quality of pendulum migrants’ social capital and 
the direction of change in the process of reconstruction of their social identity. 
These relationships fall into a clearly regular pattern, whose essence is best formu-
lated by four ideal types, whose metaphorical names illustrate the situation that is 
representative of the whole Polish migrant population in Leuven. These four types 
are: ‘residents,’ ‘guests,’ ‘commuters’ and ‘diasporians.’9 
Even though these types lack empirical ontic status, they can possess a very 
concrete cognitive value. The names of the ideal types were chosen so that their 
connotations could, in the most effective way, encompass the essence of the 
modes of reconstruction of social identity. The names are not meant to be treated 
in a literal way. At the onset, it is important to clarify that the names have nothing 
to do with the length of migration or the frequency of visits back home. Therefore 
‘commuters’ do not travel back and forth between their homes in Poland and Leu-
ven any more than the other types, while ‘residents’ do not necessarily encompass 
                                                     
9 Marcin Galent, Idesbald Goddeeris and Dariusz Niedźwiedzki, Migration and Europeanisation: Changing 
Identities and Values among Polish Pendulum Migrants and their Belgian Employers (Krakow: Zakład 
Wydawniczy Nomos, 2009), 45-83. 
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those who have been living in Leuven for the longest period of time. The research 
clearly showed that the actual duration of the migratory period, as well as the fre-
quency of visits back to Poland, do not need to have a deciding influence on the 
change of migrants’ social identity. Many migrants whose stay in the host society 
was relatively short were able to very quickly make themselves at home in their 
new environment. Others, due to the deficit of certain resources, competences or 
because of strategic life plans or ideological choices, felt like strangers to Leuven, 
even after more than ten years of migratory peregrination. 
Residents 
What makes ‘residents’ different in a significant way to other Polish migrants is the 
fact that they did not come to Belgium through the mechanism of chain migration, 
but because these were their life plans, aspirations and conscious decisions. Many 
of them had links to the university in Leuven; they had been there as Erasmus 
students, doctorate students or young researchers. They stayed in Belgium not 
because circumstances forced them to do so or because of financial reasons that 
compelled them to, but because they decided that life and work there would guar-
antee them more opportunities for personal development, for achieving higher 
qualifications and for furthering a career that would be more interesting and with 
better prospects: prospects not only in terms of higher wages but also for making 
use of their talents and intellectual potential. A common trait of ‘residents’ was the 
fact that their social identity was very weakly defined by territorial or national iden-
tification, Polish or Belgian. The activities of ‘residents’ were not dictated by a 
national framework but by their individual qualifications, competences, ambitions 
and potential channels of their realisation. These activities are coupled with chang-
es in mentality. The consequence of these changes was the acceptance of their new 
multicultural environment as a naturally ordered world where national and ethnic 
diversity is simply one of the aspects of the lifeworld, or Lebenswelt,10 and where 
multiculturalism is one of the obvious and natural components of life and its eve-
ryday interactions. Polishness does not disappear from their lives, it is treated as 
the kind of natural cultural baggage that everyone in the world carries, and not 
something that is the basis of classification into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The majority of 
respondents treated their decisions as a natural and obvious consequence of living 
in a unified Europe and a globalised world. 
Guests 
The second type of migrants are the ‘guests.’ This type consisted mainly of those 
migrants whose social capital was limited to acquaintances, friends or family who 
                                                     
10 Alfred Schütz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). 
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helped to organise their lives abroad, but while living in Leuven were able to make 
and maintain contacts with ‘others,’ albeit mainly compatriots living in the city. 
This type of social capital had a decidedly binding character right from the start, 
but with time these bonds extended to certain Belgians, with whom relations start-
ed to be close and even intimate. The ‘guests’ mechanism of building social capital 
was determined mainly by practical factors, but with time these factors evolved and 
were supplemented with purely social and disinterested relations. This ability to 
develop close relations with inhabitants of Leuven resulted in a transformation of 
social identity in the direction that can be best described as transnational. The re-
construction of social identity took place in a framework dictated by two national 
cultures and thus somewhere in between what was broadly understood by the mi-
grants to be Polish and Belgian. 
Commuters 
The third type of migrant are ‘commuters.’ Their patterns were characterised by 
the most impoverished social capital, on the whole limited to their closest family 
ties or a wider circle of Polish friends and, as a result, their social capital has an 
unusually binding character. The life of the migrant is dominated by working for 
savings, scrimping in a manner referred to as saving every penny, reducing ex-
penditure and activity outside of work to a minimum. The point of reference was 
always the reality that was left in the country of origin. This was not, however, a 
Poland treated as an ‘imagined community’,11 but more a ‘private’ homeland12 rep-
resented by their home, family and friends in their country. 
Diasporians 
The fourth type of migrant which may be analysed, in terms of the change that 
their social identity underwent in Leuven, are those referred to as ‘diasporians.’ 
What differentiated them completely from the other three types was open verbali-
sation and confirmation of different activities connected to Polishness, understood 
as Polish national identity. What united them was a need to maintain and strength-
en the social networks amongst Poles. The character of their social capital has a 
bridging nature, in the sense that whilst ‘residents’ are not dependent upon institu-
tionalised relations with their fellow countrymen and ‘guests’ and ‘commuters’ tend 
to function only amongst their own particular social networks, the ‘diasporians’ are 
motivated to create a network based on one criteria, namely nationality. However, 
from the perspective of the whole of Leuven’s society, the character of social capi-
tal created in this way has a decidedly binding nature. ‘Diasporians’ try to create 
                                                     
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso 1983). 
12 Stanisław Ossowski, O ojczyźnie i narodzie (Warszawa: PWN 1984). 
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and institutionalise a network of social relations mainly on the basis of belonging 
to Polish culture, understood as a national culture. In a manner different to the 
‘residents’ and ‘guests,’ who do not regard Polishness as an integral, clearly defined 
whole, in the consciousness of the ‘diasporians’ it is reproduced as a precise and 
obvious model. The aim of their activity in Leuven society became to reconcile 
Polishness with emigration.  
Conclusion  
The results of the research presented here use as an indicator the scale and quality 
of the social capital that characterises migrants. An obvious conclusion, in accord-
ance with what was mentioned earlier, is the diversity of the ways in which the 
reconstruction of collective identity is not only illustrated by the migrant popula-
tion of Leuven but also in relation to how a given individual, in the course of his 
career, may adhere to a greater or a lesser extent to these ideal types. It is very easy 
to imagine that, for example, the ‘commuter’ type may also change into one of the 
other three. 
The question connected to numbers and percentages also arises, namely how 
many pendulum migrants in Leuven are ‘residents,’ ‘guests,’ commuters’ or ‘di-
asporians’? The experience we gained from our research is that those with greater 
social capital are generally overrepresented in social research. They are people who 
are generally more open, they do not shun contact with others, they trust that their 
motivation will be in some sense useful. 
The final aspect is the question of to what degree these four types may be ex-
tended to the wider world, to what extent they are limited to the microsociety of 
Polish migrants in Leuven and to what extent they could be used to describe the 
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The Neustadt in Strasbourg 
A Space for Transcultural Identity Building? 
Alexandre Kostka 
Introduction 
In 2012, Strasbourg was actively preparing the application for a UNESCO World 
heritage label for an area which occupies a substantial amount of space of the inner 
city: the so-called Neustadt, a term which designates the urban extension planned 
and built mostly in the North Eastern part of the town between 1878 and 1918, at 
a moment when Alsace-Lorraine was part of the German Reich.1 The Neustadt is 
                                                     
1 This article owes much to the discussions in the framework of the research project “Genèse et 
réception de l’architecture et des formes urbaines dans une région frontalière (1850-1950): Une his-
toire croisée franco-allemande,” which is being conducted since 2010 at the MISHA (Maison Interu-
niversitaire des Sciences Humaines en Alsace; Anne-Doris Meyer, Karine Dupré, Sophie Eberhardt, 
Johannes Dahm). See: www.misha.fr/sites/5/File/li10-misha-web.pdf (accessed 5 April 2012).  
The paper is also much indebted to Marc Schalenberg, Centre for Metropolitan Studies, Berlin, 
for many research perspectives regarding the question of ‘urban icons.’ In the limited space of this 
contribution, many aspects can only be touched upon – they will be developed more fully as the 
research programme at MISHA unfolds. 
The fundamental research on the question has been accomplished by Klaus Nohlen, Baupolitik im 
Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen, 1871-1918: Die repräsentativen Staatsbauten um den ehemaligen Kaiserplatz in 
Strassburg (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1982); French translation: id.: Construire une capitale, Strasbourg impérial de 
1870 à 1918 (Strasbourg: Société savante d’Alsace, 1997); id., “Strasbourg après 1870: réorganisation 
des espaces,” in Villes rattachées, villes reconfigurées XVIe-XXe siècles, ed. Denise Turrel (Tours: Presses 
universitaires François-Rabelais, 2003), 231-45. 
The contribution also draws on many publications, which for reason of space are not always 
mentioned specifically, but which are to be found in the bibliography: François Uberfill, “Strasbourg, 
capitale du Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen: à la découverte de la Neustadt,” Saisons d’Alsace 45 (2010): 
45-53; Strasbourg 1900: Naissance d’une capital, ed. Rodolphe Rapetti (Paris: Somogy, 2000) (holds many 
interesting individual contributions); Jean-Marie Perouse de Montclos and Brigitte Parent, Alsace: Le 
dictionnaire du patrimoine (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 2011); Jean-Pierre Beck, Guy Bronner and 
Dominique Toursel-Harster, Dictionnaire des monuments historiques d’Alsace (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 
1995); Denis Durand de Bousingen et. al., ed., Strasbourg: urbanisme et architecture des origines à nos jours 
(Strasbourg: Oberlin, 1996); Georges Foessel et. al., ed., Strasbourg: Panorama monumental (Strasbourg: 
G4J, 2003; originally published in 1984); Francis Weidmann, Strasbourg, capitale du Reichsland et sa 
nouvelle université (Strasbourg: Oberlin, 1995); Conseil de l’Europe. ed., Le projet urbain dans l’histoire de 
Strasbourg: Actes du colloque des 30 et 31 octobre 1981 (Strasbourg: Conseil de l’Europe, 1983); Angéla 
Kerdilès Weiler, Limites urbaines de Strasbourg, évolution et mutation (Strasbourg: Société Savante d’Alsace, 
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not yet a household name for specialists of urban planning. They are wrong. Turn-
ing the prestigious but somewhat provincial town on the Rhine into a regional 
capital, even a showcase for German Kultur, was one of the most important urban 
planning projects of the 19th century. Baron Haussmann’s intervention on the still 
mostly medieval tissue of Paris (1852-1870) and the construction of the Ringstras-
se (1857-1913, built in several phases) in Vienna were bigger in total size; but if one 
takes as a measure the size of the original town, the construction of the Neustadt 
ranks probably among the most profound restructurings of a traditional habitat, 
since the ‘Old’ town has approximately only one third of the size of its extension 
(230 ha to 610 ha). If the ‘addition’ is bigger than the original portion, a question 
of hierarchy between old and new arises, which otherwise is relevant only in the 
case of colonial towns such as the extension of Delhi to become New Delhi (inau-
gurated in 1913). One has to add another criterion, less visible, but which is at least 
as important. Both Paris and Vienna had, at the moment of the re-engineering of 
the city centre, vibrant outskirts which had flourished with industrialisation.2 None 
of this existed in Strasbourg, still mostly a town of merchants and notables, where 
military reasons (the town was protected by a large ring which was to be flooded as 
the enemy approached) forbade any construction for several kilometres around the 
old fortifications. 
What made this venture even more daring, was its transnational nature, since 
on a multi-layered town existing since Roman times, the authorities of the newly 
founded German Reich were aiming to construct a town that would not only pro-
claim military victory, but would appear to usher the medieval town directly into a 
bright 20th century under a new tutelage – with the clear desire to push the French 
period (which had begun in 1681 with the formal annexation of Strasbourg – until 
then a ‘free city’ under the protection of the Germanic emperor – by the Sun King, 
Louis XIV) into the shade. 
Today, with the Franco-German rapprochement de facto being the ‘motor’ of 
European unification, with the cultural television channel ARTE being symbolical-
ly established at the border of the Rhine, it is a clear signal of a new era of transcul-
tural identity that a French border city like Strasbourg puts forward its ‘Germanic’ 
                                                                                                                                  
2005); François Loyer, Architecture et urbanisme à Strasbourg, 1910-1930, thematic issue of Monuments 
Historiques (Paris: Caisse nationale des monuments historiques et des sites, 1990); contemporanean 
voices: Architekten und Ingenieur Verein für Elsass-Lothringen, ed., Strassburg und seine Bauten 
(Strassburg: Trübner, 1894); Charles Goehner and Emil Brumder, Geschichte der räumlichen Entwicklung 
der Stadt Strassburg (Strasbourg: Heitz & Co., 1935). There are many historical narratives of Strasbourg, 
the most recent are: Benoît Jordan, Histoire de Strasbourg (Paris: Gisserot, 2006); Guy Trendel, Racontez-
moi Strasbourg (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 2006). 
2 The control of a potentially menacing proletarian suburb even was one of the central preoccupa-
tions after the riots of 1848. In Vienna, where the ‘centre’ housed a vulnerable aristocratic society 
which had been blockaded; in Paris, it was rather the control of an equally menacing overpopulated 
city centre that preoccupied Napoleon III. None of these motivations for new city planning exist in 
Strasbourg.  
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cultural heritage in order to receive a UNESCO world heritage label. One has to 
remember that this venture is ‘transnational’ in itself and thus reflects perfectly the 
ultimate aim of UNESCO, which is not to give out ‘good points’ to any given 
particularly meriting nation but to distinguish and protect a cultural good for the 
sake of ‘humankind’ as such. 
Yet, somewhat surprisingly, it is impossible to find a single street in the city 
centre or the Neustadt itself that would be named after one of the mayors who 
engineered the urban planning (Otto Back, Rudolf Schwander) or one of the main 
architects responsible for this very large urban planning project (August Orth, 
Hermann Eggert, Fritz Beblo, Paul Bonatz, Paul Schmitthenner, etc.).3 Even the 
architect who designed the original master plan, Jean-Geoffroy Conrath, although 
a Frenchman appointed during the times of Napoleon III and despite the fact that 
he was able to leave most of the French urban texture untouched, only got a mea-
gre little street in a commercial suburb!4  
It is even fair to say that until very recent times the Neustadt had been some-
what shunned by large parts of the Strasbourg population; its history was not 
shared to the same degree as other central parts of the town in the ‘collective 
memory’ in the sense of the ‘inventor’ of this much-used term, Maurice Halbwachs 
– who became professor at the University of Strasbourg in 1919.5 One of its major 
‘urban icons,’ the Emperor’s Palace (which now houses the Central Commission 
for Navigation on the Rhine) was about to be torn down in the early 1950s, alt-
hough it had survived the war almost unscathed. The unofficial memory states that 
the building owes its survival mainly to its sturdiness – as it was made of massive 
stone, with an impressive iron-concrete structure underlying, the authorities were 
afraid it would be just too costly to blow it up and carry the debris outside the city 
gates. One has to add that for more than one citizen of Strasbourg, this building 
had not been the palace of the Emperor anymore (who, in any case, had had no 
particular taste for the citizen culture of the city and had preferred to dwell in his 
lofty Hohenzollern fairy-dream castle of Hohkönigsburg) but of the terrible Nazi 
Gauleiter Robert Wagner. 
This clearly points to an ‘identity problem,’ which, of course, cannot be ad-
dressed by this publication, but upon which some light can be shed by looking into 
the complicated genesis of the Neustadt and by asking questions about its transna-
                                                     
3 There are of course notable exceptions, that point to a shift of the place of the Neustadt in the 
“mental landscape” of the city, see, for instance, François Uberfill, “Rodolphe Schwander, maire 
alsacien de Strasbourg sous le Reichsland (1906-1918),” in Autour des Dietrich: Hommages à Ady Schwan-
der et Edouard Schloesing, ed. Bernard Vogler (Reichshoffen: Association de Dietrich, 2008), 134-65.  
4 A street named after him is located in the recently urbanised zone ‘Parc des Poteries’; the same 
‘honour’ is shared by Otto Back, who was mayor when he was active (doing what?). 
5 About ‘collective memory,’ see Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturel-
len Gedächtnisses (Munich: Beck, 1999); Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und 
politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (Munich: Beck, 1997). 
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tional nature by making use of the theory of histoire croisée forwarded by Michael 
Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, which seems most appropriate for under-
standing its specificity.6 In particular, we will see how the urban space is punctuat-
ed by ‘urban icons’ which try to connect different cultural spaces – somewhat 
loosely and incorrectly labelled as ‘Germanic’ and ‘French’ – inside the city bor-
ders.7 Altogether, these perspectives may help to gain a new understanding of an 
important part of the Strasbourg cityscape that begins to regain its ‘proper place’ in 
the mental landscape of its inhabitants. 
Town Planning and Building of National Identity  
at the End of the 19th Century 
The French monarchy, which had annexed Alsace Lorraine after the Treaties of 
Westphalia in 1648, for reasons which we cannot address in the framework of this 
paper, never tried to annex Alsace ‘culturally.’8 This was particularly evident as far 
as language was concerned. It was enough that a part of the social elites – those 
who would have to deal with tax collectors, judges, military commanders etc. – 
understood what was asked of them. Conversely, the civil administrators sent from 
Paris, whatever their personal sympathies with Alsace might be (and there seem to 
have been many), never bothered to learn the dialect of the region.  
However, in order to show its newly acquired power, France took a stratagem 
that was to have a long future: it created the first modern ‘urban icon’ in the still 
medieval cityscape: the bishop’s residence, the Palais Rohan. Named after one of 
the families most closely connected to the royal household, the palace was built by 
none other than the Premier architecte du roi, Robert de Cotte, between 1728 and 
1741. Its clear, ‘classical’ style was in sharp contrast with its surroundings; the 
building site itself, which brought together some of the finest craftsmen of France 
and Alsace, proved to be one of the principal ‘design schools,’ which helped bring-
ing Strasbourg into the orbit of the latest Paris fashion. A generation after its con-
                                                     
6 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the 
Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45.1 (2006): 30-50. Originally published in a larger 
framework including case-studies: De la comparaison à l’histoire croisée, ed. Michael Werner and Bénédicte 
Zimmermann (Paris: Seuil, 2004). 
7 The architectural critic Charles Jencks launched the term in 2005, in order to describe the ‘star 
architecture’ that followed the ‘city branding’ by the construction of the Guggenheim Museum in 
Bilbao by Frank O. Gehry (1997); see Charles Jencks, The Iconic Building: The Power of Enigma (New 
York: Rizzoli, 2005); since, the discussion has broadened and has fallen on fertile grounds for earlier 
periods, see Philip J. Ethington and Vanessa R. Schwartz, ed., Urban Icons, special issue of Urban 
History 33:1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See the focus article by Celina Krebs, 
Marc Schalenberg and Sandra Schürmann, “Spektakel, Allheilmittel, Forschungsfeld: Perspektiven auf 
‘Urban Icons,’” Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte 2/2011: 7-16. 
8 This seeming indifference contrasted with a quite pushy attitude towards Lorraine, which officially 
joined France as late as 1766. 
The Neustadt in Strasbourg 
 
221 
struction, in 1773, the young Johann Wolfgang von Goethe paid indirect homage 
to the building, by choosing it as a backdrop in his propaganda for the glorification 
of the Germanic genius of the supposed builder of the Strasbourg cathedral, Erwin 
von Steinbach.9 
The French building policy did, of course, not rest on one single building; a lit-
tle later, in 1765, the famous architect Jacques-François Blondel presented the 
project for a complete redesign of the city-centre – a project that lacked funding 
and political will, but which nevertheless brought about the destruction of the last 
remnant of the status of Strasbourg as ‘free city,’ the former town hall, and the 
construction of the Aubette, a large rectangular building which was to house the 
military commander of the citadel. 
Thus when the Germans moved in to conquer the city, they found a surround-
ing that seemed not unlike the cityscape they could find in Nuremberg, Augsburg, 
or other cities of the Southern part of Germany. On the other side, the Alsatians, 
who had strong regional links with Baden, Württemberg, and the Palatinate, were 
surprised that the Prussians did not resemble at all their peaceful neighbours.  
The linguistic factor proved to be a false indicator and might have been re-
sponsible for much of the future misunderstandings (both in the symbolic and 
concrete sense). Most of the population of Alsace and much of the population of 
Lorraine spoke a German dialect (several, in fact, with regional differences as in 
Switzerland). The Alsatian language has survived in parts until today, but it is far 
from having the importance it had in the late 19th century, when only the upper 
strata of society (i.e. those who were in touch with the authorities in Paris) were 
completely fluent in ‘high’ French.10 This linguistic factor, together with the strong 
presence of Protestantism in its Lutheran version (France is mostly Catholic and 
the Protestant minority is of Calvinist obedience), contributed to persuading the 
German political and military authorities that they would be able to convince the 
inhabitants of the region to join the national framework Bismarck was establishing 
after the victory of 1871. 
At the outset, the attitude of the German authorities vis-à-vis Strasbourg was 
quite moderate and they wished to avoid the impression that a hard yoke was im-
posed upon the population. The Germans also felt they had to make good for the 
heavy destructions they had inflicted upon the town during a siege which had de-
generated into one of the first massive destructions of ‘cultural heritage’ in Europe 
since the Napoleonic times. Indeed, the German armies under General von 
                                                     
9 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Von deutscher Baukunst: D.M. Ervini a Steinbach, originally published in Von 
Deutscher Art und Kunst: Einige fliegende Blätter, ed. Johann Gottfried Herder (Hamburg: Bode, 1773). 
10 On the strong links of the cultural elites in Strasbourg with France, see Anne-Doris Meyer, Au 
service de l’Alsace: lettres d’Hugo Haug à Henri Albert, 1904-1914 (Strasbourg: Publications de la Société 
savante d’Alsace, 2010); Bernard Vogler, Histoire culturelle de l’Alsace: Du Moyen Age à nos jours – Les très 
riches heures d’une région frontière (Strasbourg: La Nueé bleue, 1994). 
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Werder, knowing the symbolic value of a conquest of Strasbourg, wished not to 
lose time and during the shelling of the heavy fortification many historical build-
ings such as the cathedral got badly damaged while the Art Museum and the Li-
brary (containing a very precious Medieval manuscript, the Hortus Deliciarum) as 
well as the Opera house were destroyed. In the years following the conquest, the 
Germans simply ‘repaired’ what they had destroyed, rebuilding the Opera house 
and various churches and civil buildings, which had suffered from the bombarding, 
just as they had been before.  
At a time when the German Empire thought to establish itself as a Kulturstaat, 
Strasbourg became a showcase. ‘Culture’ was the magical word, which would allow 
for making forget the violent conquest of the city and would also give meaning to 
Bismarck’s politico-military establishment of the nation-state (which would soon 
be ridiculed in Nietzsche’s Untimely Considerations). As soon as summer 1871, the 
University was at the centre of preoccupation, a library was founded and generous-
ly funded, and an art gallery was established which took as its model the prestig-
ious Berlin museum.11 This ‘soft’ approach was also in line with a general policy, 
which might be described as ‘functionalist’ (if one admits a ‘loose’ definition): as 
more and more opportunities would arise in the political and economic realm and 
spaces for decisions would progressively be shifted to local authorities, it was 
hoped that Alsatians would take the chance to participate, even that the social 
elites themselves would take initiatives in order to show their new solidarities. In 
the past, had not the neighbouring German regions of Baden, Württemberg, and 
the Palatinate shown their political sympathies with Paris by adopting the latest 
French styles, going as far as to invite the architects of the king in Versailles to 
draw up their châteaux (Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Solitude close to Stuttgart, etc.)? 
For many reasons, it soon became clear that, if Strasbourg would have to live 
up to its new function as regional capital of the ‘new’ German state of Alsace-
Lorraine, it had to be equipped accordingly and that the initiative had to come 
from outside. In 1873, the German authorities took direct charge of municipal 
administration, disbanded the city council and imposed Otto Back as caretaker 
municipal administrator (for which the German language holds the delicious ex-
pression of Bürgermeistereiverwalter). Back proved to be an energetic administrator, 
slowly gaining the respect of the citizens he was administering. This move lead to 
the establishment of the Neustadt, or ‘German town,’ not as an extension of the 
‘Old,’ culturally multi-layered Strasbourg but as a side-by-side venture of a model 
city which was erected on formerly virgin grounds.  
                                                     
11 Bernadette Schnitzler, Histoire des musées de Strasbourg: des collections entre France et Allemagne (Stras-
bourg: Musées de la Ville de Strasbourg, 2009); Tanja Baensch, “Un petit Berlin“? Die Neugründung der 
Straßburger Gemäldesammlung durch Wilhelm Bode im zeitgenössischen Kontext: Ein Beitrag zur Museumspolitik 
im deutschen Kaiserreich (Göttingen: V & R unipress, 2007). 
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How to Connect a ‘New’ City to Its Urban History? 
Figure 112 
 
Figure 213  
                                                     
12 AVCUS (Archives de la Ville et de la Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg). 
13 Ibid. 
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As soon as 1871, the military engineers started to think about a possible extension 
of the city, which was conditioned to the structure of the fortification.14 Since the 
17th century, the city had been defended according to a plan designed by the archi-
tect of the ‘iron belt,’ Vauban.15 The improvement of the artillery made this strate-
gy obsolete and the German military designed a new line of outpost forts, which 
were to block approaching armies far enough away to prevent a bombardment 
such as the one they themselves had inflicted. Only in 1875, when this line was 
completed, could a new urban planning be seriously considered: in Metz, the main 
fortress against France, the German military prevented any new construction until 
1902! It was only a direct order from Wilhelm II, given in his capacity a supreme 
commander of the armed forces, that opened the way.16  
This still left unanswered the question of how to construct the new ‘German’ 
city, a question which was of course loaded with heavy political implications.  
In 1877, two projects were submitted for final decision by the authorities: one 
by the Berlin architect August Orth and one by Jean-Geoffroy Conrath, the archi-
tect in chief of the city, who had been appointed in the days of Napoleon III and 
who had chosen to stay and work together with the German authorities.  
Interestingly, it is the solution suggested by the Berlin architect Orth that bears 
most witness to the influence of the plans developed by Baron Haussmann in Paris 
– one could almost speak of the return of a French design via Germany to the 
border region separating the two countries. Orth suggested a complete redesign of 
the city in order to connect the new city to the old, which would have completely 
altered not only the central part of the French period from the 18th century, the 
Place Broglie, but would also have destroyed a large part of the urban habitat da-
ting from the German period of the 16th and 17th century (figure I). This echoes 
the way Haussmann moved through large parts of the medieval Paris, especially in 
the Ile de la Cité, where few stones were left unturned. 
In contrast, the plan of Conrath (figure II) appeared to be quite moderate, as 
he suggested to keep the existing town intact, with very few alterations only where 
the two towns were to be connected (on the site of the former north western forti-
fication, where several old bridges had to give way to new structures).  
Instead of connecting the old and the new towns by means of designing large 
avenues prolonging the New City into the Old – as Haussmann had done in Paris, 
whose example Orth was ready to follow –, Conrath suggested that the two parts 
of the future Strasbourg should be held together by an optical reference to the one 
iconic building upon which the Alsatian bourgeoisie and the Germans could all 
                                                     
14 See Nohlen, note 1. 
15 Roland Recht, Georges Foessel and Jean-Pierre Kelin, Connaître Strasbourg (Strasbourg: Alsatia, 
1988), and references note 1. 
16 Jean-Jacques Cartal, Dominique Laburte and Paul Maurand, Les villes pittoresques: Études sur 
l’architecture et l’urbanisme de la ville allemande de Metz entre 1870 et 1918 (Nancy: C.E.M.P.A., 1981). 
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agree: the Cathedral.17 Though the Cathedral is universally known, it might be 
necessary to remind the reader that its spire was the tallest historical building in 
Christendom until the tower of the Cathedral of Ulm received a metal contraption 
in 1890 which made it slightly higher than Strasbourg. Very astutely, Conrath’s 
plans were designed in such a way that the tower of the Cathedral should be visible 
from almost any central point of the Neustadt.  
Using the Cathedral as ‘urban icon,’ Conrath would be able to respect both the 
contract of connecting the Old and the New towns and to respect the cultural 
multi-layer structure that has given the town its very special transcultural identity 
up to now. 
With a very small majority, it was Conrath’s design that was finally agreed upon 
by the authorities. One has to bear in mind, however, that already at that moment, 
the discussion was not polarised around ‘national’ issues but rather by a techno-
cratic way of thinking, which focused around a book such as Reinhardt Baumeis-
ter’s Urban Extension in Technical, Security and Economical Aspects, which was published 
in 1876 and had received a large reception.18 Baumeister was even one of the 
members of the jury, who gave the contract to Conrath. It is thus fair to state that 
besides ‘national’ considerations (which were of course present) there is another 
discourse that is parallel, which is the discourse of the ‘expert’ who is not linked to 
a particular nation but to a field of competence. This ‘transnational expert 
knowledge’ is one of the aspects that current historical presentations of urban 
planning, which are too nation-focused, have frequently underestimated.  
This left open the question in what style the New City was to be constructed. 
At the time of nation-building, stylistic options were never simply a matter of aes-
thetics.19 Especially in Germany, the new nation state thought to establish itself by 
means of a ‘patriotic’ Gothic, or rather neo-gothic, style. Later on, when it became 
common knowledge that the Gothic style was actually of French origin, it was the 
Roman style that was mostly chosen for official buildings such as schools, post 
offices, barracks, and railway stations – and the case of Metz bears witness to this 
(sometimes very loud) message in stone. It is therefore surprising to notice that in 
Strasbourg this visual language is almost absent. With some notable exceptions 
such as the Central Post Office (1899, Neo-Gothic) and the Central Synagogue 
                                                     
17 The number of books on the cathedral of Strasbourg alone testify to its ‘iconic’ status, see: Stras-
bourg: La grâce d’une cathédrale, ed. Mgr Joseph Doré (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 2007), which contains 
an extensive bibliography. 
18 Reinhardt Baumeister, Stadterweiterungen in technischer, baupolizeilicher und wirtschaftlicher Beziehung (Ber-
lin: Ernst & Korn, 1876). See also the very influential book of the architect in charge of the almost 
contemporanean Neustadt of Cologne (1881, doubling the size from 400h to 800h), Joseph Stübben, 
Der Städtebau: Handbuch der Architektur (Darmstadt: Bergstrasser, 1890), which was to become a text-
book for urban planning, republished in several editions until 1924. 
19 Ekkehard Mai and Stephan Waetzold, ed., Kunstverwaltung, Bau- und Denkmal-Politik im Kaiserreich 
(Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1981). 
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(1896, Neo-Roman, demolished during the Nazi occupation in 1940-41), the Neu-
stadt is built in a heteroclite association of styles, combining mostly Neo-
Renaissance (both in its ‘Italian’ and ‘South-German’ version) and Neo-Baroque, 
but also associating elements of Orientalism20, Art Nouveau21, and even frequent 
allusions to such typically French styles as Louis XIII and even the sober French 
baroque favoured under Louis XIV. It frequently happens, as in the case of the 
headquarter of the former insurance company ‘Germania’ (1885, subsequently 
named ‘Gallia’), that a single building exhibits even a multi-layer style, where 
‘German Renaissance’ with its use of brick and stone alludes to the French Louis 
XIII style.22  
The Neustadt and Its Stylistic Heterogeneity:  
A Discussion about Transnational City Building? 
The history of architecture is itself a tributary to national stereotypes.23 Since build-
ing is considered to be the most symbolic gesture of sovereignty, historians of 
architecture have a natural tendency to apply this criterion to the urban projects 
they consider. Thus they tend to overestimate the impact of the nation-state on 
building policies, which pervade not only the state architecture (like the Palace of 
the Emperor, the University, etc.) but also a large quantity of ‘private’ buildings 
which obey to a different agenda. These entrepreneurs did not want to fulfil a ‘pat-
riotic’ programme but tried to keep their options open, in order to attract patrons 
which desired to live in a ‘neutral’ setting. Including ‘French’ styles (such as the 
already mentioned Louis XIII) was also a way of indicating to potential Alsatian 
patrons that they were welcome as well.24 Looked upon closely enough, the homo-
                                                     
20 The orientalizing style is for instance to be seen at the ‘Egyptian house’ (Maison égyptienne, archi-
tect François Scheyder, decorator Adolphe Zilly), 10 Avenue du Général Rapp, constructed between 
1905 and 1906. 
21 See Shelly Hornstein, Tendance d’architecture Art Nouveau à Strasbourg, PhD thesis (Strasbourg: Univer-
sité de Strasbourg, 1981). 
22 Immeuble Gallia (1885, architects Heinrich Joseph Kayser, Karl von Großheim), 1 Boulevard de la 
Victoire, Strasbourg. The building was said to be the “most beautiful” in Strasbourg; Kayser and von 
Großheim established a successful office and belonged to the top league of the Berlin architects, 
where they worked, for instance, alongside a giant such as Alfred Messel, for the Wertheim Depart-
ment store chain (Alexanderplatz building). Both Kayser and von Großheim were students of August 
Orth, who had submitted one of the ‘master-plans’ for the Strasbourg Neustadt (see above). They 
were also the architects of many residential villas in the Tiergarten, the best address in Berlin.  
23 Volker Gebhardt, Das Deutsche in der deutschen Kunst (Cologne: Dumont, 2004) (with bibliographical 
references); Andreas Daum, “Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the Nation,” in 
Berlin-Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation and National Identities, ed. Andreas 
Daum and Christoph Mauch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-28.  
24 Quite few Alsatian or French families seem to have accepted this offer, giving the Neustadt a quite 
coherent ‘Germanic’ sociological profile; for the relations between Germans and Alsatians, see the 
standard work by François Uberfill and Pierre Aycoberry, La société strasbourgeoise entre France et Alle-
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geneously ‘Germanic’ character gives way to a more flexible approach. One can go 
as far as considering that the architecture of Strasbourg can be judged most accu-
rately against the background of an approach labelled histoire croisée and developing 
a special sensibility for aspects which are suppressed by a univocally national per-
spective.25  
This is one of the angles of a current research project which has been conduct-
ed under the supervision of Hervé Doucet and the author since 2010 at the 
MISHA (Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences Humaines en Alsace).26 For in-
stance, it is interesting to note – and demands investigation – that many of the 
architects who were active in Strasbourg did not only work in Strasbourg but ra-
ther developed a ‘regional’ identity that stretched out to the capital of the neigh-
bouring region of Baden, Karlsruhe, were many of them received professional 
training. The same applies to many of the artisans, masons, bricklayers, or carpen-
ters, who moved from building site to building site according to the economic 
situation, carrying with them certain styles and professional tendencies. Similarly, it 
has to be asked how the buildings were perceived during the moment of their con-
struction, whether there was a specific ‘intention’ and how this was being con-
veyed, and how the diverse categories of ‘public’ responded to this offer. This 
should also include the important – yet total neglected – question of how this 
building project (one of the largest of the German Empire as a whole) was market-
ed.27 
In addition, the case of the Neustadt also shows that cultural historians have to 
remember one of the central rules of their craft and be very careful about the pre-
cise date of the building that is considered; looked upon closely enough, the object 
Neustadt tends to show several facets that do not necessarily totally overlap. Indeed, 
the case of the Municipal Bath28 (built 1904-1910), for instance, shows that this 
building, although it is situated in the central perimeter of the official building pro-
ject, in immediate vicinity of the University and not too far away from the Central 
Post Office29 (both of which are emblematic buildings of the Reich), bears witness 
                                                                                                                                  
magne (1871-1924): la société strasbourgeoise à travers les mariages entre Allemands et Alsaciens à l’époque du 
Reichsland – Le sort des couples mixtes après 1918 (Strasbourg: Société savante d’Alsace, 2001).  
25 See note 6. 
26 See above, note 1. 
27 See Thomas Biskup and Marc Schalenberg, “Die Vermarktung Berlins in Geschichte und Gegen-
wart,” in Selling Berlin: Imagebildung und Stadtmarketing von der preußischen Residenz bis zur Bundeshauptstadt, 
ed. Thomas Biskup and Marc Schalenberg (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), 9-21. 
28 Bains Municipaux (1905-1908, 1910-11, architect Fritz Beblo), 10 Boulevard de la Victoire. 
29 Hôtel des Postes (1897-1899, architects Ewald von Rechenberg and Ernst Hake), 2 Boulevard de la 
Victoire. Initially, the building was supposed to be built in Neo-Renaissance; finally, on the insistence 
of the Secretary of State von Stephan, the more ‘Germanic’ Neo-Gothic was chosen, see Harry Franz 
and Maryline Simler, 1899, l’Hôtel des Postes de Strasbourg (Strasbourg: Société d’histoire de La Poste et 
de France Telecom en Alsace, 2009). 
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to a completely different spirit of organizing the urban space.30 Its aim is certainly 
not, as one might hastily consider, to bring the gift of ‘German’ spirit of cleanliness 
to a French public which supposedly too infrequently made use of soap. Rather, it 
has to be seen against the backdrop of a new feeling of proud self-administration 
of the municipal authorities under the leadership of the energetic left wing politi-
cian Rudolf Schwander, who, after the German authorities had transferred powers 
back to the elected mayor, embarked on a vast series of enterprises showing the 
initiative of the city. The building, designed by the municipal architect Fritz Beblo, 
displays a style that could be located as a Neo-Baroque, which is also to be found 
in other cities on the Rhine. For instance, the round entrance can also be found in 
the castle Biebrich in Wiesbaden (1700-1750). But with its vast roof, besides being 
close to the church of St. Thomas, it is also reminiscent of other constructions of 
Beblo, such as his schools in Neudorf, which try to develop a specific ‘Alsatian’ 
regional style (Heimatstil).31 This again can be seen against the backdrop of another 
prominent building which was inaugurated in the same year not far from Stras-
bourg: the imperial castle of Hohkönigsburg (Haut-Koenigsbourg), where the 
Berlin architect Bodo Ebhardt, on the grounds of a former building dating from 
medieval times, between 1901 and 1908 built a romantic interpretation of a Ho-
henzollern fortress.  
Interestingly, in the course of the conception, the city council sent a group of 
specialists to several German and Austrian towns in order to better understand the 
latest techniques – thus reinforcing the role of an ‘expertise’ group that did not 
obey to ‘nationalist’ motives but rather to a new ideal of ‘transnational’ savoir faire. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, we might say that the closer you look at the picture, the more com-
plicated it gets, since many intentions overlay each other. Only a hasty and preju-
diced view can summarise the very complex process of urban town planning under 
the category of ‘nation building.’ The process could better be understood as a con-
stant discussion between many groups: politicians, entrepreneurs, patrons, archi-
tects, builders, etc., who have different motivations at different times. Thus the 
case of the Neustadt in Strasbourg is, namely because of its size and duration, very 
different from similar enterprises in Metz or Colmar. Whereas the small city of 
                                                     
30 Didier Laroche, “L’architecture de Fritz Beblo (1872-1947), Stadtbaumeister de Strasbourg,” in 
Strasbourg 1900 (see note 1), 192-9; Liane Zoppas, Les Bains, mémoire de TPFE (Strasbourg: Ecole 
d’architecture, 1997). 
31 Interesting perspectives in Wolfgang Voigt, “Académies et manuels de directives (Baufibel): les 
manières françaises et allemandes pour imposer un style architectural à l’Alsace,” Revue d’Alsace 131 
(2005): 209-17. See also Bauen auf Tradition: Fritz Beblo 1872-1947, Stadtbaurat in Strassburg und München, 
exhibition catalogue (Munich: Stadtarchiv München, 1991). 
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Colmar does not leave enough room for a vast building project and the mainly 
military character of Metz does not leave enough space for a municipal enterprise, 
Strasbourg can truly claim to be a laboratory for transnational urban planning – but 
just as not every laboratory test is successful, in the case of the Alsatian capital, it is 
equally not possible to state that the process was in each and every case convinc-
ing. This trial-and-error principle conduced to self-criticism, as was the case with 
Beblo, who tried to develop a more ‘human’ and ‘historical’ approach for the last 
phase of urban planning in Strasbourg before the Germans had to leave. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the Alsatians tended to prefer living 
outside the Neustadt, leaving this area mostly to the newcomers from the Reich (for 
which the term Altdeutsche was invented – those who come from the ‘old Germa-
ny’). It is interesting to notice that even today, the Neustadt, which is adjacent to the 
main European institutions (European Parliament, European Commission build-
ing, etc.) is housing a much higher proportion of ‘transcultural’ inhabitants than 
‘pure’ Alsatians. With a lapse of several generations, continuity (albeit not the one 
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A Cultural-Sociological Approach to  
Democratization and Europeanization 
Paul Blokker 
Introduction 
In the last two decades, the study of democratization in the new European Union 
member states has predominantly been concerned with the identification of the 
emergence of stable democratic orders, i.e., the consolidation of liberal-democratic, 
constitutional regimes. In a related way, it is widely accepted that democratization 
is not only about legal-procedural institutions, but that well-functioning democra-
cies also need a democratic culture. In other words, democratic regimes do not 
merely consist of a set of ‘hard’ institutions (the constitution, separation of powers, 
the rule of law), but also need a supportive cultural substratum of ‘soft’ institutions 
in the form of what is variably referred to as a ‘background culture,’ ‘political cul-
ture,’ ‘civic,’ or ‘public culture’.1 
However, and this is the contention of this article, in most democratization 
studies, the recognition of a cultural dimension to democracy tends to overlook a 
plurality of possible understandings of democracy (in turn reflected in locally dis-
tinct political cultures), the open-ended nature of the democratic idea and the role 
of imagination in democracy as well as the role of conflict in democratic (meta- ) 
politics. Research on the new democracies reflects little on issues such as the dif-
ferentiated development of cultural underpinnings of democracy, the dependence 
of political cultures on the specific cultural contexts in which democracies emerge, 
and the possible relation between contextual differences and different normative 
models. There is a certain predominance of a one-dimensional, Schumpeterian 
account of democracy. In this, the necessity of a supportive democratic political 
culture is presupposed, but its nature is widely understood in an aprioristic sense.2 
                                                     
1 Cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Dieter 
Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison between 
East and West,” in Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 25-66. 
2 See, for instance: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Significant excep-
tions are: John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across 
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Here I argue that a pluralistic, cultural-sociological approach to democratic political 
culture would positively influence our understanding of the cultural dimensions of 
democratization. I therefore suggest a ‘multiple democracies’ approach in analysing 
the new EU member states, which understands Europeanization as including pro-
cesses of politico-cultural differentiation.3 The approach and its rationale will be 
briefly discussed below and some examples of the development of political cul-
tures in the new democracies in East-Central Europe will be provided. 
Democratization and Political Culture 
The conventional understanding of  political culture relates democracy closely to a 
liberal, representative democratic regime in which politics is largely confined to a 
formalised political sphere, populated by political parties, and where political 
culture takes the role of  a background culture which reflects the normative 
underpinnings of  such an institutional order. On this view, political culture 
comprises values and orientations that eschew sharp conflict and endorse 
cooperation, moderation or self-restraint, trust, and lawful behaviour. A “genuine 
democratic political culture”,4 according to democratization theorists, “embodies 
high levels of  interpersonal trust, a readiness to deal with political conflict through 
compromise rather than coercion or violence, and acceptance of  the legitimacy of  
democratic institutions.”5  
The close linkage between an institutional order – that of  a liberal-
representative democracy – and a democratic political culture is, however, 
problematic. Conventional analyses of  democratic political culture ignore three 
interrelated aspects that indicate the possibility of  a differentiation of  democratic 
political cultures as well as a strenuous relation between political cultures and the 
institutionalization of  democratic politics: 
 
 the historical and contextual nature of  ‘really existing’ political cultures;  
 the dual rather than singular ‘meta-imaginary’ of  democracy on which 
democratic political cultures are based (i.e., a rights-based, constitutional 
imaginary, on the one hand, and a substantive, participatory, or 
                                                                                                                                  
Thirteen Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Fuchs and Klingemann, “Demo-
cratic Communities in Europe”; Harald Wydra, Communism and the Emergence of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
3 See Paul Blokker, Multiple Democracies in Europe: Political Culture in New Member States (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
4 Attila Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans (Northampton, MA: Edward  
Elgar, 1998), 22. 
5 Bruce Parrott, “Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization,” in The Consolidation of Democracy 





emancipatory imaginary, on the other);  
 the inherent indeterminacy and contestability of  modern democracy. 
 
The risk of an a-historical, universalised, and one-dimensional perception of de-
mocracy lies in the negligence of the question of a significant variety between 
democratic political cultures, ultimately based on differing combinations of the 
dual dimension of constitutional order and civic participation/emancipation. A 
monist view tends to equate democratic political culture with a national liberal 
culture and in this to disregard historically contrasting pathways of democratization 
(a good example here are the classical cases of France and the United States), as 
well as the persistence of divergent perceptions of democracy within democracies, 
available in both the public sphere and political society.  
In contrast to a monist view, democracy as an idea and practice is multi-
interpretable and ‘essentially contestable.’ Therefore, the analysis of  democratic 
political culture needs to go beyond a conceptualization that understands political 
culture as a (passive) internalization of  the political system in individual attitudes 
and should be rather understood as involving the continuous (active) construction 
of  different views of  what democracy is – and ought to be – about. Paul 
Lichterman and Daniel Cefai provide a definition that can be a starting basis for 
going beyond the limited focus on liberal-representative democracy to include a 
variety of  wider political claims. In their view, political culture consists of  “the sets 
of  symbols and meanings or styles of  action that organise political claims-making 
and opinion-forming, by individuals or collectivities. By culture, we mean patterns 
of  publicly shared symbols, meanings, or styles of  action which enable and 
constrain what people can say and do.”6 
The idea of  multiple democracies entails that democratic political cultures can 
be conceptualised in different and sometimes mutually exclusive ways. Regarding 
the political reality of  the new democracies, not only can it be argued that a range 
of  perceptions of  democracy and primary justifications among both elites and 
masses have been playing a role in the democratization processes, but also that the 
way democracies have been institutionalised remains potentially open to normative 
critique. As, early in the 1990s, Michael Walzer has argued with regard to a dual 
widespread commitment to both democratic government and to the politics of  
difference in the region: “[T]heir simultaneous success is bound to pluralize 
democracy in a radical way. It will produce a number of  different ‘roads to 
democracy’ and a variety of  ‘democracies’ at the end of  the road – a prospect 
difficult to accept for those who believe that democracy is the single best form of  
                                                     
6 Paul Lichterman and Daniel Cefai, “The Idea of Political Culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contex-
tual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 392. 
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government.”7 
The delineation of a “genuine democratic political culture” as in the monist 
understanding becomes then a chimera. Democratic political culture can be under-
stood as ‘produced’ in particular political struggles in distinct historical situations, 
based on cultural orientations ultimately grounded in the dual imaginary dimension 
of democracy. Political cultures (and their reflection in institutional constellations) 
rest upon the values and meanings that the relevant social agents invoke, repro-
duce as well as modify in the process. This, among others, means that any demo-
cratic political culture possibly also includes traditional, religious, as well as politi-
cal-ethical components, and ultimately is not reducible to a ‘thin,’ liberal political 
culture that is generally supportive of an ‘objective’ liberal democratic order. But it 
also means that any democratic regime is always open to claims for the further 
democratization of democracy. 
Multiple Democracies and Democratic Ethics 
As observed by Alessandro Ferrara, democracy cannot persevere and flourish if 
there is not also a ‘spirit of democracy’ that sustains democratic politics.8 Ferrara 
elaborates on a number of basic democratic attitudes or cultural presuppositions of 
democracy that would make up a spirit of democracy: a passion for the public or 
the common good, a passion for equality, a passion for individuality, and a passion 
for openness. The upshot of these basic predispositions is that democratic regimes 
need their citizens and elites to pursue these passions to make democracy work 
over time. 
An important and related question then becomes: is there only one spirit of 
democracy that reflects these passions or might we identify different spirits, or, at 
least, different combinations and emphases of passions in distinct democratic spir-
its? It seems right to affirm the second observation, in that even in the heartland of 
modernity, Western Europe and North America, differences in both a synchronic 
and diachronic sense can be observed. In the works of Charles Taylor and Michèle 
Lamont & Laurent Thévenot, differences in emphasis – regarding individuality, 
ideas of market competition, and solidarity – are elaborated with regard to France 
and the United States.9  
What is more, it seems hard to deny that Western modern democracy has itself 
changed over time, in terms of its emphases on distinct passions. Today, democra-
                                                     
7 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), ix-x; cf. Charles Taylor, “Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy,” 
Public Culture 19.1 (2007): 117-50. 
8 Alessandro Ferrara, Democrazia e apertura (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2011), 48. 
9 Taylor, “Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy”; Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot, ed., 
Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States (Cam-




cy is deemed to be in a moment of difficulty and this observation has led demo-
cratic theorists to look for new or renewed principles to re-invigorate democratic 
politics. As is well-known, one dimension of renovation is identified in terms of 
deliberation as a defining aspect of democracy. The latter can be related to Ferra-
ra’s passion for the public, that is, public reason as a fundamental element of dem-
ocratic societies. Another important shift in democratic thinking is the re-
interpretation of equality as recognition.10 
In my own work, I have proposed a political and cultural-sociological ap-
proach to the analysis of democratic political cultures, which is grounded in the 
idea of a variety of ‘ethics of democracy.’11 Democratic political cultures can be 
identified on the basis of distinct patterns of cultural repertoires, themselves 
grounded in specific ethics of democracy. Ethics of democracy can be seen as 
orientating principles in two ways: in a normative sense as a guide to what is to be 
valued in a democratic regime and in a cognitive sense as an organising/structuring 
principle of democratic discourse, i.e., defining which political as-
pects/characteristics are relevant for realising a democratic regime. In my ap-
proach, I have derived these ethics from normative political theory, but they 
should not be taken to be exhaustive. The suggestion is that these democratic eth-
ics are analytical ideal-types of modes of justification that will not be found in any 
pure sense in ‘actually existing’ democratic discourses. These ethics rather emerge 
in distinct combinations and hybrid ways and will be hierarchised or ordered in 
distinct ways in particular discourses as well as combined with other justificatory 
ideas. 
In the case of the processes of democratization in East-Central Europe, four 
democratic ethics seem particularly relevant for an analysis of the political cultures 
that have emerged since 1989: the ethics of rights, of identity, of solidarity, and of 
participation. The first democratic ethic, the ‘ethic of rights,’ is about the priority 
of individual rights and the containment of political power by means of the rule of 
law. This ethic is close to an identification of democracy with the liberal model of 
constitutional democracy in its emphasis on individual rights, legal procedures, the 
equality of citizens before the law, and the eschewal of collectivist elements. The 
ethic of rights has clearly played a predominant role in the emergence of the new 
democracies, not least due to its centrality in the discourse of dissidents as well as 
in that of external actors, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. 
A second ethic is the ‘ethic of identity,’ based on a priority of commonality in 
terms of a defining historical, cultural, or linguistic identity or group boundaries 
and a related understanding of the common good. In other words, identity or 
commonality plays an important role in defining the in- and outsiders of a political 
community and explicates what the former have in common. The democratic di-
                                                     
10 Ferrara, Democrazia e apertura, 49. 
11 Blokker, Multiple Democracies in Europe. 
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mension to identity is the idea that democratic politics can only work in a meaning-
ful way if there is a sufficient basis in terms of a shared set of norms, values, and 
cultural capacities within a society.  
This ethic of identity is invoked when a shared ‘thick’ identity (i.e., as grounded 
in language, common traditions, and history), and its continuous preservation and 
flourishing is understood as a significant aim of a democratic polity. An ethic of 
identity has been important in different ways in the emergence of all new democ-
racies. Discourses related to the nation and national sovereignty have played a very 
important role in defining the novel identities of the political communities that 
have replaced the communist regimes. However, while some notion of commonal-
ity seems indispensible for a democratic regime (hence discussions regarding a 
European demos), this collectivist dimension can all too easily slip into a less dem-
ocratic mode. The recent events in Hungary, where democratic politics grounded 
in a political culture emphasising liberal-legal aspects has been pushed into the 
defensive by the current centre-right government which seeks recourse to an alter-
native, identity-based political culture, are a case in point. The protection and 
strengthening of a distinct Hungarian identity – and related notions such as nation-
al sovereignty, nationality, national culture and religion – is professed to be the 
overriding aim of the current government, while individual rights, the rule of law, 
and constitutionalism have clearly become subordinated goals, threatening the 
democratic nature of the Hungarian political order. 
A third ethic is the ‘ethic of self-rule,’ based on a priority of the idea of sub-
stantive participation. In the active, substantive conception of participation, popu-
lar sovereignty or democratic self-rule does not mean the transfer of sovereignty to 
an administering state, but self-rule is rather grounded in society and seen as an 
end in itself. In other words, a society is deemed democratic if there is a structural 
and meaningful way for citizens to participate in the rule-making of that society. 
This participatory dimension, which can in some ways be related to a republican 
idea of democracy, has played a major role in the dissident endeavour in the 1970s 
and 1980s and has had – in different ways and to different extents – some institu-
tional repercussions, not least regarding local forms of democracy in the region.12 
Finally, the fourth ethic, the ‘ethic of  distributive justice’ or ‘solidarity,’ is based on 
the priority of  substantive, socio-economic equality and values such as equality for 
democratic participation. The democratic dimension here implies that citizen 
participation can be only meaningful if  certain basic conditions have been fulfilled, 
in terms of  livelihood and security. The solidarity dimension has played a role in 
the new democracies in that, for instance, social rights have been valued relatively 
highly throughout the region 
                                                     
12 See: Paul Blokker, “Dissidence, Republicanism, and Democratic Change,” East European Politics and  




In my research on East-Central Europe, plurality became clear from a concise 
survey of political elite discourses in three countries in twenty years of democrati-
zation. The political cultural composites of three new democracies, as expressed by 
political elites, can be concisely designated as a legalistic-communitarian one (Hun-
gary), a civic rights-religious one (Poland), and a communitarian-Europeanist one 
(Romania). A democratic discourse informed by an ethic of rights could be found 
in all three new democracies. In Hungary, the balance has now shifted, in that the 
predominance of a rights-based discourse, grounded in the notions of a Rechtsstaat 
and the rule of law, and also reflected in the constitution, is now the object of a 
political counterproject, which is grounded in a culturalist-communitarian view of 
democracy, with authoritarian overtones and with clearly negative repercussions 
for the rights-based understanding of democracy. In Poland, a democratic dis-
course based on the ethic of rights has been continuously challenged by a commu-
nitarian-religious discourse emphasising an alternative grounding of fundamental 
rights and democracy. But in the Polish case, there also seems to be potential for 
compromise and the recognition of diversity. In Romania, while an ethic of rights 
was clearly secondary to an ethic of identity in the early 1990s, by the late 2000s, 
rights and the rule of law have clearly become more vigorous and there are signs of 
their predominance as a democratic discourse.  
Conclusion 
The democratic ethics described above should not be taken as exhaustive. Indeed, 
various ethics gaining in importance and visibility could be added, such as an ethic 
of deliberation or an ethic of critique, indicating shifting priorities and justifications 
in modern democracies. But, at the same time, the openness of democracy is clear-
ly also not unlimited. Modern democratic political cultures do refer to different 
basic justifications for democracy. In this sense, by supposing a variety of demo-
cratic ethics at work, a multiple democracies approach highlights the pluralism in 
European political culture and explores cultural patterns that combine elements on 
which different political-cultural composites are based. By referring to different, 
coexisting, and unevenly available ethics or cultural repertoires within national 
societies, it is possible to establish patterns of repertoires that are more readily 
available in some societies than in others. In this, a multiple democracies approach 
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The European Court of  Justice between 
Cosmopolitanism and National Identity 
Herman Voogsgeerd  
Introduction  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has had a dramatic influence on the creation 
of European law. With its cases on the direct effect and supremacy of European 
law, it really laid the basis for the autonomous character of this branch of the law. 
This must have been an unintended consequence that even the authors of the 
EEC Treaty did not foresee. Some academic authors submit that the ECJ was 
acting at the brink of judicial activism.1 Others maintain that the ECJ is not a polit-
ical actor.2 In this article, I will try to find out whether the ECJ promoted some 
specific cosmopolitan values and/or values related to national identity. In her re-
search on culture and European law, Craufurd Smith tried to answer the question 
whether there are specific Community values and she maintains that “particular 
social values were embedded in the EEC Treaty from the start.” She mentions 
explicitly the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality and the right 
to equal pay for men and women.3 Although I doubt whether these values are 
specifically European, they have been defended rigorously by the ECJ. More gen-
erally, the law of the internal market has had an enormous influence on the cultural 
and social values of the member states. According to Sauter and Schepel, the inter-
nal market is imposed by the ECJ on the member states.4 This internal market law 
has huge consequences for almost all areas. In my article, I will study the conse-
quences of this internal market law (and the law on European citizenship) for the 
protection of cosmopolitanism on the one hand and that of national identity on 
the other. Will it be possible to strike a balance between these two values?  
                                                     
1 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial 
Policymaking (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). 
2 Andreas Grimmel, “Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice Is Not 
a Political Actor,” Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po. 03 (2011): 2-26. 
3 Rachael Craufurd Smith, ed. Culture and European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 45. 
4 Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres 
of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11. 
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 244 
The Link between European Law and Identity?  
Many authors have tried to forge a link between European law on the one hand 
and the concept of identity on the other. Mayer and Palmowski stress the role of 
EU institutions and European law through which European identities have come 
to be expressed.5 Because there is no meaningful common European historical 
identification, the institutions and laws are almost the only source for attention. 
These authors see a role for the EU institutions in the promotion of identifica-
tion(s) with the EU. The main mechanisms for this promotion they see are a dis-
tinctive European citizenship and the strengthening of supranational institutions 
per se in Europe. Guild also focuses on European citizenship as a new ‘legal’ ele-
ment of European identity.6  
In general, Mayer and Palmowski claim that European law, and therefore also 
the decisions of the ECJ, express “what Europe is and what it aspires to be.”7 They 
even go a step further: in creating individual and fundamental laws, the ECJ has 
become “pivotal in helping to articulate substantive aspects of a European identi-
ty.”8 The authors assume that these rights are primordial in bringing about a sepa-
rate sense of European identity. The problem is that these rights are not used by 
everybody. The number of workers enjoying the free movement of workers within 
the EU got stuck between 2 and 3% of the working population. Other freedoms, 
such as the right to establishment by independent persons and the right to posted 
work within the framework of the free movement of services, are more popular. 
Concerning these freedoms, some tensions arise between the persons enjoying 
their free movement rights and the people who do not move and who stay in their 
own member state. 
In order to sustain the next stage in the building of a European identity, Perju 
is of the opinion that a ‘discursive turn’ in European law is needed. The link be-
tween European law and the ‘European public’ in the member states in general 
needs to be strengthened. This stage could be reached through a change of style of 
the ECJ. The decisions of the ECJ will get more attention among the general pub-
lic if case debates on case-law are stimulated. According to Perju, this could be 
done through the introduction of so-called dissenting opinions: individual judges 
having another opinion than the majority.9 While this last suggestion might be too 
much of a break with the existing tradition, the argument of more discussion con-
cerning case-law of the ECJ is a correct one. 
                                                     
5 Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowksi, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties that Bind the Peo-
ples of Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 42.3 (2004): 573-98.  
6 Elspeth Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2004). 
7 Mayer and Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU,” 587. 
8 Mayer and Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU,” 589. 
9 Vlad Perju, “Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice,” Virginia Journal of International 
Law 94.2 (2009): 338-44. 
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Former judge Koopmans was already in 1986 of the opinion that the “role of law 
in the next stage of European Integration” could be different.10 He means that the 
role of law in European integration will be characterised more by the essential 
‘peace-making function’ of the law than by the instrumental conception of the law. 
Landmark decisions such as Van Gend & Loos (26/62) and Costa/ENEL (6/64) in 
the beginning of the 1960s were, indeed, instrumental in bringing about a coherent 
unitary common market. In the new stage, however, the interests of the member 
states could also be protected in a better way.  
This argument that the EU institutions and the ECJ have contributed to some 
of the substantive aspects of European identity is interesting. By strengthening 
their own prerogatives, the EU institutions promote identification of the peoples 
with the EU. I agree with these statements. Law and identity are interrelated. Law 
is communication that may easily enter the domain of culture. Now, after more 
than sixty years of experience with European law, this branch of the law has be-
come part of the general discourse, at least among the elites. Culture itself can be 
transformed by EU law. 
The Role of Identity in the Original Doctrine of European Law  
In the early years of the common market, it was not at all clear that there was a 
relation between European Community law and a concept such as identity. One of 
the most influential authors in European law has been the German professor Hans 
Peter Ipsen. It is said that in formulating the basic concepts of direct effect and 
supremacy of European Law, the ECJ has been influenced by his thoughts. Ipsen 
sees the European Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom) as so-called ‘special 
purpose associations’ (Zweckverbände). An important characteristic of these associa-
tions is their technocratic nature. The tasks and competencies attributed to the EC 
level have to be handled in a technocratic and bureaucratic way. When member 
states are not able anymore to fulfil certain tasks, a European bureaucracy is need-
ed. This technocratic way is also the most efficient.11 According to Ipsen, there is 
no need for the European construction to deal with ‘difficult’ aspects like identity, 
national anthems, flags etc.12 The functions the Communities perform do not be-
long to the irrational field. Special purpose associations are not Gefühlsverbände or 
‘special emotional associations.’13  
                                                     
10 Tijmen Koopmans, “The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 35.4 (1986): 925-31. 
11 Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), 1045. 
12 Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), 198. 
13 See also Herman Voogsgeerd, “A Reappraisal of H.-P. Ipsens ‘Zweckverband’: Unidentified 
Finality as an Essential Element of a European Political Identity?,” SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur 
internationalen empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 21.2 (2002): 313-26. 
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Although it is difficult nowadays to continue to uphold the idea of Europe as a 
technocratic, special purpose association that should not deal with ‘difficult’ issues 
such as identity, the idea is still interesting. The importance of the member states in 
the idea of the single purpose associations implies that national identities should 
not be harmed too much. Essential in the special purpose associations is a process 
of disentanglement of the state, a progress in integration or ‘doing things in com-
mon,’ and this leaves unimpaired much of the identity of the individual member 
states. It is the view of Ipsen that the states open up, not that the identity of the 
states is threatened.14 
After sixty years of experience with the common market, a rudimentary Euro-
pean identity did arise, however. Mayer and Palmowski emphasise the individual 
and fundamental rights of citizens and the existence of the European institutions 
as proof of a European identity. Essential in their concept is that the European 
identity is a separate one from the identities of the different member states. Delan-
ty has tried to clarify the relationship between national and European identity; 
according to this author, these identities are not inseparable.15 In the same way as 
Mayer and Palmowski, he tries to find some distinctive elements of a European 
identity. One important element in the search of Delanty is the contrast between 
particularism and universalism. National identity is particularistic and a European 
identity is universalistic.16  
European law and the decisions of the ECJ play an important role in this re-
spect in that they ‘open’ national laws and identities. These laws and identities be-
come permeable. Openness in this context refers to the lack of a ‘finalité’ in the 
European integration concept. It also refers to the possibility of a learning process, 
if more people will make use of the four freedoms and go to work and/or reside in 
another member state. This learning process is not directly caused but facilitated by 
the decisions of the ECJ. The people who make use of one of the four freedoms 
are the potential objects of this learning process. The ECJ at the most facilitates 
this process. It is now time to look at some recent typical decisions of the ECJ 
between cosmopolitanism and national identity. How is the balance between these 
two established?  
The Case-Law of the ECJ and Cosmopolitan Values and National Identity 
Before I will analyse some cases of the ECJ, the notion of cosmopolitan values will 
have to be addressed. Cosmopolitanism is the opposite of patriotism or national-
                                                     
14 Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984,) 92 
and 93. 
15 Gerard Delanty, “The Transformation of National Identity and the Cultural Ambivalence of Euro-
pean Identity: Democratic Identification in a Post-National Europe,” SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur 
internationalen empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 14.1 (1995): 23. 
16 Delanty, “The Transformation of National Identity,” 29. 
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ism. Inclusiveness is important in this respect: people of all kinds of ethnic or reli-
gious communities are allowed to participate. Cosmopolitanism might need an 
overarching structure such as a political community or an economic relationship. 
In the EU, the internal market, the Economic and Monetary Union, could function 
as such an overarching structure. Essential for cosmopolitanism is, however, to 
acknowledge difference in society, especially with respect to cultural background.17 
It is in the fields of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and Europe-
an citizenship that the ECJ has contributed enormously to the European integra-
tion process. The case law concerning the four freedoms, e.g. the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital, has become the linchpin of the European 
construction. Member-states authorities were forced to take into account the spe-
cial situation of migrant persons from another member state. The term substantive 
or indirect discrimination was coined in this respect by the ECJ. Substantive dis-
crimination was introduced in the area of the free movement of goods and means 
that equal treatment of unequal situations is also contrary to the principle of equal 
treatment (on the basis of nationality). Later on, the concept of nationality was not 
used anymore. The ECJ used a different criterion: discrimination or an obstacle to 
free movement of goods or persons was supposed to be there in case a cross-
border situation was treated differently by a national measure than a purely nation-
al or sedentary situation.18 This wide concept made it possible to detect many dif-
ferent kinds of hidden treatments of migrant workers.   
Groenendijk is rather optimistic on “forty years of free movement of work-
ers.”19 According to him, aliens have been transformed into co-citizens with rights, 
thanks to the case-law of the ECJ. The ECJ focused on the integration of the mi-
grant worker and his family in the host state. Access to education in the host state 
and social advantages of the host state for the worker and his family were rights 
that were mentioned in regulations but widely interpreted by the ECJ. Groenendijk 
thinks free movement of workers also has had a symbolic message and that the 
public perception of migrants has become more positive.20 Posting of workers 
within the framework of free movement of services on the other hand sometimes 
arouses tensions, because social dumping and cheap labour from Central and East-
ern Europe are not excluded. Full equal treatment with citizens from Western 
European host member states is not necessarily safeguarded. The operation of the 
European internal market as a whole is taken as a base of reference by the ECJ. 
                                                     
17 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 
27. 
18 See for example case C-349/87 (Paraschi) on social security. 
19 Kees Groenendijk, “Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers: Has It Been A Success and 
Why?,” in Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Challenges Ahead, ed. Paul Minderhoud 
and Nicos Trimikliniotis (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009), 15. 
20 Groenendijk, “Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers,” 19. 
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Craufurd Smith submits that the ECJ starts from the premise of advantages of 
exposure to other cultures. Insulation of domestic traditions will not be permitted. 
The consumers can choose themselves what sort of product or tradition they want 
to buy.21 The ECJ does not mandate cultural change, only openness to change. The 
common market promotes a culture of consumer choice. Therefore, the influence 
of the ECJ on identity can be considered as deep but indirect.  
Recently, the topic of national identity has become more important in the cases 
of the ECJ. According to the Treaty on the European Union, the EU has to re-
spect the ‘national identity’ of its member states (art. 4, par. 2 TEU). This includes 
the political and constitutional structures and the essential functions of the state in 
the field of security and public order. Already in the 1990s, the ECJ respected a 
wide margin of discretion for the authorities of a member state as regards, for 
example, the control of lotteries. This line of argumentation became strengthened 
in the Omega case (C-36/02), where a company in gambling machines operating a 
‘laserdrome’ protested against a banning order from the mayor of Bonn. The 
mayor reacted to opposition from the public against that specific machine playing 
“to kill people.” According to the German court, this machine was against “human 
dignity,” a concept derived from the first article of the German constitution. The 
German court referred the matter to the ECJ. The ECJ accepted that “the specific 
circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy may vary 
from one country to another and from one era to another” (par. 31). Now that 
only the game “to kill humans” was banned, this ban did not go too far and was 
acceptable from the viewpoint of European law. On the one hand, the concept of 
public policy is under the scrutiny of the ECJ. On the other hand, there is respect 
for national traditions and identity in sensitive public order areas.  
Even more straightforward is the case Sayn-Wittgenstein (C-208/09). Here, an-
other reference to the national constitutional identity was honoured. An Austrian 
law on the abolition of the nobility was upheld against an Austrian national, who 
got a title as princess recognized (by mistake) in Germany where she operated a 
company in the luxury real estate sector and also resided. The ECJ accepts that the 
law “as an element of national identity” is an important element to be taken into 
account. After extensive references to the Omega case and art. 4, par. 2 of the TEU, 
the ECJ does not deem the refusal of the Austrian authorities to recognise the 
noble element of the name of Sayn-Wittgenstein to be a disproportionate measure. 
Now that the Austrian law is of constitutional status and also implemented the 
principle of equality in Austria, an important principle of European law as well, the 
refusal was acceptable. This recent case-law implies that national (constitutional) 
identity is a factor of importance, even in the situation of balancing internal market 
rights with public interests. It is submitted that this looks like a change of focus in 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
                                                     
21 Craufurd Smith, Culture and European Union Law, 29-31. 




The important and large body of case-law concerning the internal market and Eu-
ropean citizenship has changed Europe. It facilitated cosmopolitan values within 
the internal market. Recently, we have seen increasing respect for national (consti-
tutional) identity, especially in the area of public order. The decision in the case 
Sayn-Wittgenstein is certainly proof of this new approach, partly to be explained by 
article 4, par 2 of the Treaty on the European Union and maybe partly by the Lis-
bon decision of the German Constitutional Court of 30  June 2009, in which re-
spect for cultural, historical and linguistic elements was demanded from the EU.   
At the end of this contribution, it is possible to conclude that the decisions of 
the ECJ concerning the internal market and European citizenship have triggered 
several developments. Although these can only be seen from a long term perspec-
tive, it is possible to see examples of changes in European identities. The ECJ has 
definitively contributed to these developments. In order to remain successful, the 
ECJ must also pay attention to and respect national identities. It is dangerous to 
juxtapose European and national identities. The social experimentation and the 
learning process that is the consequence of a well-functioning internal market 
bring about changes to these national identities. The ECJ has played a huge role as 
a final broker in offering options to migrants and free-movers. In order to remain 
influential and to safeguard successful diffusion of its decisions in the near future, 
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The United Kingdom and  
the European Union 
The Shaping of Public Opinion  
Bianca Polo Del Vecchio 
Introduction 
 As the scope and depth of European integration grows, it is increasingly necessary 
to understand the impact of membership of the European Union on member 
states – a phenomenon known as ‘Europeanization’.1 Europeanization is a dynam-
ic process, bringing change to domestic institutions, policies and politics.2 The 
impact of EU membership on member states is not uniform and the United King-
dom, like all EU member states, has a unique experience of membership. This 
differential impact can be accounted for by the ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic insti-
tutions, policies and processes with those of the EU, and by other variables specif-
ic to each member state.3 
Striking, in the case of the UK, is the overall reluctance of governments to ac-
cept further integration and the consistently low levels of public support for EU 
membership. At a meeting of the European Council in December 2011, Prime 
Minister David Cameron opposed treaty reform deemed necessary to bring an end 
to the current sovereign debt crisis. This isolationist stance followed only two 
months after his defeat of a rebellion from within his own Conservative Party, 
which called for a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. Eurobarome-
tre polls show that UK public attitudes towards the EU are among the most nega-
tive,4 while the Eurosceptic Conservative Party and the anti-EU United Kingdom 
Independence Party came first and second respectively in the 2009 European Par-
                                                     
1 Markus Jachtenfuchs, “The Governance Approach to European Integration,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 39.2 (2001): 250. 
2 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 70. 
3 Tanja A. Börzel, “Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States,” in 
The Member States of the European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 50. 
4 European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 76: Table of Results (2011),” 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012). 
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liament elections.5 With voter turnout at just 35%, these election results indicate 
the UK public tends towards Eurosceptism but is also largely disinterested in the 
EU. 
One might think that this Euroscepticism results from a poor fit of the UK’s 
institutions, policies and processes with those of the EU, causing EU membership 
to have a greater impact on it than on other member states. However, although 
institutional and policy ‘misfit’ is undoubtedly an important factor, there are a 
number of variables specific to the UK that can account for a commonplace sense 
of ‘otherness.’ This paper seeks to rationalise negative public attitudes towards the 
EU by considering key cultural, historical, political and economic particularities. 
The Shaping of Public Opinion 
 David Easton’s theory of support for political institutions identifies two dimen-
sions that can be used in order to explain attitudes towards European integration.6 
The affective dimension reflects support based on an ideological association with 
the EU, while the utilitarian dimension reflects support based on a calculation of 
the costs and benefits of membership. Matthew Gabel shows that, throughout the 
EU, support is increasingly based on the utilitarian dimension, and this is particu-
larly so in the UK.7 As emotional, affective factors seem to have little positive 
bearing on UK public opinion, support for integration is more dependent on a 
favourable utilitarian calculation. 
Only one-third of the UK public feels that the benefits of EU membership ex-
ceed the economic costs.8 Important to note, however, is the extent to which re-
spondents tend to over-estimate the UK’s contribution to the EU budget. Only 1 
in 10 members of the public correctly estimate the UK’s financial contribution as 
being equal to or under 3% of GNI. The remainder either over-estimate – the 
average estimation is 19% of GNI – or have no knowledge of the size of this con-
tribution.9 This is especially significant as there is a clear link between over-
estimation and consistently negative views on the EU.10 A similar observation can 
be made concerning the influence of the UK on EU decision-making. Although 
almost half of respondents feel that the UK has a lot or quite a lot of political in-
fluence, if it were known that the UK always has a say over legislative outcomes 
                                                     
5 European Parliament, “Results by Country (2009),” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-country-
(2009).html?tab=27 (accessed 1 March 2012). 
6 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). 
7 Matthew J. Gabel, Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
8 European Commission, “Flash Eurobarometer 318: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United King-
dom (2010),” 13, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012). 
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Ibid., 16. 
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almost 60% of the public would feel more positively about the UK’s EU member-
ship.11 Not only is the public’s actual level of understanding of the economic and 
political costs and benefits of membership low, they perceive their level of under-
standing of the EU to be low.12 Again, this is of importance as there is a connec-
tion between low levels of perceived understanding and negative attitudes towards 
the EU. 
Of course relatively negative public attitudes towards the European Union are 
not simply due to the results of utilitarian calculations made using erroneous in-
formation. The affective dimension can have a considerable impact on calculations 
of the costs and benefits as the two dimensions are interlinked.13 In a number of 
ways, the UK differs notably from other EU member states and, when taken to-
gether, these differences can account for low levels of ideological, affective support 
for the EU, and thus impact on overall attitudes towards the EU. Seymour Martin 
Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) identify two political ‘cleavages’ – national-
territorial and transnational-socioeconomic – which can account for the differing 
interests and preferences of political actors.14 Simon Hix suggests that, in the con-
text of the EU, national divisions are more relevant than socio-economic ones.15  
A key factor in understanding ideological association with the EU is identity. 
Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez et al. have shown that, in principle, even strong national 
identities are compatible with a sense of European identity.16 This is because, 
whereas national identities tend to be defined in cultural terms, European identities 
are usually based on instrumental, self-interested considerations. However, the 
importance of pride and sovereignty to the strong British national identity make it 
much less compatible with a complimentary sense of European identity. This in-
compatibility is reflected in survey results, which show that, whereas almost half of 
EU respondents feel either very or a little attached to the EU, only 1 in 4 members 
of the UK public feels in any way attached.17 The geographical situation of the UK 
as an island on the periphery of Europe is undoubtedly a contributing factor. UK 
residents tend to have less frequent direct contact with other EU citizens, contact 
which might allow them to discern similarities.  
                                                     
11 Ibid., 16-7. 
12 Ibid., 64. 
13 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. 
14 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavages Structures, Party Systems and Voter Align-
ments: An Introduction,” in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives, ed. Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967). 
15 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 148. 
16 Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez et al., “European and National Identities in EU’s Old and New Member 
States: Ethnic, Civic, Instrumental and Symbolic Components,” European Integration On-line Papers 8.11 
(2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-011.htm (accessed 1 March 2012). 
17 European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 68 (2008),” 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012). 
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The UK’s status as a former dominant power has been fundamental in shaping its 
identity and interests. Due to its economic strength, military force and political stabil-
ity, the UK was the dominant colonial power throughout the 19th century and it 
emerged from the Second World War as one of the three big powers of the victo-
rious alliance.18 The UK has sought to retain a strong global role, and the perceived 
existence of alternative means to secure influence, through the Commonwealth 
and in partnership with the United States, facilitated the UK’s decision not to join 
the Communities at the time of their founding. Since accession, successive gov-
ernments have been unwilling to choose between prioritising the UK’s relationship 
with the EU or with the US and have instead sought to satisfy and influence both, 
which has impeded the UK from fully engaging in European integration.19 Here, 
again, the importance of the geographical situation of the UK should not be un-
der-estimated as it is partly as a result of its situation that, throughout history, the 
UK’s attention has often been focused on other continents.  
Whereas World War II highlighted the failings of the nation-state for many in 
Europe, for the UK the nation-state was strengthened. The founding member 
states stood to gain more from the ‘peace dividend’ that integration was to bring 
since the human, physical and political costs of war had been greater for them than 
for the UK.20 With a long history of democratic stability, the UK did not rely on 
integration to strengthen its domestic institutions.21 In fact, as Jeffrey Anderson 
shows, old democracies with strong institutions tend to be more resistant to 
change.22 And, as noted by Robert Rohrschneider, the perceived democratic deficit 
of the EU’s institutions tends to have a greater impact on public opinion in such 
states.23 Compared to the long-established and familiar institutions of the UK state, 
the institutions of the EU are intangible and illegitimate in the eyes of the public. 
A key political difference between member states is the majoritarian and con-
sensual characteristics of their political systems. Arend Lijphart identifies the fea-
tures of majoritarian and consensual regimes along two dimensions: the horizontal 
executive-parties dimension and the vertical federal-unitary dimension, the UK 
being strongly majoritarian on both dimensions.24 Lijphart suggests that, as the EU 
is a more consensual political system, member states with similar political systems 
                                                     
18 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London: Abacus, 1994). 
19 Michael Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), 34-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 157. 
20 Gabel, Interests and Integration. 
21 Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 155. 
22 Jeffrey J. Anderson, “Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity, 1945-
2000,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 814. 
23 Robert Rohrschneider, “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government,” 
American Journal of Political Science 46.2 (2002). 
24 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
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should experience less difficulty adapting to membership. It would follow, there-
fore, that the British political elite, accustomed to a majoritarian domestic political 
system characterised by a small number of political parties and a tendency for sin-
gle party governments, and centralised power, should have greater difficulty adjust-
ing to the EU’s consensual decision-making process.  
Nevertheless, the UK Executive has adapted well to EU membership. This is 
in line with George Tsebelis’s theory of veto players, which holds that member 
states with a low number of formal decision-makers adapt with greater ease to the 
requirements of membership.25 In the case of the UK Executive, adaptation has 
been facilitated by the UK’s centralized coordination system and the fact that sin-
gle party governments are the norm, lessening the need for domestic inter-
departmental bargaining.26 The UK Parliament, on the other hand, has not easily 
adapted to EU membership. Hussein Kassim shows that for this strong parliament 
the absolute and relative loss of power has been considerable.27 The impact on the 
UK Parliament is compounded by the importance of the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty to the UK constitution, which conflicts with the principle of the su-
premacy of EU Law.28 
Hix shows that, in the UK, attitudes towards the EU are heavily influenced by 
the position of the political party an individual supports, and therefore public opin-
ion has been heavily influenced by the increase in political Euroscepticism.29 Par-
liamentarians, like all political actors, have interests and preferences they seek to 
promote. Given the impact of EU membership on the UK Parliament, it is unsur-
prising that Members of Parliament tend to be at best hesitant in expressing their 
support for European integration and at worst openly Eurosceptic. The absence of 
informative public debate on EU membership has left a void that has been filled 
by Eurosceptic discourse. 
Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party, which had been marginalised 
since the 1960s, was legitimised by Margaret Thatcher’s increasingly confrontation-
al approach to the EU from the mid-1980s. Eurosceptic sentiment was strength-
ened by the arduous ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the UK’s humiliating 
exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early 1990s.30 Despite the evolu-
                                                     
25 George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical 
Analysis,” American Political Science Review 93.3 (1999). 
26 Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK, 100; Andrew Geddes, The European Union and British Politics 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 166. 
27 Hussein Kassim, “The Europeanization of Member State Institutions,” in The Member States of the 
European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
298. 
28 Troels B. Hansen and Bruno Scholl, “Europeanization and Domestic Parliamentary Adaptation: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of Commons,” European Integration On-line 
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29 Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 156. 
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tion of the Labour Party’s position during the 1980s from one of opposition to 
membership to support for active engagement, the governments of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown failed to make a convincing case to the public for a more positive 
EU policy.31 Thus, the Eurosceptic message of the Conservative Party, which is 
reinforced by that of the increasingly popular UKIP, has been more forceful than 
any pro-EU message of the Labour Party. Even in government, the pro-EU Liber-
al Democrat Party has failed to temper the typically Eurosceptic discourse of the 
Conservative Party. 
As a populous, wealthy member state, the UK is one of the main contributors 
to the EU budget and also a net contributor. However, that the UK is a net con-
tributor can also be explained by the fact that a high proportion of the EU budget 
is allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), of which the UK is not a 
major beneficiary due to the relatively small size of its agricultural sector.32 The 
CAP is perceived as a wasteful policy by many in the UK and this is a key reason 
offered by successive UK governments, faced with mounting opposition from 
other member states, to justify the continued payment of the rebate negotiated in 
1984. The maintenance of this rebate is presented as a matter of vital national in-
terest, which serves to perpetuate the notion that the UK has less to gain from EU 
membership than other states.  
A further difference of the UK economy is the importance of its financial ser-
vices sector. The City of London has historically been a predominant financial 
centre and successive governments have attached much importance to its interests, 
resisting, in particular, increased regulation emanating from the EU. The UK’s 
former status as the leading global economic power, with the Pound Sterling as the 
foremost international currency, has surely influenced opinion on Economic and 
Monetary Union and the loss of sovereignty that participation entails. More recent-
ly, experience of the Exchange Rate Mechanism between 1990 and 1992 has rein-
forced negative attitudes of both the political elite and the public towards adoption 
of the Euro.33 Today, only 15% of the UK public supports a single currency34 and 
opponents feel their reluctance has been vindicated by the crisis engulfing the Eu-
rozone. Besides, Paul De Grauwe shows that there are certain key differences be-
tween the UK and Eurozone economies, including greater flexibility of the labour 
market and heavier reliance on bond and equity markets for finance in the former, 
which suggest that the UK might benefit less from adopting the Euro than other 
states.35  
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A final particularity to be highlighted is the role of the UK press in shaping public 
opinion. The high concentration of ownership and the relatively wide circulation 
of national daily newspapers allow this medium great influence. Given the im-
portant role played by the daily press in fostering a sense of national unity36 and in 
light of the fact that four, generally Eurosceptic, newspaper groups produce three-
quarters of the 11 million national newspapers sold each day in the UK,37 the abil-
ity of the press to accentuate perceived differences should not be underestimated. 
Furthermore, most of the daily newspapers sold in the UK are tabloids that do not 
offer in-depth analysis of EU affairs and rely on eye-catching and sometimes mis-
leading headlines to draw the public’s attention in what is an increasingly competi-
tive market. The UK’s island location means residents have less frequent experi-
ence of the day-to-day benefits of EU membership and thus their reliance on the 
predominantly Eurosceptic press for information is greater.  
Conclusion 
The institutions, policies and processes of all member states are subject to pressure 
for change as a result of EU membership, which might have a negative impact on 
public attitudes towards the EU. The reaction of the UK public to EU member-
ship has, however, been particularly negative. It has been shown that, on the one 
hand, the impact of and reaction to membership is, to a considerable extent, due to 
substantial ‘misfit’ of UK institutions, policies and processes with those of the EU. 
On the other hand, it has been established that there are a number of factors quite 
specific to the UK, which shape public opinion on the EU to a significant extent. 
The public’s lack of understanding of the functioning of the EU mars its ability 
to assess the benefits of membership. The importance of pride and sovereignty to 
the strong sense of British identity coupled with nostalgia for an era of global in-
fluence make it difficult for the UK public to connect with and to commit to a 
European destiny. The public’s attachment to the narrative of the UK as an old, 
stable democracy with a historically strong and liberal economy leaves it suscepti-
ble to the increasingly Eurosceptic discourse of its politicians and the press. This 
sense of ‘otherness’ is further reinforced by the UK’s geographical location on the 
periphery of mainland Europe. All of these factors have contributed to what might 




                                                     
36 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), cited in Andrew Geddes, The European Union 
and British Politics (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 220.  
37 Charles Grant, “Why is Britain Eurosceptic?” Centre for European Reform (2008), 3, 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_eurosceptic_1
9dec08-1345.pdf (accessed 3 March 2012). 
 Europe – Space for Transcultural Existence? 258 
Bibliography 
Anderson, Jeffrey J. “Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic 
Polity, 1945-2000.” Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 793-822. 
Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995.  
Börzel, Tanja A. “Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with Its 
Member States.” In The Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon 
Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, 45-69. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
De Grauwe, Paul. Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1965. 
European Commission. Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment. “The Common Agricultural Policy Explained.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf (accessed 3 
March 2012). 
European Commission. “Flash Eurobarometer 318: Attitudes Towards the EU in 
the United Kingdom (2010).” 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 
2012). 
European Commission. “Standard Eurobarometer 68 (2008).” 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf  
(accessed 1 March 2012). 
European Commission. “Standard Eurobarometer 76: Table of Results (2011).” 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf  
(accessed 1 March 2012). 
European Parliament. “Results by Country (2009).” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-
country-(2009).html?tab=27 (accessed 1 March 2012). 
Gabel, Matthew J. Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and 
European Union. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 
Geddes, Andrew. The European Union and British Politics. Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
Grant, Charles. “Why is Britain Eurosceptic?” Centre for European Reform (2008). 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/201
1/essay_eurosceptic_19dec08-1345.pdf (accessed 3 March 2012). 
Hansen, Troels B., and Bruno Scholl. “Europeanization and Domestic Parliamen-
tary Adaptation: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of 
Commons.” European Integration On-line Papers 6.15 (2002). 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-015.htm (accessed 1 March 2012). 
The United Kingdom and the European Union 
 
259 
Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union. 2nd Ed. Basingstoke, Hamp-
shire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Empire. London: Abacus, 1994. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus. “The Governance Approach to European Integration.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 39.2 (2001): 245-64. 
Kassim, Hussein. “The Europeanization of Member State Institutions.” In The 
Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon Bulmer and Christian 
Lequesne, 285-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Ladrech, Robert. “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The 
Case of France.” Journal of Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 69-88. 
Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twen-
ty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. “Cleavages Structures, Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction.” In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: 
Cross-national Perspectives, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan,  
1-64. New York: Free Press, 1967. 
Moran, Michael. Politics and Governance in the UK. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005. 
Rohrschneider, Robert. “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-
Wide Government.” American Journal of Political Science 46.2 (2002): 463-75. 
Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia M., Jaroslaw Józef Górniak, Ankica Kosic, Paszkal Kiss, 
and Maren Kandulla. “European and National Identities in EU’s Old and New 
Member States: Ethnic, Civic, Instrumental and Symbolic Components.” Euro-
pean Integration On-line Papers 8.11 (2004). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-
011.htm (accessed 1 March 2012). 
Tsebelis, George. “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democra-




From a Traumatic Past to  
a Constructive Future  
The Spanish Transition Period as a Case Study 
Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz 
Introduction: Armed Conflicts and Collective Trauma 
Up to the second half of the 20th century, few areas around the globe have been as 
full of discord and violence-ridden as Europe. Especially from the early modern 
period on, the Old World has been swept and scarred by wars and conflict that 
have had a definite influence on the positions, formation-processes, alliances, and 
power relations among the different nations.1 It is difficult, in fact, to find any 
single historical moment in which Europe was completely at peace. Due some-
times to class inequalities, at other times to religious tensions, and still at others to 
geo-political and ideological disputes, the truth is that human aggression has been a 
constant in the history of the continent for at least as long as our memory allows 
us to remember.2 To name only a few of these sad historical occasions, one could 
mention the War of the Roses (15th century.), the French Wars of Religion (16th 
century.), the Thirty Years’ War (17th century.), the French Revolution (18th centu-
ry.), the Italian Independence War (19th century.), or the two World Wars in the 
20th century. These disruptive events usually took place on European battlefields 
but, almost as often, they were also extended to faraway territories and involved 
populations that had little knowledge of the origins and goals of the conflicts. 
There is no question that the most dramatic consequences produced by armed 
conflicts are usually gauged according to the number of casualties and the material 
destruction they have caused among the contenders. However, as conflict and 
trauma specialists have pointed out, violent events of this kind are also bound to 
shatter the individual and collective sense of well-being and security of the partici-
pants. As a result, they are invariably going to make efforts to change the situation 
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that triggered these events – or, alternatively, to try to forget them.3 Neal notes 
that, because the contenders in a conflict tend to become more reasonable once 
the violence is over, traumatic events frequently lead to advances and progress.4 In 
his opinion, “the very fact that a disruptive event has occurred [means that] new 
opportunities will emerge for innovation and change.”5 The American Civil War 
and World War II are often cited as examples of highly traumatic historical occa-
sions that fostered positive changes in some of the societies that suffered them. 
Yet, it would be naïve to assume that this recovery of stability indicates a complete 
disappearance of the resentful memories and pent-up animosities that those violent 
events generated. In this regard, Aguilar believes that the Spanish Civil War is a 
case in point since, after two decades of “willful forgetting,” the democratic ma-
turity of the country and its capacity to absorb all those intense emotions are still 
being tested.6 According to Caruth, traumatic events are characterized by their 
unassimilated nature and by the fact that they are unwittingly re-enacted by the 
victims, even when those victims try to leave them behind.7 Consequently, a socie-
ty or community can only aspire to look into the future unburdened by past re-
sentment and emotional restraints if it manages to restore objective memory by 
lifting all sorts of social and psychological pressures that keep the traumatizing 
events unavailable to the conscious mind. In the introduction to Postwar, Judt 
maintains that some movements have been made in this direction these last four 
decades in several European countries – Germany, France, Poland, and Italy, 
among them –, in an attempt to provide a satisfactory closure to a historical period 
and to push forward the process of European construction.8 
The main object of this article is to explore in some detail the trauma process 
that Spain has undergone since the early 1970s, a process that has contributed 
decisively both to healing some deep psychological wounds in the people and to 
the incorporation of the country into the EU. The article dwells upon the im-
portant role that a profoundly revisionary historiography and the recent legislation 
on historical memory have played in repositioning Spain regarding the Union. I 
maintain that, although the revisions made and the laws passed were primarily 
meant to assuage the pain and trauma caused by disturbing events that have kept 
haunting two generations of Spaniards, it is also clear that these steps should be 
                                                     
3 See: Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., eds., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2004); Ana Douglass and Thomas A. Vogler, eds., Witness and Memory: The Discourse of 
Trauma (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
4 Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 9-10. 
5 Ibid., 18. 
6 Paloma Aguilar, Políticas de la memoria y memoria de la política: El caso español en perspectiva comparada 
(Madrid: Alianza, 2008), 53-4. 
7 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 2. 
8 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005), 1-10. 
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considered crucial in the process of integrating the country into the larger Europe-
an project. Like many other Europeans, Spaniards have employed the discourse of 
trauma to describe what has happened, “not only to themselves, but also to the 
collectivity to which they belong.”9 As a result, they have felt that the scars left by 
the Spanish Civil War and the unspeakable cruelties that followed it did not just 
leave indelible marks upon their collective consciousness, but also forced them to 
adopt a national identity with which they could not feel comfortable at all. 
On the Wounds and Scars of the Spanish Civil War 
The Spanish Civil War has been described by historians and conflict specialists as 
one of the most violent and heart-wrenching internal bellicose episodes of the 20th 
century. Scholars have found it difficult to explain what could have driven a coun-
try to so much carnage and so many casualties – over 640,000, plus half a million 
exiles –, at a time when the Second Republic was trying to disseminate a modern 
sense of community and democracy in the nation. The most popular explanation 
for the brutality of the conflict has been the age-old schism between the so-called 
dos Españas (‘two Spains’): one secular, regionalist, and liberal; the other Catholic, 
unified, and very conservative. Any close scrutiny of the Civil War, however, soon 
shows that this explanation proves excessively simple and reductive. In fact, there 
were a variety of political, economic, socio-cultural, religious, and military factors 
that need to be borne in mind, if one wishes to account with any rigor for the al-
zamiento (‘rising’) in July 1936.10 Some of these factors seemed rather contextual, 
such as the liberal de-centralizing revolution of the Republic and the obsession for 
unity of the military and political conservatives, but others had a structural charac-
ter, such as the long-standing tensions of the urban capitalists of the periphery and 
the Madrid-based power or the high levels of illiteracy. All things considered, it 
seems that the key contributing factor in the outbreak of the Civil War was the 
challenge to the existing unitary conception of the state coming from the growing 
regionalism. In Richards’ opinion, “the army and political conservatives revealed 
the depth of their hatred to ‘separatism’ by claiming that even an ‘España Roja’ (a 
‘Red Spain’) would be preferable to an ‘España Rota’ (a ‘Broken Spain’).”11 It was 
this irrational fear of the disintegration of the centralized state and the disruption 
of a uniform national identity that was the mainspring of the bloodshed. 
                                                     
9 Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma, 2. 
10 Stanley G. Payne, “Antecedentes y crisis de la democracia,” in La Guerra Civil: Una nueva visión del 
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The research carried out on the internecine conflict has evinced that cruelties and 
viciousness were habitual on both sides; nevertheless, it seems that the nationalist 
side was much more brutal in its punishment and repression of any forces that 
threatened the establishment after their victory. Preston may have stretched reality 
a bit when he compares the crimes committed by Franco’s authoritarian regime to 
those that Nazi Germany perpetrated against particular human groups.12 Yet, as 
Torres and Juliá have shown, the Civil War and the early years of the dictatorship 
were plagued with all kinds of mass executions, perimortem tortures and horrible 
mutilations that speak of the victorious party’s relentless efforts to do away with 
any kind of dissent. Naturally, the repression displayed different forms and de-
grees, depending on the places where it was practiced, with class and cultural iden-
tity issues prevailing in some regions, whereas in others it was religious dissent and 
political ideology that were more severely punished.13 Some historians have argued 
that, in fact, even more traumatic than the defeat in the armed conflict were those 
years after the war – almost two decades – during which the systematic violence 
against and repression of dissenters were inflicted.14 As Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois note, “dirty wars” in which governments turn their fury against those of 
their own citizens suspected of harbouring the seeds of subversion are all the more 
traumatic because here “terror operates quietly and secretly, below and between 
the lines, as it were, in the blatant contradiction between ‘the official story’ and 
what actually happens on the ground.”15 
Paradoxically, although Franco’s regime dedicated abundant resources to strict 
censorship and all sorts of repressive tactics, the regime also depended on the 
preservation of selected memories. In order to legitimize itself, Francoism resorted 
to its military triumph and the reinvention of the Civil War as a pseudo-religious 
crusade to save the nation from the hands of communists and anarchists. There 
was a need to convince Spaniards – usually by manipulating history – that the vic-
tors had succeeded in the conflict due to their faith and patriotism, and that they 
retained the right to use violence whenever it was required in order to defend their 
principles.16 
The struggle over collective memory became particularly virulent in those areas 
of the country with a distinct regional identity (Catalonia, Asturias or the Basque 
Country), for it was there that opposition to the regime became more apparent. 
                                                     
12 Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (London: 
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14 Torres, Víctimas, 4-6. 
15 Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, eds., Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2004), 47. 
16 Richards, “Collective Memory,” 42. 
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Experts contend that traumatic experiences generally result in an ongoing process 
of reverberation, in which survivors feel compelled to re-enact the painful events. 
Something of this kind happened in these regions, where trauma functioned as a 
‘social glue’ that helped to hold cultural and political collectives together and 
helped them to see their identity reinvigorated by the persistence of the regime’s 
vengeance and the mystification of their persecution.17 But, since those collective 
memories of suffering and oppression remained only latent during the first decades 
of the dictatorship, they could not take a definite and interpretable shape until 
much later, when the apt conditions for their re-emergence were finally fulfilled.18 
Predictably enough, those conditions were first met abroad, and so the initial at-
tempts to bring back a silenced past came from foreign historians doing research 
on the Civil War and the early years of Franco’s regime. The classic studies of the 
conflict by Hugh Thomas (1961) and Gabriel Jackson (1965) inaugurated a period 
of over 15 years in which foreign correspondents and researchers were those who 
made the greatest efforts to restore objectivity to the key events of the fratricidal 
war.19 Although it is evident that these foreign scholars were generally prone to be 
highly critical of the vicious ways of the victors in the civil conflict, it is also im-
portant to acknowledge that their impact within Spain was rather limited as a result 
of the reduced dissemination of their work. 
The Trauma Process in Spain and its Recent Acceleration 
Franco’s dictatorial regime (1939-1975) succeeded in keeping the memories of the 
traumatizing experiences silenced for a long time, even as they constantly returned 
to torment the survivors. Curiously, however, a process of collective appeasement 
began to gain momentum even before the dictator’s demise, as he came to realize 
that he could not keep up the standards of repression that he had imposed during 
the early decades after the armed conflict. As historians and political scientists have 
noted, the incipient efforts to retrieve and tell the truth about the past of the na-
tion served not only to bring about the possibility of a collective reconciliation but 
also to affect the emergence of a feeling of legitimization among Spaniards to be-
come members of a larger community.20 In this sense, seeing how the European 
Community was beginning to take shape in the 70s and early 80s must have been a 
                                                     
17 Cf. Douglass and Vogler, Witness and Memory, 12.  
18 Caruth has spoken at some length about this inevitable delay in time between the experience of the 
demolishing events and their reappearance, often in the form of haunting nightmares and ghostly 
visions, in Unclaimed Experience, 3-4. 
19 Hugh S. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3rd rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977); Gabriel 
Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1965). 
20 Javier Tusell, “La reconciliación española,” Claves de Razón Práctica 132 (2003): 32-9. See also Julián 
Casanova, “Una dictadura de cuarenta años,” in Morir, matar, sobrevivir: La violencia en la dictadura de 
Franco, ed. Julián Casanova (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2002), 1-50. 
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significant incentive to make Spain revise its past. Jelin and others have argued that 
these procedures to retrieve and refashion the fragments of one’s past in the form 
of traumatic memories both arise and develop depending on the circumstances, “ 
and are always anchored in the concerns, aspirations, and interpretative frames of 
the present times.”21 
In order to come to an understanding of the trauma process in Spain, it is very 
convenient to consider some recent contributions that experts in historical 
memory and trauma theory have made to the disciplines. These contributions are 
useful because they highlight the importance of defining – through cultural repre-
sentation, acts of commemoration, and societal mobilization – collective means for 
undoing repression, and allowing feelings “of loss and mourning to be ex-
pressed.”22 The cathartic exercise of restoring memory and resisting political re-
pression started in Spain, as noted above, some time before the end of the dicta-
torial regime in the mid-1970s, with some decrees showing that the insane silence 
could not be enforced for much longer. Juliá explains that, although the Law of 
Amnesty was not passed until October 1977, almost two years after Franco’s 
death, a number of historians, journalists, lawyers, and political activists had al-
ready made sure that the country would not suffer from a bout of constitutional 
amnesia in its transition towards democracy.23 Graham, on the other hand, feels 
the need to qualify that idea by stating that “[t]he role of culture in keeping alive 
the collective memory remains paramount as Spaniards continue to rediscover the 
past that was taken from them under the dictatorship; but it coexists with a con-
verse urge to amnesia (desmemoria) which can be both a liberation from past trau-
mas and a refusal to face them.”24 In any case, if one looks closely into the histori-
ography and legislation produced in the 1970s and 80s, the conclusion to be drawn 
is that, despite the explicit political consensus to ‘willfully forget’ mutual hatreds of 
the past, still legal and socio-cultural organizations were fighting intensely to obtain 
some retribution for the victims.25 
Judt claims that the unexpected transformation undergone by some southern 
European countries at this historical juncture derived from the fact that, although 
their political structures had obviously lagged behind, their society had not, and a 
new generation of politicians and businessmen had begun to compete for the sup-
                                                     
21 Elisabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 16. See also Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, “Introduction: Forecasting Memory,” in Tense 
Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, eds. Michael Lambek and Paul Antze (London: Sage, 1996), 
xxii.  
22 Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma, 7. 
23 Juliá, “De ‘guerra contra el invasor’,” 49. 
24 Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, eds., Spanish Cultural Studies – An Introduction: The Struggle for Moderni-
ty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 313. See also: Richards, “Collective Memory,” 46. 
25 For clear instances of this trend, the strong push given to legislation on war pensions, the return of 
Republican war veterans or the dismantling of Francoist symbols could be mentioned.  
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port of voters and customers.26 There is little doubt that Franco’s last years in 
power saw a more open economic, religious, and even cultural policy that made the 
initiation of the trauma process possible – even if it was only during the Transition 
Period that it would be fully consolidated. In Ferrándiz’s opinion, the acceleration 
of the trauma process on the threshold of the new millennium was due to the real-
ization that the victims of the conflict had been “betrayed and ignored” for too 
long and that their impending demise would mean “a complete disappearance of 
the collective memory of the country forever.”27 In this context, it is not surprising 
that a remarkable number of artists, associations, and grassroots civil movements 
should foster all kinds of initiatives to retrieve the memories of the defeated and to 
establish the falsity of many of the official records. Novels such as La voz dormida 
(2002) by Dulce Chacón and Veinte años y un día (2003) by Jorge Semprún show 
deep commitment to dig into those experiences that had been bracketed out of 
history.28 Only in this manner could a real process of healing and reconciliation 
take root in a society that had been prevented from facing past traumas that fore-
stalled its natural development for too long. 
Zaldívar and Castells explain that Spaniards have only very recently lost their 
ancestral fear that the ghosts from the past might interfere with their future, and 
have realized that their century-old isolation could finally be abandoned.29 Yet, 
with the Transition Period coming to an end in the late 1980s, it seemed clear that 
the efforts to overcome past animosities and to learn tolerance were bearing some 
fruit in terms of socio-political democratization and cultural renewal. For one 
thing, the vanquished were given due recognition and concessions were granted 
from the central government to let the ‘historic regions’ play their part in national 
politics.30 By 1992, when Madrid was named European Cultural Capital and the 
Olympic Games were held in Barcelona, it could safely be said that the country 
had found the stability of a new identity and that it was ready to embark on the 
more ambitious project of joining supranational organizations. Although it is true 
that Spain had been a member of the United Nations, the OECD, and the Interna-
tional Labour Organization for a number of decades, it is also evident that Span-
iards did not see their country as a modern and democratic society that could hope 
to get on the same train as other European nations. Interestingly, the effort made 
these last two decades to come to grips with their troubling past has proved im-
mensely beneficial in terms of gathering the self-confidence and conviction to 
                                                     
26 Judt, Postwar, 756. The epilogue to his book, tellingly entitled, “From the House of the Dead: An 
Essay on Modern European Memory,” discusses the importance of collective memories. 
27 Francisco Ferrándiz, “Exhumaciones y políticas de la memoria en la España contemporánea,” in El 
derecho a la memoria, ed. Felipe Gómez Isa (Bilbao: IDH Universidad de Deusto, 2006), 556.  
28 Rafael Torres’ Victimas de la victoria also brings together numerous interviews with the survivors and 
witnesses of the most traumatic episodes during the Spanish Civil War. 
29 Carlos A. Zaldívar and Manuel Castells, España, fin de siglo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992). 
30 Cf. Richards, “Collective Memory,” 44; Tusell, “La reconciliación española,” 38. 
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believe that they were in a position to contribute to projects beyond their national 
borders. 
Closing Remarks: Centripetal and Centrifugal Purposes 
This article has considered the critical role that efforts to restore historical memory 
and to provide retribution to those most deeply affected by Franco’s repressive 
regime have played in Spain’s recent history. Despite some scholars’ opinion that it 
was a ‘wilful amnesia’ after the dictator’s death that saved the country from getting 
entangled in age-old disputes and rivalries leading nowhere, the fact is that groups 
of survivors and witnesses, historians, lawyers, and political activists have done 
their best to make the long-silenced stories of the past see the light. Lambek and 
Antze cogently defend that retrieving traumatic experiences can sometimes be 
remarkably empowering and often leads to collective organizing that may achieve 
previously denied recognition.31 No doubt names such as those of Ramón Tam-
ames, Fernando Fernán-Gómez, Santos Juliá, Jorge Semprún, or Baltasar Garzón 
are immediately associated in our minds today with those tireless attempts to bring 
inner peace and social justice to those that had been erased from history. It must 
be admitted that, as Primo Levi and others have noted, managing to finally come 
to terms with the past and to give shape to memories that have been repressed for 
such a long time is not an easy task.32 Not only that, but there are always the at-
tendant dangers of commodifying those new narratives or sacralising them in such 
a way that they may also end up distorting the truth. In spite of these inevitable 
difficulties and risks, it must be said that the post-Transition Period in Spain has 
been characterized mostly by a balanced restoration of the past that has helped 
those who earlier on felt altogether excluded to perceive themselves as an integral 
part of the country. 
Likewise, besides that centripetal process of retrieval of and reconciliation with 
one’s own past, it is important to mention that an equally urgent centrifugal need 
to project a more positive image of the country abroad has also contributed deci-
sively to the acceleration of trauma mobilization. Frey has written very lucidly 
about how countries such as Germany and France felt compelled to carry out this 
exercise of historical revisionism and reinterpretation of the past before they could 
engage in the activity of determining their role in the process of European integra-
tion.33 Nothing less should be stated about Spain, a nation doubly burdened by a 
forty-year dictatorship that had fractured the society into rival factions and a highly 
isolationist policy that had kept it apart from some of the converging dynamics 
                                                     
31 Lambek and Antze, “Introduction,” xxiv. 
32 Primo Levi, Los hundidos y los salvados, trans. Pilar Gómez Védate (Barcelona: Muchnik Editores, 
1989), 32-60. 
33 Hugo Frey, “Historical Memory and the Boundaries of European Integration,” Surrey University, 
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that had begun to take place in other countries. By the early 1990s, however, it was 
evident that, thanks to efforts to overcome cultural trauma and to seek mutual 
understanding between different socio-political groups, Spain was ready to embark 
on supranational undertakings on a par with other European states. In Tusell’s 
opinion, the path to national reconciliation has not been an easy one, but it has 
definitely capacitated the country to embrace future projects that only a few dec-
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Identity, Memory and Belonging 
The Friedland Transit Camp and the  
Process of Admission to Post-War Germany 
Sascha Schießl 
Introduction 
“Friedland! The name alone is a promise for those who are coming – a pledge and 
therefore a commitment for us.”1 With these words, the Friedlandhilfe, an affiliation 
of charity organisations working in the refugee camp Friedland near Göttingen in 
Lower Saxony, began its appeal for donations in November 1957. By that time, the 
Friedland camp, established by the British military administration in September 
1945 as a small-scale refugee camp, was a crucial institution in the Federal Repub-
lic. What had at first been an emergency solution to a pressing problem developed 
into an important transit camp where questions of identity and memory were dealt 
with. 
The main task of the Friedland camp throughout the years was to admit people, 
who were coming to West Germany as a consequence of World War II, to Ger-
man citizenship. Of course, there were other tasks at hand, for example looking 
after people heading east to the Soviet occupation zone in the immediate post-war 
era or caring for refugees such as boat people from Vietnam who were granted asy-
lum by Lower Saxony in the late 1970s. But the most important function was to 
deal with consequences of the war Germany had unleashed. Even today, the camp 
does undertake this task, serving as the only transit camp for resettlers from East-
ern Europe, although other groups, for instance various groups of refugees and, 
since the beginning of 2011, asylum seekers, outnumber the former by now. 
Although various studies analyse Germany’s dealing with its past,2 the question 
of what happened to people passing through a transit camp is rarely asked. Instead, 
                                                     
1 Charity appeal issued by the Friedlandhilfe from November 1957, in: BA Koblenz B 106/24502. 
2 See, for example, Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Neil Gregor, Haunted City: Nuremberg and the 
Nazi Past (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after 
the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Nobert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundes-
republik und die NS-Vergangenheit (München: Beck, 1996); Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft, 1999). 
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these studies mostly focus on discourses within post-war society and the political 
decision-making processes regarding admission and integration. As a result, the 
role played by newcomers and local actors in coming to terms with Germany’s past 
and shaping memories of, for example, war, flight, expulsion and war captivity are 
more often than not neglected. Drawing on the example of the Friedland transit 
camp, the Federal Republic’s most outstanding place to admit people to German 
citizenship3, this article will highlight the implementation of West German policy 
in transit camps and the interdependencies between post-war society, people ad-
mitted as German citizens, and local actors in the process of admission. This will 
help to better understand how and by whom identity, memory and public com-
memoration were shaped in West German society at a practical level and how 
discourses in this respect in turn influenced the process of admission. Because 
these broader topics cannot be elaborated here appropriately, the focus will be on 
questions of identity. What did newcomers experience when they were passing 
through Friedland? Were they admitted to German citizenship from the beginning 
or were they “turned into Germans” during their stay at the camp? Did a changing 
perception of the war and a changing public commemoration led to a transfor-
mation in the process through which people were admitted as German citizens?4 
Looking after Refugees and Expellees: The Immediate Post-War Era 
The first groups sheltered in Friedland were refugees and expellees. They were 
members of German minorities or German citizens from former German or Ger-
man-occupied territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, who had fled from the ad-
vancing Red Army or were expelled as a consequence of the Third Reich’s racial 
war.5 Refugees and expellees were now on their way towards the Western occupa-
tion zones. While flight and expulsion had not occurred simultaneously in Eastern 
Europe, refugees and expellees had merged into one indiscernible group when they 
arrived in the British or American zone. Other groups were also on the move after 
the war’s end, namely wartime evacuees, people in search of their families, former 
soldiers who had discharged themselves, members of German occupation admin-
istrations and others who were stranded far from their homes at the end of the 
war. They were mostly heading east to west and here joined refugees and expellees. 
In the early stages, a smaller and rapidly decreasing number of people went west to 
                                                     
3 The only academic (but not widely published) study concerning the camp’s history is: Dagmar 
Kleineke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1955 (Göttingen: Universität Göttingen, 
1992). 
4 This article is part of a broader PhD project concerning Germany's dealing with the consequences 
of the war in postwar transit camps and the significance of the Friedland camp for the culture of 
remembrance in the Federal Republic. 
5 Wolfgang Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer, 1985); Detlev Brandes, Der Weg zur Vertreibung 1938-1945: Pläne und Entscheidungen 
zum „Transfer“ der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und Polen (München: Oldenbourg, 2001). 
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east instead. A substantial proportion of these people on the move went through 
one camp or more. It did take some time, however, until occupation administra-
tions were able to secure their borders, thus directing most of the people crossing 
into their zone to one of the transit camps. At the Friedland camp, people arriving 
were looked after and then hurriedly sent further on their ways. By the end of 
1945, more than 500,000 people were registered in Friedland, another half million 
people passed through the camp during the following year, most of them staying a 
few hours or one night only.6 
Even though the camp represented the first station in the Western occupation 
zones for many of those fleeing or being expelled from Eastern Europe, Friedland 
did not gain the importance it had for some of the later groups. Questions con-
cerning identity were not really an issue and, if they were, there was no reason to 
especially tie them to the Friedland camp. Above all, the Friedland camp was only 
one of many similar emergency solutions established in the immediate post-war 
era. In the British occupation zone, military officials founded nine camps in which 
German administrations and welfare organisations were enabled to shelter and 
provide for people passing through, whereas at the same time British officials had 
at least in principle a tool to regulate the influx of people into their zone. Likewise, 
transit camps were erected in the American and the Soviet occupation zones, while 
refugee camps spread to many cities. Hence, refugees or expellees passing through 
Friedland were likely to stay at other camps thereafter.7 At a time when millions of 
people were on the move in occupied Germany8, Friedland merely was a small-
scale solution for an urgent problem. 
Furthermore, refugees, expellees and other groups passing through during the 
immediate post-war period had more pressing matters to deal with: Where to go 
next? What happened to family and friends? Where to find housing, food, work? 
Besides, people heading to Friedland in the early years of the camp’s existence 
were almost exclusively German citizens or could at least expect to gain admission 
during the registration process. Although refugees and expellees were often re-
ceived coldly and perceived as foreigners in post-war Germany, these partly hostile, 
partly ambivalent contacts were rather a consequence of the competition for scant 
resources than a question of inclusion and exclusion.9 
                                                     
6 For exact figures with differentiations regarding the various groups looked after in Friedland, see: 
Kleineke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland, 17-34. 
7 For introductory remarks on refugee camps in postwar Germany, see Mathias Beer, “‘Ich möchte 
die Zeit nicht missen’. Flüchtlingslager nach 1945 als totale Institutionen?,” Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Informationen 29.3 (2000): 186-93; Volker Ackermann, “Homo Barackensis: Westdeutsche Flüchtlings-
lager in den 1950er Jahren,” in: Anknüpfungen: Kulturgeschichte – Landesgeschichte – Zeitgeschichte: Gedenk-
schrift für Peter Hüttenberger, ed. Volker Ackermann et al. (Essen: Klartext, 1995), 330-46. 
8 In addition to the aforementioned groups, former forced labourers and freed concentration camp 
inmates, so-called DPs (displaced persons), were also looked after by allied occupation administra-
tions as well as the UNRRA and, from 1947 on, the IRO. 
9 Local conflicts between refugees and locals are, for example, discussed in Paul Erker, “Revolution 
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There was, however, one aspect in the Friedland camp’s early period directly con-
nected to questions concerning identity. Transit camps issued registration forms 
that refugees and expellees needed when they arrived at the towns or cities as-
signed to them. As most of the people arriving at the Friedland camp did not pos-
sess identification cards or any personal documents verifying their identity due to 
the circumstances of flight and expulsion, registration forms had to be issued bona 
fide. Moreover, especially during the camp’s early period, a great number of forms 
were issued in a very short time in somewhat chaotic surroundings. Thus names 
were frequently misspelled or home towns understood the wrong way. These cir-
cumstances were a bargain for those in need of a new identity, for instance Na-
tional Socialist or SS leaders, Nazi occupation administration officials or, in gen-
eral, all those, who had good reasons to fear prosecution after the war was lost and 
future developments were uncertain. Although this is speculative, some people 
might also have seen an opportunity to leave their no longer wanted families or 
their personal problems behind. For want of informative sources, it is, however, 
barely possible to determine how many people did actually use one of the transit 
camps to obtain a new identity, which reasons they had and how they experienced 
this change of identity. 
All things considered, the Friedland camp was a small wheel in a larger process 
in which people had to come to terms with their past and adjust to the new cir-
cumstances they were facing. During the following years, Friedland’s role was 
about to change. While most of the provisional camps were closed within a few 
years after the end of the war when more and more people were able to move into 
new homes and the number of German refugees and expellees coming from East-
ern Europe had begun to dwindle down, a smaller number of camps remained. 
The Friedland camp was one of them. It took over an increasing number of tasks 
and became widely known throughout West German society.10 In this respect, 
questions of identity gained significance since the late 1940s. The two most im-
portant groups passing through Friedland after the Federal Republic had been 
established were returning prisoners of war (POWs) from Soviet captivity and 
resettlers of German origin from Eastern Europe. 
“Tor zur Freiheit”: Friedland at the Centre of Public Attention in the 1950s 
In public perception, the Friedland camp was strongly intertwined with the fate of 
the POWs. Although returning POWs were a rather small group looked after at 
                                                                                                                                  
des Dorfes? Ländliche Bevölkerung zwischen Flüchtlingszustrom und landwirtschaftlichem Struk-
turwandel,” in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, ed. 
Martin Broszat et al. (München: Oldenbourg, 1988), 367-425. 
10 The camp administration itself was also eager to gain public attention for Friedland and even tried 
to influence newspapers. Various exchanges of letters in this matter can be found here: HStA Han-
nover Nds 386 Acc 16/83 No. 85/86. 
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the camp at that time, their arrival did nevertheless attract the highest attention any 
group in Friedland received before or afterwards. In the 1950s, the return of 
POWs stimulated important questions of identity, memory and belonging.11 
From August 1946 until the end of 1949, more than 300,000 POWs had passed 
through Friedland, which was by then the only location in the Federal Republic to 
discharge former Wehrmacht soldiers. While Western Allies had released almost all 
their prisoners by then, the Soviet Union still held back an unknown number of 
prisoners. The question of how to bring back home the prisoners still held in Sovi-
et captivity grew more and more important in the early Federal Republic. Many 
families in Germany still hoped that their missing husbands, sons or fathers had 
not been killed in action during the war but were being held in Soviet camps with-
out being able to write home.12 Their hopes and worries were directly connected to 
the Friedland camp, which by then, in the early 1950s, had become the key symbol 
for the fate of former soldiers. At that time, the camp was widely known in post-
war society and, against the background of widespread anti-communist attitudes,13 
often portrayed as the mythically charged Tor zur Freiheit (freedom gate). Newspa-
pers, radio stations and newsreels constantly reported on events in Friedland and 
were present whenever a major transport of home-comers arrived at the camp. 
When eventually the last returnees arrived in late 1955 and early 1956, the 
Friedland camp was the stage for iconic events in the Federal Republic’s history. 
Thousands of people, politicians, state officials and the media went to Friedland to 
welcome the home-comers with open arms as honourable heroes who had suf-
fered and overcome Soviet injustice. Theodor Oberländer, the Federal Minister for 
Expellees, told returnees in Friedland in his speech: “You had to endure German 
calamity till the end. You have suffered for us, for all of us. You have sacrificed 
your youth, your health, your freedom for us.”14 The return of the last prisoners of 
war did not evoke remembrance of a war of extermination in Eastern Europe ten 
years earlier, but led to an affirmation of German victimhood. Accordingly, a vet-
erans association, the Verband der Heimkehrer,15 erected a statue in Friedland in 1955 
which was directly connected with these views. The statue portrayed a solemn man 
                                                     
11 Even today, Friedland is best known for the arrival of the last returnees from Soviet war captivity. 
12 The fate of the POWs in Soviet captivity and their impact on postwar society are at length dis-
cussed in: Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also: Albrecht Lehmann, Gefangenschaft und 
Heimkehr: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion (München: Beck, 1986); Arthur L. Smith, Heimkehr 
aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Entlassung der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1985); Peter Steinbach, “Jenseits von Zeit und Raum: Kriegsgefangenschaft in der Frühge-
schichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Universitas 45 (1990): 637-49. 
13 Gesine Schwan, Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 
1945 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). 
14 NWDR recording “Friedland – Reden von und vor Heimkehrern,” undated (autumn 1955), in: 
NDR-Hörfunkarchiv Hannover 6900468000. 
15 Birgit Schwelling, Heimkehr – Erinnerung – Integration: Der Verband der Heimkehrer, die ehemaligen Kriegs-
gefangenen und die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 
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overcoming war captivity as symbolised by barbed wire. Here barbed wire was not 
linked to concentration camps or the Holocaust but to Soviet prisoner-of-war 
camps. Likewise, the commemoration of German victims was far more prominent 
in public memory than the remembrance of victims of German crimes.16 
In this regard, returning POWs were mainly perceived as a homogenous group. 
Even though one-third of the homecomers were not POWs at all but political 
prisoners arrested after the war’s end in the Soviet occupation zone and now dis-
charged as well, the former soldiers almost exclusively became the focus of atten-
tion. Only a few returnees, such as obvious National Socialists or war criminals, 
were excluded from these dominant discourses of German victimhood. While 
politicians, media and the public did focus on POWs as a group, the stories of 
individual returnees took a back seat. Their individual fates were not important for 
the story; the group’s fate in turn was a mere cipher representing the self-
victimisation of post-war society. Therefore, returnees’ individual wishes, hopes, 
expectations or worries not fitting into these interpretations were rarely discussed 
in press reports and seldom mentioned in speeches of politicians or dignitaries. 
When these aspects were acknowledged, they did usually correspond to post-war 
society’s expectations regarding the POWs. Returning POWs had, however, to deal 
with questions of identity which did not meet post-war society’s expectations. 
As a few examples indicate, returnees did face various problems in Friedland to 
which they responded in different ways. The former Wehrmacht general Walther 
von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was considered a turncoat and shunned by his comrades in 
Friedland for his call for surrender in Stalingrad and his participation in the Ger-
man anti-Nazi organisations National Committee for a Free Germany (Na-
tionalkomitee Freies Deutschland) and League of German Officers (Bund deutscher Offi-
ziere) during Soviet war captivity.17 Furthermore, post-war society received Seydlitz 
reluctantly. In Friedland, Seydlitz at first tried to gain public attention and an-
nounced his interest in political activities, but he finally fell silent after his return 
home.18 In contrast to Seydlitz, Ernst Günther Schenck, a former Wehrmacht physi-
cian and SS-Obersturmbannführer, who had conducted experiments on humans in the 
Mauthausen concentration camp, led the so-called ‘Vow of Friedland’ (Schwur von 
Friedland) upon his arrival, whereby hundreds of returnees publicly pledged they 
did not murder, disgrace or plunder during the war.19 In comparison with men like 
                                                     
16 The complex history of the public commemoration in the Federal Republic had to be simplified 
here. For detailed but competing studies concerning the public commemoration in the Federal Re-
public during the 1950s, see Moeller, War Stories; Gregor, Haunted City. 
17 “Seydlitz will sich politisch betätigen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 October 1955: 3. 
18 Regarding Seydlitz’ role in the Wehrmacht and in war captivity as well as his homecoming, see the 
biography by Julia Warth, Verräter oder Widerstandskämpfer? Wehrmachtsgeneral Walther von Seydlitz-
Kurzbach (München: Oldenbourg, 2006). 
19 Ernst Günther Schenck gave his own impressions in his memoirs; see Ernst Günther Schenck, Nie 
mehr nach Hause? Als Wissenschaftler, Sträfling und Arzt 10 Jahre in Gefangenen-, Arbeits- und Besserungslagern 
(Koblenz: Bublies, 1997), 465.  
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Schenck, other home-comers only wanted to see their families again or, to the 
camp physician’s unease, just to get a drink or maybe visit a prostitute.20 However, 
returnees’ voices remain somewhat silent in this regard.  
By all means, home-comers did have to face the expectations of family, friends 
and post-war society. They did also have to come to terms with what they had seen 
or done during the war or while in captivity. Furthermore, home-comers had to 
regain their role in their families, in their social environment and in post-war socie-
ty.21 In addition, home-comers had not only to be discharged but also at least for-
mally to be accepted as German citizens. A returnee mentioned this aspect in a 
radio interview in the autumn of 1955: “You have to be stamped as a German 
human again and therefore you have to receive tons of documents, which allow 
you to return to this human existence in the first place.”22 
After passing through the camp, many returnees expressed their sentiment re-
garding their experience in Friedland. A returnee wrote a poem shortly after his 
stay at the camp, in the autumn of 1953: “Friedland – the home I found / Fried-
land – the life I found / Friedland – the love I found / Friedland – thanks to 
you.”23 Although returnees perceived their stay in Friedland absolutely positive, 
this did first and foremost reflect the contrast to former captivity in the Soviet 
Union. In addition, their reception in the Federal Republic exceeded any expecta-
tions they might have had prior to their return, therefore shining all the brighter. 
The actual challenges for returnees did, however, begin after they had left the 
Friedland camp. 
Subsiding Importance: The Admission of Resettlers to the Federal Republic 
From the late 1950s on, the nature of public commemoration slowly changed, 
when trials against war criminals drew attention to German crimes during the war 
and a new generation inherited offices, for example as public servants or in the 
justice system. In the course of time, discourses regarding German victimhood 
gradually made way for more complex and balanced perceptions of Germany’s 
past.24 Consequently, public attention to the Friedland camp subsided over the 
                                                     
20 There are complaints about the last two aspects by the camp’s physician in his reports on 10 Au-
gust, 7 and 11 December 1953, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 No. 3 and No. 16. These 
aspects are briefly mentioned in Kleineke, Das Lager Friedland, 123-9. 
21 For a detailed discussion of returned POWs and their memories, see Svenja Goltermann, Die 
Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Erfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (München: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2009). 
22 NWDR recording “Heimkehrer in Friedland,” 7 October 1955, in: NDR-Hörfunkarchiv Hannover 
6900454000. 
23 Poem by Karl E. sent to the camp’s director on 17 October 1953, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 380 
Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 527. 
24 For further references, see again Moeller, War Stories; Gregor, Haunted City; as well as Fulbrook, 
German National Identity. 
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next decades, as the camp was now no longer mainly perceived as a symbol for 
German victimhood. This also caused changes for the groups the Friedland camp 
was responsible for, most notably for resettlers of German origin.25  
Most studies concerning resettlers come from sociology, political science or re-
lated research areas and mostly focus on the Federal German policy of immigra-
tion and integration but usually omit historical aspects. Furthermore, most articles 
concentrate on the 1990s, whereas the admission of resettlers during the 1960s or 
1970s is casually touched upon at the most.26 While Münz/Ohliger and Dietz in-
clude a historical perspective, they mainly emphasise socio-structural aspects, for 
example differences between resettlers and the West German population.27 In 
contrast, resettlers’ experiences at the transit camps or the interdependency be-
tween resettlers and the Federal Republic’s officials are rarely discussed. 
In the Federal Republic, ‘resettler’ (Aussiedler) had not been a category until the 
war’s end with its consequences for German minorities in Eastern Europe.28 Fol-
lowing Germany’s principle of ius sanguinis, the Federal Republic’s Constitution 
(Grundgesetz) from 1949 did not only mention German citizens in its definition of 
‘Germans’ but did also include people of German descent (deutsche Volkszugehörige). 
The Federal Law of Expellees (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) from 1953 provided further 
definitions for the latter.29 
In this regard, two aspects were crucial: Resettlers were, in part as former citi-
zens of the German Reich, living in former German territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line or they had been members of German minorities in Eastern European 
states. Moreover, resettlers were those who had not been expelled, had not fled or 
had not been able to flee at the end of the war or in the months thereafter, but 
now wanted to emigrate to the Federal Republic. Even though their departure 
from their former homes was part of a more regulated population transfer, it was 
also a consequence of World War II. As their standing in Eastern European coun-
tries had drastically suffered due to Germany’s crimes during the war and the oc-
cupation, German minorities found themselves marginalised and put under pres-
sure thereafter, which increased their wish to emigrate to West Germany. In the 
Federal Republic, the legal regulations granted resettlers immediate admission to 
German citizenship. From 1950 onwards, resettlers passed through a number of 
                                                     
25 This also applied to refugees and emigrants leaving the GDR, who to some extent also passed 
through Friedland, even though the transit camps in Uelzen-Bohldamm and Gießen were formally 
responsible for this group.  
26 For example: Ruud Koopmans, “Germany and Its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25.4 (1999): 627-47; Marianne Takle, “(Spät)Aussiedler: From 
Germans to Immigrants,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 17.2 (2011): 161-82. 
27 Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, “Privilegierte Migration: Deutsche aus Ostmittel- und Osteuro-
pa,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 401-44; Barbara Dietz, “Zuwanderung und 
Integration: Aussiedler in Deutschland,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 445-72. 
28 Takle, “(Spät)Aussiedler”: 164. 
29 Koopmans, “Germany and Its Immigrants”: 630-1. 
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transit camps in the Federal Republic and were since then by far the largest group 
looked after in Friedland. 
While resettlers were perceived as a homogenous group, they were primarily 
linked by the requirements and circumstances which brought them to the Federal 
Republic. Apart from that, resettlers distinguished themselves regarding the state 
or region they had left, their former social status, their religion, morale codes and 
traditions, the possibility to bring along parts of their belongings, their previous 
links to western Germany and their view on their future home, the presence of 
relatives in the Federal Republic and their knowledge of the German language. The 
challenges resettlers were facing did also depend on the time they left their former 
homes and arrived in the Federal Republic. It made a huge difference if resettlers 
came to the Friedland camp and West Germany in the 1950s or 1960s or in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Because the opportunity or permission for resettlers to leave 
did correlate with the relations between West and East as well as the local political 
situation in the Soviet Union or in other Eastern European states, the number of 
resettlers arriving at Friedland and other camps fluctuated over the decades.30 Until 
1987, about 1.4 million resettlers were admitted to the Federal Republic, albeit not 
all of them passed through Friedland.31 Due to glasnost, perestroika and finally the fall 
of the Iron Curtain, resettlers could more easily emigrate to (West) Germany in the 
late 1980s. Between 1988 and 1999, about 2.5 million resettlers came to the Federal 
Republic.32 As a consequence of restrictions in Eastern European states on speak-
ing German, many of these late resettlers (called ‘Spätaussiedler’ in German) faced 
linguistic problems in their new environment, whereas many of the former reset-
tlers spoke German fluently. 
Even though resettlers gained German citizenship, questions of identity were 
nevertheless an issue. The later resettlers arrived, the more fragile their status was. 
As a result of the aforementioned changes in West Germany’s public commemora-
tion since the late 1950s, resettlers were decreasingly perceived as Germans and 
with that no longer admitted to the Federal Republic as German victims symbolis-
ing post-war society’s perceived victimhood. Instead, public attention for resettlers 
dwindled down. In the public perception, resettlers slowly turned into foreigners 
and were, especially in later decades, called ‘Poles’ or ‘Rußlanddeutsche’ (Russian 
Germans). The Lutheran minister at the Friedland camp, Lippert, complained as 
early as 1958 that even clerics and teachers did not possess enough knowledge as 
to why resettlers were coming to the Federal Republic.33 Consequently, questions 
of identity grew more and more important. They were directly addressed in Fried-
land, as the camp was the most important place where resettlers were admitted as 
                                                     
30 See also Münz and Ohliger, “Privilegierte Migration”: 406-8. 
31 For the figure, see Koopmans, “Germany and Its Immigrants”: 627.  
32 For the figure, see ibid. 
33 Johannes Lippert, Friedland diary sheets, 6 October 1958, in BA Koblenz B 150/3304. 
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German citizens. 
West German society admitted resettlers and granted them German citizenship 
with full civic rights but had to lay down rules concerning the conditions and pro-
cedures of admission. During the 1950s and 1960s, transit camps like Friedland 
were assigned a crucial but also ambivalent role in dealing with these questions. On 
the one hand, resettlers arriving at Friedland were admitted, provided with food, 
clothing, money and so forth, prepared for the life in the Federal Republic and 
finally admitted as German citizens. On the other hand, transit camps like Fried-
land were an instrument to control and check resettlers and other groups upon 
their arrival and during their stay. This became apparent in the process of registra-
tion and admission in Friedland, which had evolved into a more and more com-
plex and bureaucratic procedure since the late 1940s, taking two or more days to 
complete. This process did not only include inevitable formal procedures but did 
also highlight the uneasy relationship the Federal Republic had regarding the reset-
tlers. Even though resettlers were accepted as German citizens and rejection at this 
point was rare, the extensive registration process illustrated they did not yet, while 
they were at the camp, belong to West German society. Resettlers had in a sense to 
prove themselves. 
An internal memorandum the Friedland camp administration issued for their 
staff in 1960 gave a guidance regarding the counsel and care a newcomer should 
receive. It referred to refugees from the GDR but could, albeit this is not men-
tioned in the memorandum, be easily applied to resettlers as well. The memoran-
dum’s principle purpose was to urge camp advisors to refrain from promoting 
political statements, but it did also show the ambivalent character these counsels 
had. On the one hand, a refugee should feel that “he is, with his experience under 
communist rule, a valuable factor for the political life in the Federal Republic,” on 
the other hand, a “civic instruction” for these refugees was considered necessary.34 
The distance between the Federal Republic’s society and resettlers was also 
clearly evident when it came to medical examinations. These examinations were 
not merely restricted to a routine check-up, but during the 1950s did also include a 
screening for venereal diseases. According to federal law, such screenings could 
only be conducted if a person was already suffering from a venereal disease or was 
strongly suspected to be infected. Neither was the case for resettlers or likewise 
screened refugees from the GDR, whose infection rates were not higher than the 
rate in the West German population. These screenings did obviously reflect older 
patterns of thought, emphasising dangers for the racial body (Volkskörper). In this 
regard, those who wanted to be admitted had first to show they did not pose any 
sanitary threat to West German society. These proceedings did only change when 
camp physicians from Sandbostel and Uelzen-Bohldamm themselves, indicating 
                                                     
34 Camp administration’s memorandum, March 23th, 1960, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 
No. 1. 
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the infection rates, denounced these screenings as illegal in the late 1950s.35 During 
the 1960s, medical examinations apart from venereal screenings continued. A med-
ical report was required before federal and state officials allocated the resettlers 
among the federal states. 
As the latter procedure indicates, resettlers were not entirely free to decide in 
which town or federal state they were going to live after their stay at the camp. 
Only resettlers whose relatives already lived in the Federal Republic could express 
their wish to reside near them. The rest had, at least for a start, to go where they 
were sent, if they did not want to forfeit state financial aid. Federal state officials in 
turn did choose resettlers they wanted to admit according to their particular eco-
nomic needs. If a resettler failed to match the economic profile – which could 
happen to a single mother with two or three children, for example, – federal state 
officials bargained until one of them eventually agreed to admit him or her to their 
federal state.36 
Resettlers therefore found themselves in an intermediary state separating their 
former and their forthcoming lives. They had already left their homes, family, 
friends, work and so forth behind, but had not yet arrived in their new lives. The 
process resettlers had to run through was somewhat similar to rites de passage. In 
cultural anthropology, rites de passage are defined as a person’s transfer from one 
social status to another connected to ritual ceremonies. Usually three stages are 
distinguished: separation, transition and reincorporation.37 However, there is an 
important difference between the process experienced by resettlers and the con-
cept of rites de passage. Here a person is separated from society but then, after the 
ritual transition, reincorporated into his or her society. In contrast, people passing 
through Friedland left their former society and social status behind, obtaining an-
other status during their stay at the camp. They did not, afterwards, return to their 
former society but entered one which was as new and unfamiliar as the social sta-
tus they now obtained.  
This does, of course, not imply that emigration to the Federal Republic and 
admission at Friedland was necessarily a negative experience for resettlers. Admit-
tedly, some resettlers, especially since the 1990s, have not coped with the difficul-
ties related to adopting their new role and, leaving Germany, returned to their for-
mer homes. Even in the late 1950s, individual resettlers moved back to their for-
mer homes in Eastern Europe.38 These cases indicate the difficulties experienced 
by some resettlers. For other resettlers, however, their experience was completely 
                                                     
35 Several letters and reports on this topic can be found in: HStA Hannover Nds. 120 Hild. Acc. 
111/77 8/2. 
36 For this aspect, see HStA Hannover Nds. 120 Hild. Acc. 111/77, Nr. 32. 
37 For a cultural anthropological introduction, see Arnold van Gennep, Übergangsriten (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus, 1986). 
38 One example for an early return can be found here: Internal memorandum issued by the camp 
administration, 28 August 1958, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 No. 1. 
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different. For them, Friedland was the beginning of a new life and their stay at the 
camp directly connected to their German identity. A resettler who arrived in 1956 
wrote a Christmas card to the camp administration stating that Friedland will never 
leave her mind. She remembered the first German preaching at the camp and 
praised the camp’s excellent organisation: “Especially before Christmas, I gratefully 
think of Friedland – it was – with one word – German.”39 Apart from such rather 
individual voices, it is not easy to determine resettlers’ perceptions, as there are no 
historical studies focussing on the aspect of transition or the questions of ‘integra-
tion’ and admission from resettlers’ point of view. 
In the early 1990s, the increasing number of resettlers as well as financial and 
social problems regarding their integration led to an amendment of the Bundesver-
triebenengesetz. As a result, the possibility to be accepted as resettler to the Federal 
Republic was restricted. Consequently, the numbers of resettlers drastically 
dropped during the following years.40 Although their number is still decreasing, 
even today German resettlers from Eastern Europe are coming to Friedland. They 
all have to pass the camp to be accepted as German citizens. Some of the resettlers 
stay in Friedland for up to half a year and partake in so-called ‘integration courses,’ 
in which they can, amongst other things, learn German, if necessary. 
Conclusion 
Although their feelings, impressions, hopes and wishes remain somewhat specula-
tive due to a lack of sources or various difficulties linked with them, people passing 
through Friedland did perceive their stay at the camp in manifold ways. For some 
of them, the camp was no more than a stopover on their way to, in most cases, 
West Germany; for other newcomers Friedland was the place where they felt ‘free’ 
for the first time in awhile after leaving communist domain. Still others perceived 
the camp as a positive place because of the care and support they received there. 
Thus on a personal level questions of identity or belonging were not always evi-
dent.  
Nevertheless, since the late 1940s the Friedland camp was a threshold to a 
physical, temporal and mental transition dealing with questions of identity, belong-
ing, memory and coming to terms with Germany’s past for the Federal Republic’s 
                                                     
39 Christmas card to the camp administration sent by L.S., 22 December 1956, in: HStA Hannover 
Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 1. 
40 The political process as well as the legislative changes are discussed in Takle, “(Spät)Aussiedler”; 
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, “Willkommene Deutsche oder tolerierte Fremde? Aussiedlerpo-
litik und -verwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit den 1950er Jahren,” in Migration steuern 
und verwalten: Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Jochen Oltmer (Göttingen: V 
und R Unipress, 2003), 399-419. For the political background as well as the associated restrictions 
regarding the right of asylum and the modifications of federal immigration legislation, see Ulrich 
Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge 
(München: Beck, 2001), 286-334. 
Identity, Memory, and Belonging 
 
283 
society as well for those admitted as German citizens. These questions were some-
times directly addressed, for example when returning POWs were cordially wel-
comed and thereby incorporated into dominant discourses of self-victimisation in 
the Federal Republic, but at times only hinted at, for instance in the camp’s proce-
dures of registration and admission. In any case, these aspects do reveal how im-
portant the perceptions of the war and its aftermath were for the processes of 
admission in Friedland. With regard to the various actors involved, the often com-
peting perceptions did shape to a high degree how people were admitted to the 
Federal Republic, in which historical or political context they were put, and to what 
extent newcomers had the chance to actively participate in dealing with the afore-
mentioned questions of identity and memory. 
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ries derives its name from the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Euroculture: 
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the European democratic development; mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and 
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ments: it includes topics such as cosmopolitanism, cultural memory and trau-
matic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Europeanization as well as 
the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary contexts such as law 
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